IN THE COMPETITION

Victoria House,
Bloomsbury Place,
London WC1A 2EB

Before:

VIVIEN ROSE
(Chairman)
DR ADAM SCOTT OBE TD
DAVID SUMMERS OBE

Sitting as a Tribunal in England and Wales

## BETWEEN:

(1) IMPERIAL TOBACCO GROUP PLC (2) IMPERIAL TOBACCO LIMITED

OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING

CO-OPERATIVE GROUP LIMITED

OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING

## WM MORRISON SUPERMARKET PLC

(1) SAFEWAY STORES LIMITED
(2) SAFEWAY LIMITED
Appellants
$-\mathrm{v}-$
OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING
Respondent
(1) ASDA STORES LIMITED
(2) ASDA GROUP LIMITED
(3) WAL-MART STORES (UK) LIMITED
(4) BROADSTREET GREAT WILSON EUROPE LIMITED
Appellants
$-\mathrm{v}-$
OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING
Respondent
(1) SHELL UK LIMITED
(2) SHELL UK OIL PRODUCTS LIMITED
(3) SHELL HOLDINGS (UK) LIMITED
Appellants
$-\mathrm{v}-$
OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING
Respondent
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## HEARING (DAY 19)

Note: Excisions in this transcript marked "[...][C]" relate to passages excluded.

## APPEARANCES

Mr Mark Howard QC, Mr Mark Brealey QC and Mr Tony Singla (instructed by Ashurst LLP) appeared on behalf of the Appellants Imperial Tobacco Group Plc and Imperial Tobacco Ltd.

Mr Rhodri Thompson QC and Mr Christopher Brown (instructed by Burges Salmon LLP) appeared on behalf of the Appellant Co-operative Group Ltd.

Mr Pushpinder Saini QC and Mr Tristan Jones (instructed by Hogan Lovells International LLP) appeared on behalf of the Appellants WM Morrison Supermarkets Plc and Safeway Stores Ltd and Safeway Ltd.

Mr James Flynn QC and Mr Robert O’Donoghue (instructed by Norton Rose LLP) appeared on behalf of the Appellants Asda Stores Ltd, Asda Group Ltd, Wal-Mart Stores (UK) Ltd and Broadstreet Great Wilson Europe Ltd.

Ms Dinah Rose QC and Mr Brian Kennelly (instructed by Baker \& McKenzie LLP) appeared on behalf of the Appellants Shell U.K. Ltd, Shell U.K. Oil Products Ltd and Shell Holdings (U.K.) Ltd.

Mr Paul Lasok QC, Ms Elisa Holmes, Mr Rob Williams, Ms Anneliese Blackwood and Ms Ligia Osepciu (instructed by the General Counsel, Office of Fair Trading) appeared on behalf of the Respondent.

## Tuesday, 25 October 20011

(10.30 am)
(Proceedings delayed)
(10.35 am)

THE CHAIRMAN: Good morning.
MR FLYNN: Good morning, Madam, sirs. Unless anyone has anything else, I think we continue with Mr Jolliff, and I'll ask that he be brought in.

## THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

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    MR JOHN JOLLIFF (recalled)
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THE CHAIRMAN: Good morning, Mr Jolliff.
A. Good morning.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much for coming back. I remind you that you are still on oath from last time you gave evidence.

Cross-examination by MR LASOK
MR LASOK: Good morning, Mr Jolliff.
A. Good morning.
Q. I wonder whether you could be given a copy of your witness statement, which is in core bundle 10. It starts at tab 109. \{C10/109/373\}. Could you possibly give Mr Jolliff annex 14, please. I wanted to ask you a couple of questions about the ITL/Asda trading agreement that was signed, I think, in June 2002. You deal with that trading agreement in paragraphs 116 to 1

117 of your witness statement. It might be a good idea if you could turn to those paragraphs and read them over to yourself.

## (Pause)

If you want to cross-refer to the text of the
trading agreement, it's in annex 14 at tab 53.
\{D14/53/148\}.
(Pause)
A. And also document 44 -- sorry, 54?
Q. If you want to look at 54, please do so. (Pause)
A. Okay.
Q. Okay, so, as I understand it, firstly you did sign this trading agreement on behalf of Asda?
A. That's correct, yes.
Q. On the third page of the trading agreement, we have a reference to a quarterly payment being made to Asda.
A. Yes, I've got that.
Q. So there is a quarterly payment made to Asda, and it says:
"Subject to Imperial Tobacco's requirements ..."
Now, the remaining phrase is, I think, confidential with the exception of the reference to strategic pricing. But the end of the phrase concludes with the words "being met". So what we can see is that
a quarterly payment would be made to Asda on condition
that Asda complied with ITL's requirements including the requirements relating to strategic pricing; do you agree?
A. I agree with what it says in there, yes.
Q. In tab 54, we have a letter setting out a revised summary of ITL's strategic pricing requirements. Now, I take it that the strategic pricing requirements that Asda was supposed to comply with, as referred to in the trading agreement, was a document like the one that we have attached to the letter at tab 54 ?
A. When it was discussed, I mean, I didn't sign this document until, I believe, June, just before I was about to leave the area, so they had already been paying us the [redacted] retro for six months, and when it was discussed at first, strategic planning -- sorry, strategic pricing was based on, say, for example, if Richmond needed to come down, we would look at bringing the price down, provided that we agreed the costs and the retails. So it was myself who was agreeing to make sure that the benefit was to Asda by negotiating the costs and the retails because they were asking for these things, which basically I wouldn't follow.
THE CHAIRMAN: When you say "the retails", what do you mean?
A. When you have a pricing document, you would get what

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I call a deal sheet, I am sorry I have to call those, but I used to be a grocery buyer, so they were always "deal sheets". So you would get your cost, and the recommended retail price from, in this case, Imperial Tobacco. So it was up to me whether I accepted that price or not.
THE CHAIRMAN: But is that what we have called the retail selling price? That's something different from the published recommended price?
A. That's right, yes.

THE CHAIRMAN: I think what you are being asked is: was the reference to strategic pricing here a reference to a kind of document like that?
A. Well, I wouldn't follow that at all --

THE CHAIRMAN: I am not asking you whether you followed it --
A. Sorry.

THE CHAIRMAN: -- but was it a reference to something like that?
A. It was a reference to the strategic planning -- sorry, strategic pricing that ITL wanted but didn't necessarily get, if you can follow my ... the only way they would get it would be my getting my correct retail margin and being competitive against the rest of the market.

MR LASOK: How did they communicate their strategic pricing
requirements to you?
A. The document that's just been sent --
Q. Yes, that's an example of it?
A. Yeah, days after I had signed that agreement.
Q. In your paragraphs 116 to 117 of your skeleton argument (sic), as I understand it you say that --
THE CHAIRMAN: Statement.
MR LASOK: Sorry.
THE CHAIRMAN: You said his skeleton argument.
MR LASOK: Freudian slip there.
In 116, if you go to the fourth line, you say:
"I viewed the content of the trading agreement as basically irrelevant in my business."

A little further down, when you are referring to the payment under the agreement, you say:
"How it was assessed, whether Asda had met these requirements was not set out in the agreement and in practice, satisfaction of these criteria was not assessed."
Just pausing there, are we talking about assessment of satisfaction of the criteria before or after you left the tobacco part of the business?
A. Could you repeat the question, please?
Q. You signed the agreement in June; right?
A. That's correct, yeah.

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Q. And you seem to have left tobacco at about that time?
A. In June. That's right, yeah.
Q. So when you say "How it was assessed, whether Asda had met these requirements was not set out in the agreement, and in practice, satisfaction of these criteria was not assessed", are you talking about the period after June 2002 or the period before, or both?
A. It's a bit of both, because I can't honestly remember that these strategic pricing ever came up, because I am not interested in strategic pricing. All I am interested in is getting the correct cost and the correct retail price to remain competitive in the marketplace. Because my brief was to make sure that Asda were the number one retailer in tobacco, ie equal to or better than Tesco, Sainsbury's, Somerfield as it was then, Safeway, and that was my brief. Now, if somebody comes along with strategic pricing --
THE CHAIRMAN: Just pause there. Ask, if you have a follow-up question.
MR LASOK: How do you know what happened after you left in June 2002?
A. I don't.
Q. Okay, fine. In paragraph 117, in the last sentence but one -- do you have that?
A. Yes.
Q. You say:
"Payment of this bonus had no relation to my compliance with their strategic pricing."

Now, you couldn't know about payment of the bonus after you left in June 2002, and after that point, there was of course no question of your compliance with the strategic pricing because you weren't there?
A. Correct.
Q. Isn't that so?
A. That's correct.
Q. So what you are talking about must be the payment that reflected the backdating of the agreement; is that so?
A. Yes, the payment was coming in even before I had signed the agreement.
Q. Right. Now, I want to turn to, in annex 14, tab 56. $\{D 14 / 56 / 156\}$. You may not have seen this, but this is a letter from Mr Graham Hall of ITL to Mr Kevin Lang, and in the second paragraph of the letter, under the heading "Trade Development Programme Investment", he sets out -- that's to say Mr Hall sets out -- the purpose of the trade development programme, and that's a reference to the trading agreement that we have just seen. Could you read that paragraph to yourself, please.
(Pause)
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A. Right, I've read it.
Q. So what he says there -- that's Mr Hall says -- is that:
"The purpose of the trade development programme is to ensure that we [and he must mean ITL] have the range of products available in your stores to meet consumer demand and on sale at prices which reflect the standard price list differentials against competing lines."

Is that your understanding also of the purpose of the trading agreement?
A. Well, that's what it says there, but when I am negotiating prices, as I've already said, I negotiate for Asda based on the cost prices. I don't look at the differentials against anybody's product, the margin has to fit the retail price. Hence if a price went up or went down, I would go out on a Monday morning, as I stated last time, to check these prices to correct -to make sure that I was in a competitive situation against my major competitors.
Q. Now, the question I am putting to you, really, is not so much how you determined retail prices, that's to say the shelf prices at Asda stores, but whether this description of the purpose of the trade development programme coincides with your understanding of the purpose of the trade development programme?
A. The only thing I can say is what I've already said, that
that's what I did.
Q. I am sorry, I am not asking you what you did in terms of how you sorted out retail prices, I am just asking you whether Mr Hall's description of the purpose of the trade development programme coincides with your understanding of what the purpose of the trade development programme was?
A. The purpose of it is that they wanted us to have certain strategic prices which I disagreed with, because I looked at the margin to get the retail percentage margin.

THE CHAIRMAN: But you knew at the time that you signed the agreement that that was what they were hoping to get out of it?
A. That's what they were hoping to get out, but they weren't going to get it.
MR LASOK: And you told them that at the time?
A. Oh yes, yeah.
Q. Oh yes. So why did you sign the agreement?
A. Because, as long as I have been buying tobacco, the retailers, both ITL, Rothmans and Gallaher's, have always known that the retailer, in this case Asda, set the retail prices for their particular companies. So I presumed it was okay.
Q. Well, I am putting to you that what actually happened 9
was that you read the trading agreement before you signed it, you understood what it meant, you understood that there was a provision there providing for payment to Asda by ITL of a sum of money in return for Asda's compliance with, amongst other things, ITL's strategic pricing requirements. You knew all that, and you committed Asda by signing that agreement on Asda's part; is that not so?
A. Well, I knew what I was signing for, and you are quite correct in what you are saying, but I still reiterate back that it doesn't necessarily mean that we met that criteria, because they had already been paying us for the previous six months, and though they had sort of said to me, you know, "Your differentials are out here based on this particular document", so as far as I was aware they understood that I was setting the retail prices.
Q. I put it to you that the reason why you got the payment backdated was because your prices weren't out of line with ITL's strategic pricing requirements?
A. I don't know whether they were or they weren't, to be honest with you.
Q. Because what was actually happening was that, generally speaking, you were pricing in accordance with the RSPs sent to you by ITL?
A. No, I think you are incorrect there. I was pricing
based on what I've already said.
Q. Well, you have already stated in your witness statement that generally you followed the RSPs?
A. We followed the RSPs if we were competitive and if the percentage margin and the cost prices enabled us to do so, because I couldn't afford, because of the lack of margin, to either be -- to be below those particular prices, because I was judged on my cash margin and my percentage margin.
So in my terms, I've nothing to play with, as I couldn't go below those prices because my margin would disappear quite rapidly.
DR SCOTT: You have 56 open in front of you; yes?
A. Excuse me taking my glasses off.

## DR SCOTT: That's all right.

A. This is the one dated 13 August to Kevin Lang.

DR SCOTT: Kevin Lang. If you look at the bottom of the page, I realise that some of this is marked "Confidential". It doesn't tell me on my -- I would assume that it's confidential to ITL, though in fact it's concerned with margins in Asda.

I have heard what you said about the margins being thin, but according to this letter, things had actually been improving under your stewardship?

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A. At least I did something right. Excuse me for saying that. I mean, that is the reason why you set your own retails, you set your own retails because you have to ensure that you get what Asda is asking for. You know, Asda's wish list is what I've already stated. So my job is to increase margins by fair means.
MR LASOK: Can I move on to a related topic, which is ITL's wish list. Because in this letter at tab 56, at the paragraph I asked you to read, we have the phrase, in the second line of the second paragraph of the letter:
"... on sale at prices which reflect the standard price list differentials against competing lines."

If we go to the next page, there is a heading "Price Increase", and just below the first holepunch we have a bit where Mr Hall says to Mr Lang:
"I also left you with full details of our strategic pricing requirements effective from 2 September. Philip Zentner will forward you an updated price file on 27 August incorporating the changes effective from 2 September."

Now, is it not the case that the price file sent from time to time by ITL to Asda set out ITL's wish list?
A. It set out the -- there was no wish list, what they did was set out with the recommended retail prices they
would like to see, but it doesn't necessarily mean that
they are going to get those particular recommended
retail prices. I mean, I'll give you a typical example.
THE CHAIRMAN: Well, is this referring to recommended prices
or is this referring to differentials between ITL and
Gallaher brands?
A. It's basically what I call a deal sheet where they are actually recommending retails which I don't necessarily have to follow.
MR LASOK: I think that, for clarification, the price files that we have seen have been sheets that set out the name and product code of the ITL brand, when it's an ITL price sheet, and you have things like the cost price, the various bonuses, and then there is a recommended selling price. It's not the RRP.
THE CHAIRMAN: No, but --
MR LASOK: And there is no reference in the price files that we have seen where there is a comparison between the ITL price and the related Gallaher brand price.
THE CHAIRMAN: When it refers in this letter to "strategic pricing requirements", is that a reference to that kind of document, or a reference to the kind of document we saw at tab 54?
MR LASOK: Well, what I am putting to the witness is that the price file incorporated the strategic pricing

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requirements, so what I've described as the wish list, ITL's wish list in the price file would be selling prices, shelf prices that ITL wished Asda to sell the brands at, and those prices reflected the strategic pricing requirements that ITL had.
DR SCOTT: But in this letter, a distinction is drawn in the two paragraphs on page 88, to which you have referred, between the strategic pricing requirements in the first of them, and an updated price file to be sent on 27 August in the second paragraph.
MR LASOK: Yes.
THE CHAIRMAN: Is the reference to the strategic pricing requirements which Mr Hall says he left with Mr Lang, is that a reference to the kind of document, an updated version of what we saw at tab --
MR LASOK: Well, let's take it in stages.
MR FLYNN: Wouldn't these questions be better put to Mr Lang, to whom this letter was addressed and who might actually remember?
THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, I am just trying to work out what the OFT's position is.
MR FLYNN: I understand that, and it would be helpful, but I just remind that of course Mr Jolliff doesn't actually know what these were.

THE CHAIRMAN: No.

MR HOWARD: If it helps, at least from ITL's point of view,
I don't think it's actually controversial. I think the strategic pricing requirements document that's being referred to in that paragraph, I think it's what Mr Hall said, is a similar document to the one that's at tab 54, it's just the one -- because you have to remember there was then I think an MPI, so it's a similar document to that. I don't think we have the document, and then the price file is the price file at the time that we have seen. I hope that helps, and I don't think it should be controversial.
MR LASOK: The point is that, so far as you were aware, the recommended selling prices in the price file were oriented around the strategic pricing requirements that ITL had?
A. The retail prices that they quoted were based on the margin that they were giving us, so whatever the cost price they were giving us, that's how it had come up in the retail, based on the margin, ie the percentage margin and the cash margin. So ... That's how you come to the price.
Q. That brings me to the bit in paragraph 117 of your witness statement. If you look at page 29, it's the internal page 29, of the witness statement --
A. In my witness statement?
Q. Yes. It should be the right-hand side at the top. It's the second half of your paragraph 117. Your paragraph 117 starts at the bottom of the left-hand side.
A. Yeah. Where am I going to now?
Q. If you go to the third line on the top of the next page.
A. Yeah.
Q. You say:
"If a byproduct of this was that my price for
a particular ITL brand was the same as that for a Gallaher brand, that was because the manufacturers were able to create that position by having equivalent cost prices and knowing I did not have the margin to price any differently."
I just wanted to explore that with you. In order to do that, I wonder whether you could have a look at two documents side by side. One of them is in annex 14 and the other one is in annex 4. The one in annex 14 is at tab 50. \{D14/50/137\}. If you have tab 50, you will see that this is a letter to you dated 11 March 2002, and it's a letter that you comment on in your witness statement. Just to give you the context, the first heading is the word "Margins", and you see that the writer, who is Mr Hall, encloses a spreadsheet showing the change in margins over the three years to

February 2002. He refers to the substantial increase in cash margins.

If you go to the last page in the tab, you will see the spreadsheet that he attaches. What he does is to, in the columns we have on the left, that's to say the far left, a date 3 February 1999 and then we have a column which starts with the word "Brand", and then we have a series of columns which sets out different brands. So we have Regal Kingsize, L\&B Kingsize, Superkings, Richmond Kingsize, Classic and Golden Virginia.

Underneath the brand headings you have various figures which are explained in the second column from the left. Okay? So the first group of figures relate to 3 February 1999. I wanted to look at the second group, the one with the date 25 February 2002. If you look at the second column, the first line in the second column appears to be "RSP", but if we check as against tab 11 of -- this is for the Tribunal's benefit. If you go to the file dealing with the chronology of Budgets and MPIs and go to tab 11, you will see that the RSP figures are the published RRP figures. But that's just for the benefit of the Tribunal.

So if we look at 25 February 2002 figures, and just take Richmond. Do you have Richmond? 17
A. Yeah, Rich Kingsize, yeah, yeah.
Q. So we have 3.59 and that's the RRP.
A. Yeah.
Q. The figures below it are, as I understand it, confidential. The second figure, which is expressed in pounds and pence, is the cost to Asda. So that's the wholesale price to Asda.
A. Yeah.
Q. Then the figure below that, which I think is unconfidential, is a figure of 3.44 ?
A. Yeah.
Q. That is described as the Asda SP. We can actually see, and then this again is largely for the sake of the Tribunal, but if we looked at tab 48 of this annex, page 3, we would see that the figure which is Asda's SP is its shelf price. So --
THE CHAIRMAN: The cost to Asda, that's per ten packs, presumably?
MR LASOK: Per outer.
THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.
MR LASOK: So that's ten packs.
So we have a figure of the cost to Asda, and we have the price per pack of 20 , and we have the percentage margin and the cash margin. What I want to do is to look at the confidential figure which is the cost to

Asda which is the per outer price, bearing in mind that the shelf price is 3.44 . Okay?
A. Yeah.
Q. So I am just looking at those two figures, in relation to Richmond.
A. Right.
Q. If you now go to annex 4, tab 5. $\{\mathrm{D} 4 / 5 / 17\}$
A. The letter from Chris Halford?
Q. Yes, this is Chris Halford to you, and it attaches the parallel price file for Gallaher brands, because if we go to page 2, we have "Asda Limited Cost and Retail Prices Gallaher Limited". We have a date, December 2001.
A. Yes.
Q. Now, December 2001 is clearly not 25 February 2002, but we just have to make use of the information that we have. As far as I am aware, there wasn't any MPI between -- or relevant MPI -- December 2001 and February 2002.
As I understand it, a lot of the figures in these price files are confidential. Asda obviously can see them, because this document was sent to Asda, in particular yourself, but I think they are probably blanked out as far as ITL are concerned, but Asda knows what I am talking about.

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## If we go to the fourth page --

A. The fourth page of --
Q. It's the fourth -- it's the last page but one. Do you have a copy that's got everything blanked out?
A. It starts off "Camel Lights".
Q. That's right. If you go to the middle of the page, you have "Dorchester"?
A. Yes.
Q. If you take the second Dorchester, Dorchester Kingsize, it's the second one listed, and you run finger along to the right, it should be a pack of 20 s?
A. Yes.
Q. If you run your finger further along you should get to a column which is the fifth from the right, which is
"Net Cost". Do you have that one?
A. There is nothing in mine.
Q. Right, okay. I think this is a clean copy. (Handed).

MR HOWARD: We do not have copies of this material.
THE CHAIRMAN: It's confidential to Gallaher.
MR HOWARD: That may be, but I can't follow it and deal with it if I am not to see it.
THE CHAIRMAN: Well, let's see where we get to with this first, and then we will decide what to do about it.

MR LASOK: So we are looking at the second "Dorchester Kingsize", which is the pack of 20s. If you run your
finger along to the column headed "Net cost" --
A. Yes.
Q. -- there are actually two figures for net cost, and if you move further to the right, right to the box on the right, you will see that the reason for that is because there is a normal price and then there is a price from 29 October. We are interested in the 29 October-line. Because if we look on the 29 October line, we have the net cost, we have the RSP, which is 3.44 , and that's the same as the Richmond shelf price, and then we have the cash margin and the percentage margin.
A. Yes.
Q. But I was actually quite interested in the figure for net cost, because that is a bit below the net cost to Asda for Richmond. Now, these two figures are confidential, but I think you will agree that there is a differential between those two figures?
A. Yes.
Q. This is a cost per outer?
A. Yes.
Q. So if you then transpose that to per pack of 20, you got pretty close to a difference that would enable Asda to price Richmond and Dorchester at different prices.
A. I presume I could, yes.
Q. So we can't actually assume, without looking at the 21
figures, that the wholesale prices to Asda were so close together that the retail prices would necessarily be the same, can we?
A. No.
Q. No. But nonetheless Richmond and Dorchester are priced the same?
A. There will always be a situation where products are the same price, but obviously in this particular case
I haven't looked at it in as much detail, because
I wouldn't be comparing Gallaher retails against ITL retails or Rothmans retails, which I wanted to go at. So I could only work off that scenario.
Q. But I think one of the points that I am putting to you about this is that -- you can close the files up.
THE CHAIRMAN: Well, let's just finish off that point. Or are you moving on to a different point?
MR LASOK: No, it's a continuation of this point.
THE CHAIRMAN: Okay.
MR LASOK: The point I was going to put to Mr Jolliff is: in paragraph 117 of your witness statement, and the bit that I read out to you, you say -- and I'll read it again. I'll read the entire sentence. It starts in the second line at the top of the right-hand page. You say:
"As I have said, my pricing decisions were based on my cost price, my RSP, my margin and my competitors. If
a byproduct of this was that my price for a particular ITL brand was the same as that for a Gallaher brand, that was because the manufacturers were able to create that position by having equivalent cost prices and knowing I did not have the margin to price any differently."

When you wrote that, did you write it after having verified that this statement was actually accurate?
A. As far as I am aware, it was accurate. I don't really know what to say. As far as I was aware, it was accurate. Because I don't compare -- when you get the price sheets and everything, I don't compare ITL's cost prices and retail prices, all I am interested in is the cost price that I am given from either ITL or Gallaher's or whoever it may be. I don't compare the cost prices, because if I am happy with the margin that I am getting from Gallaher's in this particular case, I am quite happy and I would set my retail around that. I mean, obviously if I had checked it against ITL's, I wouldn't have been happy, but I didn't. That's how it looks anyway.
Q. The point I am putting to you is that actually what you did was price in accordance with the RSPs that were sent to you by Gallaher and ITL?
A. But I've already stated that there could be cases where 23 you take Richmond Kingsize here, if your percentage margin was [redacted] and your cash margin was -MR LASOK: The figures I think are confidential.
A. Sorry.
Q. What you are there looking at is the spreadsheet in annex $14, \mathrm{I}$ am not sure that that is confidential, it's the Gallaher figures that are confidential.
A. I think it is, in the right-hand corner it does say. I apologise for that.
DR SCOTT: It's marked "ITL Confidential", so ITL can -MR LASOK: Yes.
A. So I wouldn't compare ITL's cost prices, because it's not the same brand.
THE CHAIRMAN: But would you price in accordance with the RSP given to you by either ITL or Gallaher, provided that that gave you a satisfactory margin?
A. Yes, and that's my decision.

MR LASOK: But this is actually an incident in which you could have priced the Dorchester product otherwise than in accordance with the RSP that was sent to you. But in
fact you priced at parity with Richmond.
A. Well, I could have done, but that wasn't because -- Asda
aren't interested in parity, all we are interested in is getting the best deal for Asda. Or that's what I was employed for when I was buying tobacco.
Q. Well, we can, I think, perhaps wind this particular bit up. You have constantly stated that you determined Asda's retail prices by reference to your examination of cost prices, the recommended selling prices proposed to you by the manufacturers, by reference to margins and what competing retailers were doing?
A. Mm.
Q. A constant refrain. I wonder whether you could turn in annex 14 to tab 31, please. \{D14/31/77\}.
This is the one where, at the bottom of the page,
you receive an email from Martin Downham stating that ITL would like to increase the retail price of ITL's roll-your-own range, and he sets out the price moves showing the original price and the price that he wants the roll-your-own range to move to. On the second page, he asks you to confirm a date for the change, and suggests Monday 26 March. He says a price file will follow. Then this is the email that I think we saw when you were last here, to which you replied by saying "This will be okay".

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Now, could you just take us through the processes that you followed before you said to Mr Downham that it would be okay?
A. Right. Amber Leaf had already gone up in price, that is a Gallaher's brand. So what I would be expecting would be that the competitor's brand would be going up in price. So they had decided to increase their cost prices to myself, because there was, I presume it was after the manufacturers' price increase, or it might have been the Budget, I am not too sure, it's 20 March, I can't really remember when the Budget day was in 2001.
So what I would do then, I would await from ITL the deal sheets, as I call them, to come to me to see exactly what my cost price would be against for Drum and Golden Virginia. Because if the supplier withdrew the bonus levels, it would mean that the price had to go up, otherwise I would be losing money. I couldn't afford to do that.

I would then look at whatever the recommended retail price was. I would look at the yearly costs and the margins, I would also check -- not all at the same time -- that Amber Leaf has gone up in other retailers, I would check the price of that -- hence I used to go out on a Monday afternoon checking prices to make sure they were correct -- and then I would make a decision
there on the retail price.
Q. So you would make the decision after doing all those things?
A. Mm .
Q. How long would it take you to do all those things?
A. Well, first of all, you would have to wait until the price file came because until you actually got the price file, you wouldn't know what you were doing, because you would expect, if Amber Leaf has gone up, that the competitors, ie Drum and Golden Virginia would be going up in price, because ITL wouldn't want to be losing money, unless they wanted to hold the price down. If they were holding the price down, I have no doubt that Gallaher's would get hold of me and say "The situation is, John, that ITL have held these prices", we now want to bring our prices down and take an overall view of it.

So how long it would take, it's very difficult to put actual estimated time on it.
Q. I am just wondering about that, because the first email is the one that requests you to move the shelf prices. You respond and you say "This will be okay" and as a result of that, we then see the succeeding two emails, which are towards the top of the page, in which internally ITL activates your agreement, because we see that there is an email from Helen Wood to yourself and 27
to Martin Downham about the pricing, and she says to you -- sorry, Helen Wood of Asda sends to you and to Martin Downham a message:
"Retails on system to change in store Monday, 26 March."

Then what happens is that Martin Downham sends an email to Stephen Carroll, copying him in on the email exchange, and he simply says:
"FYI and price file confirmation."
So it looks as though what's happened is that firstly you are asked: will you move your prices? You say yes. Helen Wood of Asda confirms the date that she says "Retails on system to change", so it looks as though you have inputted it into the system, and then ITL sets about sorting out the price file. That's the sequence of events, and it happens over a very short period of time. So I was just wondering how, within, you know, that sequence of events revealed by the email, you fitted in all the things that you said that you did on this occasion?
A. Yes, I understand what you are saying. Probably the reason being is that I was expecting Amber Leaf to move, sorry, it had already moved, so Drum and Golden Virginia would follow. It was confirmed that I would be moving the prices, but I couldn't actually move my cost prices
or my retail prices until I got the price file from
Imperial Tobacco, because until I got the cost prices,
I couldn't do my work.
Q. Well, can I put it to you that what actually happened is what this document shows happened, and that is that you were asked to make a move, and you just did it, you agreed to it, and you cannot didn't carry out any of this complex exercise that you say you carried out, and you then no doubt waited for the price file to be sent to you, and you just followed the price file?
A. No. I think that the situation would be, as I've already said, that I would be expecting it to move. So I've said "Yes, we will move the price", but I couldn't put the prices until I had the deal sheet from Imperial Tobacco because I wouldn't know what they were.
Q. You see, we don't get this explanation in your witness statement. You deal with this document in paragraph 92. (Pause).
A. Well, it states there that I will be moving my retails, and the reason I'll be moving my retails is because Amber Leaf has gone up.
Q. The problem is that you have put to us an explanation for what happened on this occasion that doesn't appear in your witness statement. I am just wondering how that happened?
A. This is item 92 , document 31 ?
Q. Yes.
A. I've understood that the discount funding will be removed, which it states on there. I will therefore be increasing my prices which is what I've already said. We've no choice but to increase it because they were taking away the bonus.
Q. He doesn't say that in his email. What he actually says, if you go back to tab 31, and look at the first email in the string, he says:
"Hello, John. Following yesterday's increase in the retail prices of Amber Leaf, I would like to increase the retail prices of ITL's roll-your-own range as follows."
He then sets out the prices. It's after that that he says:
"These prices will be achieved by withdrawing the bonus support."
And asks you for confirmation of the date. You don't come back to him and say, "Well, you know, I am not sure that that's actually in Asda's interests to increase the prices, what about a bit of movement on the bonus? I don't like the fact that you're simply saying that you're going to withdraw the bonus in order to achieve these prices", nor do you go, apparently,
through this exercise of looking at cost prices and so on and so forth and comparing yourself with competitors; you respond immediately saying "This will be okay"?
A. That's because Amber Leaf had increased, in the market you would be expecting Drum and Golden Virginia to increase in price. That's all I can say, really.
MR LASOK: All right. I have no further questions.
THE CHAIRMAN: Mr Howard.
MR HOWARD: Yes.

## Cross-examination by MR HOWARD

MR HOWARD: Just a couple of questions, Mr Jolliff.
I think as well as tobacco, you worked in retail, I think, for something like 30 years; is that right?
A. That's why I've got grey hair.
Q. I've got grey hair too, and I haven't worked in retail, it may be something else that causes that.

I think you have told us you worked in beer and soft drinks. What else did you work in, other than those?
A. Oh, lots of things. When I first started work -I don't want to give you a life history.
Q. I do not want a life history, I am interested in your experience in the grocery trade, in the supermarket world. Can you tell us the sort of things that you have dealt with, that's what I am interested in.
A. Out of buying as well?

## 31

Q. As a buyer.
A. As a buyer, I bought Christmas puddings, sauces, pickles, that's when I first started with Asda, then they realised that I had something to offer, so they set me onto bigger things. Then I got the portfolio of soft drinks, which is one of the biggest portfolios that anybody could have, from my then boss, who was John Lee, he was the controller. I then got promoted to senior buyer, when I got that particular product.
Q. So senior buyer, what portfolio did you have responsibility for there?
A. I had soft drinks there, and I bought that, I can't remember, it was a long time.
Q. You have talked about what you call deal sheets, and are they a feature of the grocery market, or at least Asda's way of running its business?
A. Yes.
Q. Just so we understand it, explain to us what deal sheets are, what their function is, let's say across the board?
A. You know the sheets that Gallaher's and Imperial send in.
Q. Yes.
A. They were more or less single sheets of those. So every single -- take, for example, Coca-Cola. If you had Coca-Cola products and there was a manufacturers' price
increase, you would get a deal sheet for every single line. So if they had 300 lines you would get 300 lines. If there was a change in bonus, so say, for example --
Q. You are going too far. I am going to come to that, but it's helpful if we just break it down. What I am trying to find out is the extent to which these what you are calling deal sheets are a feature of the supermarket grocery business, or are they limited to tobacco?
A. The --
Q. That's what we are personally interested in. So can you explain to us the extent to which they apply to products generally and whether they are any different in relation to tobacco as opposed to soft drinks.
A. It's just the way the grocery trade works, we use what we call deal sheets and tobacco uses these different kind of sheets.
Q. Are the sheets in tobacco in any respect different from the sheets in Coca-Cola?
A. No, it's just that they have to be single lines and not all on one --
Q. Say that again?
A. They have to be for single lines. So you get one for Coca-Cola 2-litre, Diet Coca-Cola, et cetera, et cetera, eight pack, 12 pack, 24 pack, and it's the self-same thing, costs.

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Q. Right.

THE CHAIRMAN: Do they all have an Asda shelf price on them suggested by the manufacturer?
A. Suggested but you have no need to particular to that.

MR HOWARD: Right. Okay, we have established that, that they are essentially the same.
The next thing I just want to consider with you: we know from your evidence that, and we know from everybody, one knows it from general knowledge anyway, that the supermarkets benchmark against each other. So Asda is benchmarking against Tesco, I think, and Morrisons and so on.
A. My brief was, as I've already said, Tesco, Sainsbury's, Somerfield, Morrisons, et cetera, et cetera, and we were far cheaper than say, for example, convenience stores.
Q. Yes. Now, we understand that, but I just want to explore this benchmarking thing a little further. Again, looking at suppliers in the supply chain in the grocery market. To what extent do suppliers monitor the selling prices of their competing products in the supermarkets and benchmark themselves?
A. The vast majority of them do it. Obviously there are smaller companies that don't, but the vast majority.
Q. In other words, is there anything unusual about a supplier, whether he is of tobacco, dog food, soft
drinks, whatever it is, being interested in the selling price of his brand and of the competing brand?
A. No.
Q. The system of bonuses, can you tell us, again because you have this wider experience of the grocery market and I am interested in knowing the extent to which this system of bonuses prevails in the grocery market, bonuses in order to reduce your selling price. To what extent is that something you find?
A. We used to promote on a two weekly or four weekly basis. So say, for example, your bonuses would be paid off-invoice and not retrospective, so the price you got was the price you paid. And I mentioned earlier, but I don't think ... say, for example, you got a two week or a four week promotional period -- I am making this up, this isn't ... say for example it's 2-litre Coca-Cola. You would have two deal sheets for it.

So you would then be in a situation where the price may be coming down for, say, 99 p to 87 p or wherever it may be. You would then have a date when it finishes. So to make things easier, if the promotion began on 1 January, the promotion would begin on Monday, 1 January, and it would then finish, for example, on 30 January. What you would do, you would input the cost prices for a promotion, because it was off-invoice, so 35

> there was no retros, off-invoice and then that price would revert when the bonus ended. So say, for example, it finished on 30 January, that bonus would end and the price would go up automatically on 30 January. That's why you get problems at store level where the POS might say a different price because the store hasn't removed it, but it's been removed by the computer on what you call a revert.

THE CHAIRMAN: Is this what happened in the time we are talking about as well as now? Our understanding was that the computer systems were slightly less sophisticated at the period that we are discussing.
MR HOWARD: I think that's only true of Morrisons. I think Morrisons had a slightly surprisingly out of date computer system. I don't think it was true for -- the witness can tell us.

Asda between 2000 and 2003, to what extent, how sophisticated was the computer system that it operated at that stage?
A. It was quite, you know, sophisticated.

MR HOWARD: I think Morrisons were in an unusual position, because at that stage although they were a FTSE 100 company, they were confined to the north of England and things changed a lot as a result of their massive expansion with the Safeway takeover.

DR SCOTT: But I think what we are hearing is that the
computer -- in other words, the price when you scanned
it at the till had changed, but sometimes the price on the shelf, the little paper thingy, had not changed.
I think that's the point he was making.
MR HOWARD: Yes. That goes to really the efficiency of changing the prices.
A. Can I explain the reason why that's done. The reason why it's done is that we don't want to create a lot of hassle between the suppliers and Asda over incorrect bonuses, because all it's doing is wasting the supplier's money and wasting Asda's money and wasting everybody's money if you have the incorrect bonus. If you've got the correct bonus up and it comes up, everybody knows they are okay, and that's why in the grocery industry you used to have these revert retails.
MR HOWARD: Okay. We have established --
A. For example, for example, like on beer, if you got -beer can be quite highly priced, it can be $£ 12.99$ for a 12 pack, whatever it may be, or maybe a 24 pack. If you got that bonus wrong, you were in big problems. Created a lot of work.
Q. Okay. We have a picture of the benchmarking and the bonuses. I want to then go down to another level and just see if you can assist us about this. I am moving

## 37

outside of tobacco, and drawing on your experience. So if we take the soft drinks market, which I think you have spoken about, and I think at one point in your evidence you gave us an example of Coca-Cola and Pepsi Cola?
A. Yes.
Q. To what extent -- this is perhaps a statement of the obvious, but let's extract it from you -- are Pepsi Cola and Coca-Cola in competition?
A. They hate one another.
Q. What?
A. They hate one another, basically.
Q. To what --
A. They were very, very, how can I put it -- they watched one another like ...
Q. Hawks I think is probably the expression one would use.
A. Hawks, yes.
Q. To what extent were you, as the soft drink buyer at Asda, aware (a) of their watching each other like hawks -- well, tell me that: to what extent would you be aware of that?
A. They were equally as bad. To me it was bad.
Q. If we take the Pepsi/Coke thing, let's take cans of Coke that you sell in a pack of six, so you have six cans of Coke of whatever the standard size is, and six cans of

Pepsi Cola again sold in a pack. To what extent are the two suppliers benchmarking, seeking to benchmark themselves to ensure that their prices, one doesn't have a price advantage over the other?
A. They would look at the -- they would go out price checking to, for example, everybody, Tesco, Sainsbury, and check it out, and they would look at the retails that are out there and they would compare the retails. If, for example, I had done a deal with Pepsi, for example if I had gone down from 99p to 75p, I wouldn't go and tell Coca-Cola that I am going down in price to 75p, but Coca-Cola would phone me up by saying "What's going on here, John?" And the fact of the matter would be, we have gone down to 75 p because we have this price promotion on which is fully funded, and I would say "Would you like to do that?"
Q. Yes, and what would they very often say?
A. Well, they would say "Not at this particular time" or they might say "Yes, we will fund it".
Q. If they did say "Yes, we will fund it", what did that means in terms of your margin and what they had to do?
A. They would ensure that our margins were enhanced and that it was worthwhile for Asda to bring the prices down.
Q. Right.

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A. So we didn't lose any money.
Q. Right. If in your example Pepsi had come down to 75 p as a result of the promotion, but Coca-Cola national account manager or whatever they call them has rung you up and said "What's going on?" It becomes clear there is a Pepsi promotion, and you get to a situation where he says "Okay, I want to promote as well to get to 75 p ". To what extent would you decide whether or not you were prepared to do that? What influences you?
A. Well, depending on what -- how much bonus he had given me. If he had given me more than that, I would probably go to a lower price. If it was a cost price which was the same, I would probably go to the same price.
Q. To what extent, can you explain to us, the way in which you dealt with, say, Pepsi and Coca-Cola, to what extent was that different, as far as you were concerned, to the way in which you dealt with Imperial, Gallaher and Rothmans?
A. There was no real difference.
Q. No real difference. Thank you. Now, the Office of Fair Trading I think today, they asked you a question which was by reference to the trading agreement which you have at tab 53. \{D14/53/148\}. If you turn to tab 53, you can see it says:
"Subject to Imperial Tobacco's requirements on [and

I am going to read out what's there because I can waive the confidence] [redacted] strategic pricing being met, ITL will make a quarterly payment to Asda of [redacted] per thousand on all cigarette purchases."

Now, you signed this in June 2002. What did you understand you were obliged to do, if anything, as a result of this?
A. I wasn't obliged to do anything.
Q. If, for instance, your strategic pricing did not comply with ITL's targets, say, did you understand that you were exposing Asda to any liability as a result of that?
A. No.
Q. You were then taken to, a little bit later, tab 56.
$\{D 14 / 56 / 156\}$. I think you were asked some questions, the question that was put to you is that there was a payment in return for compliance with strategic P\&Ds, parity and differential requirements, and that you were committing Asda to comply with the parity and differential requirements.
Now, the first question I wanted to just get clear: as far as you were concerned, were you committing Asda to complying with the parity and differential requirements?
A. No, because I set the retails.
Q. As far as you were concerned, could there have been any 41
doubt from Imperial's perspective as to whether or not you were committing yourself in any way?
A. I don't think so, because they paid the bonuses, the reason why they have paid the bonuses.
Q. Hidden within this question appears to be, because the case hasn't been explicitly put to you, a rather more convoluted case that the Office of Fair Trading is running. Although they haven't directly put this rather convoluted case to you, I need to just tease it out so that you can have a proper opportunity to deal with it.

What the Office of Fair Trading first appear to be saying is -- I want you to comment on each one of these scenarios -- that if Imperial chose to decrease its price, so let's say Richmond was being sold by you at $£ 3.34$ as a result of the bonuses that you have been given, and they chose to promote Richmond by saying to you, "We will give you an enhanced bonus to reduce the price by 5 p " and you did so, the Office of Fair Trading appears to be saying that, in that event, having reduced the price of Imperial, Imperial having paid you to do it, that it was a requirement as a result of the trading agreement that you should also reduce the price of the competing Gallaher product, here Dorchester.

Firstly, could you tell us whether you understood you were under such a requirement from Imperial?

1 A. No, there was no requirement whatsoever.
Q. Can you tell us what you would consider about the commercial sense of such a suggestion that Imperial has paid to reduce its price but it's being said at the same time it expects you to reduce the price of the Gallaher brand?
A. Well, I wouldn't reduce the price of the Gallaher brand because I was getting no funding from Gallaher's to reduce the price.
Q. Yes.
A. So Asda would be losing money.
Q. Now, it's then said that if Imperial, having paid a bonus to you, then withdraws the bonus -- and you were shown an example of this at tab 31 -- this was a situation at tab 31, do you remember this email, you looked at a moment ago?
A. Golden Virginia and --
Q. Yes. This was a situation where Imperial was following, it was withdrawing its bonus because Amber Leaf had -it would appear Gallaher had withdrawn a bonus relating to Amber Leaf, so the price of Amber Leaf had gone up. Correct? Now, what I want to ask you about, I'll come back to that situation in a moment, but assume instead of Imperial following Amber Leaf what they had decided was they had had enough of paying you all this money, in 43
respect of let's say Richmond, and they withdraw their bonus partially, so they have taken the price of Richmond down from $£ 3.34$ to $£ 3.29$, and then they put it back up again by withdrawing the bonus.

If we just separate that out in stages. If they withdraw the bonus so that -- and in order to maintain your margin the price has to go up, what would you normally do?
A. I would ask the reason why the price is going up in the first place.
Q. Yes.
A. And then if they give me a valid reason for putting the price up, because for various reasons --
Q. Yes.
A. I would take an overview as to what retail I would go to.
Q. Yes, and if their reason was "we just can't afford to do this any more, continue paying you this bonus, so we are not going to do it" then what?
A. I would eventually put the price up to the agreed level that I would want to go to, not what Imperial wanted to go to.
Q. Right. Now, if that occurs, so that you have put up the price of Imperial to 3.34, and let's assume that at the same time that Gallaher have paid you a bonus to get
their product down to $£ 3.29$, and Gallaher don't do anything, they are still paying you the bonus, do you do anything to the Gallaher product because you have put the Imperial product up?
A. No, because the bonus would still be in situ, which would keep the retailer at 3.29. Had we expected Imperial to come back to me and say -- we are going to have to bring it back down again.
Q. Then take a different situation, but it is the other side of the coin: Gallaher decides to decrease the price of its product, here Dorchester, because it wants to get a competitive advantage, it says "I'll pay you 5 p, Mr Jolliff, to get our product down to $£ 3.29$ ". Assume they do that. As far as you were concerned, if Imperial wants to come back to compete, what does it have to do?
A. It would have to match -- if the retail price came down from -- on the Gallaher's brand, and Imperial approached me, they would have to ensure that the deal that they gave me was good enough for me to bring the price down and then I would make a decision on the retail.
Q. Yes. If Imperial did not approach you, would you do anything to Imperial's product?
A. No, because I couldn't afford to do it.
Q. Right. Then if we go back to tab 31 , which is actually a specific example we can see what happened.
\{D14/31/77\}. Amber Leaf goes up because Gallaher withdraws its bonus. If Imperial do nothing, they having bonused their product to come down to compete with Amber Leaf, do you do anything to the price of their product?
A. No, I just leave it.
Q. Now, in relation to tab 31, Imperial having paid a bonus in respect of Drum, is there any basis on which you are entitled to say to them "you have to keep doing this, whether you like it or not"?
A. Well, you could say that to them, but the fact of the matter is that if they couldn't afford to do it or they were withdrawing the bonus, they would withdraw the bonus and I would be left with a price that I couldn't afford the margin.
Q. Just to consider two other final scenarios. One is the position of a manufacturers' price increase by Imperial. So Imperial decides it's going to put up, let's say, across the board the price of its cigarettes by $6 p$ a pack, and they then produce a new price file to reflect that. As far as you were concerned, and assume Gallaher has done nothing at this stage, they haven't announced their MPI, did you have to do anything as far as you were concerned to the price of the Gallaher product?
A. No.
Q. Did Imperial at any stage suggest to you that "we require you to move the price of Gallaher's products if we change our price"?
A. No.
Q. In the case of a Gallaher MPI, so the Gallaher price goes up, did you understand -- let's say Gallaher put up their prices by $6 p$ and Imperial hasn't yet announced whether it's having an MPI at all, were you, as far as you were concerned, required by Imperial to do anything with the price of its products?
A. Could you just repeat that?
Q. Yes. The OFT appears to be saying, still appears to be their case as far as we can understand it, that where Gallaher put up the price of its cigarettes as a result -- I've already discussed with you where they withdraw a bonus. So now this is where Gallaher has an MPI. So it puts up the price across the board of 6 p . Again, if we take it in stages. As I understand it, what then happens is you get a price file where the prices of Gallaher products go up. Correct? If we then assume Imperial hasn't had an MPI, and it doesn't send through a price file changing the price of its brands in any way, what, if anything, did you understand you were required to do with the selling price of Imperial's 47

## products?

A. I would just leave the prices where they are, because there was no manufacturers' price increase, it was just from Gallaher's.

## Q. Yes.

THE CHAIRMAN: Can I just ask the question a slightly different way: what was your understanding that ITL wanted you to do, whether you were required to do it or not, what did you think they would want you to do in those circumstances?
A. If there was a manufacturers' price increase?

THE CHAIRMAN: The scenario that Mr Howard put to you.
MR HOWARD: We will take the two situations. Where Imperial puts up its price, has a manufacturers' price increase, and Gallaher hasn't done anything, the Chairman is asking you: what did you understand Imperial wanted you to do to the Gallaher product in that event?
A. Let's get this straight. Imperial have put the prices up --
Q. Of their product.
A. -- of their product by 6 p. Provided it was verified that I could put the prices up, I could put the prices up of the Imperial product and Gallaher's products I would leave them exactly where they are.
Q. Did you understand that Imperial had any expectation or
requirement or however you want to express it, that they had an expectation that you should, in order to satisfy them, do something to the Gallaher product?
A. No, I wouldn't move the Gallaher product, it would be uncompetitive. There would be somebody -- you just wouldn't do it.
Q. Equally, where the Gallaher product was put up in price by an MPI, what did you understand Imperial wanted you to do to their price, their selling price, they not having had an MPI for their product?
A. Just leave the Imperial products where they were and the Gallaher prices would go up.
Q. Right. Then the final point I wanted to ask you about was your evidence about cost prices, and at various stages in your witness statement you explain that you set cost prices, selling prices on the basis of the cost prices and your margins. Okay?
Now -- you are nodding, as I understand it that's what you have said in your witness statement?
A. Yes, that's right.
Q. You were then asked a question about a specific example where, in that example, I haven't actually seen the underlying figures, but the example was what was said -what you were asked to do was to compare the cost of Richmond on 25 February 2002 to the cost of Dorchester 49
in December 2001, and you were asked to explain why the selling prices in Asda were the same for those two products, although apparently the cost price of Dorchester was less than Richmond. You understand, that was the point that was being put to you?
A. Yes.
Q. In relation to that, I just want to see if I understand the position. Firstly, to what extent is it reliable to compare prices and costs in December 2001 with February 2002, do you know?
A. I don't honestly know.
Q. Let's assume that it is for a moment a reliable exercise. As I understand it, you get these selling sheets, or the deal sheets, from the two manufacturers, and in the same way you get them from Coca-Cola and Pepsi and so on when you were dealing with soft drinks. Now, what is the exercise you do when you get the Imperial sheet? What are you actually doing when you look through it and then decide what price to sell at?
A. You would have the previous deal sheets and you would compare your costs, your margins, et cetera, et cetera, to ensure that you are getting a better deal or an equal deal to what you have, and then you would re-set your retail price around that.
Q. Right. Of course, insofar as one finds that the selling

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prices in Asda to -- insofar as they reflect, and there

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prices in Asda to -- insofar as they reflect, and there
is an issue as to the extent to which they did, but
is an issue as to the extent to which they did, but
insofar as from time to time they reflect the
insofar as from time to time they reflect the
differentials that Imperial had been seeking -- sorry,
differentials that Imperial had been seeking -- sorry,
let me start again.
let me start again.
Insofar as the selling prices -- may I just look at
Insofar as the selling prices -- may I just look at
one point?
one point?
THE CHAIRMAN: Well, Mr Howard, I've delayed our having our
THE CHAIRMAN: Well, Mr Howard, I've delayed our having our
mid-morning break, thinking that you were about to come
mid-morning break, thinking that you were about to come
to an end.
to an end.
MR HOWARD: Yes.
MR HOWARD: Yes.
THE CHAIRMAN: But perhaps if you are not immediately coming
THE CHAIRMAN: But perhaps if you are not immediately coming
to an end, we should --
to an end, we should --
MR HOWARD: There is a point my attention is being drawn to
MR HOWARD: There is a point my attention is being drawn to
which I think I might want to draw the Tribunal's
which I think I might want to draw the Tribunal's
attention to.
attention to.
THE CHAIRMAN: Well, would it be convenient then to have
THE CHAIRMAN: Well, would it be convenient then to have
a ten-minute break?

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    a ten-minute break?
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## MR HOWARD: Yes.

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THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. We will come back at just after
ten past 12.
( 12.04 pm )
(A short break)
(12.15 pm)
MR HOWARD: Mr Jolliff, just a couple more questions.
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I want to go back one stage, just help me with this: what did you understand was the nature of the competition between Imperial and Gallaher at the time that you were involved?
A. They were very competitive.
Q. How did that competition manifest itself? What were they doing in order to compete with each other?
A. Well, they were obviously in a situation where, with these particular brands like Dorchester and Richmond, et cetera, trying to keep people smoking, and because of this they were really keen on price, which is like any other manufacturer.
Q. Yes. Of course, other manufacturers, were they entitled to advertise? Was Coca-Cola entitled to advertise?
A. Yes, they advertised everywhere.
Q. The tobacco manufacturers, we know it's not a secret, they faced what was at this time the growing dark market and restrictions on their ability to advertise. So for them, in relation to this competition, how important was price?
A. That's all they had. All they had was price. And all we had was price as well.
Q. To what extent was price being used as far as you could see by them to achieve a competitive position?
A. They were trying to be as competitive as possible.
Q. Thank you for that. If we take the situation where, you explained to us they were trying to be competitive, Gallaher puts up its price of its products which, let's say, include Dorchester. So it puts up Dorchester by $6 p$, and Imperial doesn't do anything at that stage.

Now, going back to this question that the Chairman was asking you as to what, in that circumstance, Imperial wanted, having explained to us the competitive environment, are you aware of any reason in that circumstance why Imperial would have wanted the price of its product to be put up if it hasn't done anything?
A. No.
Q. Moving on to a different point, you will need a different file for this, could you be given core bundle volume 1, which is the ITL appeal bundle, and for this purpose I want you to turn to tab 3, which is ITL's appeal in respect of Asda, and I want you to turn to page 23 of that, is internal page numbering 23 , and page 389 of the bundle itself in the right-hand corner. \{C1/3/389\}.
A. Is that the page with all the graphs on?
Q. It is, yes. I want to set in context Mr Lasok's questions against the graph of actually what was happening. Just wait a moment while the Tribunal locate the document. (Pause). Is your copy coloured?
A. It is, yes.
Q. Does the Tribunal all have the relevant page?

What we have here is a graph which is comparing in Asda the selling prices of Richmond and Dorchester, and zero is parity, and then where you see things going above and below the line, that tells you the extent to which, at the relevant time, actually these products were being sold at the same price. Okay?
A. Right.
Q. So what one sees is, between 2001 and 2002, there are periods -- considerable periods in fact -- where Richmond appears to be significantly below Dorchester, and then there are short periods where it was above Dorchester. Do you see that?
A. Yeah.
Q. Firstly, seeing that, you were then, if you just remind yourself about what you were asked to compare was -- you were shown the two documents, one which was I think dated December 2001, and the other was February 2002. But seeing this graph of actually what was happening, can you help us as to what it was that would motivate you to price Richmond and Dorchester in this way? What would be --
A. It would be the bonuses that the suppliers were giving me.

# Q. Just explain to us -- it may be obvious -- how the bonuses feed through into (a) your margin and (b) then the selling price? <br> A. If the supplier gave me a bonus to bring the price down, the price would go down. If they gave me a -- took the bonus off, the price would go up. <br> Q. Yes. Insofar as, again if we look at this graph, Richmond is at various periods being sold for less than Dorchester. What conclusion do you draw in those periods as to the cost price of Richmond to Asda? <br> THE CHAIRMAN: Do we see on this graph the price of Richmond? <br> MR HOWARD: What we are seeing is a comparison of the two. <br> THE CHAIRMAN: Well, but it's the differentials. As I understand it, this is not showing the price of Richmond and the price of Dorchester, it's tracking how the differentials between them move. 

MR HOWARD: Yes, but that shows you that Richmond -- where you are below the line -- is that much cheaper than Dorchester. Where it's a flat line, they are at the same price; and where it's above, then Richmond is not at parity, it's actually more expensive. That's the effect of it.

THE CHAIRMAN: I am not sure that's ...
MR HOWARD: Well, I am not sure I understand what ... the
blue line is actual difference in retail price.
DR SCOTT: To make life simpler, do we have the underlying data somewhere in the files?

MR HOWARD: I don't know that we do. It is somewhere in the files, and I don't have -- all that this data is being -- it's not made up.
DR SCOTT: No, we are not suggesting that. It's just that sometimes it's clearer to look at the matrix of the numbers.
MR HOWARD: We can certainly try and supply you with that, but it is actually -- I am not sure --
THE CHAIRMAN: Why is it you say, when the blue line is below zero, that that means that it's Richmond which is lower?

## (Pause)

MR HOWARD: The answer is the whole of the comparison is comparing -- the blue line is always Richmond, and where Richmond starts is it's more expensive before the repositioning. That's why you start, you have a position actually which was 10 p above but sometimes it was actually considerably above, and then there were periods where it drops down. What it's doing is tracking Richmond against Dorchester. So where the blue line is dropping down, the blue line is tracking Richmond. You are right, it's tracking it in terms of
differentials, but if one is trying to see whether -because we know ...
THE CHAIRMAN: So the descriptions of what the lines are is shorthand, if I can use that expression.
MR HOWARD: Which description are you referring to?
THE CHAIRMAN: When it says the blue line, "Actual difference in retail price".
MR HOWARD: Yes, that's right. It's how much the actual difference was.
DR SCOTT: So it looks as though, if one looks at the period where the Richmond has been repositioned, so it's the difference in RRP is now parity, it looks as though we have periods of a week or two of difference occurring. I was wondering how that fitted into the two week and four week promotional periods Mr Jolliff has talked about and maybe --
A. That was on grocery.

DR SCOTT: That was on grocery.
A. With tobacco, that could go on for -- until further notice.

## DR SCOTT: Right.

A. Depending when the bonuses were withdrawn or given.

DR SCOTT: So it could be much shorter periods or a much longer period?
A. That's right.

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DR SCOTT: Thank you.
MR HOWARD: I think that the inference you are drawing is not necessarily correct, because in order to have got Richmond down, they paid considerable bonuses for a considerable period of time.
DR SCOTT: Yes, that's what is puzzling me. What appears to be happening is, if you take the big spike, it goes walloping down for what looks like a week or some short period, then it --
MR HOWARD: Well, that's because probably --
THE CHAIRMAN: Can we limit ourselves to questions to Mr Jolliff for the moment, as we have him in the witness box.
MR HOWARD: Of course.
THE CHAIRMAN: So what is it you are asking him about this table?
MR HOWARD: Just before I ask that, I don't want to ask questions without the Tribunal not understanding, or saying the draft isn't showing what I --
THE CHAIRMAN: I understand now what it is you say the graph shows.
MR HOWARD: Okay.
Now, Mr Jolliff, looking at the graph, what one sees is that during 2001, from the middle of 2001, going into 2002, that the difference in retail price between

Richmond and Dorchester, for considerable periods or for certain periods, certain weeks, was favouring Richmond and for some of the time they were at the same price and some of the time it was favouring Dorchester. I just wanted you to explain to us what it would be that would cause these shifts in the differentials over this period?
A. It would be -- with the case of Richmond, it would be the bonuses that Imperial were giving. With the case of Dorchester, it would be the bonuses that Dorchester or Gallaher's are giving, to bring down the price of Dorchester, so that we are losing sales.
Q. Right. This, where we see things moving up and down, what does that tell us about the competitive environment as you perceived it?
A. That is what tobacco is like. I mean, it's highly competitive because, as I've said earlier, it's the retail price which is all you have, you have no advertising at all. So it's the retail price that's driving. So the bonuses are driving the price.
Q. So there we see differentials. Now, in periods where Asda was -- for instance, where Asda is pricing Richmond at a greater differential, in other words they are not pricing Richmond at the same price as Dorchester, they are pricing it below, what does that tell us about the

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> cost price, the relative cost price of Richmond as against Dorchester?
A. The cost price of Richmond should be lower than the Dorchester price.
Q. Right. Conversely, where Richmond was being priced more expensively than Dorchester --
A. It would be the opposite way around.
Q. Right, and where they are being priced at the same amount, generally what is that telling us about the cost prices?
A. The cost prices would be near as dammit very close to one another, but the margin which drives my cost price would give you that price.
MR HOWARD: Thank you very much indeed.
THE CHAIRMAN: We have some questions from the Tribunal before re-examination.
MR FLYNN: Very well, Madam.
Questioned by THE TRIBUNAL
DR SCOTT: Mr Jolliff, you talked quite a lot about the margins, and how the prices went up and down, as we see on this graph, depending on the bonusing. Can we just step back from that for a moment? As we understand it, tobacco is pretty inelastic; in other words, demand hasn't slumped despite the duty going up. We do appreciate that, as between Asda and other retailers, it

> mattered considerably what the differential prices were between Asda, Tesco, Sainsbury's and so on. Yes? But we have also learnt that whereas some customers are very brand loyal, there are other customers who are price sensitive. From the point of view of seeking to keep or to capture price sensitive consumers, what would matter to a manufacturer?
A. That he's got the correct retail price.

DR SCOTT: Right, and they would be monitoring that, as we have heard.
A. Yes.

DR SCOTT: And their concern would be with the correct retail price or its relationship to the prices of their competitors?
A. That's right, yeah.

DR SCOTT: So their prime concern is the relation of the prices to their competitors. And you, as you have emphasised to us, are the person who sets the Asda prices, so if a manufacturer is trying to influence the prices in Asda, who does he come to?
A. He comes to the buyer.

DR SCOTT: He comes to the buyer, and if he wants to make an agreement, who does he come to?
A. He comes to the buyer.

DR SCOTT: He comes to the buyer. So as a buyer, you 61
expected them to come to you, and your evidence has been that prices went up and down with the bonuses. If we look at the letter in tab 2 in volume 14. \{D14/2/6\}.
A. Yes.

DR SCOTT: Here we see -- and we can probably track it on one of these graphs -- what's going to be a temporary reduction, you can see that in the last paragraph:
"We would like this activity to start when
Mayfair 20s price moves down and then when the price returns to its normal level."

So here we have an example of one of these dips taking place, and Mr Downham writes to you:
"As always, this activity will be fully funded."
Does that meet your expectations of a typical instance of this happening?
A. Yeah, it's got to be fully funded, so Asda don't lose money.
DR SCOTT: So your expectation, then, would be that this would be a typical sort of letter in the cat and mouse procedure?
A. Yes.

DR SCOTT: Thank you very much. That helps me.
THE CHAIRMAN: Just going back to the similarities or differences between tobacco and soft drinks, you have referred on a number of occasions to the thinness of the
margins in relation to tobacco. Would it be right to say that, in relation to soft drinks it was more likely that Asda would self-fund a promotion for its own benefit, even if it wasn't getting that funded by the manufacturers? That was more likely to happen in other groceries than in tobacco?
A. That could be the case, because there were bigger margins, but also what you have to remember is that, with soft drinks, you can take price out of the product, whereas with tobacco you can't price out of the product.
So as an example, many, many moons ago I listed the first PET bottle of lemonade at 38 p. That self-same bottle of lemonade when I left soft drinks -- a long, long, while ago, I must admit -- was 19 p. The reason for that was we were driving prices down because of Aldi and Netto coming in, and we were taking it -- you changed the top at the top, make it cheaper, but safer, make the bottle thinner, take the bottom off the bottle, you had got a little thin bottle. You take sugar out of the actual lemonade, if it's lemonade, and before you know where you are you have gone from 38p to 19p. But you can't do that with tobacco.
THE CHAIRMAN: With a promotion, an Asda funded promotion in respect of another grocery product, say, Coca-Cola and Pepsi Cola, if Asda were doing their own promotion,

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would they tend to have a promotion across all soft drinks, so bring down the price of all the brands, or would they bring down the price of one brand and not the other?
A. It would be selected items.

THE CHAIRMAN: Right. This point about the fact that the agreement was signed in June 2002 but applied from January 2002, and you mentioned that you had already got the two quarters' worth of retro bonus. We have seen the figure that there is set in the agreement, which I think is a confidential figure of pence per thousand. Was that the same pence per thousand as you had already been getting then in the first two quarters?
A. Yes.

THE CHAIRMAN: How was that pence per thousand arrived at, then, by the January 2002?
A. I don't honestly know. It would be based on your rate of sale.
THE CHAIRMAN: Perhaps to put the question a different way: did you understand, as from January 2002 that that pence per thousand was being given for the same things as are set down in the June 2002 --
A. Yes.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. So the June 2002 agreement, as we have seen written, was really putting in written form what
was already the case as far as you were concerned.
A. Yes.

THE CHAIRMAN: Okay. Dr Scott has asked you some questions
about the fact that I think you realised that the
manufacturers were looking very closely at their relative retail prices in the stores. Were you aware that the strategic pricing differentials that were set out in a document like we have seen at tab 54 -- I think you are familiar with that?
A. Yes.

THE CHAIRMAN: -- that those reflected the RRPs, the published RRP differentials?
A. In some cases, but I never really went back to the document where it showed you the details. If you can understand what I mean.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. Did you understand at the time that when ITL were suggesting in the deal sheets what your RSP should be, that in making that suggestion they would be taking into account what they knew about the pricing of competing brands in the market?
A. Sorry, could you repeat that question again?

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. When you got the deal sheet and it had the RSP in it, which is the price that ITL were suggesting to you you should price in your stores --
A. Yes.

THE CHAIRMAN: -- did you understand that, as part of their calculation of that price that they are suggesting to you, that would reflect their aspirations as to where their product should be priced relative to the competing Gallaher product?
A. That could be possible, but I would look at the margin to set my retail. I wouldn't look at --
THE CHAIRMAN: No, just what your understanding was of how they arrived at the price that they were suggesting?
A. It's a possibility.

THE CHAIRMAN: Only a possibility, or would you have expected them to be setting that RSP to reflect the --
A. It depends, because say, for example, it was a manufacturers' price increase and it went up 5p, I would expect the product to go up 5 p and so would the public. Self-same thing with the Budget, if it went up 10 p , you would expect it to go for 10 p .
When the prices were going up and down, it depends. Say, for example -- again I am making these prices up, because it was a long while ago -- say, for example, Richmond was 3.49 and prior to that it was 3.69 , I would expect it to go back up to 3.69. If it was going down, for example, from 3.49, I would be expecting it to go down go down to 3.29. But I wouldn't be looking at Gallaher's or anything like that, I would just be
looking at the ITL pricing.
THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, but I am just thinking of what you understood they would have been looking at in suggesting those prices. Did you understand that those prices were an expression of their hopes as to where their product would be priced in relation to --
A. That would obviously be their hope, but it doesn't necessarily mean that it would be actually the case.

## THE CHAIRMAN: No.

A. I mean, I can remember one incident where there was a price increase where I think it went up $6 p$. It went up 6 p, and some of the prices went up 7 p and I moved the $6 p$ and then got all the suppliers saying "Hold on a minute, you need to fund this down, because we are not going up 7 p because it should be 6 p in the agreement."
THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.
Any questions, Mr Flynn?
MR FLYNN: Just one or two, Madam.
Re-examination by MR FLYNN
MR FLYNN: Mr Jolliff, just really to clarify one or two points in your evidence.
You signed the agreement in June 2002, and then the letter comes in, tab 54, the one that shows that sheet of the ITL strategic pricing aspirations.

Can you just tell the Tribunal how important in your 67
day-to-day price setting decisions that sheet would be?
A. It was of no importance whatsoever. In fact, could have thrown it in the bin because I never looked at it.
Q. You didn't look at it?
A. Because I was setting the prices.
Q. When you were setting the prices, you didn't think, "Well, one of the things I had better just check is whether this reflects that pricing issue?"
A. No.
Q. The agreement you signed in June 2002, it contains a bonus, a confidential but not very large amount that the Chairman has just referred to. Just to be clear, did ITL at any time before that, you know, during that six-month period, did you have any discussions with ITL about whether that bonus should be paid?
A. You know, it was automatically payable.
Q. You don't recall any discussion about whether it should be withheld?
A. No.
Q. You agreed with Mr Lasok, I think, that tobacco for Asda was not a high margin product, it was a must-have product and it drove footfall. Did that mean that you didn't drive hard bargains with the manufacturers?
A. I drove hard bargains because I think it's been said today where the margins had gone up over three years or
something, so I must have been driving bargains.
Q. There was one point which you raised that wasn't dealt with in any detail, I think, in your witness evidence, and it may assist the Tribunal. You mentioned a solus agreement for the Sterling brand?
A. Yes.
Q. Could you explain very shortly what that was about?
A. Gallaher's were our category captains, and a suggestion was put to me about a brand called -- well, in fact it wasn't Sterling, I could have selected any names, but I just happened to select Sterling, and this brand was put in just above own label and in between various brands, again to drive for six months, we had six months solus, and after that Tesco's --
Q. What does solus mean?
A. Solus is just to Asda.

THE CHAIRMAN: Exclusive?
A. Exclusive to Asda. It was six months only. I wanted a year, they wouldn't give me a year. And then Tesco got it as well in the following year, but I can't remember the exact dates.
DR SCOTT: So this was just above Balmoral, is it?
A. Yeah. Because Balmoral had been there for years and years and years, and nobody -- you know, people -- it was getting stale, was the brand, so we put this 69
particular brand in.
MR FLYNN: Madam Chairman, you will stop me if you think you didn't get a clear answer, but I thought perhaps you could have been assisted.
The Chairman asked you this scenario: if Imperial have a price increase and Gallaher do that, and you put up the prices on your shelves of Imperial products and you do not move your Gallaher prices, what is Imperial's reaction? What is Mr Hall going to say to you at that point?
A. He would want me to drive -- get hold of Gallaher's and get the prices up which it's not in my interests --
Q. Would he have said to you "why have you not put up your Gallaher prices?"
A. Yes, he would do, yeah.
Q. What would your answer be?
A. Basically it's got nothing to do with Imperial Tobacco.
Q. There were a couple of examples --

THE CHAIRMAN: Would he then say "Wait a minute, you signed this agreement in June 2002, why aren't you abiding by that?"
A. I don't think so. Can I just sort of point out that on price increases, the suppliers have to give four weeks' notice to Asda for a price increase. So the likelihood is that I would know that there is a price increase
coming down the track, and there is probably a distinct possibility that either one of the two parties that we are talking about would know that within a certain, you know, period, that one or the other would be going up. Not at the same time, but ...
MR FLYNN: But would Mr Hall say "Look, you have put my price up and I would expect you to put Gallaher prices up as well."
A. Well, Imperial Tobacco wanted to put the prices up, because there was a manufacturers' price increase, it had been agreed by myself as a manufacturers' price increase so --
Q. That's for their prices but what about the Gallaher prices? Is Mr Hall going to say to you "I expect, when I increase my prices and you correspondingly put up the Imperial brands, you should put the Gallaher brands up as well, that's what I expect, it's our deal"?
A. Well, he would probably expect it but he wouldn't get it because the cost prices haven't gone up and we wouldn't be stupid enough to put the prices up if we hadn't got a price increase.
Q. There were just a couple of points of detail. There were a couple of examples when Mr Lasok effectively said "Well, you could have tried harder", the Amber Leaf and Drum thing, you didn't say to Mr Downham, I think it

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was, at the time, "Why are you withdrawing this bonus? I want to keep it" or "I want to keep some of it".
The other example which was the rather more elaborate one was the difference between cost prices between Gallaher's Dorchester brand and Imperial's Richmond brand, if you remember those.
In the case of the Amber Leaf and Drum one, something is happening on a Tuesday, 20 March 2001, and you put into effect price increases in the Imperial brands with effect from the following Monday.
Is there something magic about Monday?
A. Monday is the day all the prices move. Or it was then. I believe it's changed now, I think they move at any other time.
Q. When you say "all prices move"?
A. Well, grocery prices, tobacco prices.

THE CHAIRMAN: If they are going to move, they will move on a Monday?
A. They will move on a Monday.

MR FLYNN: They will move on a Monday.
What would have happened if you had that Monday got in your car and gone round and seen that they had not moved in Tesco?
A. I would have been onto Imperial Tobacco like a shot saying "What on earth's going on here? I want funding
back down to that previous retail because so-and-so are at that price".
Q. In respect of the Richmond/Dorchester example that Mr Lasok gave you where in fact your cost price for Dorchester was a bit better than that for Richmond, and he says "Well, you could have sacrificed a bit of margin rather than going on the shelves at 3.44 ", what if you had seen that Dorchester was priced at 3.43 or 3.40 , say, in Tesco or Morrisons?
A. I would have been onto Gallaher's because Dorchester is a Gallaher brand.
Q. And if they said "Well, I am very sorry, we have given you a good price, we are not giving you any bonus, we are not going to give you any more" --
A. Because of the lack of margin I would have to stay where I was, couldn't afford to go down in price.
Q. You would stick at 3.44, even if Tesco were at 3.40, say; is that what you would do?
A. Yeah. And it used to word vice versa as well. I would phone up about Tesco and Tesco would say, whatever it is.
Q. You would try and get a better margin --
A. You'd try and get a better margin.
Q. A better bonus out of the manufacturer?
A. Yeah.

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MR FLYNN: I don't think I have any more questions at that point, Madam. Thank you, Mr Jolliff.
THE CHAIRMAN: Just wait one moment. (Pause). Thank you very much, Mr Jolliff --
A. Thank you.

THE CHAIRMAN: -- for your evidence, and I can release you from the witness box.
A. Thank you very much indeed.
(The witness withdrew)
MR FLYNN: Our next witness is Mr Mason, Madam.
THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, but we will take our break. We will
come back then at five to 2 .
( 12.55 pm )
(The short adjournment)
( 1.55 pm )
MR FLYNN: Madam, with the Tribunal's permission, we will call Mr Mason.
THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.
MR GUY HURLSTONE MASON (sworn)
Examination-in-chief by MR FLYNN
THE CHAIRMAN: Good afternoon. Please sit down, Mr Mason. MR FLYNN: Mr Mason, would you please just give the Tribunal your full name for the record?
A. It's Guy Hurlstone Mason.
Q. Could Mr Mason be given core bundle 10. Within that
file, Mr Mason, could you turn to tab 110.
$\{\mathrm{C} 10 / 110 / 406\}$. Do you see there a witness statement?
A. I do.
Q. If you turn to the end, the last page of that tab, is that your signature?
A. It is.
Q. I think you said that you needed to update paragraph 1 of your witness statement, if you would turn back to the beginning.
A. Yes.
Q. If you could tell the Tribunal what you are currently up to?
A. Yes, I am now employed on a permanent basis by William Morrison Supermarkets as head of government affairs.
Q. Otherwise, is this your evidence in these proceedings?
A. It is.
Q. And is it true?
A. It is.

MR FLYNN: Then Mr Lasok will have some questions for you on behalf of the Office of Fair Trading.

Cross-examination by MR LASOK
MR LASOK: Mr Mason, I think that you were the Asda tobacco buyer from summer 2002?
A. I was.

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Q. Can you remember approximately when in the summer?
A. I think it was around about May or June 2002.
Q. If you have your witness statement, could you possibly go to paragraph 10 , please.
I just want to run through certain parts of the witness statement, just to see that I've got what you are saying right.
In this paragraph 10 , you are referring to the RRPs and then the separate recommended selling prices or RSPs. In the final sentence you say:
"Asda generally priced below RRP on all brands, although often priced at its RSP."

Then in paragraph 11 you refer to the fact that the manufacturers would frequently refer to pricing particular brands at parity or within the given differential. In paragraph 12 you set out how you say the parities and differentials worked from your perspective. You talk about the parities and differentials being the aspirations of the manufacturers, and you say in the middle of the paragraph:
"However, it was never the case that Asda would alter a price at its own expense in order to maintain a brand at parity with another brand or at a fixed differential to that brand."

Is that a reference to Asda moving the price downwards?
A. It is.
Q. Yes. Then you say:
"We would only increase price if the manufacturer effectively altered the net cost price and thus forced us to raise our retail prices in order to maintain our margins, which were already very slim. Again, because of the thin margins, we would not routinely discount from RSP at our own expense as this would wipe out our profit, but we would look to the manufacturers for promotional discount funding so that we could lower the price to consumers."

Then if you go to paragraph 15 , here you start off by saying that the actual cost prices received by Asda were some degree lower than RRP. Can I just pause there? Is that the wholesale price?
A. Yes. From that, the RRP, they published cost prices which relate to the RRPs, which are then the published price lists, so that's what I meant by that.
Q. When you talk about the actual cost prices, are you talking about the actual price that Asda had to pay to ITL or Gallaher?
A. Correct.
Q. Then you say that the actual cost prices were lower than 77
the RRP and:
"... were designed to encourage Asda to sell at the RSP specified in pricing schedules received from the manufacturers."

You refer to the RSPs as only being recommended, but then in the next sentence you say:
"As the percentage margin was so small on tobacco products, we would normally look to price at RSP if this was competitive against the other retailers because otherwise we would not make any money on our sales."

Now, am I right in thinking, therefore, that Asda would normally or routinely price at the selling price indicated by the manufacturer in the price file?
A. In paragraph 15 I am using the RSP as a maximum. That's how I understand it.
Q. Well, my question wasn't directed at that. I was simply asking you this: am I right in thinking that Asda would normally or routinely price at the selling price indicated by the manufacturer in the price file?
A. That would most often be the case.
Q. Yes. Now, in paragraph 67 of your witness statement, right at the end of it, in the last sentence, you say:
"Typically pricing at RSP would mean that ITL's strategic pricing parity positions against Gallaher would also be satisfied as they set their cost prices at
levels that would enable this to happen, and often pricing at the Asda RSP was the most sensible commercial position for us."

Now, I am right in thinking, therefore, that Asda
knew at the time that the recommended selling prices --
THE CHAIRMAN: Well, ask him what he knew rather than what Asda knew.

MR LASOK: I am sorry.
Do I take it, therefore, that you knew at the time that the RSPs communicated to you, as the buyer, by the manufacturers were oriented around the manufacturers' parities and differentials?
A. Yes.
Q. By the time you appeared on the scene, the written trading agreement with Asda that was signed by Mr Jolliff was already in play.

Now, just so that you know what I am talking about, could you be given annex 14, please, and could you go to tab 53. \{D14/53/148\}. Could you cast your eye over this. Have you seen this before?
A. I have, yes.
Q. At the time when you were tobacco buyer, that's to say from June 2002, would you have seen it then?
A. I can't specifically remember, but perhaps. It is likely.

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Q. Right. We have on the third page of this document, under the heading "Trading Agreement Package", a little bit. Could you read that to yourself, please.
(Pause)
Have you finished reading it?
A. Yes.
Q. Thanks. Now if you go to tab $56,\{\mathrm{D} 14 / 56 / 156\}$, we have here a letter dated 13 August 2002 to Mr Lang from Imperial. Mr Lang was, I think, your superior, wasn't he?
A. He was, yes.
Q. Did you see this letter at the time?
A. More than likely.
Q. Could you look at the second paragraph of the letter, it's the one under the heading "Trade Development Programme Investment".
A. Okay.
Q. Now, the writer of the letter talks about the purpose of the trade development programme as being to ensure that.
"... we [and he seems to be referring to ITL] have the range of products available in your stores [that's to say the Asda stores] to meet consumer demand and onsale as prices which reflect the standard price list differentials against competing lines."

Was that also your understanding of the purpose of
the trade development programme?
A. It was what they stated was a part of it, yes.
Q. Well, I am actually asking whether it was your understanding?
A. I understood that it was written down, but it wouldn't really have affected the way I ran the department.
THE CHAIRMAN: You understood that at the time, that that was what they saw as the purpose of --
A. It's what they saw as the purpose, yes.

MR LASOK: Right.
If we go to the next page, there is a bit with the heading "Price Increase", and after the first holepunch there are a couple of sentences there which I'll read out. The writer of the letter says:
"I also left with you [that would be Mr Lang] full details of our strategic pricing requirements effective from 2 September. Philip Zentner will forward you an updated price file on 27 August incorporating the changes effective from 2 September."
Now, I think that you already told us that you knew that the price files took into account the strategic pricing requirements of the manufacturers. So you would therefore expect, wouldn't you, that Mr Zentner would be forwarding updated price files that took those ITL strategic pricing requirements into account?
A. Yes.
Q. I want to move on to your understanding of how this worked, because we have an agreement, a written agreement, in which ITL is going to pay Asda a certain amount of money quarterly in return for Asda meeting certain requirements, that's the third page of the agreement at tab 53. If you want to turn back to that, please do. So a payment is going to be made, subject to Asda's compliance with a number of requirements, one of which is strategic pricing.
We have the purpose of the agreement being communicated to Asda in the letter at tab 56 and we know that -- or rather Asda knew, you knew -- the price files communicated to Asda by ITL incorporated ITL's strategic pricing requirements. So isn't the deal that ITL expected that Asda, when it priced, would price in accordance with ITL's strategic pricing requirements?
A. It was our aspiration, but we ignored it.
Q. Let's take it in stages, but I think you -- the understanding between ITL and Asda was that Asda would price in accordance with ITL's pricing requirements?
A. It was their understanding, but we just ignored it.

That's all I can --
THE CHAIRMAN: Just listen very carefully to the questions you are being asked, because you are running ahead
a little bit.
MR LASOK: You are inheriting a situation, because it's Mr Jolliff who signed the trading agreement; right?
A. Yes.
Q. So you are coming into the position after the trading agreement has been signed, but we have ITL informing Mr Lang what the purpose of the agreement was, and I am putting to you that that was the understanding reached between ITL and Asda, and I think thus far you have said to me "but we, Asda, didn't perform it". I am not asking about that. I am asking you about the understanding.

At this point, we are talking about the point when you were the buyer, the understanding was that Asda would price in accordance with ITL's strategic pricing requirements, wasn't it?
A. It's the word "agreement" that I can't -- just doesn't ring true, because it was in the agreement, but we all knew in Asda that we were never going to abide by that.
THE CHAIRMAN: You knew that in Asda, but we are just now thinking about what the ITL/Asda understanding was as it might have appeared to ITL or to somebody, an external person who wasn't privy to whatever Asda thought secretly or whatever that they were going to do. That's what we are trying to nail down at the moment.

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A. I understood it was in the agreement and I understood it was in the letter, but I also understood that it was just something that they put in their agreement in order to trigger that payment to us on a quarterly basis, but was never something that we were going to abide by.
DR SCOTT: When you took over, you didn't write any letter saying, or email saying "You may have done this with Mr Jolliff, but things are different now"?
A. Not to the best of my knowledge, no.

DR SCOTT: So they would have expected things to continue as they expected things to continue before?
A. That would follow, yes.

DR SCOTT: Thank you.
MR SUMMERS: May I just ask: you took over from Mr Jolliff, so there was a handover period?
A. A brief one.

MR SUMMERS: Yes. Did he make you aware of the agreement?
A. Of that agreement? There was a file that he handed over to us, and I would assume that it was in that file --
MR SUMMERS: Did he draw your attention specifically to the agreement, as you remember?
A. Not as I remember, no.

MR SUMMERS: So you received no briefing from him as to how the agreement had come about or how it was intended to be implemented?
A. We really talked about the product ranges, the different
manufacturers, the practicalities of pricing and
ranging.

MR SUMMERS: So to that extent it was not the most detailed of handovers with regard to the agreement, it doesn't to me indicate that the agreement was a very essential part of the knowledge that you were expected to acquire to run the department to fulfil your role as tobacco buyer?
A. Correct.

MR SUMMERS: When you say that "we all knew that we weren't going to implement it, we were going to ignore it", how did you reach that decision, if you hadn't been briefed by him?
A. Well, because Mr Lang and myself discussed it. But over time, so this is not something that happened, say, in May or June of 2002. Over time.
MR SUMMERS: Thank you. Sorry, Mr Lasok.
MR LASOK: Well, now, the combined effect of the trading agreement and this letter at tab 56 is that if Asda kept to the RSPs in the price file communicated to it by ITL, it could be sure that it was complying with ITL's pricing requirements; is that not so?
A. That would follow, yes.
Q. Yes. The understanding with Gallaher was the same, wasn't it?

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A. I was aware of aspirations from both sides to have a parity.
Q. Now, could you look at paragraph 54 of your witness statement, please. Could you just read paragraph 54 to yourself, please. You are commenting here on the document at tab 56 that we have just been looking at. (Pause)
A. Okay.
Q. What I just wanted to explore with you is this: in the middle of that paragraph you say:
"Our pricing decisions were based on analysis of our cost price, our margin and our competitors' positions."
Then you refer to Gallaher's desire to align a brand against a Gallaher brand, and you say that it was able to encourage this by setting its cost price and RSP at equivalent levels. You then say:
"They knew we would not price above RSP for fear of being uncompetitive against the other retailers and we would seldom price below RSP as we did not have the margin to be able to afford to."
Now, I am just slightly puzzled about the earlier sentence talking about pricing decisions based on analysis of cost price, margin and the competitors' positions. Did you actually do this, or did you just follow the RSPs?
A. No, we did that as well, so we set up a spreadsheet which had all the products in and gave us our margin as well, so we did it independently of the pricing sheets which had RSPs on them.
Q. So was this just a sense check of the RSP? In other words, unless the RSP cut across Asda's interests, Asda would follow the RSP?
A. Sorry, perhaps can you just rephrase that? Sorry.
Q. Yes. I am putting to you this scenario: you looked at the RSP, you did a sense check on it, so you looked at cost prices, margins, competitors' positioning, unless the RSP simply cut across your interests, you would go along with it?
A. Yes. I mean -- yes. We are talking hundreds of products and lots of price changes throughout the year, so quite often that would be the case, yes.
THE CHAIRMAN: Quite often what would be the case?
A. That you would take the -- the RSP would be there, and you would -- unless it was commercially unviable to do so, you could take the RSP, but it wouldn't always be the case.
MR LASOK: I am putting to you that basically you have the RSP, unless there is some very good reason to use another price, you just go with the RSP?
A. More often than not.

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Q. Now, the only contemporary evidence that we have of Asda qualifying its commitment to price in accordance with a manufacturer's parity and differential requirements is the document that we have in annex 14 at tab 58. Could you have a look at that, please. \{D14/58/160\}.

You should have at the top of the page the name Philip Zentner and then you see it's an email from Eddie Oram sent on 29 August 2002?
A. Yes.
Q. I am sure you will appreciate as this is an email string, the earliest email starts off at the very end, so you have to read it backwards, and the first email starts at the bottom of the page. It's from Graham Hall to Kevin Lang, dated 29 August 2002. So perhaps if you read that email and then work your way back up the first page.
(Pause)
A. Okay.
Q. You commented on this email exchange, I think, in your witness statement at paragraphs 56 to 57 , but I just wanted to clarify the position. You are not mentioned, I think, as a recipient of any of these emails. Were you aware of this exchange at the time?
A. Well, I think I may have been on holiday, looking at the dates. I am not 100 per cent certain. But I am often
away in August. So I think I may have been away.
Q. Do you remember this incident?
A. Not specifically, no.
Q. If you don't remember it, I don't think it's appropriate to ask you questions about it.

If you go to tab 62, $\{\mathrm{D} 14 / 62 / 167\}$ we have here two emails, the first which starts round about the first holepunch is an email from Graham Hall sent on 7 October 2002 to you, copied to Mr Lang. Then we have, at the top of the page, an internal ITL response which you would not have seen at the time. But the original message, which is from Mr Hall to you, is about moving prices up in the market. We don't see you responding to Mr Hall saying -- I was going to say "saying get lost" but that would be a particularly impolite way of doing it.

Shall I put it this way: you don't reply, as far as we know, to this email qualifying Asda's position regarding following ITL's pricing requirements, do you?
A. I don't recall doing, no.
Q. No. Similarly the next tab, tab 63, \{D14/63/168\}, I think the first email is the same one, but this time we have another email at the top, because Mr Hall comes back to you and he asks you to delay implementation of the price change. Again, we don't see you responding 89
saying that Asda prices independently and makes its own decisions?
A. No.
Q. If we go back to your witness statement, I would just like to ask you something about promotions. If you go to paragraph 13 of your witness statement --
A. Sorry, can you just help me find that?
Q. Yes, your witness statement is in tab 110. It's not in annex 14 , which I think is the file you have on your right. I wanted to have a look at a bit in paragraph 13. It's a bit in paragraph 13 that is at the top of the fourth page of your witness statement. At the top of page 4 you say:
"If at a given time both brands were priced at the same level and Gallaher then offered Asda promotional funding to discount the retail price of Benson \& Hedges, Asda would not itself fund any discount of Marlboro to ensure that the pricing requirements were met."

But I noted that in paragraph 39 of your witness statement -- perhaps if you could read paragraph 39 to yourself.
(Pause)
A. Okay.
Q. In the middle of that paragraph you say:
"Due to their concern to remain competitive, they
would normally respond to each others' promotions and give us funding to allow us to discount the rival brands to match the promoted ones."
So it looks as though the scenario that you posit in paragraph 13 was either theoretical or a wholly exceptional case, because normally the manufacturers would be funding promotions. Is that correct?
A. They would normally spot that and respond with a promotion of their own.
Q. Now, in paragraph 40 -- again perhaps you could read the whole of paragraph 40.
(Pause)
The bit that I was interested in was the penultimate sentence, where you say:
"We were very clear on numerous occasions that we would tolerate no interference in our retail pricing and we would always make the final decision."

I think that that can't be right, as a result of the answer that you gave to a question put to you by Dr Scott.
A. It's not in writing, if that's what you are asking me.
Q. So these communications were -- how were they done?
A. Verbally.
Q. Verbally.

THE CHAIRMAN: Wait a minute. When you say "we were very

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clear", are you saying it was very clear within Asda or are you also saying it was made clear to ITL?
A. Both.

MR LASOK: I did take you to two documents, tabs 62 and 63,
in which we saw nothing in terms of you making clear to ITL that you would tolerate no interference in retail pricing and you would always make the final decision. If you would go to annex 14 , and turn to tab 69 , $\{D 14 / 69 / 131\}$, again you have here an email string, the first email starts on the second page, and is an email from Stephen Carroll to you sent on 29 January 2003. I wonder whether you would be kind enough to just read the sequence of emails to yourself, please.
(Pause)
A. Okay.
Q. Now, I just want to see whether my understanding of what happened here is correct. As I read it, ITL raised with you a query about pricing. They were expecting Asda to price in line with the price files. You don't disagree, you don't say that their expectation was misconceived. You give an explanation of what the position was, and it turns out that there was simply a misunderstanding. But the point here that I am trying to get across is that again this is an incident in which we have a clear expectation on ITL's part that you would price in

> accordance with the price file, we know that ultimately
> it's a misunderstanding, but you don't come back to them and say that Asda tolerates no interference in retail pricing and makes the final decision itself, do you?
A. In document 69 these are all about the Small Classic Cigars and it's a string of emails about price marked packs, so it's when one price marked pack at one price runs out and is replaced by a new price marked pack, so these are all -- this whole exchange is about price marked packs, where we would always sell at the price that was on the pack, because otherwise it's very confusing to colleagues working on the kiosks and customers if you don't do that.

THE CHAIRMAN: But it's not, is it, because the email at 132
was talking about the move of the price of the plain pack, the Small Classic Filter 10, when the price marked pack has run out. It's whether the plain pack would move up to 2.69 after the exhaustion of the 2.55 price marked packs, and in fact you are selling it at 2.73.
A. Because on Classic cigars we have had lots of different barcodes all running against the same products and there were a few different prices in for the different barcodes. So in that instance it was one that hadn't been selling that was still on the system at 2.73, and as I understand this, he was saying back to me that
bonuses are going to be in place to make that packet 2.69 , a maximum RSP of 2.69. But then he goes on to talk about another price marked pack towards the top.

So it was a -- Classic cigars was -- it stands out in my mind, because I remember how confusing Classic cigars were, because there were lots of different lines all running at the same time and you might have a packet of cigars in one particular store with a certain barcode on them which sold at a certain price.
THE CHAIRMAN: The point that I think Mr Lasok is asking is -- well, you say in your witness statement "we were very keen that everyone should know that we made our own pricing decisions and would tolerate no interference", and yet he has put to you a number of instances where it looks like ITL is trying to interfere with your pricing and you are not pushing back saying "Mind your own business, we will do as we please".

Now, why is that?
A. I understand. The way I would explain it on this particular instance was because it was all about price marked packs and because we were talking about price marked pack I wouldn't go back and say that anyway on that occasion.

On the other examples that were pointed to, it is
because I knew the cost prices were moving, and as the
cost price moves, we move the retail price in store to match that differential, to keep the differential the same, so that we were making the same amount of money, and because there are so many price changes so frequently, it would be -- if the cost price moved up 6 p, you will often move the selling price up by $6 p$, unless you went out into a competitor, for example, and saw that it was at a different price, in which case you would have to think again.

DR SCOTT: So as you said earlier on, more often that not you would be following the RSPs?
A. That's correct.

MR LASOK: I was interested more particularly in your reply to the first email. If you go to page 2 , your reply to Mr Carroll's first email, and your reply was sent on Friday, January 31, 2003.
After the subject line, you say:
"In PF158 it shows Classic filter plain as 2.73 post PMP."

I have to say that I read PF158 as referring to
a price file. Is that correct?
A. That is correct.
Q. So what you actually do is, in response to the query from Mr Carroll, you give the explanation as something in the price file, you say that you are pricing in

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accordance with the price file?
A. The way I read it is I am questioning a price in the price file.
Q. I think I put it slightly inaccurately, because what you are doing is you are using the price file to give an indication of what the Small Classic 10s should be priced at.
A. I am working with the price file, I am working from the price file.
Q. Yes.
A. Yes.
Q. So this is, though, yet another instance in which you are working with the price file and you are not indicating to ITL that Asda makes the final decision. (Pause). That was a question.
A. That was a question?
Q. Yes.
A. Can you just repeat it? I am sorry.
Q. Yes. You are working from the price file. It is yet again another situation in which you do not say to ITL that Asda tolerates no interference in its retail pricing policy and will always make the final decision?
A. That's correct.
Q. That's correct. Now, if you move to tab 79, now this again is an email string. \{D14/79/231\}. The emails
here are quite lengthy. The first one starts on the third page with an email from you sent on August 8th 2003 to Mr Batty and Mr Hall of ITL. This is in connection with the negotiation of a new trading agreement with ITL, as I understand it. Is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Although these were rather long emails, I am only interested in certain bits in your first email -- I am quite happy if you would prefer to read all the emails in totality, if that's what you would prefer to do. I was only going to focus on one particular bit in your first email, it's on the last page of the tab. It would be the second full paragraph down from the top, the one starting off "Pages 3 and 4 ..." Do you have that?
A. Yes.
Q. Could you read that paragraph and the paragraph immediately following it, please.
(Pause)
A. Okay.
Q. Now, am I right in thinking that when you use the phrase
"Pages 3 and 4 -- ITL's strategy pricing", you are
referring to a draft of the trading agreement that was
floating around at that stage?
A. I think so.

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Q. Here you are focusing on the strategy pricing aspect in the proposed trading agreement, and it's at this point that you state categorically:
"We cannot and will not however be dictated to on price."
But we don't get any communication in writing along these lines before this point in time. It arises only in connection with the negotiation of the trading agreement. So the point that I am putting to you now is that we see you now, in August 2003, objecting to Asda being dictated to on price, and that was a concern that you had had in the situation that was then prevailing under the 2002 trading agreement, and you wanted to bring that position to an end; is that correct?
A. No, that's not how I see it, because we were negotiating a new -- well, I was negotiating along with Kevin and Paul on a new trading agreement, and as that section was still in, we said "Well, that section where you talk about how we must price is not acceptable".
Q. The point I am putting to you is that it's at this point that you are, as it were, kicking against the traces. You have been operating under the 2002 trading agreement regime, and it's now that you want to bring it to an end. Is that true or not?
A. That's not how I see it, no. I was negotiating a new
trading agreement which was fresh, it was in front of me, and I knew that I had to put my signature on it, and that section, I had to clarify it.
Q. Could you turn to paragraph 77 of your witness statement, please. Now, this actually refers to a document at tab 77, \{D14/77/226\}, so perhaps what you might want to do is to look at tab 77. Tab 77 appears to be a case of a Mr Mancey in Asda who is forwarding to you an email that Mr Mancey has received from Roger Batty of ITL.

You have in Mr Batty's email numbered points.
Number 9, which is the one that you are referring to in paragraph 77 of your witness statement, is on the penultimate page. It's a very short paragraph.
(Pause)
Now, at the beginning of paragraph 74 of your witness statement, just so we get the full picture, you say that:
"The email exchange [this is the very, very beginning of paragraph 74] between ... Mr Mancey and ITL showed tensions between Asda and ITL as Asda tried to formalise some of the terms of our relationship through persuading us to sign up to the trading agreement."
This is the new trading agreement for 2003. In paragraph 77, when you turn to consider ongoing pricing,
if you go to a sentence just beyond the halfway point in the paragraph beginning "There was some misunderstanding ..." Do you have that?
A. Yes.
Q. You say there in the following line:
"We were pushing a position that they were less able to influence our retail price as we wanted greater freedom."

You go on to say:
"The position eventually reached was the basic position that had always existed. The manufacturers would continue to recommend prices through RSPs, but we would be free to set our own prices and discount further if we wanted."

But I was puzzling about why you said that Asda was pushing a situation that they were less able to influence Asda's retail price as Asda wanted greater freedom, because that suggests to me that what was happening at this stage, in 2003, was that Asda was pushing ITL to get greater freedom than it had under the 2002 trading agreement.

Am I wrong on that?
A. "Greater freedom than", you would read from that aspirations in the 2002 trading agreement.
Q. Well, greater freedom than was -- let's be a bit more

## refined about it. Greater freedom than was envisaged under the 2002 trading agreement?

A. By them.
Q. And that's correct?
A. That's correct.
Q. So you wanted greater freedom than was envisaged under the 2002 trading agreement?
A. By Imperial Tobacco.

DR SCOTT: Sorry, it was a signed agreement?
A. It was.

DR SCOTT: Mr Jolliff has given us very, very, very strong evidence that he was in control, and so if there was to be an agreement on pricing, it had to be made with him, when he was your predecessor?
A. Right.

DR SCOTT: This wasn't an offer by ITL, this was an agreement which Mr Jolliff signed. So it wasn't simply an aspiration, was it? It was a document that Mr Jolliff signed, it was an agreement, an offer, an acceptance.
A. I mean, I can't really speak for how John operated at the time. Obviously it was before my time.
DR SCOTT: But he was acting on behalf of Asda.
A. He was.

DR SCOTT: He was the duly authorised person on behalf of 101

## Asda?

A. He was.

DR SCOTT: So Asda agreed it, and you have told us you didn't then countermand that until this -- in writing, until we see this point where you are negotiating the next agreement.
A. We didn't tear up the 2002 agreement, we didn't see any point in doing that.
DR SCOTT: Thank you.
MR LASOK: I would like to move on to another point. Could you look at paragraph 35 of your witness statement,
please. Could you read that to yourself, please. (Pause)
A. Okay.
Q. I just wanted to look at the second sentence where you say:
"Where the manufacturer was being unreasonable, we would threaten to delist its products."
Did you make that comment in connection with tobacco or other products?
A. I made that comment for all products, really.
Q. Because the oddity is that Mr Jolliff seems to take
a rather different view of that. If you go to tab 109, the preceding tab, now, there is pagination here which is the sort of pagination in the bundle, and if you look
at the bottom you see a printed number. If you could go to page 377. \{C10/109/377\}.
A. Okay.
Q. There is a bit, it's actually paragraph $14(\mathrm{~b})$, and it's the penultimate sentence in 14 (b). So if you are on page 377 , go up to the top of the page, you see there is a paragraph there, and if you look at the second to last sentence, it's the one that goes:
"If I took out a product line in tobacco, however, I would never get any greater negotiating power with the supplier."

What he does with his experience is compare tobacco products with other products, and the point that he is making -- at least as I understand it -- is that delisting was fruitless in relation to tobacco. It might be useful in relation to other products, but not in relation to tobacco. But I think you are saying that the position was different?
A. Well, so let's say, for example, it was Lambert \& Butler, you wouldn't really threaten to delist something like Lambert \& Butler because they would know full well that there was no way you could afford to do that, either monetarily or in goodwill to customers. What I meant when I said "all products" was -- I mean, you might think about some of the lesser known cigarette 103
brands or you might think about some cigar brands, or you might think about some filter papers, for example. That's what I meant when I said "all products".
Q. But we have no evidence of this ever being done in relation to tobacco products?
A. No written evidence, no, that I can see.
Q. Did you ever do it?
A. Did we ever delist a brand?
Q. Did you ever say to ITL or Gallaher "you are being unreasonable, we are going to delist one or more of your products"?
A. As I say in the statement, it was mainly posturing, but it was done verbally, so we would frequently meet with Graham Hall or Chris Halford, in Asda House, and have discussions all the time. And often in those discussions they were the kinds of things that you would talk about.
Q. And it never found its way into a written document?
A. Not that I can see in the evidence that's been put in front of me, no.
Q. Okay. Now could you go to paragraph 43. Perhaps you could read 43 to yourself, please. It relates to a document that is in annex 4 at tab 8. \{D4/8/26\}.
(Pause)
A. Okay.
Q. The point I am interested in was a reference, I think
it's in a "Confidential" box in paragraph 43 of your witness statement. But it refers there to a particular -- shall we call it a technique that Asda had, and I just wondered when this technique was adopted by Asda?
A. I always remember it being in place, really.
Q. Always from when, from June 2002?
A. From when I was a buyer.
Q. Because I think part of the problem that we have is that, if we look at -- let's take, in annex 14, if we go to 49, it is a document that goes back to March 2002. You have an original message. This is Graham Hall relaying to Roger Batty and the NAMs within ITL, Asda pricing. But we don't see this technique being employed by Asda.

## (Pause)

We have various other examples of this, because if you go, for example, to 52(a), it is an internal ITL document but the third page of it is a list of Asda prices. We have been told that these prices were communicated by Asda to ITL. If we look at these Asda prices in the right-hand column, we don't see this technique being used there.
A. It's very difficult for me to be exact on when exactly 105
that policy started, but in paragraph 43 where I talk about it, I use that price quite deliberately, because that's exactly the kind of thing that I did.
Q. If we look at tab 59, here we have under the heading "Asda Stores Proposal" -- tab 59 is a letter, by the way, from Mr Hall to Mr Lang dated September 2002.
A. Mm.
Q. Towards the bottom of the page you have a heading "Asda Stores Proposal", and you have a selling price there. This technique doesn't seem to be employed.
A. That was an RSP for a new product that Graham Hall was trying to sell into us. So he is putting that as his RSP. This particular product is an example of where we were not bullied by the manufacturers, because he put Davidoff to us, and we rejected it, said it wasn't something we wanted to take. So if we had decided to take it, then we may well not have priced at 4.49. That was just his proposal to us as a suitable retail selling price.
Q. If you go to tab $60,\{\mathrm{D} 14 / 60 / 165\}$, we have an email here, it's the very first one, it's Mr Hall sent on Tuesday, September 17th to Roger Batty, and he professes to be reporting shelf prices in Asda, and we don't see this technique being employed there.
A. Well, I can't tell whether we do or we don't there,
because there are prices which look to follow that
technique. Well, all of them do.
Q. That's the point, though, isn't it? If you go to tab 62 --
THE CHAIRMAN: Well, where is this getting us, Mr Lasok, whether this technique applies or not?
MR LASOK: Well, it's getting to the submission that this technique wasn't applied. I think there was a sort of great deal of mumbling.
THE CHAIRMAN: I think the mumbling was "yes, and?"
MR LASOK: Well, there we are.
THE CHAIRMAN: You have been shown various examples where it doesn't seem to be applied, and yet you have said in your witness statement that it was. Do you have any explanation for that apparent contradiction?
A. Without a doubt what I say in paragraph 43, an example I give, I mean, I remember that very clearly, and we didn't use it on every single product but it's an example of where we used to sell below the RSP by using that technique.
THE CHAIRMAN: Well, that technique may have been the reason why, in some instances, you didn't price at RSP?
A. Correct.

THE CHAIRMAN: But didn't ITL know that you had that technique, wouldn't they have taken that into account

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when they were setting the RSP in the price file?
A. No. No. They would put their RSP at their -- if you like, the price they were suggesting to us, and then we would take it and say "Well, is that the price we want to go with or do we want to take a penny off or 2 p off, whether we want to 10 p off because it is a multipack, particularly to annoy one of our competitors. Which is exactly what I am trying to get across in paragraph 43. That was just the kind of technique that we did, and we picked random prices, often either to give a slight encouragement to our customers or to annoy or frustrate our competitors.
DR SCOTT: If we take the 34.88 price, if you had priced one manufacturer's multipack at 34.88, but you had actually done the other one at 34.90 , what would have happened then?
A. You would annoy one of the sides.

DR SCOTT: So to keep the peace, you would price both at 34.88?
A. No, no, we would probably let that --

DR SCOTT: Probably let that go.
A. -- continue.

DR SCOTT: How would they react then? Would they bonus you down again?
A. Sometimes.

DR SCOTT: Or take away the bonus, if they were the other way?
A. If anything, they would probably try and bonus you down to match it.
DR SCOTT: Thank you.
MR LASOK: If you would go to tab $62,\{\mathrm{D} 14 / 62 / 167\}$ and this is one of the instances we have looked at before where an email is sent to you, and a price is indicated by ITL, and you haven't responded, can we infer that you would in fact have priced in accordance with the ITL email?
A. Not necessarily. I mean, I would read that and I would know the cost prices were going to increase or, in this case ...
Q. Well --
A. Or, sorry, that the bonuses were going to be removed, in which case I would need to change the retail price, but I wouldn't go back and say what I was going to put that to, I would just do it, at whatever I wanted to put it to.
Q. Well, you say wherever you would want to put it to, but we saw from tab 69 that ITL -- tab 69, you might just want to refresh your memory. You have looked at it before. This was the incidence when they raised a failure to comply with the price files with you. If 109
you weren't complying with the price files, they would have been on at you, wouldn't they?
A. I go back to the point about tab 69, was about Classic cigars, which was a very confused situation because there were so many price marked packs, and different barcodes of plain packs all in the same discussion. So because it was about that, I would get into a discussion, because I knew it was about price marked pack. But there were other instances that we have just been talking about where I wouldn't respond because I would know either the bonus is being removed or the cost price was going up and I would have to have to re-set the retail price that I was charging in store.
Q. Can I put it to you fairly bluntly: this is all odd because we have very few instances in which ITL raises with you a query about your pricing, and this particular instance in tab 69 is one where it resulted simply from a confusion in the price files.
I put it to you that the reasonable inference to draw from that is that generally you did price in accordance with the prices set out in the price files, and that if it was the case that you had this particular technique that you refer to in paragraph 43 of your witness statement, you just didn't apply it in such a way as to interfere with the prices in the price
> that Asda needed to keep parity on prices because the trading agreement said so. I just want to focus on that. As I understand it, you are saying that on occasion Graham Hall would speak to you and he would say to you that Asda needed to keep parity on prices because the trading agreement said so?
A. Well, he would be referring to a particular example, he wouldn't just say that sentence, he would use it when talking about an example.
Q. But then you say:
"We did not take any notice."
Does that mean that you turned a deaf ear to what he was saying to you.
A. You mean as opposed to saying --

THE CHAIRMAN: Well, how did you reply to him when he said something like that to you?
A. Literally I would just ignore it.

MR LASOK: So effectively, as I understand it, from time to time Graham Hall would say to you "you need to be keeping parity"?
A. As I say, he wouldn't just say that sentence apropos of nothing, he would say something like "we have noticed that you are selling $X$ at $Y$ price, don't forget the parities that are in the agreement", to which I would either move on or say "Thank you, Graham" or something 113
similar.
Q. But your evidence is that you would not challenge him on that?
A. Well, I may have done, I may not have done.
Q. Can you remember whether you did or you didn't?
A. No.
Q. Could you go back to your paragraph 62, please.

THE CHAIRMAN: When we get to a convenient moment for our break --
MR LASOK: This is probably the last question. Subject to my junior instructing me -- as she almost certainly will -- this is likely to be the last one.

Paragraph 62 in your witness statement. This refers to the documents at tabs 61 and 62. If you go to 61, this is in annex 14 , and just read that to yourself. \{D14/61/166\}.
(Pause)
Then 62 you have already seen. $\{D 14 / 62 / 167\}$.
(Pause)
A. Okay.
Q. What puzzles me slightly is why you say in line 3 of paragraph 62 of your witness statement: "We understood the prices mentioned in these emails to be recommended maximum prices. (RSPs)"?
A. (Pause). I am sorry, I don't understand the question.
Q. Well, what words in the documents at 61,62 and at -63 is another one that you are referring to in your paragraph 62, what words in those documents are the ones that gave you the understanding that the prices mentioned in those emails were recommended maximum prices?
A. Just because we were doing this all the time, so we are seeing RSPs were changing all the time, so just -that's how I would read that, just from the fact that I was doing this day in, day out.

THE CHAIRMAN: Why do you read them as being recommended maximum prices rather than recommended selling prices?
A. Well, because we wouldn't -- because of what I said before, about we would not go over that price because then we would be uncompetitive in the market, but we may decide to go under that price, and I would understand that the prices mentioned in the emails would appear in a price file to follow under the RSP column.
MR LASOK: This is what puzzles me. Perhaps it's clearer if we look at tab 63. \{D14/63/168\}. If we look at the email at the top of the page, where Mr Hall says to you:
"Apologies for the change but please delay
implementation of the 3.59 and 3.63 prices until 21 October."
What puzzles me is that, on an ordinary reading of 115
that, he is talking about a move to 3.59 and 3.63 , he is not talking about some other move. If you look at the earlier email which is on that page, and go to the second paragraph of it, he says:
"As part of our pricing strategy we will be moving prices up in the market from 14 October to 3.59 for Richmond Kingsize and 3.63 for Richmond Superkings."

Then in the next paragraph, he says that:
"ITL are anticipating that Gallaher will follow by moving Dorchester up by 5p."

So these are all references to specific price points and specific price moves. He is not saying "As part of our pricing strategy, we will be moving prices up to a maximum of $£ 3.59$ but it could be less", is he?
A. He is not saying that, that's exactly how I would understand it, I would read that and say "Right, that means that bonus is being removed or cost price is going up, I am going to get a new price file and in that price file there is going to be a column of recommended selling prices and as far as I am concerned, I can charge whatever I like".
THE CHAIRMAN: But what he seems to be saying is that they want you to move the prices up as a signal to Gallaher so that Gallaher will then follow up. Now, if you don't move your prices up, then Gallaher are not going receive
that signal and they are not going to move their price up and therefore prices won't move up generally.

Did you not understand that was what he was wanting you to do?
A. I understand what you are saying, but he is not saying -- but what he is saying from that is "if you don't" -- well, the truth behind that is "if you don't move your prices, you are going to start losing money because we are going to remove the bonus or going to push the cost price up". So as the buyer I would know that I had two choices, one to either push the RSP -push the retail price up to whatever I wanted it to be, or not to touch the retail price at all in which case you are absolutely right, Gallaher would not get that signal, but I would be losing money on the product.
THE CHAIRMAN: It's as much in your interests as in ITL's interests, isn't it, that Gallaher receive that signal and everybody's prices move up?
A. But if I don't move the retail price, I'm losing margin.

DR SCOTT: In your witness statement, you put it like this -- this is paragraph 21, subparagraph (d):
"Of course the thin margins available to retailers on tobacco products meant that when tactical discount funding was discontinued, Asda would normally revert to the pre-promotional retail price to maintain its 117
margin."
A. Yes.

DR SCOTT: When Mr Jolliff was giving evidence we were shown some of the diagrams which showed that things sometimes went off key for a week or two, but then quickly came back on track with this Richmond and Dorchester business. Does that square with your recollection?
A. Yes. Sorry, I thought I was saying the same thing.

That from that email from tab 63, you know, there -- how I read that when I am just reading it now and how I remember reading it then, "Right, the bonus is being removed or the cost price is going up, I need to move my retail price if I want to keep my margin the same".
DR SCOTT: You were bonused on achieving your margin? You personally, rather than --
A. Yes.

DR SCOTT: So margins mattered?
A. Margin was -- well, sales and margin combined were everything, yes.
DR SCOTT: Yes, thank you.
MR LASOK: This is the final question, I think: in the period that we are looking at, which is from when you became the tobacco buyer until August 2003, which was the point at which this case ceases to be of relevance, because post August 2003 things move on, but in the
period that we are looking at, Asda was operating under a trading agreement with ITL, and under that trading agreement, the deal was that unless ITL told Asda otherwise, Asda was going to move around prices in accordance with the price file that ITL sent to it from time to time. That was the deal, wasn't it?
A. I understood that trading agreement to be in place, but I paid it in mind is the best way I can put it.
Q. You had a private mental reservation about implementing this agreement, but that was not communicated to ITL?
A. I guess ... do you mind if I ask a question? Are you referring to the 2003, the new trading agreement?
Q. No, I am talking about the period from when you took over as tobacco buyer until August 2003.
A. The 2002 agreement that was in place, I just put no significance on it, as far as I was concerned there was a monthly payment coming off that, whether we abided by everything that was in there or not.
Q. And the truth is that, as you say in your witness statement, Asda routinely, because you use that word, or generally or normally did comply with the RSPs in the ITL price file and you also did the same for the RSPs in the Gallaher price file?
A. Well, I object to the word "comply", but we more often than not priced at the RSP to protect the margins.

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Q. And the result was that Asda complied with the parity and differential requirements of the two manufacturers?
A. That was the end result.

MR LASOK: Thank you. No further questions.
THE CHAIRMAN: Well, we will take a break there before you ask your questions, if you have questions, do you, Mr Howard?
MR HOWARD: I just want to say this, because it does go to the points that I would want to cross-examine about, and it goes to points that we discussed before: you will again, I think, observe that the case as to what the requirements are, as set out in paragraph 40 , does not --
MR LASOK: Could I just say that I am not too sure that the witness should be here when hearing legal submissions of this nature.
THE CHAIRMAN: Perhaps, could we just ask you to step outside? You can start your break a little earlier than the rest of us.
A. Sure.
(In the absence of the witness)
MR HOWARD: The very simple point I was just making is this: you are now very familiar with paragraph 40, we have had Mr Lasok's explanation, such as it is, as to what the case is by reference to that, and I may want to say

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something about that at a convenient juncture, but it
appears to us -- certainly it appears to me -- that the case that's being put to this witness actually doesn't seem to have anything whatsoever to do with that paragraph or with the explanations that were put by reference to it, in that the case that has been put to this witness or built up, really I think the repeated point was that you were pricing in accordance with the price file, that is of course -- for instance, you have to remember paragraph 40 is all about price increases and decreases and the effect that that is supposed to have on the competing brands.

Now, in my submission, the case that's being put doesn't seem to have anything to do with that, it's quite a different point.

Now, I don't propose to go through with the witness the paragraph 40 points because in my submission it is abundantly clear that Mr Lasok is not putting a case that has anything to do with that to the witness. It's not even -- we have variants on the style. Sometimes we have a style which is -- and I don't know, maybe he thinks he is fitting into this, which is --
THE CHAIRMAN: Never mind about the style so much, but at the moment as far as the Tribunal is concerned, we are anxious to understand how the pricing worked in this
market, and what the witnesses have to say about what they knew at the time, what they understood they were agreeing to or would or wouldn't do, and once we have established what was actually going on, then we will need to decide what is the law and how does that law apply to these facts as we find them, and then where are we as regards the appeals.
MR HOWARD: Well, where are we as regards the appeals, but also -- one may say that one possibility is that once there is the divergence between what the decision says and the evidence is so enormous that really it's quite impossible to see how it continues. I certainly say that is a view one should be taking. There is also, even if one is not taking that view, and the reason I am making this point now, we are coming towards expert evidence and the expert evidence is addressing a rather different case. It is addressing the case that is put forward in the decision and there is genuine puzzlement as to what the case actually is that the experts should and shouldn't be addressing, and it does arise out of what we have heard this afternoon, but it is a general concern that I have, but for present purposes, I do not believe that Mr Lasok has put a case to this witness which actually relates to essentially the theory of harm and the basis of the requirements that were being said
to form part of the case, and I do not think it is
incumbent upon me to keep cross-examining the witnesses
to put a case that the OFT doesn't want to put. Because what Mr Lasok I think said to you the other day, and again this is slightly puzzling, that we are not going to say which of the 40(a) to (d) have to be present, it may be one, it may be more, we don't know where their case is. But it's perfectly clear to this witness he has not put any of it, and I am not going to do his job for him.

THE CHAIRMAN: No, well, I don't see that anyone could criticise you for that, Mr Howard. Let's take our break now, and we will come back at 20 to 4 . In the light of that, how long are you going to be, Mr Howard?

MR HOWARD: I don't think very long, no more than 20 minutes, maybe less.
THE CHAIRMAN: Mr Flynn?
MR FLYNN: I imagine much the same, Madam, so we should be --
THE CHAIRMAN: We should be finished by this afternoon with this witness.
MR FLYNN: Certainly I imagine Mr Mason will be able to be released this afternoon.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, thank you. We will come back at 20 to 4.

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(3.32 pm)
(A short break)
( 3.45 pm )
Cross-examination by MR HOWARD
MR HOWARD: Mr Mason, can I ask you firstly this: you were the tobacco buyer, you tell us, from 2002 to 2005; what did you do before 2002 at Asda?
A. I was a systems manager and just before doing tobacco buying I worked in the petrol team, who took tobacco under their responsibilities.
Q. Then after 2005 to 2010 , what did you do?
A. I was a public affairs manager at Asda for several years before I left.
Q. Okay, so your period as a buyer was really just this period of 2002 to 2005?
A. Correct.
Q. We have heard about how price files fit in, and you tell us in your statement that the manufacturers, you say at paragraph 12, you say to Asda, in the second sentence:
"The parities and differentials were aspirations of the manufacturers, positions they tried to achieve to remain competitive with each other. They did this through manipulating their net cost prices including through the use of promotional discount funding which I discuss further below."

Then a bit further on you say:
"We would only increase price if the manufacturer effectively altered the net cost price and thus forced us to raise our retail prices in order to maintain our margins, which were already slim."

The margins that you were seeking to earn on tobacco, who determined what the margins should be?
A. Well, it was set through a business plan, first of all, set as -- in Asda overall and then down to category level. So the business plan was already set for us for the year. And really that would be a percentage margin leading to a cash profit figure.
Q. Right. So we have been told -- so that comes from on high, presumably?
A. Yes.
Q. We have been told by you and others that one of the things that Asda wants to do is remain competitive with the other supermarkets who you viewed as your competitors. We have also been told that the margins on tobacco, you tell us, are very slim. Now, I just wonder if you can explain to us a little bit about why it is the margins on tobacco, in particular, are slim. Why is it you can't, say, charge -- we see that the margins appear to be 4,5 per cent, something like that, why is it you can't say "Well, I want a margin on tobacco of 125

20 per cent"? What's the problem with doing that?
A. The only way of getting a margin of 20 per cent would be to hike your prices up very high, which would obviously make you extremely uncompetitive in the market, and customers are reasonably sensitive to tobacco prices, so if they saw that their packet of Lambert \& Butler which they may buy one or two packets a day were suddenly 10 p more expensive in Asda than it was in other supermarkets, (a) they would go and shop in other supermarkets to buy their tobacco, and (b) they would obviously be very vociferous with the store colleagues about the fact that their tobacco had suddenly become much more expensive.
Q. We know, for instance, there are other types of stores like convenience stores or the newsagent, for instance, where people might go and buy their cigarettes, that may charge RRP or above; what is it that's inhibiting Asda from charging RRP plus 10 p?
A. The supermarkets charged at a very different level to convenience, which really (a) fits with the volume that we sell, so we sell a huge volume of tobacco, which does allow you obviously to negotiate better cost prices with the manufacturers, which customers also do expect you to pass onto them through lower retail prices. Obviously the stores are more efficient as well, so you are not
just running one store where you are only selling tobacco, it's part of your whole offer, so you can afford to make less money on tobacco in a supermarket than you could if you were running a convenience store and it was your entire livelihood.
Q. Is it really the decision of Asda as to what margin it's going to set based on what it's trying to achieve in its competitive setting?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, was the fact that Asda was competing with the other supermarkets something that would be known to ITL or Gallaher when preparing the price files?

## A. Definitely, yes.

Q. And the margins, if we just take Imperial, that we see that they assume for the purposes of the price file, where would they get the knowledge of what your margin expectation was?
A. I would say probably their main way of getting that would be historical, so they would know over a period of time what margins were being made by every line that they gave you.
THE CHAIRMAN: How would they know that?
A. In a sense of they have their own historical data, of course, they have half the market almost and Gallaher have half the market, so they have been doing this for 127

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many years, and they know the general overall margin, but we wouldn't say -- we wouldn't tell ITL or Gallaher the specific overall margin figure that we were going for.
MR HOWARD: So obviously if one looks back, if one were looking back, say, into history, Imperial has supplied products to Asda, so it knows Asda's cost price on Imperial's products, obviously?
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A. Yes.
Q. And it can look into your store price and see what your selling price is; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. If you have those two pieces of information, can you then determine historically what the margin is that you have been seeking to achieve?
A. Yes.
Q. Yes.

THE CHAIRMAN: So that's the gross margin?
A. Correct.

MR HOWARD: Yes, the gross margin, but what we are talking about here is gross margin, is it not?
A. Yes.

THE CHAIRMAN: But in your business plan, when you are looking at the percentage margin that you have to achieve, is that a gross margin or is that the margin
taking into account other costs than just the purchasing of the cigarettes?
A. At a category level it's gross margin.

THE CHAIRMAN: It is, okay.
MR HOWARD: Yes. In terms of what you are doing, obviously there are net margins of the business after taking account of all sorts of costs, but in relation to an individual line of business such as you, as a tobacco buyer, you, as I understand it, are given a target of gross margins which then feed through into net margins and net profits of the whole group at the end of the day?
A. Correct.
Q. Yes, and just thinking about it, just to pursue this, just to knock it on the head, it would be obviously completely impossible for you to be working on the basis of net margins, because that depends on how you allocate overheads, employee costs of all sorts of people, and so on?
A. Yes, and lots of things that are outside our control, yes.
Q. If we go back to what you are saying at paragraph 12 ,
the supplier of here tobacco who wants to try to influence you to achieve a retail selling price of his product, and he is preparing the price file, what does
he have to do about his cost price in order to try to achieve what he regards as a desired retail selling price?
A. Well, if he wants the retail selling price to increase, he obviously has to increase that cost price or remove a discount that's in place.
Q. And if he wants to reduce it?
A. He needs to either reduce cost price or more likely, as time goes on, he would be adding bonuses in to help you reduce the selling price.
Q. So is this saying other than that he needs to set his cost price to you at a level which I believe he believes will allow you to earn the margin he expects to allow you to get to what he regards as the desirable selling price?
A. That's right.
Q. The price file, so we are clear about it, you have told us that it's a recommended selling price for Imperial's product, we will see it all set out. Does it say anything at all about the selling prices for Gallaher's product?
A. No.
Q. Could you go to --

THE CHAIRMAN: Could we just clarify that answer? It doesn't include on it any information for Gallaher
products, there are no lines on that relating to
Gallaher products?
A. Correct. There are no lines.

MR HOWARD: Yes. So just to follow that through, so we are absolutely clear about the position, you have told us that you regarded the price files as containing recommended selling prices, but let's just not worry about the detail for a moment, let's assume there is an RSP for Richmond of $£ 3.34$, and you decide, in the way you have explained, that you are going to price Richmond at $£ 3.34$. Having done that, does that in any way affect your pricing decision in respect of Dorchester?
A. No.
Q. Is there anything in the price file to suggest that you have to do anything about Dorchester?
A. No.

THE CHAIRMAN: But I think you did agree, but correct me if I am wrong, that you did understand that in setting the price on the price file, ITL may have had regard to its own aspirations in relation to the price relationship between Richmond and Dorchester?
A. Yes, and the reason I say no to the question is because, going back to what I said earlier on, it might be that we are in a circumstance where (a) we want to put the cat amongst the pigeons, for want of a better phrase,

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> one supplier over another, or we might want to be saying something to our competitors, so we might want to be causing them confusion.
> Q. And just -- sorry, go ahead?
> A. Sorry, if I may just add something to that. And that often relates to southern versus northern brands as well, so for example we may do something on Benson \& Hedges because we had many fewer stores in the south, and that was very much a southern brand. So you might reduce the price of Benson \& Hedges independently because you know that your competitors that are more southern based will have to respond, and that's going to hurt them more than it's going to hurt you.
> MR HOWARD: To what extent did you understand that when the manufacturers set their recommended retail prices, their RRPs which they have to publish by law, that that also reflected their aspirations as to the positions of the two brands?
A. Yes, that's how I understood it, yes.
Q. That's the RRPs, and so were the RSPs doing any -- when

Imperial gives you the RSP, we know that you sell
historically below the RRPs and they also give you
a contribution to do that, but insofar as the RSP reflects their aspiration, is it doing anything different to the RRP?
A. Sorry, could you just ...
THE CHAIRMAN: You don't learn anything more from looking at
the RSP than you would learn from looking at the
published RRPs about what Gallaher and ITL think about
which of their brands compete with each other?
A. Correct.

MR HOWARD: Now, can I then ask you about paragraph 57, which I think you were asked about, of your witness statement. Paragraph 57 you tell us relates to documents at tabs 57 and 58. I think particularly 58 you were being asked about.
Let's look at 58 for a moment. This is an internal communication at -- I think in fact this is when you were away. We see what was being referred to was:
"... our new man at Asda refusing to accept a margin reduction on Drum and it looks likely I will have to put some bonuses back in place to maintain certain prices to match Amber Leaf prices or move selling prices up slightly to restore the margin."
What appears to be happening is that ITL were saying they wanted to remove a -- I am sorry, I think what was happening is they had changed the bonuses, and the result was that Asda were complaining that they were going to suffer a margin reduction as a result of this, and Asda were kicking up a fuss. Do you remember this, 133
either this episode or this type of episode?
A. I recognise the type of episode.
Q. Can you put some flesh on the bones and explain to us why you would be resisting this type of thing?
A. On a product like this, as on any product, we couldn't really afford to lose the margin, either from losing the bonus -- from losing the bonus.
Q. What's being said is, well, you did -- we are here talking about a situation where there is movement in bonuses, bonuses here I think are getting withdrawn and it affects your margin. I think it's in percentage terms rather than cash terms. Is that what the problem is?
A. Yes. Well, particularly following a --

THE CHAIRMAN: I am not sure this is a bonus point. My understanding was that -- is it right that generally margins on lower cost brands are generally narrower than they are on premium brands?
A. Yes.

MR HOWARD: You are quite right. What has happened -sorry, it's over the page -- actually is rather interesting. What's happened is Imperial has actually reduced the cost price, and you can see that on the second page, and the effect of reducing the cost price is causing you, Asda, to have a lower margin, and that's
what you are upset about, and so they have to think about restoring your margin by adding a bonus.

## (Pause)

I think that's what's happening, isn't it, and
that's what the margin reduction --
A. Yes. They haven't quite -- yes. They have reduced --

THE CHAIRMAN: As I understand it, what was happening was that Amber Leaf was becoming a cheaper brand, and therefore Drum was going to become a cheaper brand, and they would reduce the cost, and also reduce the price, but the margin that you ended up with would be narrower just because margins are narrower on a cheaper product?
A. They've not quite got their figures right so they've not quite delivered the margin that we received --

THE CHAIRMAN: Right, but they were saying "Well, you can't expect to have that margin that you used to get because this is now an ultra low type product".

## A. Probably.

MR HOWARD: So here, in other words, in the price file, Imperial is trying to reduce the price, but --
MR LASOK: Forgive me, but there are two points about this. Firstly I myself did not cross-examine the witness on this because he said he didn't know the incident. My learned friend is cross-examining, so that's for him. But we already established on Friday that the price 135
changes had already occurred. This relates to what had happened in June and July.

MR HOWARD: The latter point is correct and I don't think it actually goes to anything.

The point I was asking about, despite Mr Lasok's intervention, is whether this type of episode was one that you were familiar with?
A. Yes.
Q. What I was asking you to do is to explain to us what the relevance of this is in relation to the price files and your evidence that you didn't always go along with the price files; can you explain how this fits in with that?
A. So following this change, a new price file would come with a new set of cost prices and a new recommended selling price, but this clearly wasn't delivering the margin that we would expect from this product. So we were asking for additional funding to increase the profit margin.
Q. This sort of discussion where you would be saying "Well, if you want the price to come down here in this way, we require additional margin", how frequent did these sorts of discussions take place?
A. All the time. When you think that if -- obviously you had a price change following a Budget decision, that would be followed later on in the year by
> a manufacturers' price increase, but then you would have
> bonus discussions throughout the year and promotional discussions throughout the year, as products moved about.
Q. Then I wanted to ask you about the interaction between the national account manager, here Mr Hall, and you. You have told us that there were discussions by phone, and we have a certain amount of correspondence. Can you tell us: what was the form in which communications generally were taking place?
A. Normally we would speak on the phone.
Q. How often were you speaking on the phone?
A. I would speak to every national account manager every week.
Q. The topic of conversation, other than these questions about price, what else were you talking about?
A. We would talk about ranging, we would talk about legislation, we would talk about packaging, might talk about position on the shelf, availability.
Q. How much of the discussion was about the pricing? In other words, how significant a feature of these oral discussions was pricing?
A. I mean, you would only talk about it if there was a reason to talk about it. So if it was following a duty increase or it was following an MPI or it was 137
following a tactical bonus.
Q. Then if we go back to your witness statement at 56 and

57, at 56 you referred to the communication at document
58 , but I am really interested in what you have said at 57, which was where you are talking about basically the bonusing that was going on.
You say:
"This kind of competition between the manufacturers to offer us bonus money was of course good for customers as it drove retail prices down. It would make no commercial sense for Asda to decline the offer of discount money that would enable it to sell at a lower retail price while maintaining our margin all the more so, given Asda's commitment to Every Day Low Prices."

From your perspective, what I wanted to ask you about is the competitive dynamic that was going on during 2002 to 2003 . What was your impression of the extent to which these manufacturers were seeking to compete on price?
A. It was extremely competitive, constantly, which of course we recognised very closely because we were the same way with our competitors.
Q. I think you also told us that you gave us examples, I think you have talked about where -- I think you put it as "annoying the opposition" by pricing, taking
a couple of pence or 10 p off the price of cigarettes, and you also said you used that to sometimes annoy the manufacturers.

Now, in terms of the manufacturers, can you explain to me what you were trying to do when you were, say, putting down the price of Gallaher, what were you trying to do vis-a-vis Imperial?
A. It might be that you perhaps were having a discussion about, let's say for example multipacks, and you were saying "We think multipacks are not performing in our stores the way they should be, can we look at doing some promotional funding so that we are able to reduce the retail price in stores". We might say, "We will meet you halfway on that, we will do some of that funding if you do some of that funding" and perhaps one of those manufacturers said, "Well, no, we don't want to do any promotional funding on multipacks at the moment or in the foreseeable future", and then we might therefore change a couple of the retail prices of their competitors to make it look like we were getting bonus funding from their competitors rather than from them, to try and stimulate a bit of activity.
Q. Now, where a manufacturer is offering a bonus in order to get the price down of its product, providing your margin is maintained, seeing what you say in

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paragraph 57 , would there actually be any reason that you can think of why you wouldn't take the bonus and put the price down?
A. No.
Q. Where a manufacturer has provided a bonus in order to get his price down, what obligation is he under to maintain that situation?
A. He is under no contractual obligation, so if we came to an agreement that he was going to bonus us so that we could reduce the retail price of a particular product, and he said he wanted to do it for 12 weeks, we would obviously expect him to stick to that agreement. But then if we said "Can we do it for another four weeks?" And he said "No, I can't, this is as far as I can go", then we would stop at 12 weeks.
Q. In relation to -- you have described and we know that the bonusing often takes place here in a competitive environment where one manufacturer is trying to compete with the other, but where the bonus hasn't been expressed to be for any definite periods, an indefinite period, is there any restriction on the manufacturer's entitlement to say "Well, I am now going to withdraw the bonus either in part or in whole"?
A. No.
Q. Let's move on to something else. Actually, we can pick
this point up at tab 62 and tab 63, so we can see what was happening. You were asked some questions both by Mr Lasok and the Chairman about this. Let's just break it down as to the stages of this.
At tab 62, \{D14/62/167\}, we see at the first paragraph:
"Current prices for Richmond Kingsize, 3.54, and Richmond Superkings, 3.58 , reflect additional price support of $\square$ per pack."

Stopping there for a moment, what had Imperial been doing in order to achieve those prices?
A. So they had been providing us with a bonus to be able to reduce the selling price to what's there.
Q. Right. Then in the second paragraph we can see what they are talking about doing, which is moving the price up. Then it says that Stephen Carroll is going to forward an updated price file detailing these changes. What would you then anticipate to see in the price file about this change in the bonus?
A. So I would expect that bonus to be removed.
Q. Right. Now, if we look at tab 63, originally at tab 62 they were contemplating this happening on 14 October, and then at 63 they are contemplating delaying things until 21 October with then an amended price file to show the revised date. So can you explain to us what's 141
happening in terms of the price files in terms of the bonusing and then the revision?
A. So I understand from that that the bonus will continue for an additional week, which allows us to keep the price lower for that additional week.
Q. Why, from your understanding of the position, would Imperial need to hold down the price and continue this bonusing for an extra week? What would be the commercial reason that would be driving that?
A. For competition reasons.
Q. Right.
A. So they have seen that a competitor is holding out the prices.
Q. Right, okay. Then you were asked some questions about
paragraph 13 of your witness statement and paragraph 39.
I am not sure I quite understood what the point was
here, that you were ... I think what Mr Lasok said to you is that it looked as if the scenario in paragraph 13 was theoretical as the manufacturers normally fund promotions.
What I would like to ask you about is this: if there is a promotion by Gallaher so that they reduce here the price of Benson \& Hedges, that was the example you gave, was Imperial under an obligation to have a promotion for Marlboro?
A. No.
Q. So whose choice was it as to whether they did that?
A. It was their choice.
Q. Right. What would be the factors which would determine whether they chose to follow or to seek to compete with Gallaher?
A. They would be monitoring their sales and they would be watching for customers switching brands.
Q. Where one of the manufacturers decided to have a promotion, did the other manufacturer always respond competitively?
A. More often than not.
Q. Right. So in relation to what you say at paragraph 57 of your statement, to what extent was this, so far as you saw, driving prices down?
A. It briefly drove prices down, and if I may just add to the point you made before, we would obviously -- we would also point out, we would say "do you want to bonus a particular product to reduce the prices", we were always looking for opportunities in a market where prices were continually being increased by Budget increases all the time, we were always looking for some opportunity to try and make things a bit cheaper for the customers.
Q. That leads me to tab 69, \{D14/69/186\}, which you were 143
asked a lot of questions about. This was the Small Classic Cigars. If we pause for a moment to see what the exchange of emails was about, the first one on page 132 was Mr Carroll, Stephen Carroll, complaining that the price of the cigars had moved after the price marked pack ran out from 2.55 to 2.73 rather than 2.69.

You then I think explained that you had had a price file which showed 2.73, and then you also made a point as to why you thought these particular cigars should be more expensive, due to the greater weight of tobacco.

Then if you go back to page 131, the email from Mr Carroll at the foot of the page made the point that a bonus had been paid of 34 p per outer to have a price reduced to 2.69. Okay?

Now, you have explained to us also that the RSPs you regarded, you have told us, as maximum selling prices, but leaving that on one side for the moment, I just want to ask you about the bonus: where you have been paid a bonus, here of $34 p$, to achieve either a specific or maximum price, it doesn't matter, of $£ 2.69$, to what extent was Imperial entitled to complain if you were selling above that price?
A. They would complain if we were selling above that price.
Q. If we then go to paragraph 77 of your witness statement, which concerned the new trading agreement, and if we
just put this in context: where bonuses are being paid, then ITL -- why are they paying a bonus? What are they trying to do?
A. To help us to achieve a lower retail price.
Q. Right. Now, paragraph 77, Mr Lasok asked you some questions towards the end, but let's just see what you are saying at the beginning of the paragraph:
"At item 9 there is a reference to ongoing pricing and how we should communicate on such issues. This comment reflects a nervousness about competition on ITL's part which I believe we may have raised with them."

THE CHAIRMAN: "Competition law on ITL's part". MR HOWARD: I am sorry, I didn't mean to misread it, I apologise if I did. "Competition law on ITL's part".
"Their concern was to ensure that where they discounted cost prices, this discount was passed on to customers. They did not want their funding of aggressive pricing initiatives against Gallaher to be absorbed by the retailers as extra margin."
Those two sentences, the one beginning "their concern" and "they did not want", can you explain, just tell me how this arose and what the nature of the discussion was?
A. I mean, I think really that they were just -- they
wanted to -- when they are talking about pricing, they want to make it clear that whenever they are offering discounts they expect those discounts to be passed on to consumers. And occasionally of course there will be mistakes like that, the Classic example, where it was a clerical error because of the number of products that were out there, where the price wasn't right. But fundamentally they wanted to be able to say "If we are paying you discounts -- paying you bonuses, the understanding is that you will then follow that with a reduction in retail price to, at the very least, the maximum RSP".
Q. Right. When you say, then, there was some misunderstanding on all sides as to how competition law applied to supplier/retailer communications, can you just tell us -- you are describing it as a misunderstanding -- what was this misunderstanding about supplier/retailer communications, what was it, particularly in this context of bonusing, that you were concerned about?
A. I think because when you are talking about bonusing you are also in the same context talking about retail prices, it's a fundamental part of the discussion, that I think that was where the questions were arising about Competition law around that.

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Q. So if the supplier is saying to the retailer "I'll pay you a bonus of 5 p to reduce the price of Dorchester from $£ 2.34$ to $£ 2.29$ ", assume that was it, was it your concern that they shouldn't be able to say that?
A. That's what's behind that paragraph.
Q. Right. You then tell us that, in the last bit:
"The position eventually reached was the basic position that had always existed. The manufacturers would continue to recommend prices but we would be free to set our own prices and discount further if we wanted to."

So the net position that you reached in relation to this, to what extent did you actually have any difference between that position and the 2002 position? Was there a change?
A. Not for us, no. It was the same for us.
Q. We know that --

THE CHAIRMAN: Do you think it was the same for ITL?
A. Perhaps our feelings were clearer.

MR HOWARD: Let's just have a look at the agreement that was actually executed. It's at tab 80. If you go to the page marked 22 , the final page in the tab, you see ITL's strategy pricing requirements:
"The strategy pricing requirement is a part of this trading agreement, but Asda stores is at all times free

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to set its own retails for products stocked in its stores."

Do you see that? We see it's different language, and that last clause wasn't set out in the 2002 agreement. As far as you were concerned, was this changing the way in which you or Imperial behaved?
A. No. No, it was to clarify the wording.
Q. Sorry, it was clarifying ...
A. The wording.
Q. Thank you.

Just on a separate point about delisting, I think you were told there was no evidence at all about delisting. Could you go to tab 70, just as an example. This is an Imperial internal document. If you would go to page 233, under "RYO sales 2001", roll-your-own, do you see that paragraph, under the paragraph it says:
"After a poor launch" --
A. Sorry.
Q. It's the last sentence, I beg your pardon. I didn't realise you weren't there.
A. Sorry, it's page 233?
Q. 233 .
A. Okay.
Q. You will see it says "RYO sales" and then various information about Golden Virginia and Drum and

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Amber Leaf, and so on. Then the last sentence refers to a product called Raw, which was delisted. Do you know anything about that?
A. That was before my time.
Q. I see, okay. But we also see other references in here to products being delisted. This document may be all pre-dating your involvement. Although it's dated 3 March.

At 232, at the foot of the page, you will see a list, it says:
"The following brands have either been delisted ...", and a whole lot of brands are listed at the top of page 233. Was that in your time, the delisting of those brands?
A. The Embassy, I think the Embassy was at the beginning of my ...
Q. Was that your decision, I mean Asda's decision to delist?
A. Yeah, and it was low sales, Embassy, yeah, of those packs of Embassy.
Q. Also Rizla on page 234, I think we see in the second paragraph under "Rizla, Other", something about the rolling machines being delisted. I think the rolling machines are the machines that you roll your own in, I suppose?
A. Yes.
Q. Was that something you were aware of?
A. This was before my time, looking at the dates.
Q. These sort of examples of products being taken out, whose decision would that be?
A. Asda's.
Q. That would be on the basis of what sort of consideration?
A. Sales normally.
Q. Right. From the manufacturers' point of view, what was generally his strategy about having his products listed? What would he want?
A. He would want all products to be listed.

THE CHAIRMAN: When you discussed delistings, these delistings, were they resistant to you delisting them, or did they see the writing on the wall? Can you remember?
A. It's a little bit of both. So sometimes as a company, they would take a product out of circulation, and other times it would be you would just say "I am really sorry, there is only limited space on the gantry. We need to delist this product as the sales just aren't there."

MR HOWARD: Just finally, sorry, and it's going slightly backwards, paragraph 62 of your witness statement, you say in the second sentence:

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## "In this case it appears ITL did delay

implementation of the price increase, presumably they were nervous about whether or not Gallaher would also increase the Dorchester prices."

Can you just explain this to me: why would Imperial be nervous about this?
A. Because these are two brands where customers might switch between brands, because the prices were similar.
Q. If Gallaher chose not to put up the price of the competing Gallaher brand, from a competitive point of view, in what respect would Imperial suffer?

## A. A loss of sales.

MR HOWARD: Thank you very much.

> Questioned by THE TRIBUNAL

DR SCOTT: Mr Mason, you have talked quite a lot about margins and the need to sustain them, therefore not reducing prices at the expense of Asda, and one of the things that we learnt from Mr Jolliff and indeed if you take the bundle again and turn to tab 50 first, this is just before you are taking over, and Mr Jolliff was very pleased with himself because he must have done something right, he told us, margins had increased. You will see -- I am not going to read it out, but you can read for yourself what is said under "Margins" on page 80 there.

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## (Pause)

So you were inheriting a good patch, and that's reiterated, you will find when we come to 56 , tab 56. This is a letter to Mr Lang. I think by now you have arrived; yes?
A. Yes.

DR SCOTT: So there has already been an improvement, and in this letter Mr Hall is noting -- and again I am not going to read it out, but you can read for yourself the passage marked with a box, then "from tobacco"?
A. Yes.

DR SCOTT: So what appears to be very clear to us is that ITL were concerned with the margins that you needed to get your bonuses, and we will come back to that in a moment.

If you would turn to your statement and to paragraph 63 where you are commenting on document 64, if you turn the page to page 20 or 425 --
MR HOWARD: Can I just interrupt to say when you said that ITL is very concerned with the margins you needed to get your bonuses, did you mean your profits?
DR SCOTT: No. We established earlier on that there were personal bonuses at stake from achieving margins.
MR HOWARD: I don't think it's been suggested that ITL was aware of the personal bonuses that individuals were
going to earn. It hasn't been suggested to anybody that they were aware of that.
DR SCOTT: Yes. We have established that there were personal bonuses, bonuses paid by Asda to Mr Mason.
MR HOWARD: But it's not suggested that Imperial was aware of the terms of Mr Mason's employment.
DR SCOTT: No, there are two distinct things here. One is that ITL were aware of the margins improving under the stewardship of Mr Jolliff.
MR HOWARD: Yes.
DR SCOTT: And that Asda had an intention of trying to improve the profitability of tobacco.

MR HOWARD: Yes, absolutely. That was my ...
DR SCOTT: At the personal level, we have seen that within Asda there was bonusing going on for maintaining and improving those margins.
MR HOWARD: Yes. It's just putting the two together, Imperial had no reason to know.
DR SCOTT: Yes, I --
MR HOWARD: It's just your question -- I'm not trying to be difficult, your question was I think on the basis that Imperial were aware of the individuals' bonuses.
DR SCOTT: No, no, I am not suggesting, I am just thinking about your situation, sitting in Asda, but you are recognising that Imperial are concerned about those 153
margins, whether they know about your personal bonusing or not. However, if we go back to 63, you were:
"... trying better to understand ITL's cost prices,
but they refused to share this information with us as it was confidential. This was typical of ITL, they were not transparent and we always had a sense, reaffirmed by the profits announced in their annual accounts, that they were making a lot more money than we were on tobacco products."
You looked at their annual accounts, presumably?
A. Yes. Yes. Well, top line, yes.

DR SCOTT: Do you happen to remember what the margins were?
A. No, I don't, I'm afraid.

DR SCOTT: But you felt --
A. It was really an overall cash profit in comparison to
the cash profit that retailers made from selling
cigarettes, really was the comparison.
DR SCOTT: Mr Howard, would you mind if I shared the numbers with him?
MR HOWARD: Well, no.
DR SCOTT: The numbers that he would have read.
MR HOWARD: If the numbers are taken from public documents, then I couldn't possibly object, they are public documents.

DR SCOTT: The operating profit on tobacco in the UK seems
to have been 390 million, representing a 51 per cent margin net of duty and a 9 per cent margin including duty. So you are absolutely right in remembering that. From that point of view you presumably expected them to be able to afford to bonus you.
A. Yes.

DR SCOTT: Now could you turn to tab 2. This is sometime before your time, so it reflects a situation before any of the negotiations had taken place on the agreement that you were participating in. But Mr Downham ends his letter to Mr Jolliff:
"As always, this activity will be fully funded."
What this activity involves, as you will see, is a move to prices which are related to, in this case, Mayfair, an activity that's to start when Mayfair moves down and end when the price returns to its normal level and as usual an updated price file will follow.
What it suggests is a pattern in which the prices go up and down and the margin that we talked about is maintained by bonuses being added or withdrawn when those prices change. Is that ...
A. Yes.

DR SCOTT: Is this the sort of letter that -- this doesn't surprise you, this letter?
A. No. No.

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DR SCOTT: If you had received this letter after the negotiations in which you took part, how would you have viewed it?
A. I would still have viewed any communication like this as they were talking about maximum RSPs. I would view any communication like that in that way, at whatever time.
DR SCOTT: Okay, but both you and they would have regard to the fact that you needed to make margins both to achieve the objective within Asda to push up the profitability of tobacco and to achieve your personal bonus?
A. Whenever we were thinking about moving retail prices up or down, we had to be very mindful of the margins.
DR SCOTT: Thank you very much indeed.
THE CHAIRMAN: Just one question, going back right to the beginning of what Mr Howard was asking you about: why were margins on tobacco so thin? I understand the comparison with why margins in the supermarkets on tobacco are thin compared with in convenience stores, but my understanding was that even if you look across the range of different kind of groceries within supermarkets, say comparing tobacco and soft drinks and baked beans or whatever, supermarkets earn more profits on other items than they do on tobacco, that of the profits that Asda earns per category, tobacco are thinner than other products; is that right?

## A. That's correct.

THE CHAIRMAN: Well, why is that, given that the answer that you gave as to why margins are thin -- namely that yes, we are all competing like mad with other supermarkets -presumably applies to all those other grocery items, so why is it that with tobacco the competition between the supermarkets beats the margin down to a thin level, thinner than it does in relation to other products that you all sell?
A. You can get to a position where you have a very low margin on tobacco because the volumes are so high, so the cash margin you can generate can still be quite substantial, even though the percentage margin is fairly low.

THE CHAIRMAN: So is what you are saying really that it's a small high value product, so the amount of shelf space that's taken up per pound, as it were, by a packet of cigarettes compared to a bottle of Coca-Cola is much smaller, you have to devote a lot more shelf space to earn a pound from selling baked beans or soft drinks than you do to selling tobacco? Is that the way to look at it?
A. Of course it's not a discretionary spend, either, if you smoke Lambert \& Butler and you smoke them every day, then you are going to need to buy them every day and you 157
are going to make some purchasing decisions based on that, so where you go to buy that product from, so obviously price is so very important as well, whereas if its a packet of biscuits, it's a discretionary spend, so the pricing structure is much different.
THE CHAIRMAN: So you can afford to have a bigger margin on a discretionary spend item than you can on a must-buy item?
A. Because it's not discretionary, you have to buy it every day, that makes the pricing very, very keen. It's a mix of factors, and that also relates to the fact that it's very high volume as well. So if they were 5 p, for example, and it was a very, very low volume area and people weren't needing to buy them every day, then the whole market would operate in a very different way.
THE CHAIRMAN: Right.
MR SUMMERS: Just noting that comparison with other areas of supermarket activity, do you have any returns on cigarettes, returns to the manufacturers because the stock is out of date or ...
A. Yes.

MR SUMMERS: Oh, really?
A. Yes. Sorry, not from customers.

MR SUMMERS: No, no, but from you --
A. To manufacturers, yes.

MR SUMMERS: And for what reasons, other than -- it's an out of date reason or are there other reasons?
A. Yes, it could be out of date, so there's only so much shelf life for tobacco, and also there was of course the legislative changes, so they change the marking fairly frequently on a packet of cigarettes. I did mention, partly through the statement, the 10 being a classic example of that, where they changed the levels of tar, for example, and of course because it was a duty paid product, so there is already a huge amount of duty money tied up in the product we have in store, if you send that back to the manufacturer, the manufacturer can claim that duty back, prove to Customs \& Excise that they have received X amount of product back and then destroy it, normally by fire.
MR SUMMERS: Thank you very much indeed.
THE CHAIRMAN: I see we are at quarter to 5, Mr Flynn. Unless you are going to be very brief, would it be better to come back tomorrow? Or would you prefer to continue?
MR FLYNN: I was going to be brief, Madam, but it depends on what one means by brief. I was going to ask about three or four questions, but it depends on the length of the answers and maybe Mr Mason will take note of that.
THE CHAIRMAN: Well, Mr Mason, we can either continue this 159
afternoon and then you will be free to go --
A. If possible.

THE CHAIRMAN: If possible. Okay. Let's carry on, then, and see if we can finish this afternoon.
MR FLYNN: Let us see.
Re-examination by MR FLYNN
MR FLYNN: Mr Mason, I think what the Tribunal is interested in, your evidence about the status of the agreement, the 2002 agreement I think you said in answer to Mr Summers, it was probably in a file but you weren't very sure; is that right? What sort of part did that play in your daily decision-making when deciding to accept or otherwise the recommendations that Imperial were putting forward to you on a price file?
A. None at all.
Q. If Gallaher made some change, upwards or downwards, doesn't really matter, the MPI or bonus going down for the revised price file to them, in deciding whether to accept that recommendation for your shelf price, would you ever get out the Imperial strategic pricing requirements for those differentials and parities? Would you ever check that against the Gallaher proposal?
A. No.
Q. Was it any concern to you if you were out of line with what Imperial hoped in those strategic pricing

## requirement sheets?

A. No.
Q. Mr Lasok put to you, I think, as really the bottom line at the end of his questioning what he said was the deal, and you baulk at the word "compliance". Was the position that, say Imperial expected you by and large to comply to follow through with the RSPs, or was it that they thought they had a deal with you under which they did? I am asking you about the Imperial perspective as far as you are concerned.
A. They expected us to follow it purely to maintain margin.
Q. Let's just be clear about expectation, they thought that was what was going to happen, or they thought you were required to do that?
A. They thought that was what was going to happen.

MR FLYNN: Thank you very much.
THE CHAIRMAN: Can I just clarify this point about why you didn't feel the need to consult the trading agreement? Did you appreciate at the time that the differentials that were expressed, the "no more than", "this p less or more than the competing Gallaher brand", that those were going to be in any event reflected in the RRPs and in the retail selling prices? What I am trying to get at is: was the reason that you say you didn't need to refer back to the agreement because you entirely disregarded 161
that agreement and what was the understanding that appeared to be reflected in it; or was it because you didn't need to go back to that page of differentials because you knew that most of the time you were pricing at RSP and that ITL would have ensured for their own interests that the RSPs were consistent with the differentials in that page? Do you understand the question I am asking?
A. I think so. I think the best way to describe it is you had an appreciation of the products that were linked, and that you knew that if one had been bonused down, that it wouldn't take very long for their competitors to notice that that product had been bonused down and then come to you and offer a similar kind of bonus. So it was more that you had an appreciation day to day in your head and also from what you are seeing in front of you on your own spreadsheets and on your own sales figures, because we had a system which showed all sales figures for every store and at the same time shows the current retail price in that store, so you had an appreciation of the way that there these products were linked and you knew that a bonus was coming, but if a price file came through and said "We would like to bonus Benson \& Hedges down by $5 \mathrm{p} "$, would I get out a trading agreement and say "Well, it says here it should be no more than $1 p$
different than", I would not do that.
THE CHAIRMAN: No, but you realised at the time that if you
more or less stuck with the RSPs and if you accepted and
implemented the bonuses that you were being offered,
then in fact your prices would be consistent with that
schedule that had been attached to the earlier agreement?
A. They would more often than not end up in that situation --
THE CHAIRMAN: In a correct relationship.
A. -- which you know the products that are linked.

## THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

A. But it would not always be that case.

THE CHAIRMAN: No. Thank you very much, Mr Mason, that's been extremely helpful, and I can release you from the witness box now. Thank you.
(The witness withdrew)
Housekeeping
MR HOWARD: Before we rise, could I raise one point?
THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.
MR HOWARD: It simply relates to the position on Sainsbury and Fiona Bayley.
THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.
MR HOWARD: You may remember Addleshaws and Sainsbury's intervention, as it were, at an earlier stage.

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THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.
MR HOWARD: In order to ensure that we don't get some procedural hiccup, we think the sensible thing would be to sit in camera on Thursday, and then at a later stage you can perhaps consider the extent to which any of it is in camera, but what we don't want and, in fact, nobody wants is Sainsbury's and Addleshaws popping up saying this is all confidential and so on. We don't accept it is, but it would be a lot easier to avoid wasting time having a debate about it.
THE CHAIRMAN: If tomorrow afternoon we are going to get on to your Sainsbury's mini opening --
MR HOWARD: Yes.
THE CHAIRMAN: -- does that apply to that as well as to Ms --
MR HOWARD: It probably would, although as I said the other day, it may well be that we will dispense with that depending on how much time is available.
THE CHAIRMAN: Okay.
Yes, presumably Sainsbury know that Ms Bayley is appearing on Thursday?
MR LASOK: Yes, they are aware of that.
THE CHAIRMAN: Will they be attending then?
MR LASOK: We think so.
MR HOWARD: This would put them off from attending because

| I think they wanted to know whether -- their expressed | 1 |
| :--- | ---: |
| concern is confidentiality, so if we tell them we are | 2 |
| sitting in camera, then I think they will not need to | 2 |
| attend. | 3 |
| THE CHAIRMAN: Does anyone have any objection to sitting in | 4 |
| camera for the Sainsbury's evidence? | 5 |
| MR LASOK: We have no objection. | 6 |
| THE CHAIRMAN: I think that does make sense. | 7 |
| MR HOWARD: I should make it clear I don't accept, it's just | 8 |
| as it were a pro tem. | 9 |
| THE CHAIRMAN: It's a logistical practicality. | 10 |
| MR HOWARD: Yes, then the court will have to consider in due | 11 |
| course whether actually -- I mean, as it were, for | 12 |
| public disclosure points of view, whether it remains in | 13 |
| camera. | 14 |
| THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. | 15 |
| So tomorrow we have Mr Lang in the morning and then | 16 |
| any Sainsbury's opening in any space that's left apart | 17 |
| from that? | 18 |
| MR FLYNN: Yes. | 19 |
| THE CHAIRMAN: So if we start at 10.30 tomorrow morning, is | 21 |
| that going to be all right? Very well, we will resume | 20 |
| at 10.30 tomorrow morning. Thank you. | 22 |
| (5.00 pm) | 23 |
| (The court adjourned until 10.30 am on | 24 |

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