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**IN THE COMPETITION
APPEAL TRIBUNAL**

Case No. 1226/2/12/14

Victoria House,
Bloomsbury Place,
London WC1A 2EB

28th July 2014

Before:

PETER FREEMAN CBE QC (Hon)
(Chairman)
BRIAN LANDERS
STEPHEN WILKS

Sitting as a Tribunal in England and Wales

BETWEEN:

SKYSCANNER LIMITED

Appellant

- and -

COMPETITION AND MARKETS AUTHORITY

Respondent

- and -

**BOOKING.COM BV
SKOOSH INTERNATIONAL LTD
INTERCONTINENTAL HOTELS GROUP PLC
EXPEDIA, INC.**

Interveners

—————
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HEARING
DAY ONE

APPEARANCES

Miss Kassie Smith QC (instructed by Maclay Murray & Spens LLP, Edinburgh) appeared on behalf of the Appellant.

Miss Kelyn Bacon QC and Mr David Bailey (instructed by the Office of General Counsel) appeared on behalf of the Respondent.

Mr Alistair Lindsay (instructed by Slaughter and May) appeared on behalf of the Intervener Booking.com B.V.

Mr Duncan Sinclair and Samar Abbas (instructed by Shoosmiths) appeared on behalf of the Intervener Skoosh.

Mr Tim Ward QC and Miss Jessica Boyd (instructed by Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP) appeared on behalf of the Intervener IHG.

Mr Josh Holmes (instructed by King & Wood Mallesons LLP) appeared on behalf of the Intervener Expedia.

1 THE CHAIRMAN: Good morning. Just before you start, we have reasons for a ruling from
2 Wednesday to hand down, so can that be done. I am sure you will read it and consider it in
3 the fullness of time, I do not want it to interrupt the proceedings now, but we just want to
4 get it off our desks and on to yours.

5 MISS SMITH: Thank you, sir.

6 THE CHAIRMAN: The second thing, we have a statement to make if I may make it. All three of
7 us have, as a matter of our ordinary activity, accessed, used, and on occasions made
8 bookings through one or more of the online services provided by one or more of the
9 interveners, and indeed of the applicant. We do not regard this as in any way impairing our
10 objectivity in the present dispute, or giving rise to any perception of impairment, but if any
11 party objects to our continuing to hear this case we should like to know it now, and we shall
12 take silence as consent. If that is out of the way, on you go.

13 MISS SMITH: Sir, thank you. I appear for Skyscanner, the appellant in this case, in this
14 challenge to the Competition and Market Authority's Decision of 31st January 2014 to
15 accept the various commitments from Booking.com, Expedia and Inter-Continental Hotels
16 Group. Miss Kelyn Bacon QC and David Bailey appear at the other end of the table for the
17 CMA, Duncan Sinclair appears for Skoosh supporting my application, and Tim Ward QC,
18 Alistair Lindsay, Josh Holmes and Jessica Boyd appear for the interveners, Booking.com,
19 Expedia and IHG, supporting the CMA.

20 Sir, you should have a number of bundles in front of you, three main authorities bundles,
21 which are lever files, two lever arch files which are called core 1 and core 2, but, in fact,
22 they are the full bundles of all the documents in the case. I think in front of you there is a
23 small bundle of additional authorities that has been prepared by the CMA for today
24 containing three additional authorities.

25 THE CHAIRMAN: What do you want us to do with these?

26 MISS SMITH: Those I have in a separate bundle, but if you want to put those ----

27 THE CHAIRMAN: I do not want to spend the next half an hour clicking open files, but equally I
28 do not want to lose the authorities.

29 MISS BACON: Sir, there should be a small black file with three additional authorities, and in
30 addition to those on your desk you should have three things. The first is a full judgment in
31 the *Bolton* case. We noticed that only the headnote had been included in tab 21, so *Bolton*
32 should go in tab 21. The second is the court judgment in the *Pierre Fabre* case, because the
33 current bundles only contain the Advocate-General, and we thought it would be useful for
34 you to have, if you wanted to refer to it, the court as well. That should go behind what is

1 currently in tab 51. The third thing is the actual commitments given in *E-Books*, and those
2 can go behind the *E-Books* decision in tab 55.

3 THE CHAIRMAN: Can you give us some idea of how you are going to plan out the next two
4 days, please?

5 MISS SMITH: Sir, we have had discussions between counsel on that, and we anticipate that this
6 side of the court, that is me and Mr Sinclair, will be finished by, at the latest 3.30, so that
7 the CMA can get started on their submissions this afternoon for perhaps another 45 minutes
8 or so.

9 THE CHAIRMAN: We want to finish at 4.15 today. We are quite happy to go on tomorrow.

10 MISS SMITH: The CMA and the interveners on the other side of the room have agreed that they
11 will be finished by 3.30 tomorrow, which gives them essentially the same time as we will
12 have, and then there will be time for replies for the last 45 minutes or so. We hope that this
13 will work.

14 THE CHAIRMAN: If nothing goes wrong, that seems fine.

15 MISS SMITH: We are ever hopeful, sir. The structure of my submissions, just to outline where
16 we are going today, I propose, first, to make some brief introductory remarks about the
17 nature and importance of the metasearch model in the online hotel booking market.
18 Secondly, I want to address in a little more detail the decision making process engaged in
19 by the CMA leading to the acceptance of the commitments on 31st January of this year.
20 Then finally, I will address against that background, although I will have covered a lot of
21 the substance of the submissions I want to make in that second tranche of my submissions,
22 to address the Grounds of challenge. I am going to do that backwards, starting with Ground
23 3, then Ground 2 and finally Ground 1.

24 THE CHAIRMAN: A sort of countdown. Half way through the morning there will be a
25 convenient pause.

26 MISS SMITH: For the transcribers, yes, I will keep an eye on the time.

27 THE CHAIRMAN: The transcribers and for us, I think!

28 MISS SMITH: And for us! So, sir, the brief introduction, the metasearch model: as you say,
29 you and your colleagues have used this model, and so you are familiar with it.

30 THE CHAIRMAN: We did not say that.

31 MISS SMITH: The model is simply, if one looks at Skyscanner, for example, there are a number
32 of operators, price comparison sites or metasearch sites out there in the market. What one
33 does is click on to the site and search in the hotels for a hotel - they also do flights. For a
34 hotel you would put in the place where you want your hotel and the dates and the search
35 engine will search across all online travel agents, and will provide details of all the offers of

1 hotel rooms for that date in that particular town, comparison between the prices and hotels
2 offered by all the online travel agents.

3 Could I ask you, first, just to give a bit of the background of what the market was like at the
4 time or shortly before the OFT made its decision, to look at core bundle 1, tab 2, the
5 witness statement sworn by Miss Jameson for Skyscanner in support of our application, and
6 the first exhibit to that statement at CJ1 is a report entitled “European Consumer Travel
7 Report Fourth Edition”, by a body called PhoCusWright. That report was published, you
8 will see on the second page, p.32 of the bundle, in September 2013, so at about the time
9 between the OFT’s first consultation on the commitments and its second consultation on the
10 commitments. This sets out a survey of the European travel market. Could I ask you to
11 turn to p.40 of the bundle, this comes under the heading, p.38, Research Highlights. The
12 first bullet point on p.40, “Meta muscles in”:

13 “Travel metasearch engines command a lot of attention in the online shopping
14 process, possibly at the expense of online travel agencies (OTAs), which lost a
15 bit of consumer reach during 2013. Well over a third of online travel shoppers
16 in all markets already use metasearch sites to compare flights, hotels and other
17 travel products.”

18 I would emphasise there that over a third of online shoppers use metasearch sites, so it is
19 obviously an important element of the market for online hotel booking. We will look at the
20 specific figures for hotel booking in a moment.

21 The second bullet point under the heading “Fewer shopping on supplier.com”, just towards
22 the end of that paragraph:

23 “Price-sensitive travelers looking for the best deals on flights and hotels often
24 appreciate the breadth of content available on OTAs and travel search engines,
25 compared to the relatively limited content found on hotel and airline websites.”

26 Of course, the whole point about metasearch particularly is that they provide a comparison
27 of all the offers available across the whole market.

28 If you could then turn to p.67 of the bundle, the third paragraph on that page:

29 “While brand name OTAs like Booking.com, Hotels.com, and Odigeo have been at the
30 heart of Europe’s dynamic online travel market, online travel agencies have lost a bit
31 of consumer reach over the past year. The drop was consistent across markets but
32 strongest in Germany, where the number of online travel shoppers who visited an
33 OTA fell [and you see the figures]. Much like in the US, European OTAs are
34 encountering stiff competition from the rising stars in metasearch”,

1 and then there is reference to Easyvoyage and Trivago. And the point here made in the
2 summary:

3 “Well over a third of travelers in all markets already use metasearch sites to compare
4 flights, hotels and other travel products and a strong growth in metasearch use is
5 expected to continue”.

6 And then the example is given of Kayak.com and then at the end of that paragraph:

7 “European travel shoppers gladly welcome any website that can serve up more of this
8 content in one place”.

9 And that is the point, it is in one place. Then, towards the end of the next paragraph:

10 “Price-sensitive travelers looking for the best deals on flights and hotels tend to
11 appreciate the breadth of content available on OTAs and travel search engines,
12 compared to the relatively limited content found on hotel and airline websites”.

13 And then finally on p.75, figure 43 gives the specific figures for typical purchase methods
14 for lodging. So, that is for hotels, and there it is broken down for France, Germany and the
15 UK. And if you look at the third set of results “Using a travel search engine”, this is along
16 the bottom line of the graph, using a travel search engine you see the figures for France,
17 Germany and UK for 2011, 2012 and 2013. And in the UK about 20 per cent of consumers
18 use a travel search engine specifically for hotel bookings.

19 So, we say that the benefits of metasearch sites or price comparison sites are obvious. They
20 enable consumers to compare prices in one place which increases price transparency and
21 reduces search costs, and there are self-evident benefits to competition arising from this
22 model.

23 So that is just the brief – to set the scene, as it were – for the decision making process then
24 carried out by the OFT.

25 THE CHAIRMAN: Miss Smith, would it be reasonable for us to use the term “price comparison
26 website” and “metasearch” interchangeably?

27 MISS SMITH: Yes, sir. My understanding is they are essentially the same.

28 THE CHAIRMAN: Right.

29 MISS SMITH: So, sir, the Decision that is at issue here is of course the Decision by the OFT to
30 accept commitments, which is a Decision they made under s.31A of the Competition Act.
31 I will take you to the specific section in due course but, just by way of introduction, that
32 applies in a case, as we know, where the OFT has begun an investigation under s.25 of the
33 Act but has not yet made a decision. The OFT will have identified competition concerns
34 and it is allowed under s.31A to accept commitments which address those concerns. The
35 wording of the section is “address those concerns”, but the OFT accepts that what that

1 means is the commitments have to fully address those concerns. The OFT accepts that that
2 is the test that has to be fulfilled in para.13 of their defence. They say there:

3 “The CMA does not contend that it is entitled to accept commitments that only
4 partially address its competition concerns”.

5 So there is agreement between the parties on that point.

6 Now, the process of accepting commitments under s.31A and the European law equivalent
7 contained in Article 9 of Regulation 1, 2003, is said to be justified by considerations of
8 procedural economy, and what does that mean? The CMA recognises, and this is para.53 of
9 its skeleton:

10 “... that this does not entitle the OFT to adopt a Decision accepting commitments that
11 are restrictions of competition”.

12 Well, one would obviously hope not, but also the CMA says that:

13 “... it is permissible for it [for the OFT] to accept commitments that address its
14 competition concerns without it having to carry out a detailed analysis of every other
15 competition issue that might potentially arise from the conduct under investigation”.

16 Quite apart from whether that is the same as “fully addressing” the competition concerns,
17 we say that submission is not really to the point. Our case is – our issue is – with the fact
18 that we say the commitments that were accepted by the OFT in the present case themselves
19 had a consequence of introducing a potential restriction on competition, which is quite a
20 different matter.

21 THE CHAIRMAN: So, you are saying that it is permissible to start an investigation covering a
22 number of issues and then focus on one and accept commitments in relation to that. That
23 will be all right. What you are saying is that the commitments themselves cannot raise
24 competition issues that ----

25 MISS SMITH: We are saying our case in this instance, we do not need to go that far,
26 Skyscanner’s case is that the commitments that were accepted by the OFT – and I will go
27 on to develop this point – but they first of all left in place what were known as “residual
28 restrictions” on price competition; but they also, and this is Skyscanner’s particular
29 objection, introduced a new restriction on the advertising of prices. And our objection,
30 Skoosh comes at this from a slightly different angle because they are a classic online travel
31 agent, although a small market participant, we are a metasearch site, our concern is with
32 transparency and the ability to advertise the actual prices available with discounts. But
33 there are, and I will take you through this, the OFT identified in its statement of objections
34 which, sir, you have now, ordered should be disclosed, a number of competition concerns.
35 They then accepted commitments which left in place residual restrictions on discounting.

1 You can only discount into a closed group. You can only offer discounts after a first full
2 price sale has been made, and you can only offer discounts to the extent of – an online
3 travel agent can only offer discounts to the extent of their commission, they cannot offer
4 any deeper discounting. So, those are what are described by the OFT as “residual
5 restrictions” in its Decision.

6 The commitments, however, also introduced what we say was an additional restriction on
7 advertising. So, I will come back to develop those points, but at the moment, looking at
8 what is the role of commitments in the competition landscape, obviously if a Regulator such
9 as the OFT or the Commission accepts commitments, that Regulator and the parties being
10 investigated do not have to go through the detailed decision making process and detailed
11 determination of remedies. The *quid pro quo* for that, we submit is that higher demands are
12 made as to the appropriateness of the commitments to address the competition concerns
13 identified. And in this regard I would ask you to look briefly at the Advocate General’s
14 opinion and then the judgment in the case of *Alrosa*, and that is in authorities bundle 2,
15 tab.44. This was the appeal from a Decision by the European Commission to accept
16 commitments by De Beers after an investigation under Article 82 in De Beers’ sale and
17 purchase of rough diamonds. I just want to take you to the Advocate General’s opinion on
18 p.144 of the Advocate General’s opinion of the bundle. Just for a little bit of background,
19 *Alrosa* was objecting to the commitments on the basis that the commitments that had been
20 accepted effectively stopped it, *Alrosa*, entering into agreements with De Beers, and *Alrosa*
21 said that there were less onerous commitments that could have been accepted by the
22 Commission which could have had the same impact on competition, or would have had the
23 same beneficial effect, and the Commission should have considered those less onerous
24 alternatives, therefore it’s decision to accept the particular commitments in this case was
25 disproportionate.

26 The AG made some useful, and we say interesting, comments on the role of commitments
27 in the competition landscape and at para 51 of her opinion she talks about Article 9 of
28 Regulation 1/2003, which is the European equivalent of s.31A. She says:

29 “Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003 is characterised by a concern for procedural
30 economy.”

31 She then explains that it cuts down effectively the extent of the investigation. She compares
32 that with a decision under Article 7, which is a full decision (an infringement decision)
33 leading to the imposition of remedies.

1 In para. 52 she says the distinctive features of Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003 affect the
2 examination of proportionality of decisions on commitments adopted under that provision
3 in two ways.

4 Then we would underline what she says in para. 53:

5 “First, higher demands are to be made in the context of Article 9 of Regulation
6 1/2003 as regards the *appropriateness* of the commitments which have been made
7 binding. If such commitments are not *manifestly appropriate* for eliminating the
8 competition problems identified by the Commission, the Commission is entitled to
9 reject them.”

10 Then she goes on to say this is the only way possible to meet the objective of Article 9 to
11 ensure a quick and efficient resolution of the competition problems while avoiding the
12 considerable investigation and assessment.

13 Then, over the page, in para. 57 she is addressing the question of proportionality.

14 “However, in this connection, the Commission is required to take into
15 consideration only alternatives which are *equally appropriate* as the commitments
16 offered to it with a view to resolving the competition problems identified. Both the
17 commitments actually offered and any alternatives to those commitments must
18 therefore be *manifestly* appropriate for resolving the competition problems.”

19 And I would ask you also, I am not going to read them out but for your note, sir, to look in
20 due course at paras. 60 and 61 of the AG’s opinion.

21 For completeness, I can take you to the Judgment in *Alrosa* which appears in a separate tab
22 of the authorities bundle, authorities bundle 3, tab 48. It is true the Judgment does not use
23 the words “manifestly appropriate” but, in our submission, its decision is consistent with the
24 approach of the Advocate General. If you look at para. 41 of the Judgment, which is at
25 p.1675 of the bundle. Paragraph 41:

26 “Application of the principle of proportionality by the Commission in the context
27 of Article 9 of Regulation No.1/2003 is confined to verifying that the commitments
28 in question address the concerns it expressed to the undertakings concerned and
29 that they have not offered less onerous commitments that also address those
30 concerns adequately.”

31 Then, over the page, para. 48:

32 “Undertakings which offer commitments on the basis of Article 9 of Regulation
33 1/2003 consciously accept that the concessions they make may go beyond what the
34 Commission could itself impose on them in a decision adopted under Article 7 of
35 the regulation after a thorough examination. On the other hand, the closure of the

1 infringement proceedings brought against those undertakings allows them to avoid
2 a finding of an infringement of competition law and a possible fine.”

3 So we say that is consistent with the AG’s approach, but the *quid pro quo* for avoiding a full
4 investigation is that, as the AG put it, the commitments must be manifestly appropriate for
5 addressing the competition concerns identified.

6 THE CHAIRMAN: But you are not making any argument on proportionality?

7 MISS SMITH: Not in this case, no. It is just that, in assessing that question of proportionality the
8 AG made what we say are useful comments about the approach that should be taken to the
9 acceptance of commitments.

10 THE CHAIRMAN: But you have already said that the CMA accepts that the commitments must
11 fully address the concerns.

12 MISS SMITH: Yes.

13 THE CHAIRMAN: Is there any difference between manifest appropriateness and full
14 addressing?

15 MISS SMITH: I think there is. First, and this again I will come back to, is the difference that
16 I’ve highlighted between sufficient and appropriate. You have to accept commitments that
17 fully address the competition concerns but that are also appropriate to address those
18 competition concerns. Now, we say, there may be a case and this case probably is not it,
19 because of the residual restrictions that are left in place, but there may be a case where
20 commitments fully address the competition concerns that I have identified, but are not
21 appropriate because they introduce further and different impacts on competition.

22 THE CHAIRMAN: But there is nothing of that in *Alrosa*?

23 MISS SMITH: That particular factual situation is not ----

24 THE CHAIRMAN: *Alrosa* is a case where the commitments arguably went too far, and the
25 Advocate General is discussing proportionality in that context.

26 MISS SMITH: Yes, but she is also making the point that the *quid pro quo* for the parties and the
27 regulator of being able to avoid an infringement decision and the process that leads to an
28 infringement decision is that commitments must be manifestly appropriate and the court
29 accepts that that means they may go further than what might be imposed as a result of an
30 infringement decision.

31 THE CHAIRMAN: I think that is what I am saying. When the Advocate General says that
32 proportionality is affected in the commitments context in two ways, the first is that the
33 commitments must be manifestly appropriate, is not what she is meaning there that
34 compared to the remedies part of a final decision, which may be more finely tuned, the
35 commitments might be a bit broad brush and a bit crude and go further than is justified?

1 MISS SMITH: Well, she certainly was not considering the factual situation that we are
2 considering here, and I do not think there are any cases that I have been able to find that
3 consider the factual consideration we are considering here, which is that ----

4 THE CHAIRMAN: I think you are right, I think we have not found any either.

5 MISS SMITH: Commitments that not only, we say – and we leave to one side that they leave in
6 place residual restrictions – but they go further in that they introduce a new and different
7 restriction and we are saying that what one gets from the language of the Act and the
8 approach that the courts have taken, of course they have not addressed the particular factual
9 circumstance that we have here, but the language of appropriateness brings with it not just a
10 concept of sufficiency, are they sufficient to address what they have identified as
11 competition concerns, but are they appropriate and, in considering whether commitments
12 are appropriate one has to consider the role that commitments play in the competition
13 regime as a whole. We say that commitments that introduce a new and different restriction
14 on competition plainly cannot be appropriate.

15 THE CHAIRMAN: Do you think there are any relevant differences between the EU
16 commitments regime and the UK commitments regime?

17 MISS SMITH: Off the top of my head I am not sure I can answer that one way or the other.
18 Generally, I have not identified, and I do not want to rely on any differences for the
19 purposes of this case.

20 THE CHAIRMAN: It would affect the weight we attached to Judgments and Advocates
21 General's opinions in cases like *Alrosa* if there were relevant differences.

22 MISS SMITH: Well, sir, I am certainly not arguing that there are such that you cannot attach
23 weight to that Judgment. I accept that that Judgment does not deal with the factual situation
24 that is on all fours with this case, but I accept that you can get some guidance from what the
25 AG says in that case which, in fact, is echoed by the language of s.31A which talks about
26 being appropriate to address the competition concerns, and I take it no further than that.
27 And, yes, of course, this also, in fact, is a response to the CMA's reliance on procedural
28 economy in their skeleton argument. In their defence they put procedural economy up front
29 as their defence, as saying that this gives them, as I understand it, a margin of appreciation
30 and a margin of discretion and we say: No, procedural economy, as considered by
31 European Courts brings with it this *quid pro quo*, that if you are going to do it quickly you
32 have got to make sure that what you put in place is manifestly appropriate.

33 THE CHAIRMAN: I am sure the CMA will enlighten us as to what they think we should make
34 of *Alrosa*. Do my colleagues have anything on this point? No. Please go on.

1 MISS SMITH: If I can then go to the process leading to the Decision, and I hope you and your
2 colleagues have a copy of the Statement of Objections that was disclosed finally to the
3 Tribunal and to Skyscanner last week. I have it in a separate file. It looks like you also
4 have it in a separate file, so let us deal with it on that basis. By way of introduction, this
5 Statement of Objections, which is dated 31st July 2012, of course, we fully accept, contains
6 only provisional findings by the OFT, but what it does do is it sets out the competition
7 concerns found by the OFT in response to which the interveners then offered the
8 commitments. So this sets out the OFT's position and it is this document and these findings
9 in response to which the interveners offered their commitments. I will take you to various
10 particular paragraphs in the SO that we say are relevant, but in summary the points that we
11 take from the Statement of Objections are threefold. First, it is clear that the OFT
12 provisionally held that the prohibitions on discounting between the parties were hardcore
13 restrictions under Article 4A of the Vertical Block Exemption Regulation. The OFT held
14 that they were hardcore restrictions on the basis that "they restricted the OTAs' ability to
15 determine the sale price of hotel rooms".

16 The arrangements between the parties putting in place those restrictions were therefore
17 presumed to fall within Article 101(1), presumed to infringe competition law and were held
18 to be unlikely to fulfil the conditions of Article 101(3), the exemption, the possibility for an
19 individual exemption. That is the first point we make.

20 The second point that we make is that the OFT provisionally found that there was "a
21 commercial link" between the agreements that restricted price discounts and Rate Parity
22 Agreements, also known as Most Favoured Nation clauses, which were agreements between
23 the parties that "I will not offer a price lower than that which you offer". Those were also
24 widespread in the market, the OFT found, and the OFT found that those Rate Parity
25 Agreements were monitored and enforced by the parties.

26 The third point I want to take from the Statement of Objections is that the OFT found that
27 there were real benefits arising from the price transparency and the low cost of searching
28 that was enabled by online sales of hotel rooms. Those were seen as a potential driver for
29 discounting: if there is price transparency and low search costs a consumer is able to look
30 at all options and that drives discounting of price in the market, but the OFT found that
31 those benefits were being explicitly countered by/ responded to, by the parties with the
32 combination of restrictions on discounting agreements and Price Parity Agreements.

33 Those were the competition concerns identified on a provisional basis by the OFT and the
34 SO.

1 Having now seen that SO and comparing it, looking at it, against the commitments that
2 were accepted by the OFT, which supposedly addressed the OFT's competition concerns,
3 we say a number of immediate questions arise. First, the OFT indicated in the SO that the
4 restrictions on discounting, as I have said, were a hardcore restriction, but the commitments
5 leave in place restrictions on the OTAs' ability to determine the sale price of hotel rooms -
6 what I have already said the OTA described as "residual restrictions". Those are the fact
7 that discounts can only be made to members of a closed group after an initial full price
8 purchase and for no more than the extent of the OTAs' commission.

9 I will come back to this point, but the OFT accepts explicitly in the Decision that it reached
10 no conclusion on the efficiencies relied on by the interveners. Those efficiencies are
11 summarised in annexe 2 to the Decision, yield management arguments, etc. The OFT
12 explicitly accepts in the Decision that those efficiencies provided no justification for the
13 residual restrictions, so you may ask yourself, "What did?" and we will look at the Decision
14 in that regard. That is the first question that arises.

15 The second question, and for the purposes of Skyscanner, perhaps even more importantly,
16 as I have said, the commitments introduced these additional restrictions on the advertising
17 of discounts. That is OTAs are prevented from publicising what is defined as "specific
18 information" about reductions on hotel rooms to consumers who are not closed group
19 members. So they cannot put the actual discounted prices on offer to closed group members
20 on their own websites or on price comparison or metasearch sites. So that is, in effect, a
21 prohibition on advertising the actual discounted price that might be available.

22 We say that restriction self-evidently reduces price transparency and increases search costs,
23 and therefore we say that it was at least incumbent on the OFT to justify this effect of the
24 commitments, or at least to properly consider it.

25 As I will, I hope, make good, the OFT did not do that. The OFT provided, we say,
26 absolutely no justification for the introduction of this restriction.

27 Sir, if I can look at the Statement of Objections itself, can I take you to internal page
28 numbering 6, and this is under the heading "Relevant price agreements constitute hardcore
29 restrictions", para.1.7:

30 "In the OFT's view, restrictions on the ability of OTAs to determine the sale
31 price for Room-Only hotel accommodation, for instance ..."

32 so that is just an example -

33 "... by restricting OTAs from sharing their commission with the customer, or
34 within the scope of Chapter I prohibition and constitute 'hardcore' restrictions."

1 Paragraph 1.8 rejects an argument that appears to have been made of Expedia and
2 Booking.com that they were agents. The reasoning on that is much fully redacted from the
3 SO, but this appears to be an argument that was made by Expedia and Booking.com and
4 was rejected by the OFT. They give reasons for that in para.1.9.

5 Paragraph 1.11 on p.7:

6 “Given that the Relevant Price Agreements constitute ‘hardcore’ restrictions,
7 they are presumed to fall within the Chapter I prohibition and Article 101(1),
8 and it also presumed that they are unlikely to fulfil the conditions of section 9 or
9 Article 101(3).”

10 However, the OFT then goes on for the purposes of the statement to say that it has not
11 considered the extent to which the exemption criteria might be met, and it is for the parties
12 to put forward any arguments on that. That is, of course, correct, the burden is on the
13 parties to justify an exemption under Article 101(3).

14 Could you then go to the background to these agreements, para.1.13 on p.8. At 1.12 the
15 OFT explains the complaint that they received, in fact we now know from Skoosh. At 1.13:

16 “The OFT understands that to the extent that these vertical agreements have
17 been adopted, sale prices for Room-Only hotel accommodation at any given
18 individual hotel do not vary across third party distribution channels. The
19 industry generally refers to such limited intra-brand price competition as ‘rate
20 parity’ or ‘price parity’.”

21 Then 1.14:

22 “The OFT understands that, historically, rate or price parity became
23 increasingly prevalent in response to the growing importance of the internet
24 generally and online distribution models more specifically. The internet
25 brought about price transparency across the market, enabling consumers to
26 identify the best deal, i.e. the lowest price ... at very low search costs.”

27 So this is finding that the benefits of the internet are countered by a combination of
28 restrictions on discounting and Price Parity Agreements.

29 Paragraph 1.15 is also important. This deals with the point that eventually was brought up
30 by the OFT about alternative ways of introducing discounting, for example, through
31 membership arrangements. The OFT there, at 1.15:

32 “As a result of vertical agreements between hotels and OTAs, there is limited
33 variation of sale prices for Room-Only hotel accommodation, largely depriving
34 customers of the ability to identify and obtain a better, discounted deal by shopping
35 around. Any discounting of hotel accommodation, for instance by allowing OTAs to

1 share their commission with the customer, can (and does) take place only through
2 much smaller, niche distribution channels – hidden/opaque, membership or package -
3 which do not allow for room only price comparison”.

4 So the OFT notes that:

5 “... in that sense, the distribution arrangements resulting in rate or price parity
6 undermine the benefits of transparency and enhanced search functions brought about
7 by the internet and the possibilities offered by e-commerce”.

8 So this is a point that we now see is actually consistent with the submission that Skyscanner
9 subsequently made, that before the commitments were introduced, the use of closed groups
10 or membership arrangements was very small scale and “niche” as described here. It was
11 definitely limited. That is supported by (if you could perhaps keep a finger in that page at
12 p.9 and flick forward to the submission) submissions that are made by Skoosh at para.2.59,
13 p.43, there is a quotation from a submission that Skoosh made, and the third paragraph of
14 that quotation at the page:

15 “There are some niche opportunities still available such as members’ sites and flash
16 sales ... However, these opportunities are relatively limited and are created by
17 necessity from an artificially restricted environment” etcetera.

18 So the evidence, clearly, before the OFT was that these membership groups in so far as they
19 did exist before the commitments were introduced, were very small scale.

20 THE CHAIRMAN: A membership group is a closed group on your part.

21 MISS SMITH: That is my understanding.

22 THE CHAIRMAN: And this is hotels, not any ----

23 MISS SMITH: This is simply hotels we are talking about here, the OFT’s investigation was
24 limited to hotel booking. So, if I can then take you to some of the points that we wish to
25 highlight in the SO about the state of the market at the time – if I could ask you to turn, this
26 is in chapter 2 which is called “Background information or facts” and we will go straight, if
27 we can, to para.2.41 which is on p.36. This says:

28 “However, both independent and branded hotels acknowledge the increasing
29 significance of the OTA distribution channel and use OTAs to target audiences they
30 would otherwise hardly reach. In this regard, it is notable that certain customers
31 appear to have developed a degree of brand-loyalty to particular OTAs, which, from
32 the OTA’s perspective, is vital for the purposes of being recognised as a relevant
33 business partner by hotels, for example”.

34 I draw your attention to that point just to emphasise the brand loyalty towards large online
35 travel agents. And that is borne out by what is said in para.2.44. I am not going to read that

1 out, but what that essentially says, and it is borne out by the figure that follows, para.2.44 is
2 that there are a couple of very large or possibly three very large players in this market,
3 Expedia, Booking.com and Travelocity, and they have a relatively stable combined share of
4 supply, but “the OFT notes”, and this is the end of para.2.44, “... in contrast a number of
5 smaller OTAs have exited the market in recent years”.

6 So the market is characterised by a small number of large OTAs with brand loyalty, and a
7 number of small OTAs who have been seen to exit the market.

8 Paragraph 2.42 considers online advertising, and there is an interesting contrast here
9 between the quotation from Expedia which talks about the importance of – and you will see
10 about halfway through that quotation – search engines and metasearch engines as well as
11 the use of internet search engines such as Google, which is not a specific travel search
12 engine but simply you put in a hotel name or something like that through Google and you
13 will get results.

14 THE CHAIRMAN: This is a quote from a Form 10K submission. Just remind us of what a Form
15 10K is.

16 MISS SMITH: Good question! I may have to come back to you on that one, I am afraid. I think
17 it may be an internal annual report.

18 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

19 MISS SMITH: Something like that.

20 MR LINDSAY: The US SEC filing that is akin to an annual report but has more details.

21 MISS SMITH: Thank you.

22 THE CHAIRMAN: I thought that was right, and so that is emphasising dangers and threats to
23 your business.

24 MISS SMITH: Yes.

25 THE CHAIRMAN: So that you are not misleading the market.

26 MISS SMITH: Yes. So Expedia certainly see not only the Google type of advertising but the
27 specific search engines and metasearch engines as an important player in the market. But
28 what I said the interesting contrast is is that the OFT in its commentary at para.2.42 only
29 picks up search engines like Google. And this is a consistent strangeness in the OFT’s
30 approach to this issue, because if you look, for example, at the diagram in para.2.82 which
31 is on p.51, the diagram is on p.52, the OFT has constructed a diagram which shows how
32 when a customer goes about booking a hotel in Intercontinental Hotel London. There are
33 only two routes identified there for the customer to reach an online travel agent site, either
34 by typing in the actual address of the online travel agent, “www.expedia.co.uk” or by
35 searching for “luxury hotels London” on Google, because Google have an agreement with

1 Expedia, the AdWord agreement, it clicks through to the website. What the OFT does not
2 recognise there, despite the fact that we have seen this is a substantial proportion of the
3 market, is the role that price comparison metasearch sites play.

4 So if we then go on to the OFT's theory of harm which is on p.67 of the SO, and the OFT
5 makes the point there in para.2.116, "There is a restriction on the buyer's ability to
6 determine its sale price", a broad definition of what the restriction is, and then the example
7 given, for instance by restricting the buyer from sharing its commission, "This is an object
8 infringement and a hardcore restriction", and again makes the point it is not necessary for
9 the OFT to demonstrate anti-competitive effects. And then you will see that there are three
10 aspects to that theory of harm. The first heading, just above para.2.118, "Restrictions on
11 discounting limit price competition and increase barriers to entry", and the explanation is
12 given in those subsequent paragraphs.

13 And if I can – for your note, I am not going to read them out – ask you to look in due course
14 at para.2.119 which is about the importance of price transparency and low search costs,
15 paras.2.120 and 2.122. Then the second aspect of the theory of harm is the heading below
16 para.2.123:

17 "Rate Parity obligations are capable of reinforcing and exacerbating any prevention,
18 restriction or distortion of competition arising from discounting restrictions",
19 and that is considered in the following paragraphs 2.126, "Rate Parity obligations reduce the
20 incentive to negotiate lower rates"; 2.127, Less incentive for OTAs to lower their margins
21 or commission; 2.128, "However, the OFT has not investigated the extent to which Rate
22 Parity obligations are capable of reinforcing...". Then the third aspect of the theory of harm
23 is the heading under para.2.128:

24 "To the extent that similar discounting restrictions and Rate Parity obligations are
25 replicated in the market, then any prevention, restriction or distortion of competition is
26 further reinforced and exacerbated",
27 and the point is essentially made in para.2.131:

28 "A market in which both discounting restrictions and Rate Parity obligations are
29 prevalent is likely to be characterised by significant limits to price competition and
30 barriers to entry"

31 Then 2.132:

32 "The OFT has also seen evidence of Rate Parity obligations being imposed on a
33 number of hotel chains. This evidence indicates that such obligations may be
34 replicated in the market alongside discounting restrictions, although this is not an
35 issue the OFT has investigated, and the OFT makes no findings in this respect."

1 THE CHAIRMAN: This is just saying that this is a case against these two groups but other
2 people may be at it.

3 MISS SMITH: Sir, yes. The legal framework is in s.3, I am not going to take you through that.

4 MR WILKS: Can I just raise one other question before you leave the theory of harm?

5 MISS SMITH: Yes.

6 MR WILKS: The introduction to the theory of harm 2.116, as you say talks about hardcore
7 restrictions and infringement by object, and it goes on to say the OFT does not need to
8 demonstrate that the agreements did, in fact, have an anti-competitive effect. Are you
9 comfortable with that objects approach?

10 MISS SMITH: That is the approach the OFT took to the restrictions. We do not challenge that
11 approach, no. If you go to chapter 4, which starts on p.113. This is the analysis of the
12 relevant price agreements, it is quite extensively redacted, but if you look at what is actually
13 p.192 you can see about 70 or 80 pages appear to have been redacted. Page 191, the
14 heading is “The Expedia Price Agreement”, and the OFT heading is: “does not benefit from
15 the Exemption in the Vertical Block Exemption Regulation”. Paragraphs 4.157 to 4.161,
16 which is on p. 193, sets out the finding of the Expedia Price Agreement, essentially the
17 points we have already made; it is a hardcore restriction within the meaning of Article 4A of
18 Vertical Block Exemption Regulation and cannot benefit from the exemption. It is a
19 hardcore restriction because – this is para. 4.159 – it involves a restriction on the ability of
20 the agent to determine the sales price, and therefore, 4.161 it’s presumed to restrict
21 competition or fall within Article 101(1), also presumed unlikely to fulfil the conditions of
22 Article 101(3).

23 There’s the conclusion set out in para. 4.166 and the same conclusions you’ll see in the
24 following pages for the Booking.com agreement.

25 The proposed decisions are on p.262. As regards the Expedia Price Agreement, para. 6.4:
26 “Strong and compelling evidence to find that Expedia IH London IHG infringed the
27 Chapter 1 prohibition. The proposed decision relates to the Expedia Price Agreement, which
28 restricted Expedia’s ability to determine its sale price, for instance by restricting its share in
29 the commission, and the OFT proposes to find that the alleged infringement lasted from 17th
30 October 2007 to 21st September 2010. So that arrangement has finished. The Booking.com
31 agreement, is in the same Decision in para. 6.5, but you will see over the page, on p.263,
32 that the Booking.com price agreement is ongoing. So therefore, in para. 6.9 the OFT
33 proposes that Booking.com and other parties to that agreement should be ordered to take
34 action to bring the alleged infringement to an end, and proposes to direct the parties to bring
35 the alleged infringement to an end, such that Booking.com’s ability to determine its sale

1 price is no longer restricted. So the proposed direction is effectively to remove the
2 restrictions completely.

3 THE CHAIRMAN: No residual restrictions?

4 MISS SMITH: No. That is the position as of 31st July 2012 as set out in the SO, but despite what
5 we say are those strong provisional determinations the OFT, as you are aware, does not
6 proceed to make an infringement decision or impose a remedy requiring the parties to put
7 the infringements to an end. Instead, it is persuaded to accept the commitments proposed
8 by the parties, reaching the view, apparently, that those commitments fully address its
9 competition concerns.

10 THE CHAIRMAN: Miss Smith, do you attach any significance to the apparent intention to
11 impose a fine?

12 MISS SMITH: Well, there is a provisional finding there that this was intentional or negligent
13 behaviour and therefore a fine should be imposed.

14 THE CHAIRMAN: Going back to our discussion about relevant differences between this and the
15 EU regime, am I correct that, under EU practice, if a fine was being imposed commitments
16 would not normally be considered to be appropriate – or, am I wrong?

17 MISS SMITH: I will have to double check, sir, but I believe that is the position.

18 THE CHAIRMAN: Perhaps somebody will confirm that for us in due course.

19 MISS SMITH: The OFT guidance, certainly does not say that.

20 THE CHAIRMAN: No, I am aware of that.

21 MISS SMITH: The OFT guidance identifies other situations where commitments are unlikely to
22 be appropriate.

23 THE CHAIRMAN: I think the EU Best Practice Notice might be relevant.

24 MISS SMITH: I think that is the case, sir, but I will double check.

25 THE CHAIRMAN: Well, I am asking whether you attach any significance to it and you are
26 saying you do not.

27 MISS SMITH: Sir, it may be significant but it is another point to put into the mix.

28 THE CHAIRMAN: All right.

29 MR WILKS: You have highlighted the fact that the Expedia agreement had ended in September
30 2010 when the Booking.com had continued. Are you drawing some conclusions from that?
31 Is that significant in some way?

32 MISS SMITH: I do not know why that was the case. I do not know why and I cannot speculate.
33 All I am saying is that for the agreement that was ongoing the OFT proposed to make a
34 general order that they should stop the infringing behaviour without any continuing
35 restrictions, completely stop the behaviour, and I will – at a later stage in my submissions –

1 come back to that point when we look at the commitments that have been accepted
2 generally in the European Union. Generally, where there are agreements involved the
3 commitments that have been entered into by the parties have involved complete removal of
4 the infringing behaviour.

5 THE CHAIRMAN: It is the reverse of the *Alrosa* case, just to note.

6 MISS SMITH: Sir, that is where we are in July 2012, as I have said, but the OFT does not
7 proceed to this infringement Decision that it has proposed, it is persuaded to accept
8 commitments.

9 THE CHAIRMAN: Have we finished with the Statement of Objections?

10 MISS SMITH: We have, sir, you can put that away. So, how does the OFT get to that decision?

11 If I could ask you to open core bundle 2 and look at the OFT's evidence in this regard from
12 Mr Rasmussen at tab 13. Tab 13 is the first witness statement of Mr Rasmussen, put in with
13 the CMA's defence. He tells you who he is, and what his role was. He was project director
14 of this investigation.

15 He sets out the factual background at p.582 of the bundle. Paragraph 11 – the Statement of
16 Objections is issued on 31st July 2012, that is just what we have been looking at, and on 9th
17 August 2013, just over a year later, he says at para. 12, the OFT announced a public
18 consultation on commitments that had been offered by each of the parties in order to
19 address the OFT's competition concerns.

20 Then, at para. 13, a second public consultation on 2nd December 2013. So we have the SO,
21 we have a year of behind the scenes discussions, we have the first public consultation on the
22 commitments on 9th August 2013; the second public consultation on 20th December 2013.

23 The first public consultation is addressed in paras. 19 and onwards of Mr Rasmussen's
24 statement at p.585 – I am not going to read it out but he gives you details of the publication
25 of the first notice. Then in para.23 he says:

26 “... the OFT proactively contacted various interested parties ...”

27 The last sentence of that paragraph:

28 “The OFT also tried to contact Skyscanner by completing an enquiry form on
29 its website, in response to which it received an automated reply.”

30 I do not think any real emphasis is given to this point any more by the CMA, but I will be
31 corrected if I am wrong, but it has been addressed - sir, for your note, if I may - in paras.4.3
32 and 4.4 of Miss Jameson's second witness statement, which is at core bundle 2, tab 22. The
33 point is that it would appear that the OFT clicked on a link “Contact our commercial team”,
34 but did not go back the next step, which you might have thought was reasonable, to look at
35 the details of the legal team which were on the website, including the contact details of,

1 among others, Miss Jameson, and the legal team on Skyscanner's website. Then when the
2 OFT received a standard form automated reply from the button they pressed saying,
3 "Contact our commercial team", they took it no further.

4 We do not make a big play of this. It is just that in the OFT's defence and skeleton they
5 make the point, "We tried to contact you in the first consultation, you did not take part in
6 the first consultation", and we have a response to that evidence.

7 THE CHAIRMAN: I have no idea what we are to make of this. It is ironic, Skyscanner is an
8 online organisation, you contact it online, the online contact does not work for the purposes
9 of contact. It is slightly curious.

10 MISS SMITH: We would say you chose to press the button. You pressed a button to the
11 commercial team when you could have contacted the legal team. In so far as in the OFT
12 seeks to put any weight on this point, we have responded to it in those paragraphs, and I
13 would ask you to have a look at those paragraphs if the OFT proceeds with this point.

14 THE CHAIRMAN: In hindsight, it is a pity.

15 MISS SMITH: Sir, I am not sure that it is. The point is that Skyscanner did take part in this
16 consultation process. We say the representations it made were not properly considered by
17 the OFT.

18 There is also the point that at this stage Skyscanner's business in hotel online booking was
19 relatively under-developed. Skyscanner bought a Spanish hotel online booking company in
20 September 2013.

21 THE CHAIRMAN: So they might have replied, "This is of no concern to us".

22 MISS SMITH: I am not going to speculate, sir, but it is simply to respond to that point made in
23 Mr Rasmussen's statement. I would ask that you do not take it at face value, have a look at
24 Miss Jameson's statement at 4.3 and 4.4.

25 At para.25 of Mr Rasmussen's he says that the OFT commissioned a market research
26 agency Opinion Leader to carry out qualitative research on consumer's views about the
27 initial commitments. I would like, if I may, to take you to that, which is exhibited to
28 Mr Rasmussen's statement at exhibit KTGR9. You have there "Online hotel bookings
29 Qualitative research report", dated 12th September 2013. So this was being done in line
30 with the first consultation, and it is some consumer work on market research on the
31 proposed commitments. In the Executive Summary on p.760, the second bullet point:

32 "The main objective of the research was to understand consumers' views
33 around the concept of joining an OTA's closed group in order to receive
34 discounts on hotel room bookings."

1 Then bullet point 3 explains what the research consisted of, four 90 minute focus groups
2 with consumers. Then bullet point 5:

3 “The majority ...”

4 it does not say how many, or what proportion -

5 “... of consumers were open to the proposed changes and saw themselves as
6 likely to join a closed discounting group. They felt that there were no
7 significant downsides to joining and that it made sense to make the most of
8 potential cost savings.”

9 The next bullet point:

10 “Most ...”

11 again, we do not know how many or what proportion of those who took part in the four 90
12 minute focus groups that covers -

13 “... were also open to joining multiple groups. Although they expected to try to
14 stay loyal to one group initially, they did not want to find themselves tied to one
15 OTA and wanted to be able to continue to shop around. Those who were
16 booking hotels more frequently were more likely to expect to join multiple
17 groups ...”

18 The next bullet point:

19 “There was some concern that there would be restrictions placed on discount
20 offers, such as time limits or minimum bookings - consumers sought
21 reassurance that any such caveats would be minimal ...”

22 Then on p.763 we get a bit more detail of what this consumer research consisted of. Under
23 the heading “Methodology”:

24 “A total of four 90 minute focus groups were conducted in London on Tuesday
25 20 and Thursday 22 August 2013. 30 consumers took part overall.”

26 So that is 30 people split between four groups. I do not need to make the point, that is
27 pretty minimal.

28 Then we see at the bottom of that page:

29 “... consumers were taken through a slideshow (prepared by the OFT) that
30 outlined the current situation and proposed changes. Participants could then
31 conduct informed discussions ...”

32 So there were slides prepared by the OFT.

33 Just before we leave this document, could I take you to p.768. This is under the heading at
34 the top of the page, “Using multiple OTAs”, and this is effectively the possibility of what
35 has become known as “multi-homing”, joining more than one proposed group:

1 “One issue mentioned spontaneously by consumers was what would happen if
2 they made full price booking with one OTA but when they went to book a
3 second hotel, the hotel they wanted to stay at was not available, so they would
4 have to book via a different OTA and join a second discounting group. Some
5 ...”

6 again we do not know how many -

7 “... felt that this would be problematic and would rather only join one group,
8 whereas others ...”

9 again we do not know how many -

10 “... were quite sanguine about this happening.”

11 We have quotations from both sides, so views were mixed. Then in the following
12 paragraphs after the quotations:

13 “Many ...”

14 again we do not know how many -

15 “... thought it likely that they would join a number of closed discounting groups
16 ...”

17 Then after the quotation:

18 “Others felt that the proposed changes would make them more loyal to one
19 OTA in particular, and that they would make an effort to always try to book
20 hotels from the same site, or at least always start their hotel searches with that
21 one site.”

22 So really the evidence is, we say, completely mixed. Some will join many groups, some
23 will not, and we do not know how many on each side. In any event, there are only 30 of
24 them who have been asked.

25 Page 769: there is an interesting paragraph after the quotations at the top of the page:

26 “Having heard earlier in the focus group that there may be no difference in the
27 prices offered by different OTAs for the same type of room in a hotel, there was
28 a feeling amongst some that there should be no need to join more than one
29 discounting group, as all the OTAs would be offering the same deals.”

30 It is not entirely clear, this may be a reference to ate parity, it may be a slight confusion on
31 the part of the consumers as to whether or not there would be discounting after
32 commitments.

33 Then finally on p.772, the top of that page:

34 “Having to join a club in order to see discounts

1 Most consumers were not concerned by the fact that they would have to join the
2 closed discounting group in order to see the discounts, although some felt that
3 the hassle factor would put them off.”

4 Importantly in this regard, the attention of these consumers in the focus groups was not
5 drawn to the impact on price comparison metasearch sites. When we were given
6 Mr Rasmussen’s statement Skyscanner asked to see the slides that the OFT had prepared for
7 these focus groups, and they were disclosed by the OFT and they are exhibited to
8 Miss Jameson’s second statement, and I would like to take you to those. Miss Jameson’s
9 second statement is at tab 22 of the same bundle. Reference is made to this request and the
10 OFT’s response in paras.2 and 3 of her witness statement, p.836, and the slides are at
11 exhibit CJ22. I am not going to take you through those slides in detail, but if we flick
12 through them, p.848, how do you book, 849, hotels, online travel agents, examples given at
13 850 and 851, an example of a direct sale from the hotel’s own site 852. Explanation of
14 pricing, p.853. Two sales routes, p.854, booked on online travel agent, booked on
15 Randomhotel.com, pricing strategy at 855. Then 856, airlines, the pricing method is
16 similar. 857, hotel sets price. What is the result? Then after a five minute break on p.859
17 we go back to the sales routes. Then we get to the question at 860, how could online travel
18 agents offer discounts? It is an explanation about basically sacrificing part of the
19 commission. Then p.861, why can’t they adopt this approach now? Effectively, because
20 they are restricted by price parity clauses, top slide on 861.

21 A solution is offered at the bottom slide, p.862. It is a solution that effectively appears to
22 respect the existence of the Price Parity Agreements.

23 Then on p.862, why shouldn’t everyone see the discount? The answer given by the OFT
24 appears to be, it is all about yield management. So the OFT was telling these consumers
25 that hotels need to engage in yield management, even though we know subsequently in the
26 Decision the OFT explicitly said it did not reach a view on whether this was an efficiency
27 that justified the restrictions contained in the commitments. They are basically saying this
28 is why everyone should not see the discount.

29 Page 863, the proposed scheme. This outlines the closed group scheme, you can join
30 multiple closed groups, you can then see the discounts, you can benefit from the discounts
31 after you have made your first purchase. Then it explains on p.864 and 865 how that works
32 in practice, and comparison is drawn to a customer loyalty scheme which we strongly
33 dispute. Putting that to one side, that is p.865. Then in practice, 866, and a recap at 867.
34 There is absolutely no reference in these slides to the role played by price comparison sites
35 or metasearch sites, even though this research was carried out, or these slides were

