2 3 4 This Transcript has not been proof read or corrected. It is a working tool for the Tribunal for use in preparing its judgment. It will be placed on the Tribunal Website for readers to see how matters were conducted at the public hearing of these proceedings and is not to be relied on or cited in the context of any other proceedings. The Tribunal's judgment in this matter will be the final and definitive record. IN THE COMPETITION Case No.: 1380/1/12/21 APPEAL TRIBUNAL Salisbury Square House 8 Salisbury Square London EC4Y 8AP (Remote Hearing) Friday 5th March 2021 Before: The Honourable Mr Justice Marcus Smith Bridget Lucas QC Professor David Ulph CBE (Sitting as a Tribunal in England and Wales) **BETWEEN**: BGL (Holdings) Limited & Others -V-Competition and Markets Authority APPEARANCES Daniel Beard QC and Alison Berridge (On behalf of BGL) Ben Lask and Michael Armitage (On behalf of Competition and Markets Authority) Digital Transcription by Epig Europe Ltd Lower Ground 20 Furnival Street London EC4A 1JS Tel No: 020 7404 1400 Fax No: 020 7404 1424 Email: ukclient@epiqglobal.co.uk

1	Friday, 5 March 2021
2	(2.00 pm)
3	Case management conference
4	THE CHAIRMAN: Good afternoon everyone. I appreciate that this is obviously
5	a remote hearing. But apart from its remoteness, it is in all other respects
6	a hearing as if in open court and the usual rules apply. I'm sure I don't need
7	to tell anyone this yes, I see. Mr Beard, are you there? There's a very
8	odd
9	MR BEARD: Yes, I am, sorry.
10	THE CHAIRMAN: Right. Something's gone wrong with your image. I don't know
11	MR BEARD: I'll switch off and switch on again.
12	THE CHAIRMAN: There you are.
13	MR BEARD: I'm very sorry sir. I don't quite know why that happened.
14	THE CHAIRMAN: Not at all. These things regularly do.
15	I was saying that although I don't need to tell anyone this, the rules about recording,
16	broadcasting or transmitting this hearing apply. They shouldn't be done, it
17	would be wrong to do so. The hearing is of course being recorded for the
18	purposes of a record at the Tribunal.
19	It would be helpful, I think, if in your submissions you can take it a little bit more
20	slowly than one would in a physical courtroom and in particular my experience
21	at least is that it is slower digging up electronic documents than it is finding
22	paper documents. But there we are.
23	I have a few things that I want to go through before I invite the parties to speak.
24	I have quite a long speaking note setting out some of the views that we have
25	about the process and I think it's probably important to get those off our
26	collective chests before you address us, rather than throw them at you in the

course of your submissions. So apologies in advance for not inviting you, Mr Beard, to open the case management conference in the way you normally would.

Before I come on to our thoughts about process, I know I probably shouldn't have to raise this, but we are all three of us subscribers to home insurance products.

Some of us have used price comparison websites, we all know about the meerkats and ComparetheMarket, but I take it that that is not a problem.

I raise it simply out of an abundance of caution so that that is on the record.

I appreciate that we have an agenda and probably the most important questions before us are the following three: first, the timetable for the service of the CMA's response to BGL's notice of appeal and evidence; secondly, the permission to file and, if permission is granted, the timing of any reply from BGL; and thirdly, the timing and length of the appeal itself.

I don't want to anticipate too much. But it may assist the parties if I indicate now that we are minded, subject to hearing from the parties and subject to what I'm about to say, to extend the time for the CMA's response, to make provision for reply evidence from BGL and to go for a hearing no later than November 2021.

Now I had hoped that this would be an uncontroversial matter, given the parties' helpful indication as to availability. Unfortunately, as you probably all know from communications from the Competition Appeal Tribunal during the course of this morning, we have a problem with the dates suggested by the parties and I'm afraid we are going to have to debate different dates. I'll say no more than that.

But we are going to have to press the parties about when the matter could go and we are looking, and I know this will not come as pleasant news to the CMA,

but we are looking at dates at the very beginning of November for the three weeks then which we, the Tribunal, can do, I know Mr Beard can do, but I also know that that places Ms Demetriou in difficulties. So it's obviously something which we haven't finally decided, we'll want to hear both parties on it. But I think I should signal a distinct reluctance to move the hearing into 2022 or beyond because I do feel that although this is an historic abuse, these appeals should be heard quickly and not slowly. So those are the broad picture points.

But in light of the volume of the material which we've already seen, and by that I mean the CMA's decision, and BGL's appeal material which we've read, we are concerned to achieve as part of the timetable to the hearing an identification of what is common ground and, to the extent that matters are not common ground, a frame of reference that everyone, the parties, the Tribunal and witnesses, can use so that there are no misunderstandings or ships passing in the night.

Now this is obviously a case where the infringement that has been found by the CMA's decision is an infringement by effect and not by object of Article 101 TFEU, or the Chapter I prohibition. For shorthand, I'm going to refer to these provisions as the cartel prohibitions, although I appreciate that this case is very far from a typical infringement of the cartel prohibition and the range of this provision is far wider than the name I've given it would suggest.

In very broad summary -- you'll know this better than I -- the CMA has determined that BGL through its insurance price comparison website, comparethemarket.com, has infringed the cartel prohibition by entering into agreements with insurers -- and I will call them subscribing insurers -- offering insurance through comparethemarket.com which contained a wide most

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favoured nation clause. As I understand it, it seems to be common ground between the parties that a number of the conditions necessary to be established under the cartel prohibition are uncontroversially met.

It seems to me to be common ground that the agreements with insurers are agreements or decisions or concerted practices within the cartel prohibition. that the agreements, if I can use that shorthand, are between undertakings. The logical consequence of the CMA's decision just on that point is that the insurers subscribing to comparethemarket.com are themselves in breach of the cartel prohibition.

However, the CMA's decision is not addressed to those subscribing insurers, as I call them. The inference of this may be that the subscribing insurers were involuntary participants in the infringement and the relevance of this may be something -- I can say no more than that -- may be something that needs to be further developed when we come to "theory of harm". However, simply looking at the need for there to be agreements/decisions/concerted practices between undertakings, it appears to be common ground that that requirement is met.

Thirdly, it appears to be uncontroversial that the effect on trade, whether between Member States or within the United Kingdom, is satisfied.

As we see it, the real area of dispute is whether the agreements between BGL and the subscribing insurers have the effect of preventing, restricting or distorting competition. In order to avoid the repetitive mantra of "preventing, restricting or distorting competition", I'm simply going to refer to the distortion of competition. The decision does not allege that the use of wide most favoured nation clauses had as their object the distortion of competition. This is a case where it is said that the effect was one of distorting competition.

It would be helpful to have on the record confirmation that this is indeed the battleground between the parties. To be clear, I have no desire, none of us do, to shut out any defence that is being run. But if there is a point in issue going beyond the question of the existence of a distortion of competition, including, to be clear, questions of market definition, which I regard as part of this question, then we consider those points need to be clearly articulated by BGL in short order. I hope it is a simple confirmation, but if there are other points alive, then I want to know about them sooner rather than later.

I want to stress that this aim for clarity and common reference isn't intended in any way as a criticism of either the CMA or BGL. Rather, it's a reflection of the complexity of the appeal and the volume of material on both sides already produced and to be produced in the future.

Now assuming we're right about the ambit of the common ground between the parties and the areas of dispute, the question is how best to focus everyone's efforts on these controversial questions which relate to the existence of a distortion of competition within the sense of the cartel prohibition.

As to this, at the risk of being obvious, the critical and crucial question in order to ascertain whether there's a distortion of competition is the comparison between the conditions of competition with and without the conduct in question. In other words, we consider the actual as against the counterfactual case that would pertain if the infringing conduct were removed. I'm going to refer to these as "the actual case" and "the counterfactual case", again for shorthand.

The difference between the actual case and the counterfactual case lies, as it seems to us, in the use of wide most favoured nation clauses in agreements between BGL and its subscribing insurers. As a preliminary, it would be very helpful if

the parties could agree: first, the relevant examples of wide most favoured nation clauses as used in the agreements between BGL and the subscribing insurers, and the widest permissible, that is to say non-infringing, narrow most favoured nation clause that would appear in the counterfactual.

We consider it's important to get these terms identified when considering the counterfactual case now, sooner rather than later. I appreciate of course that examples of clauses are quoted in the decision, for example at paragraph 2.59. But I think it is very important that we know exactly what we're talking about. It may be of course that examples will not cut it and that we'll have to look at each and every clause in play between BGL and the subscribing insurers. If that's the case, then so be it, but I do want to know what we are talking about.

There is one point which I think is uncontroversial but I'm going to note it in case it's not. Our understanding is that narrow most favoured nation clauses existed as between other price comparison websites that competed with comparethemarket.com and insurers subscribing to those websites; therefore, the existence and effect of such clauses will be present in both the actual case and in the counterfactual case. If that's wrong, again I would like to know. It may be helpful to ensure that there's common ground as to the terms of these provisions also or, if there is a dispute, that it is articulated sooner rather than later.

Moving on to what I think is a genuine point of controversy is this: there is, I think, a dispute between the CMA and BGL as to the extent to which wide most favoured nation clauses were either present in the agreements between BGL and the subscribing insurers or, if present, the extent to which they were effectively enforced.

Now on this point, it seems to us that the point is both relevant and important because if it is said by BGL -- and let me stress I'm not trying to state BGL's case -- yes, these wide clauses were present in the agreements but no one took any notice of them, then that might be said to affect the actual case when contrasted with the counterfactual case and assessed. Of course, the CMA may say in response that when deciding whether the cartel prohibition is infringed, regard must be had to the effect on potential as well as actual competition and that we should proceed on the basis that even if the wide most favoured nation clauses were not enforced, they could have been. We have absolutely no desire to prejudge this issue, it would be wrong to so, but again we do want the battlelines to be clear.

In the first instance, we would like BGL to clarify its position as to the actual case against which the counterfactual is to be judged. For the moment, I'm going to assume that it is BGL's case that what matters is the extent to which wide most favoured nation clauses were complied with by subscribing insurers as opposed to what their theoretical contractual obligations might have been.

It may be that BGL could provide a series of factual propositions on this point so that the CMA can understand exactly where BGL is coming from, and any factual controversies addressed in evidence well before the hearing.

If we are right and this is indeed BGL's position, then it seems to us that the CMA's defence may have to differentiate between and deal with two actual cases against which the counterfactual case is considered. First, the CMA may say, as I mentioned, that what matters is the potentiality and not the actuality. If so, then the CMA will have to be very clear as to how the potentiality of a rigorous enforcement of wide most favoured nation clauses affects the actual case.

Secondly, the CMA may wish to say, either in the alternative or as its primary case, that there is an infringement of the cartel prohibition even on the basis of the minimal actual use of wide most favoured nation clauses. Or, of course, the CMA may say on that basis, the actuality, there's actually no infringement.

However, if it's the former case, that there is an infringement even on the basis of the actuality, it seems to us important that the parties engage well before the CMA's defence in identifying and resolving the factual disputes that may exist. It would, we consider, be entirely inappropriate for those factual disputes, as opposed to arguments about their relevance, to persist up to the final hearing of this appeal.

Now to be clear, we are not minded to make an order in this regard, but we do want to send out a clear signal because we think that unless this question is addressed early, an efficient and effective hearing is prejudiced. It may be that narrow and clearly defined factual issues in this area can be left for determination at the final hearing, but they will have to be narrow, they will have to be clearly identified, and evidence will have to be led to the extent that there is disagreement.

In any event, it seems to us that the appeal may very well turn on the existence of two, rather than one, actual cases. Provided the issues are clearly articulated, we see no problem with this. The counterfactual question, moving on to that, whatever the actual case, becomes "what would have happened if during the relevant period, narrow most favoured nation clauses had been used by BGL in their agreements with the subscribing insurers in place of the wide most favoured nation clauses actually used?", whatever "actually" means.

The starting point in relation to this question lies in identifying the relevant market or

markets. We are conscious that there is considerable dispute between the parties on this point, and again we have no desire to prejudge. We just wish to ensure that the Tribunal and the parties have a clear understanding of where the fault lines are.

With that end in mind, we consider that in the first instance, the CMA should articulate all of the markets that are potentially relevant. We say potentially relevant because we consider that there is benefit in the CMA defining markets, even if it is not contended that there is a distortion of competition on that market.

The reason we consider there to be such a benefit is because of the controversy regarding market definition that exists between the parties. We consider that the CMA should go first on this because it is the CMA's decision that is under appeal, and we consider that the CMA should do this in short order within the next week or so. To be clear, this effort at market definition will be followed -- I'll be coming to this -- by a statement of the CMA's "theory of harm" in relation to each market. In other words, what we are asking the CMA to do is to distil section 5 of its decision, pages 57 to 157, into something more manageable. I want to be clear that nothing in these clarifications we're seeking is intended either to allow a party to expand its case, particularly the CMA, or to preclude a party from taking a point that has clearly been made.

In response to this list of potential markets, and again in short order, BGL needs to articulate the extent to which it disagrees with the CMA's formulation of the potentially relevant markets and state its own position as to the potentially relevant markets that it says exist. In short, we want the respective positions of the parties locked down well before the CMA's response to the notice of appeal.

1 2 3 4 today; that is to say, by around 26 March 2021. 5 6 7 to push back on, but that is our present thinking. 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 the outcome of this appeal. 18 19 20 minded to permit such evidence. 21 22 23 24 25

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We anticipate, but this is subject to argument, that all of the steps we are minded to order, with the exception of the factual disputes regarding the actual use of wide most favoured nation clauses, can be dealt with within three weeks of We would then be minded to give the CMA a further four weeks to 23 April 2021 to file its defence and evidence in support. I know that's a date which BGL want At some time well before 23 April 2021, the aspirational date for the defence, we would want the CMA to file an indicative "theory of harm" pleading, setting out, without adducing evidence, the distortion of competition it alleges in relation to each market identified by each party, nil returns being required. I say "indicative" because the CMA would be at liberty to adjust this pleading at any time up to the service of its defence, that is to say on 23 April 2021 if that is the date we order, so as to enable the CMA to take full account of the views of its experts or expert. But this approach would enable both the parties and the Tribunal to consider the extent to which market definition is significant to There would be no need for BGL to respond to the articulation of the CMA's "theory of harm" until the service of its reply evidence and, as I've indicated, we are I hope that these points will assist in crystallising the points of dispute and the issues between the parties without in any way precluding the parties from taking points that they want to take. We also hope that this approach will enable BGL's reply evidence to be served well before the long vacation in the course of late May or early June. That would leave open the potential for the appeal to be heard right at the beginning of the new term in October, or in November.

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As I say, we'll have to come back to timing in a moment.

I've gone on far too long. I've a few final points to make to conclude those opening remarks. First, we consider that a further CMC should be in the diary for a date not earlier than three weeks from today and not later than five weeks from today. That is in order to deal with any issues arising out of the matters that I've already mentioned. We consider that there would be a yet further CMC in July in the run-up to the long vacation and that would be, in effect, the pre-trial review because we would expect by that date everything to have been served that is going to be served with the exception of written submissions.

We do not propose, and I don't think the parties are going to try to persuade us otherwise, to consider how evidence is to be received at the appeal hearing. That, it seems to us, is appropriately considered at a later CMC. It may be that the evidence could be given issue by issue or that "hot tubbing" would be appropriate. I confess that I have views on both those points, essentially sceptical ones, but they are obviously best discussed when the parties' positions are clearer, and it may be that the best time to debate this is actually at the CMC just before the long vacation.

It may be that that the July CMC could be combined with a "teach-in". Again it's something which has been raised and it is perhaps too early to say whether a "teach-in" would be necessary. But the operation of price comparison websites, particularly for insurance products, seems to us to be potentially quite complex and we would rather that provision was made for a "teach-in" that could, if necessary, be scrapped later on in the year. So what I would want the parties to think about is a two-day slot, ideally together but wouldn't necessarily have to be, in July at which we would discuss procedural

questions as at a PTR and have the "teach-in" over one or maybe two days.

Just on the question of "teach-in", in some cases it's blindingly obvious what the subject matter of the "teach-in" will be. This is not such a case and what we would have in mind would be, well before the aspirational date of the "teach-in", for us to articulate to the parties the questions or subject matter areas that we would want to be helped on and for the parties to either add to that list or even say, "Frankly you will understand this by the time we get to the hearing, you don't need to be taught about this".

So that, I suspect, is the way in which one could work out whether a "teach-in" is indeed necessary or not. If when trying to work out the questions we draw a blank, then that would strongly suggest that a "teach-in" is not necessary. If, on the other hand, we come up with ten pages of detailed questions on which we don't know the answer, then a "teach-in" is almost certainly indicated.

Finally, we want to say something about expert evidence. We can see, and it is understandable, that both sides will be relying extensively on expert economists. That's only to be expected and of course we welcome the assistance of expert economists in this case. But we do not want the expertise of the economists to be abused. So far as we know, none of the economists that the parties intend to call are experts in the field of insurance, or home insurance, or the rating of insurance business, or indeed the placing of insurance.

Now these insurance-specific fields may or may not be relevant, we can't say. But if they are relevant, we as a tribunal will take a singularly dim view of these matters being addressed by or through economists. This is a warning that has been sounded many times by this Tribunal under various different constitutions and I have particularly in mind the statement made by Mr Justice

Barling in the Tribunal in *Sainsbury's v Mastercard* [2016], CAT 11, paragraphs 36 and following. If and to the extent that there are questions of insurance or insurance marketing or insurance pricing arising in this case, then either these issues must be presented in the form of an agreed statement of facts or agreed data on which the economists can comment, or proper evidence on the point must be adduced from a witness of fact or an expert in the field.

I'm conscious that I've thrown a great deal at the parties in those opening remarks.

I have reduced my speaking note to writing which identifies in red highlight the orders we are provisionally minded to make, subject of course to the parties' submissions.

What I'm minded to do is to email the speaking note to the parties and their representatives and rise for, say, 20 minutes so that counsel can take instructions and the parties can respond after at least some consideration -- the email can go now by the way.

I should also say that the Tribunal appreciates that it is far behind the parties in understanding the matters here in issue, so that is an invitation to the parties not to hesitate to push back as strongly as they consider advisable if we have the wrong end of the stick in these procedural directions. If they are not workable, then tell us. But that is the end of an overlong introduction.

Mr Beard, does 20 minutes fit the bill or would you want longer or less?

MR BEARD: I think it might, given we are all remote and therefore will have to be linking up with people around the place, if we could be given half an hour 'til 3.00. I think that might be best.

THE CHAIRMAN: I'm more than happy. Mr Lask, is that enough for you, or would you want more?

1 MR LASK: I was going to suggest the same. Unless those assisting me tell me 2 they need longer, I think half an hour should suffice. 3 **THE CHAIRMAN:** Look, we'll resume at half an hour. If you need more time then, 4 then of course you'll have it because there's no point in dealing with these 5 points without proper consideration. So what we will do, that is to say 6 the Tribunal, we will leave this hearing and I think the other parties, or the 7 parties and their representatives and advisers, can stay in the courtroom 8 virtually as they wish. But we will now retire to our virtual retiring room. So 9 we will resume at 3.00. Thank you all very much. 10 **MR BEARD:** Thank you. 11 MR LASK: Thank you sir. 12 (2.35 pm) 13 (A short break) 14 (3.00 pm) 15 **THE CHAIRMAN:** Good afternoon. Can you hear me now? 16 MR BEARD: I can, sir. Thank you very much. 17 **THE CHAIRMAN:** Excellent, thank you very much. In that case, I think we are good 18 to go. (Pause) 19 Yes, Mr Beard, thank you very much. 20 **Submissions by MR BEARD**

MR BEARD: Sir, members of the Tribunal, I appear with Ms Berridge today and Mr Lask appears for Mr Armitage I believe.

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In relation to the agenda that you kindly provided to us, I'm going to leave the majority of it and just focus on the issues which your very helpful speaking note has drawn attention to, but obviously I think we were quite acutely aware would probably be the centre of discussion today. I thought the way I would

deal with it, if I may, is zip through the various red points in your notes and in doing so then pick up issues in relation to timing and evidence and the remainder of the procedures because I think they are all probably somewhat interlinked, rather than trying to separate stuff out. Then Mr Lask obviously can comment as he sees fit, and then perhaps come back to do a tidy up on remaining issues, if that pleases the Tribunal.

THE CHAIRMAN: That seems very sensible, Mr Beard, because you are right, these things are interconnected and it wouldn't make sense to do them point by point. Sometimes it's sensible to hear from both parties on one point before moving on. Your course commends itself.

MR BEARD: Thank you very much, sir.

If I may, I am just going to -- we're enormously grateful for the outline and indeed the preparation of work that's gone in that you were able to provide it to us so we could take instructions. But with that in mind, I'll then just work through the points, sir, that you highlighted.

Paragraph 8 and paragraph 10 of the speaking note, you highlighted the question of whether or not there are actually contentions about whether or not what we're talking about are agreements or concerted practices within the scope of the prohibition. The answer is no, there isn't an issue in relation to that.

Are there agreements between undertakings? Well, whether or not they are, strictly speaking, agreements or concerted practices, they're certainly between undertakings. As to effect on trade, I don't think there's going to be any issue there. I think theoretically some issues arise about trade between Member States, but let's park those because they are entirely minor in all of this. That then takes us to a simple proposition which is: is this case about distortion of competition, as you put it in your shorthand, and the answer is yes.

1 We will come back and formally confirm all of that, but I think I can deal with that one 2 relatively swiftly. 3 Obviously that is only the start of the enquiry in relation to these matters and in 4 relation to a case which, as you emphasise, is about effects, not object. So if 5 we then move on to 13(2): 6 "As a preliminary it would be very helpful if the parties could agree examples of wide 7 most favoured nation status clauses and the widest permissible narrow most 8 favoured nation status clause." 9 We are very happy to engage in that exercise; do it by way of example or discuss 10 with the CMA in relation to that. 11 Obviously in relation to 2(b), there may be issues that arise as to how it is the CMA 12 makes assertions about what is or isn't permissible. This is going to -- I'm 13 going to highlight now a point that will become boring I fear in my 14 submissions. But in dealing with any of these matters and their submissions 15 subsequently, and indeed any other evidence, the key issue here is ensuring 16 that the CMA indicates where in its decision it has dealt with these matters. 17 So we think that whenever the CMA is providing any of this material, it should be identified by reference to parts of its decision on why it is making these 18 19 assertions. 20 The reason that matters is because it may well be that certain of these points aren't 21 covered in the decision and that might itself be germane. But I don't want to 22 cut across the project that's set us in 13(2) and we are entirely content to 23 engage with the CMA on that project. 24 **THE CHAIRMAN:** Mr Beard, you've made a very important point and it does bear 25 repetition. I see it in, for instance, what you say in your skeleton regarding the 26 evidence of Professor Baker, which I'm sure we'll be coming to. But to be

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clear, I think we all know, and I'm including in the "all" the CMA, that this is very much a question of the CMA defending a decision it has made and that we are not in the business of working out whether there is another different case that could have been made but hasn't.

So you can certainly take it that we are very conscious of that and indeed I'm absolutely sure that the CMA team is itself very conscious of that because it is, frankly, the starting point for this kind of appeal. But it does bear repetition and I think your marker that it would be helpful to tie matters back to the decision is a good form of best practice because frankly it's a long decision and it will simply help us to work out what the CMA is thinking about when they make a certain point. But I don't think I'll be minded to make an order that these materials be part(?) of it, but I think as a marker, the point is well made and I endorse it.

MR BEARD: I'm grateful, sir. I wasn't pressing for an order. I'm trying to avoid getting into too much formality about these things, but I wanted to send a signal. So you hear it and the CMA do too. So thank you, sir.

If we move on to 3, it's the point about other price comparison websites and the use of narrow MFNs by them. We will confirm the position, but yes, they are subject to these provisions. But we'll obviously liaise with the CMA in relation to their position on that so you have the position of both sides.

Then when we move on to 13(4). There is obviously a discussion in 13(4)(a) about the possibility of two -- it's actual versus counterfactual, but within the actual it's actual or potential competition.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

MR BEARD: Now this is going to be an issue of some controversy both as to the extent to which there is a proper case made on either or both of those bases

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in the decision, and I think as is probably plain from our notice of appeal, the extent to which that is permissible under law, having regard to Krka and so on, or indeed adequate in circumstances where of course we are talking about a situation where these clauses came to an end in 2017 and there's a natural experiment. Now obviously that is a debate for another day, but I think it is worth putting down a marker because it links back to those points about how the decision deals with these things.

But in relation to the red, in relation to 4(b), you would like BGL to clarify its position as the actual case against which the counterfactual is to be judged. We are certainly happy to do that and the way we put it in the notice of appeal is we look at the actual cases, asking ourselves how the wide MFNs affected the behaviour of the insurers and it's not simply a matter of the formal terms of the provisions because we are dealing with an effects case. So we'll certainly set that out and that's fine.

As to a series of factual propositions on this point so the CMA can understand exactly where BGL's coming from, obviously we'll have that in mind and do our best in setting out a summary of our position in relation to it. I think at this stage, that's probably as far as I can go, but we're certainly not cavilling at the idea of fulfilling that role you have for us under 4(b)(i).

THE CHAIRMAN: No, indeed, thank you. This was the one bit of red I didn't put a date by because I'm very conscious that it's something which is actually very difficult to pin down. What I have in mind as the sort of disaster scenario I want to avoid is for there to be at the appeal hearing itself an absence of a clear articulation of what both sides are saying was the actual case.

MR BEARD: Yes.

THE CHAIRMAN: That's the concern I have. But I completely accept that what I'm

asking the parties to do in this regard is not something that could be done in a week or two, it's something which just has to inform the way in which the pleadings and the evidence supporting the pleadings develops. So it's rather like your first point, it's a marker that I'm putting down as to how I want this dealt with.

MR BEARD: Yes. We of course completely see, sir, your point in relation to this.

And we will do our best so that it can be fed into what the CMA are dealing with in their defence. I should say it's actually in relation to (iv) that we had more difficulty, and I think this perhaps overlaps with the point you were just raising because you are suggesting that well before the CMA's defence, you want us to identify what disputes exist between us.

Now we understand the thinking behind that but in many ways, the defence is the crystallisation of what issues do exist between us because obviously we've put forward our notice of appeal and said, "Look this is what we're not happy about, this is what we think you've got wrong, this is where we take issue with things specifically which we say really affects the way your decision was taken".

We anticipate that the CMA's defence will come back and say, "We don't agree with you on that" -- I mean, it would be delightful if they came back and said "No, no, no, you're absolutely right", that would foreshorten all of these matters, but I'm not so naive as to think that's where we stand at the moment.

But the point I make is that it's actually going to be extremely difficult to engage in this particular exercise prior to the defence because if you think about it -- obviously in this Tribunal, pleadings are done on a rather fuller basis. But if you were to think of this as being the claim and defence, in particular the claim and defence in ordinary commercial proceedings, until you get that

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25 26 defence, you don't know the issues that are crystallised between the parties.

So I do wonder whether -- you were asking about practicability. I have a real concern that we could spend an awful lot of time, whilst the CMA are actually trying to formulate their defence, arguing about what the issues are between us, and I do wonder whether or not we are going to achieve much by that means.

On the other hand, getting the defence, and part of the reason why we wanted the defence sooner rather than later, but I'll come back to that, was that we do want to work out what their case is and how we engage with it. On the other hand, I think that is the document, the forum in which it should be done and in those circumstances, it would seem to us rather than having this sort of engagement, we should actually see the defence doing it.

But if in the light of that defence there really are outstanding ambiguities about the respective positions of the parties in relation to the actual case against which the counterfactual's to be measured, then I think one is in a much clearer position to require the parties to do things and engage and perhaps provide relevant lists of differences, and so on. But I just wonder whether it's slightly premature, given that we don't have the defence of the CMA in that regard. That will be my observation on 4 (iv).

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, I understand what your issue is with this. The analogy with civil process isn't complete, of course, because in an odd way your document, although the appeal, is really a response to the decision which sets the ball rolling. But of course I take your point.

What I had in mind, it may be that one could phrase what I'm looking at differently, is if there is a point which the CMA is working away in its defence and thinks actually, we're not quite sure what the appeal is saying on this point -- and it

MR BEARD: I'm grateful.

That then takes me down to 7. This is really a matter for the CMA articulating the

will save us a great deal of work if we had a degree of clarity -- then what I would want is I would want that to be raised between the parties before the defence comes so that the defence can be better focused.

So again, this is one of the provisions that one can't make an order in relation to. But it does seem to me that if I put down the marker that it would assist us if there was, if necessary -- I mean the CMA may say it's not, but -- a constructive engagement to work out what each party is saying even though the defence hasn't been served so that the defence can be better focused, that would, I think, be time well spent. But I think that is as far as I would want to go.

MR BEARD: Well, look, if -- obviously the team and those involved in the case on the BGL side are on this hearing and we all hear your statement, sir, in relation to that. The CMA can be assured that if there are concerns or ambiguities they want to raise with us, we will stand ready to try to answer those as quickly as we can in order to assist them in the process of ensuring that their defence can be efficiently prepared. As I say, that doesn't mean we won't engage with (b)(i), we will do that in addition, but I think that might be the practical position which means neither side is wasting inordinate amounts of time, but we are hopefully capturing a solution to the concern, sir, that you are raising in relation to these matters.

THE CHAIRMAN: That's helpful. The last thing I want is a cottage industry growing up of informal requests for further information which simply result in the cutting down of more trees than one wants. So I think the point is on the record and we'll see what Mr Lask has to say. But for my part, indeed our part, I think that is an approach we are content with.

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markets that are potentially relevant. Again, I put down the marker that has to be by reference to what's in the decision, but I leave that to the CMA. Then 8 is our responding to that, and of course we will respond and be happy to respond promptly in relation to those issues.

Then 13(11), again a matter for the CMA. Indicative "theory of harm", pleading, well, I leave that up to Mr Lask to make submissions in relation to. If it's feasible, then that would be excellent. If it's not going to be feasible, if Mr Lask says this creates difficulty for him, then obviously this ends up being a very clear marker as to what needs to be set out in his defence when it comes. But I leave that to Mr Lask and how he wishes to deal with those matters. So in relation to BGL, we are happy to deal with matters in relation to 8.

That I think then takes us to -- I think that has dealt with all of the specific points, sir, that you very helpfully raise in your speaking note, so we are very happy with that process. There aren't specific times attached to anything except perhaps the suggestion in 7 that the CMA should articulate the relevant markets within the next week which are potentially affected. We are very happy to respond to that promptly thereafter. So if you want indicative timings, I'm sure we can provide that.

But that rather takes me to the other issues here about timing more generally --

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

MR BEARD: -- both in relation to the defence and also of the trial itself. I'm not going to repeat the points that we've made in our submissions, and you'll have seen the concerns we've expressed, and I'm grateful, sir, for your acknowledgement of those issues, I'm not going to press them further. I mean, our position was, you know, we received an 800-page document which was a huge task for us to deal with over Christmas and we dealt with it

with a two-week extension, and frankly having the CMA turn up and say, "We want to double the statutory period for the service of a defence", seems to us unreasonable, and these points they made about the shock of the new -- in relation to the material that had been put forward were very significantly overstated when we were basing our analysis on the CMA's own data, save for some very limited material in relation to commission data in 2019. And all of the exercises undertaken were either built on those that had been put forward or were relatively simple.

But I do wonder whether in the spirit of trying to make these things work rather better, we need to take a slight step back in relation to that. Although submissions are very well and good, but if we are going to have this process of engagement which, sir, you've adverted to in the various points we have just been traversing in your speaking note, I can see that that is going to add to the time that the CMA needs. But I'm also conscious of the point that the Tribunal's emphasised of wanting to get this done this year in October or November, which, as I say and we've indicated, we will ensure we're able to do.

But as far as I understand it, the objection on the CMA side is that their counsel, Ms Demetriou QC, wouldn't be available during the period. Obviously that is not ideal for them and I'm not suggesting anyone can replace Ms Demetriou in the way that she would deal with matters in the sense of replicating how she would deal with things. But I think there is an interest in making sure that this hearing is dealt with relatively promptly and we would be moving to a period of over a year from the decision before a hearing if we move it into 2022.

Obviously the CMA do have other standing counsel, such as Mr Lask and others who may be able to assist with this, as well as obviously the pool of fine

1	barristers that are out there.
2	If
3	THE CHAIRMAN: Mr Lask sorry Mr Beard, just one moment.
4	Mr Lask, you have your hand up, which and you are now breaking up.
5	MR LASK: I haven't been able to hear Daniel Beard very well for the last two
6	minutes.
7	THE CHAIRMAN: I'm so sorry.
8	MR LASK: I'm not sure if I'm also breaking up. It was just about the time he was
9	starting to take a step back and perhaps (distorted audio) but I missed that.
10	MR BEARD: I am so sorry.
11	THE CHAIRMAN: No, not at all. Mr Beard, you were coming through loud and clear
12	at this end. Mr Lask, your connection is quite poor. So what I'm going to ask
13	Mr Beard is to use his time machine and go back two minutes and I think it's
14	really the point that you have a great deal of interest in, which is the
15	scheduling of the time for the hearing.
16	MR BEARD: Yes.
17	THE CHAIRMAN: And I think it's probably important although I heard your
18	submissions, that you repeat them.
19	MR BEARD: Yes.
20	MR LASK: Sir, before Mr Beard does that, I'm so sorry, may I suggest that given it
21	seems like it's a connection problem at my end and rejoin.
22	THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, I think that is a very good idea, Mr Lask.
23	MR BEARD: I'll pause.
24	THE CHAIRMAN: We'll wait here, Mr Lask. Feel free to leave and rejoin and
25	hopefully you'll have a better connection. (Pause)
26	Mr Lask, welcome back. Do you want to say a few words so we see the strength of

1	connection?
2	MR LASK: Is that connection any better?
3	THE CHAIRMAN: No. I'm afraid, Mr Lask, it is exceedingly poor. I'm not sure that
4	I would be able to follow your submissions if the quality remains at this level.
5	And equally, it seems clear you are not hearing others.
6	MR LASK: What I might suggest (distorted audio) the Tribunal.
7	THE CHAIRMAN: I'm sorry, Mr Lask, you will have to repeat that. I didn't
8	(Pause)
9	What we're going to do is we're going to move remotely to our retiring room whilst
10	this matter is being dealt with. But before we do that, I'm assuming that
11	Mr Lask doesn't have multiple internet connections from where he is
12	speaking. I'm not sure what the solution to that is, but I certainly don't want to
13	lose this hearing, that would be remarkably unhelpful. But equally, I obviously
14	have to hear from Mr Lask.
15	MR BEARD: In the meantime, sir, I am actually in chambers, as is Ms Berridge. If
16	there is a particular problem with Mr Lask's laptop or desktop, Ms Berridge
17	has offered to see whether or not his using her laptop might work. He would
18	in due course become Ms Berridge as the submitted screen, but that might
19	work because I think her connection seemed to be working earlier. So we'll
20	get in contact with him if that's of assistance.
21	THE CHAIRMAN: That's extremely helpful, Mr Beard ah, Mr Lask, it may be that
22	matters are better. Do you want to say something so that we can see how
23	MR LASK: Yes. Apologies for the disruption, sir. I'm now in Mr Armitage's room
24	and I'm hoping this is better.
25	THE CHAIRMAN: It certainly does seem to be, in which case we will resume. But
26	I would be very grateful if all those participating would keep an eye on

audibility and raise their hand if there is a problem so that I can deal with it further. But pro tem, it looks like the problem has resolved itself so Mr Beard you can go back to Ms Demetriou's availability.

MR BEARD: All I was saying, just for Mr Lask's benefit because I'm not quite sure where it ended, was that we did have real concerns about the idea of the period for the defence being doubled beyond the statutory scheme, six weeks.

We don't see the justification, particularly given what was served on us and the time we had to deal with it over Christmas.

However, we are conscious of two matters. First of all, the matters that have been put forward by the Tribunal through the Chairman, that obviously will require some further consideration to feed into the defence process.

Second of all, we recognise the concern expressed by the Tribunal about moving this hearing out into 2022 which would mean that the matter was only being heard over a year after the decision was produced which is, I think we all agree, unsatisfactory.

We recognise that the real concern on the part of the CMA is that their chosen leading counsel wouldn't be available for the October/November hearing and I was making it clear that we recognise that always does create difficulties for a party in these circumstances. However, I was also noting that the CMA does have other standing counsel and can call on other members of the bar.

But if it was to be of assistance in ensuring that the CMA was able to instruct alternative leading counsel and be able to then attend a trial in October or November of this year, and that having a longer period for the defence would enable that or facilitate that on the part of the CMA, then that in conjunction with the proposals put forward by the Tribunal would seem to us to be a sensible course.

Obviously I'm sure the CMA would not be delighted, but that may be the proportionate and sensible course in all the circumstances: that the CMA have slightly longer to prepare their defence, they will be able to deal with the matters set out by the Tribunal and will be able to involve leading counsel at least in the latter stages of preparation of that defence.

I can come back to issues to do with the timing in relation to our reply and in relation to the two CMCs that are envisaged. We certainly have no issue with the need and appropriateness for a CMC in July which can stand as a pre-trial review, effectively, if we are going to be heading to a trial in October or November. That makes sense to us. In relation to the precise timings of an earlier CMC, we wonder whether or not that might more sensibly be set shortly after the defence was served at least in order that those matters that might arise in consequence of the defence and interactions to that date could be digested at the CMC rather than necessarily having it before the defence is lodged in circumstances where the CMA will no doubt be immersed in preparation and will be trying to finalise its position and in those circumstances it might be rather more difficult to get specific and constructive outcomes from that earlier CMC. But that I think is a small matter in relation to those issues.

There are one or two other points that I'll pick up subsequently, including matters to do with potentially Professor Baker, although we've made our points in relation to that. But those I think are our submissions relating to the very helpful observations made by the Tribunal to date, the position in relation to timing of the defence and the situation in relation to the trial, where we would emphasise that we do want to have this trial dealt with before the end of this year. We recognise that it's unfortunate it can't be dealt with in late

November/early December, but that may be unfortunate but unavoidable and
we are looking to deal with that as best we can.

So unless I can assist the Tribunal further, those are my submissions on the very

helpful opening and on those broad timing issues.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much, Mr Beard. I don't have any further points for you, but I will just check that my fellow Tribunal members themselves don't have anything they want to raise.

PROFESSOR ULPH: Not from me.

MS LUCAS: Not from me.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much, Mr Beard. Mr Lask, masquerading as Mr Armitage, you are welcome to start.

Submissions by MR LASK

MR LASK: What I propose to do is take matters in the same order Mr Beard, starting with the very helpful speaking note you provided earlier on in the hearing. I'll focus as Mr Beard has done on the passages highlighted in red, which are the action points, and the first comes at paragraph 10. We agree with the Tribunal and with BGL that this is what the case is about, namely a distortion of competition and associated issues concerning market definition. I would add for completeness that there is of course also an appeal against penalty involving not just the level of the penalty, but whether the statutory test of intention or negligence has been met.

THE CHAIRMAN: Indeed, you are absolutely right.

MR LASK: That takes me on next to paragraph 13(2) which concerns examples of wide MFNs and narrow MFNs. Like BGL, we are happy to engage on that and provide relevant examples to the Tribunal. One point of clarification I would make in relation to paragraph 13(2)(b), where the Tribunal refers to

the widest permissible, i.e. non-infringing narrow MFN, is that the CMA didn't find that narrow MFNs were necessarily permissible or lawful. It didn't address that issue and so it wouldn't want it to be misunderstood in any further pleading or document of another kind that it put in that it was somehow accepting that narrow MFNs were necessarily lawful. It's just not something it's made a decision on.

THE CHAIRMAN: That's entirely fair enough and I don't think there is any magic in the language "non-infringing", and certainly all we're doing is debating what would be slotted into the counterfactual. And by definition of course, it's got to be a proper clause that is slotted in and therefore not an infringing one. But obviously we entirely accept that in framing the counterfactual, the CMA is in no way committing itself to what might be an infringement in other circumstances regarding such a clause. And that, I think -- I won't say goes without saying because I think it's important that it be said, but that I think is now on the record and we obviously will ensure that the CMA is not even impliedly forced down a route where it is endorsing as legitimate something on which it is not making a decision. So I hope that's clear and helpful.

MR LASK: It is, sir, I'm very grateful.

A related point Mr Beard raised in relation to -- well, firstly in relation to this paragraph, was the suggestion that the CMA tie any statements made in documents submitted in accordance with these proposals to the relevant parts of the decision. The CMA's very happy to do that. The CMA of course understands the importance of defending the decision made and it has no intention of constructing a new case. It seems that BGL's concern about this arises from the CMA's decision to instruct Professor Baker to give evidence in support of its defence, Professor Baker being an independent expert. But the

26 MR LASK:

purpose of having Professor Baker give evidence is to respond to the expert evidence adduced by BGL and there's no intention to construct a new case using the language that BGL has used in its skeleton.

THE CHAIRMAN: That's very helpful, Mr Lask. I'll obviously hear Mr Beard further on this if necessary. But it may be that I can give a provisional indication about our thinking regarding Professor Baker. As you've just said, and obviously you know, you can't expand your case, you have to justify it. I'm not, I think, minded to require you to explain beyond what you've already said why Professor Baker is needed. It seems to me that if -- I'm sure it won't happen -- but if Professor Baker expands the CMA's case, we all know what's going to happen at the CMC which if it's held after your defence is served, Mr Beard will be articulating any concerns he has with his usual clarity.

And we all know that if you do seek to expand your case, there's going to be a gap in the evidence that you serve because it's going to be removed from the hearing material. But that, as it seems to me, is a matter that we shouldn't address in the abstract, we should address it if -- as I said, I very much hope it doesn't arise -- but it seems to me that we shouldn't be debating now what Professor Baker might or might not say, we should if we have to, debate it when he has said it and if objection is taken. So I raise that just as a guide to you, but obviously if Mr Beard wants to push back, I'll hear from him and then hear from you in reply.

MR LASK: Sir, before -- I'm not sure if the intention was that Mr Beard have an opportunity to push back now or --

THE CHAIRMAN: No, in a bit later. I don't want to interrupt your submissions, Mr Lask.

MR LASK: I'm very grateful for that indication. And respectfully we would agree that

the time to raise any objection in relation to Professor Baker's evidence is once he's given it.

May I, however, lay down a marker of my own, which is to say that if Professor Baker is responding to new analyses relied on by BGL's experts and those analyses, being analyses the CMA didn't carry out in the decision, we would not accept that in responding to those new analyses he is elaborating on the decision or constructing a new case. That sort of approach to Professor Baker's evidence would, we submit, be purely responsive and would be entirely permissible.

But I respectfully agree it's not helpful to debate the issue in abstract.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. And again, I don't think there's any controversy about the principle you've just articulated, namely that the CMA is obviously entitled to address points taken in the appeal in order to deflect or respond to an attack made, that I think is trite. But whether something is genuinely responsive or an expansion of the case is something which one really can only test in the concrete case, and that I think is what we are minded to do. But we will see what Mr Beard has to say about that in due course.

MR LASK: Indeed, sir, thank you.

Prior to that diversion, I was indicating the CMA would be happy to tie any statements made in accordance with the Tribunal's proposals to relevant parts of the decision. We would also ask that BGL does the same and ties any statements it makes to relevant parts of the notice of appeal because we would be concerned, in the same way that BGL has expressed concern, if this exercise happened to lead even if only inadvertently to the expansion of the grounds of appeal. So we would ask that BGL adopt the same approach as the CMA in that regard.

In relation to paragraph 13(3), again we are happy to liaise with BGL on that and we

agree that in fact other PCWs do use narrow MFNs. And then paragraph 13(4), and again this was another issue in relation to which Mr Beard raised a concern about the scope of the decision. There is of course a difference, as I'm sure everyone understands, between an effect on potential competition and a likely effect on actual competition. The decision does include the latter, and Mr Beard mentioned the case of *Krka* as one of the reasons why BGL disagrees with that. So certainly insofar as the CMA advances a case based on the likely effects on existing competition as opposed to potential competition, that would not, in my submission, be going beyond the four corners of the decision.

We note that BGL will produce a note on the factual propositions in accordance with paragraph 4(b)(i) and we certainly hear what the Tribunal says in relation to 4(b)(iv) in that it wants a constructive engagement between the parties if possible in advance of the defence. We hear that and we will of course engage if in the course of preparing the defence we identify ambiguities arising from the appeal that we think need to be clarified, and we hear what BGL have said about being willing to engage and we are grateful for that indication.

I think the next action points comes in paragraph 13(7), and this is the relevant markets exercise. In principle, the CMA is happy to comply with the Tribunal's proposal. I would however say that in section 5 of the decision, the CMA has only identified one relevant market, which is the market for the provision of PCW services in relation to home insurance, albeit it's a two-sided market. So we did wonder whether what triggered the Tribunal's request in this regard was the fact that the effects on competition found by the CMA include not only an effect on competition between PCWs, but an effect on competition

THE CHAIRMAN: Well, clearly you are right that the range of effects in this situation might well be wider than simply the defined market. I think one of the reasons I was keen to have a list of, as it were, potentially relevant markets is because it actually assists everyone, including particularly the experts, when they're trying to distil the effects, as you just said. So for example, if you actually do define the various different markets that are in play, you can then use that as a shorthand to describe the effects. So it seems to us helpful to have it articulated in the first instance by the CMA, also of course to have calibrated the precise extent of the disagreement with regard to the scope of market. And it seemed to us that the best way of doing that was to have, as it were, sort of side by side a list of markets, which seemed logical for you to go first on, but then for Mr Beard to, as it were, set out precisely where his clients disagreed with that.

So we entirely take the point that you are making, but I don't think it diminishes the value of the exercise that we're proposing.

MR LASK: Thank you, sir. Would I be right in thinking then that the CMA's list of relevant markets in terms of what the Tribunal is envisaging would be a very short one because it would simply be the relevant market as defined in section 5?

THE CHAIRMAN: No, that's not really what I was saying. I quite understand that you are in section 5 articulating and identifying only one market. But you are not saying that there aren't other markets in play, what you are saying is they're not relevant for the purposes of your decision. What I'm suggesting is that when one comes to discuss effects, it is probably sensible to have a list of all of the markets that might be affected so that one can simply say, "When

I'm talking about this market, this is exactly what I mean". When I did *Mastercard*, I found it hugely helpful to list the three markets that we found to exist there.

Now that was a case where all three markets were actually relevant in your sense, but we would have still done that even if there was only one relevant market, just to ensure that we had explained exactly how what is not a straightforward or easy to understand market in the generic sense operates. That's where I'm getting at. So I'm looking for a longer list than you would produce if you were simply articulating the market that is, as it were, relevant to the decision. And that's why I think I've underlined the word "potentially" in subparagraph (7).

MR LASK: Yes.

THE CHAIRMAN: I hope that's clear.

MR LASK: I think it is. We've certainly heard those comments and they're very helpful and we will take that away and produce that list in accordance with the Tribunal's timing.

That leads me on to the subsequent steps in this exercise, and in particular the one at subparagraph (11), which requires the CMA to file an indicative "theory of harm" pleading setting out the distortion of competition in relation to each market identified by each party.

I think we would find it helpful to have a little clarification on that because of course if, as one might expect, BGL were to respond to the CMA's list with its list of alternative relevant markets which are affected in the notice of appeal, it might be rather difficult for the CMA to articulate a "theory of harm" in relation to those alternative markets because it has rejected the proposition that they are the relevant markets in the decision and therefore not found theories of harm in relation to those markets.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. So what you are saying is unless we're very careful, you are going to be sucked into precisely what Mr Beard doesn't want to have happen, which is expand your decision.

4 MR LASK: Exactly, sir.

THE CHAIRMAN: Does that mean that this proposition is correct: that if you are wrong on market definition, the decision must fall?

MR LASK: I hesitate before accepting that proposition certainly without consulting those instructing me, who have a much greater and deeper familiarity with the decision. But it's certainly right to say that, as I've emphasised, the CMA only found one relevant market and didn't, as far as I'm aware, engage in the decision with a consideration of what their decision or what their findings might be if an alternative market definition were adopted.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. I have no desire to tie you down because the question I asked you was a hard one. I mean, it seems to me logically to follow from what you have said about market definition and what you don't want to say about otherly defined markets. Perhaps we can leave it like this: you must, I think, only be required to articulate a "theory of harm" where you have, as it were, properly alleged it and if you don't consider that it has been alleged in the decision in relation to, let us say, a market as defined by Mr Beard's clients, then I think what you should say there is not "no harm", but "no harm alleged".

- **MR LASK:** Yes, sir, I understand. That's very clear, thank you.
- 23 Sir, I think that deals with all of the action points highlighted in red in your speaking note.
- **THE CHAIRMAN:** Yes, thank you.
 - MR LASK: If I may turn next to two related issues, first being the time of the

defence and the second being the timing of the trial.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

MR LASK: You of course have an application for an extension of time in relation to the defence. It may be that I don't need to make that application in full, given the indication the Tribunal's given and the helpful indications from Mr Beard.

But may I just summarise the four key building blocks for the application, just to be clear where we're coming from.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, of course Mr Lask, though let me give you an indication that we are -- never say never, but we are minded to order 23 April 2021. I think Mr Beard's position was that his clients could live with that and his position was that if it assisted you to instruct new leading counsel in order for to the trial to take place at the beginning of November rather than at the end, then his endorsement of that date was verging on the even enthusiastic, but maybe -- he's raised his eyebrows at that, I can -- but I think there was a linkage to timing of the defence and the timing of the trial. So I think the point you really do need to assist us on is the timing of the trial. By all means explain why you need the further time, but we have read your skeleton and we are sympathetic to the points you make there.

What I think is the issue that is troubling us is what appeared to be a happy form of agreement as to when the trial might take place has been undermined not by the parties but by the Tribunal's own availability which makes those three weeks regrettably simply not possible.

MR LASK: Thank you, sir. I don't need to take up the Tribunal's time with my further submissions on the timing for the defence, save to say this: whilst we are grateful that the Tribunal has indicated that it's minded to grant until 23 April, we are conscious that the proposals we've been discussing do add

somewhat to the CMA's homework and that the timing for those steps coincide with the timing for the defence. So I would ask in those circumstances, even leaving aside the issues I'm going come on to, I would ask in those circumstances we do have until at least 28 April to do the defence, which in my submission is appropriate and fair in the circumstances. That's the timing for the defence.

Then coming on to the timing for the trial, we've obviously heard what the Tribunal has said and it may be you've seen the correspondence that the CMA sent to the Tribunal and to BGL shortly before the hearing.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, I've seen both an email from CMA and a letter from Linklaters in response to our reaching out to the parties in the course of this morning.

MR LASK: It may be that all I can really do is emphasise the point the CMA has already made in writing, which is to say that the CMA is, with respect, strongly opposed to having to change leading counsel at this stage. Ms Demetriou is of course standing counsel and she has also been instructed on this case for a long time, having advised during the investigation. As things stand, she simply can't do a trial in October or indeed the first half of November.

So our primary position would be that we ask the trial do take place on the dates agreed provisionally between the parties, if at all possible; or alternatively that it is pushed back a short period to the start of 2022 because we think the alternative does put the CMA in a difficult position, and particularly given that work has already started on preparing responsive evidence and the defence and to have to change leading counsel at this stage will cause some disruption and will, I say, prejudice the CMA's position more generally on the appeal.

So we do ask if at all possible that a solution be found that allows Ms Demetriou to continue in leading the team on this case.

THE CHAIRMAN: Indeed, Mr Lask, you are pressing at an open door in terms of the desire we have to ensure that both the parties have the leading counsel of choice.

The problem I have is that if both parties said, "We can do three weeks in January 2022", then probably that's what I would order. But Mr Beard's point is that he can't do the first half of 2022 and it would it seem to me a little unfortunate if we were to adjourn into 2022 in order to accommodate your leading counsel with the consequence that the appellant loses their leading counsel. It seems to me that that is --

MR BEARD: Before we go further, what dates would be contemplated in early 2022 if this was to be moved further forward? Because I think our strong position is we do not want it in 2022 at all and we don't think it's reasonable for the sake of some disruption to the CMA that it is there moved. I don't think it would be right to say there can be no period during the first half of 2022 when there will be no availability by members of the counsel team on this side. But I am concerned that that is not our primary submission in any event; it is the concern that this matter should be dealt with within the year.

MR LASK: Sir, I'm very grateful for that clarification from Mr Beard. To answer his question, on our side we could do, I think, any time in January or February 2022.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. My understanding, Mr Beard, was that that was something which was not possible because the letter we received from Linklaters -- let me just find it:

"BGL would struggle to offer dates before Michaelmas 2022".

MR BEARD: I have a series of hearings in the first half of 2022. But if there are particular dates the Tribunal has in mind, then obviously I'll go away and look at that. But if that were the desire of the Tribunal to move it, then it wouldn't be right to say there is no possibility. But that is very much our second preference in relation to these matters. **THE CHAIRMAN:** Well, that's very helpful for you to say and we may need to rise to consider this. My expressed desire in the speaking note was that we actually wanted it sooner rather than November. We said October. MR BEARD: Yes, we do too. THE CHAIRMAN: The dates we had in mind were the 1st, 8th and 15th

of November as the three weeks to run, conscious as we are that your expert is not available in the latter part of October. So that's what we were thinking about and I was raising the question of January as something that we would contemplate, but it is definitely second best and the reason I wasn't pressing it very hard is because my understanding was that wasn't really an option. The one thing I think I have to make clear is that Michaelmas 2022 is really not an option, that's not going to happen.

So can I suggest that we leave it like this: I think we can do as a Tribunal any date in January, so the question would be: do you have three weeks in January to deal with this?

MR BEARD: And then going into early February. I'm sorry to be intrusive, but if the Tribunal -- I have capacity there.

THE CHAIRMAN: So it would be what, from late January to ...

MR BEARD: Yes. I think -- I want to go and check exactly what the position would be for all of our team in relation to this. But I think -- I don't want to leave the Tribunal with a false impression that if what was happening was

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a consideration by the Tribunal of those two periods. We would emphasise, and it is our primary submission, that given we are talking about the best part of nine months for trial, we do not see a significant difficulty with the CMA switching counsel in circumstances where there would be an extended period for the defence. But if the Tribunal is specifically asking about particular weeks towards the end of January and beginning of February, the statement made by Linklaters is perfectly accurate; that there would be a range of difficulties in the first half of 2022. But it's not right to say that, for instance, I am in trial or just preparing for trial at all points throughout that six months.

THE CHAIRMAN: I'm extremely grateful, Mr Beard, for that clarification. In one sense it makes the question harder. I think it would be helpful to identify and confirm whether you do have not just the three weeks that you would be in court for, but sufficient preparation time. I'm not saying that if you can find that time, we are automatically going to take it up. I think what it means is it makes the timing question a little bit harder. Because I'll be frank: my thinking when I was of the view that January/February was not a runner was that this was actually a fairly straightforward decision.

MR BEARD: I understand. Obviously our primary position is that it should remain a straightforward decision. But I also don't want the Tribunal to act on a false basis because that would be wholly inappropriate, so I'm very happy to confirm that position. But if I may, I'd like five minutes to take instructions on that.

THE CHAIRMAN: Of course, that is understood. What I suggest we do is we allow Mr Lask to finish his submissions and then we'll rise for five minutes to discuss the question of -- well, to enable you to take instructions on this, the (inaudible) point. Mr Lask, back to you.

MR LASK: Thank you, sir, I'm very grateful for that.

There was really only one other point that I think I need to cover at this stage, which was the question of further CMCs. We agree with BGL that the most sensible time for our second CMC would probably be after the filing of the defence, notwithstanding the point I've already made about the timing of the defence, but not least because of the need to focus in the interim on the steps the Tribunal's indicated and indeed ...

THE CHAIRMAN: Indeed, I understand. Mr Lask, unless I see violent dissent on the screens from my fellow members, I think Mr Beard's point was actually very well made and you are certainly not going to get any pushback from me about timing it then.

- Professor, Ms Lucas, are you happy with that?
- **PROFESSOR ULPH:** Yes, I'm content.
- **MS LUCAS:** Yes.

- **THE CHAIRMAN:** You don't need to address further then on the timing of the CMC.
 - MR LASK: Thank you, sir. The third CMC/pre-trial review, if I can call it that, I think was proposed for some time in July which seems sensible to us, assuming that by that point -- I think it's almost certain that by that point BGL would have served any reply, then that seems sensible in terms of timing for that hearing.
 - THE CHAIRMAN: To be clear, I think even on the according of you to 28 April and six weeks to Mr Beard, we get to somewhere late June, I think --
- **MR LASK:** That is correct.
 - THE CHAIRMAN: -- so we can fit something in. Obviously the third CMC, or PTR perhaps I should call it, would only make sense if we had everything in apart from the written submissions, which would obviously come, I would imagine, assuming without prejudice a November date, they would come I would

1	imagine some time in early October. But that's something which we'll debate
2	when we've sorted out the question of trial.
3	MR LASK: Thank you, sir. Those were the only other submissions I had to make.
4	THE CHAIRMAN: Well, thank you very much. I think then what we'll do is we'll rise
5	for five minutes to enable Mr Beard will that be enough time, Mr Beard, to
6	check your diary?
7	MR BEARD: I need to check my diary, but I also need to check one or two other
8	team members' diaries, so I will do that. I'm sure we could do a quick Webex
9	call and be back in five minutes.
10	THE CHAIRMAN: Very good. We will say five minutes. If you need more time,
11	then do let the Tribunal know and we will obviously give it to you.
12	MR BEARD: I'm most grateful. Thank you very much.
13	THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much.
14	(4.12 pm)
15	(A short break)
16	(4.20 pm)
17	THE CHAIRMAN: Good afternoon. We'll just see if we have everyone in the
18	courtroom who should be there.
19	MR BEARD: I can hear you sir. This is Daniel Beard speaking.
20	THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much. Yes, Mr Beard, what's the diary like?
21	MR BEARD: I've taken instructions and if the hearing were to be fixed for some
22	point starting in the latter two weeks of January, preferably the final week of
23	January and into the first two weeks of February, those are dates which the
24	key members of our team would be able to attend. But I do wish to stress that
25	we don't think it is appropriate that there should be more than a year since the
26	relevant decision was put in place. And with respect to Ms Demetriou, we

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have look at Mr McInnes' email again. The indication is she was involved at some point advising during the administrative phase. She is of course the standing counsel, it's quite common for standing counsel to advise in the course of investigations. That does not mean, and to be fair to Mr McInnes he is not saying, that she has been heavily involved in the preparation of the decision. And given what we have said in relation to the shifting of the timetable for the defence, it is plain that, absent that consideration, November is very much the relevant and appropriate period for this trial. It is also plain that nine months out from that trial and with the best part of two months before the defence is to be served, alternative leading counsel can be engaged to assist Mr Lask and Mr Armitage. The CMA has a very substantial team and it has already, as I have indicated, at least two counsel deployed on this matter who are well versed in it.

In those circumstances, we think it would be quite wrong to move it from November and mean it's been well over a year before the trial is heard, and then of course there is a period for judgment, and so on. So we would continue to stress that November is the appropriate time. But I have checked the diary and those are my answers.

THE CHAIRMAN: Well, that's very helpful.

Just to be absolutely clear, and I'm afraid the position is even more complicated than I thought, but the dates we'd be talking about would be 24 January, 31 January and 7 February, weeks commencing.

MR BEARD: Correct.

THE CHAIRMAN: Is that --

MR BEARD: Those are the three that -- those would fall within the parameters of the three weeks I was referring to.

1 THE CHAIRMAN: Okay. I mean, I don't think it is any problem -- well, subject to 2 one point I'm going to come to -- we can move those around. It's just my 3 understanding of what you were saying was those are three weeks that were 4 the best three weeks in that period. 5 MR BEARD: Yes, I think that would be right. We can start slightly earlier than that if 6 necessary. 7 THE CHAIRMAN: That's very helpful. 8 To the problem that we have. The reason we could not do the dates that the parties 9 can do, that is to say the three weeks commencing 22 November, was 10 because of a commitment that Professor Ulph has. He has a role in working 11 up the budget for Scotland and he was concerned that the budget work he 12 has to do might fall within the weeks that the parties had agreed were 13 sensible. 14 The problem is that there is no guarantee that the Scottish government will call 15 a budget in early December requiring him to work for those three weeks. The 16 position as I understand it from him is that 12 weeks' notice is given but that's 17 it. So if we had a trial on 22 November, you would expect to get notice on I think 30 August if my calendar is right. 18 19 Now the interesting point is that when I was exploring with Ms Lucas and 20 Professor Ulph the feasibility of 24 January, 31 January, 7 February, 21 Professor Ulph said exactly the same problem arose because it's quite possible there may be a budget for mid-February, in which case he would be 22 23 in trouble. 24 It struck me therefore that we could perhaps take advantage of the movable feast

that is the budget in this way, and I raise it as a suggestion and it's this: we

book two dates for the trial, we book the date that the parties can do, that is to

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1 say the three weeks from 22 November, and we fix that as the primary date 2 for the trial, but we fix at the same time an alternative, which is the three 3 weeks commencing 24 January. 4 Now if the budget is fixed for early December, then we'll have to switch to the later 5 date. But we would make that decision on 1 September 2021 and if at some 6 point the Scottish government decides that they do want a budget in early 7 December, then Professor Ulph is happy to make clear that his primary 8 commitment would be to the trial. 9 So what we're doing is we're taking advantage of the fact that there is --10 **MR BEARD:** I understand, sir. 11 **THE CHAIRMAN:** -- a floating question. It's very unusual, I don't think Chancery 12 listing will like it at all, but it is doable. I'm not going to order it, but I want to 13 hear --14 MR BEARD: Can I raise a problem --15 **THE CHAIRMAN:** Sorry, professor, you have your hand up. 16 PROFESSOR ULPH: To clarify that if the budget was called for, say, the second 17 week of December, it would be the 12 weeks before then that they would have to give us notification, so you are talking more like mid-September. So 18 19 I couldn't guarantee that we would know at the start of September if there 20 were to be a December budget. 21 THE CHAIRMAN: I understand, that's helpful. I've calculated my 12 weeks wrong. 22 Mr Beard you clearly have reservations, but I would like to hear them. 23 MR BEARD: I think there's a very significant practical difficulty with this because if 24 you effectively book out two trials in late January and in November/December, 25 essentially we will have to book out the prep time for all of the first trial, and

then assuming that that doesn't go ahead, prep time for the second trial. At

the moment, that will end up looking like you are going to be booking up four or five months in the diary. And with respect, sir, I simply cannot do that at the moment because I know that I have a series of other matters which are going to be listed and whilst obviously I ensure that I have booked out sufficient prep time in relation to any trial that is going to be put forward, it is extremely difficult to do these things on a contingent basis and the difficulty arises, for example, I have matters that are listed in the European Courts where you get relatively short notice of listing.

You can communicate with the European Court and say, "Well look I have a trial running through this period, please do not list the hearing during this period". It is very difficult for me in good conscience to write to the European Court and say, or have my solicitors write to the European Court and say: "no actually, can you postpone Google's hearing in this or that because actually I might have a trial here or I might have it there" because perfectly legitimately they say no.

And of course it isn't just a European Courts issue, it's a Domestic Courts issue because all of us are involved in -- just as you are sir, and the other members of the panel will be -- other work, whether it's in relation to multiparty damages cases, other judicial review matters, other commercial cases.

Talking to listing in relation to all of those matters is in a great difficulty because you can't be saying to them in all good conscience, "No, I'm not going to be available". So with respect, the difficulty comes that we actually need certainty. That's why I would say that given the completely understandable difficulties that Professor Ulph is faced with, that is a factor that is strongly militating in favour of actually fixing those November dates because whatever happens in relation to the notification in September, we know that

Professor Ulph is going to be available to do this and since the CAT is empanelled in these circumstances, I think we are going to be making for ourselves a real problem if we are effectively booking out two trials, particularly when they are effectively quite close to one another. What it means is effectively you will be sterilising diaries from mid-September, possibly the beginning of October, through to the middle of February and that is highly problematic, I imagine, for all involved.

So I completely understand the desire of the Tribunal to do this, and if we had no other activity, if there were no other knitting to be getting on with, then of course that would be perfect. But that is not the reality I think for any of us. I think in those circumstances, conditional booking, I'm sorry, would create very significant difficulties for planning. I'm very sorry because I would like to -- as you can perhaps tell from the submissions I've made, we do want to be amenable in relation to these things, but up to a point.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, thank you very much, Mr Beard. Mr Lask, what do you have to say?

MR LASK: We have heard everything that Mr Beard has said and indeed what the Tribunal has said and we are very grateful to the Tribunal for coming up with a pragmatic solution. From our perspective, the proposal of two provisional bookings would work and would be appropriate and does represent an appropriate and proportionate solution to what is a difficult conundrum. There are obviously a number of moving parts and there is no perfect solution. But what we wouldn't accept is that the disruption and the inconvenience should fall primarily at the CMA's door because of the difficulties Mr Beard would have in complying with the pragmatic solution the Tribunal has proposed.

1 MR BEARD: I'm sorry, these are not entirely solipsistic submissions on my part. 2 These are submissions made in relation to counsel, solicitors and those that 3 are preparing for the trial. It creates significant difficulties for all concerned 4 and that is what I'm talking about. If it were merely me, I can see there might 5 be different submissions to be made, but that is not the position. 6 MR LASK: I'm grateful for that. The point I'm making is there is no perfect solution 7 to this conundrum, but what we oppose is the suggestion that the best 8 solution is one in which the CMA is (distorted audio) and that the CMA's 9 preparation is disrupted by it having to (distorted audio) its leading counsel to 10 work around (distorted audio) with its own preparations. 11 **THE CHAIRMAN:** Mr Beard, if you have anything by way of reply, I'll hear you, but 12 I think the positions are pretty clear. 13 MR BEARD: Yes, I have made my position. It's not solipsism here. We have 14 a practical problem here that would create a huge sterilisation. If we could be 15 sure we could bank on January then -- as we have tried to be amenable and 16 find what we could do in relation to that. But I completely understand the 17 difficulty that Professor Ulph is in, but it's beyond his control as to when budgets are triggered and I think the only safe course is to avoid that 18 uncertainty if we are going the hold on to this triumvirate hearing this case. 19 20 **THE CHAIRMAN:** Mr Lask, did you want to say anything? 21 **MR LASK:** Sir, nothing further from me, thank you. 22 THE CHAIRMAN: We'll rise for five minutes to consider our decision. Thank you 23 very much.

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(4.36 pm)

(4.40 pm)

(A short break)

Ruling (see separate transcript) Post-ruling discussion MR LASK: Sir, thank you. If I may, the CMA is obviously disappointed at the ruling but for taking the time and trouble to explain its real

If I may, the CMA is obviously disappointed at the ruling but grateful to the Tribunal for taking the time and trouble to explain its reasons so clearly. You mentioned at the end that if there was anything the Tribunal could do to assist the CMA's process of having to instruct a new leading counsel then you would be willing to --

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, of course.

MR LASK: -- listen to suggestions. The deadline that we have sought for the defence of 28 April was premised on the basis that Ms Demetriou would be leading counsel on this case. It seems to me likely, if not certain, that if the CMA is going to have to instruct new leading counsel it will need longer than that to complete the defence. So I would ask for an extension to the extension please, sir, perhaps until the middle of May, to give the CMA adequate time to get a new leading counsel in place.

THE CHAIRMAN: Let's see how that would work in terms of the diary. I'll obviously hear from you, Mr Beard, if necessary. But having said that I will listen sympathetically, I think I am pretty much obliged to do that and I think that if it can be accommodated then we should try and do that. But we absolutely must have all of the stages completed for the beginning of the long vacation, including an ability to have the "teach-in" which may or may not take place.

If we look at 14 May as the date on which the CMA would serve its defence, you then want I think six weeks which frankly I would be minded to give, from 14 May which I think takes us to 25 June; is that right?

- **MR BEARD:** Yes, I think so.
- **THE CHAIRMAN:** 25 June.
- 3 MR BEARD: Yes.
- **THE CHAIRMAN:** For your reply evidence. I think I've got that right.
- **MR BEARD:** Yes on my calendar you have sir.
- THE CHAIRMAN: So we would be able to fit in a two-day CMC probably middle of July. It's quite tight. There will be absolutely no room for slippage.
- MR BEARD: Yes. I think the other thing to raise in relation to this is you'll have seen -- and I must apologise, we managed to drop off the sort of amended order that accompanied our submissions. But I think it was provided to the Tribunal.
- **THE CHAIRMAN:** Yes, I have it somewhere. Let me find it.
- **MR BEARD:** It might just be worth having it. The CMA did get it, we just managed not to send it to the Tribunal, I apologise for that.
 - THE CHAIRMAN: I have it.

- MR BEARD: The only reason I turn to it is because, having regard to one of the other issues on the Tribunal's agenda we have this issue of trying to identify issues in relation to data that are not in dispute, or what is in dispute, and that process is only really going to be possible involving experts. And we think naturally that is a process you engage in after you've closed pleadings.
- So on our timetable -- and I realise this is going to shift to some degree -- we'd been starting that process in a fortnight after the reply, so everyone has had a chance to digest the reply. Then you have interactions between the experts rolling forward. I think my concern is that the more that one moves the reply into June the more difficult it is for the experts to engage in that process. And the reason I raise that now is because if there's going to be something comes

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up in the course of those interactions between the experts that needs to be dealt with at the CMC, we are at risk of not having that process closed by then. So that would be my concern.

Sir, you had originally, I think, talked about ... 23 April?

THE CHAIRMAN: 23rd, yes.

MR BEARD: If Mr Lask -- I'm assuming the Tribunal has a sympathetic ear, were to move out to 7 May, that would bring the reply to 18 June. It might then be possible to commence the witness expert interaction at the beginning of July at least. Because I think we should be cautious about trying to list CMCs for right at the back end of July as well. For my part, because I know I'm absent for a week during July but that may not be the critical factor for a CMC, but it always seems to me that it is better to have these CMCs in the first half of July rather than the second half, particularly this year when everyone is no doubt going to be wanting to flee as far as (inaudible) they possibly can if that is feasible.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

MR BEARD: I'm just talking about the pragmatics.

Of course it's the case that if we set down these deadlines and the CMA encounter some kind of overwhelming problem with hitting them then they do have liberty to come back. We understand that. And we recognise that these may be circumstances where that liberty may need to be sought. But I do wonder whether we are better off having a slightly tighter timetable than Mr Lask is suggesting for these reasons, and that we try and point towards a CMC some time like 14 July.

MR LASK: Sir, in case it assists, I'm looking at the time that BGL's draft order allows for between the filing of the reply and the beginning of the expert

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process, and I think it currently provides for a fortnight. And I wonder whether it might be possible to shave some of the time off that and bring it down to a week, rather than shave some of the time off the extension for the defence that I've been seeking and save time that way instead.

MR BEARD: I'm just --

MR LASK: And work forward from there and see if it all fits. But it seems to me that on Mr Beard's case it must do. If saving a week on the defence works (distorted audio) to be fair.

MR BEARD: Sorry, I completely understand Mr Lask's point. I think it's important though that you have three stages that are almost a month long in our order. Unless Mr Lask is thinking somehow we can get rid of them. I don't have any objection to Mr Lask's suggestion actually that we start the expert process a week earlier. But ironically I still think that militates in favour of the 7 May deadline and 18 June reply. The expert process commencing the week commencing 28 June, and actually having to compress that across three weeks, so that we're getting close to the conclusion of it during that period of late June and early July. Because it's still two weeks longer than the Tribunal had suggested.

THE CHAIRMAN: Indeed.

MR BEARD: And I just think -- we might want to go away and discuss, Mr Lask and I, the modalities of that expert process, but I think we need to allow at least three weeks for it. So if it's starting only on 28 June we will at least be some way through it by 14 July.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, thank you. Okay.

What I'm going to propose -- I'm not going to order it because I want to see the reaction of Ms Lucas and Professor Ulph, see if they disagree -- but what I'm

1 minded to order, subject to consent, is that we go for 7 May, 18 June, 28 June 2 for the expert process to commence, and the PTR to be listed for 19 and 3 20 July. 4 MR BEARD: Thank you, sir. I will discuss with Mr Lask I would not be able to 5 attend on the 19th and 20th but that's a separate issue. 6 **THE CHAIRMAN:** That's a separate issue, and I don't think, given -- I mean I would 7 very much hope that actually you'll be spending those days either not having a hearing at all, or just having a "teach-in", because if things go well we 8 9 shouldn't need a PTR. It's only if things go wrong that the need for the 10 hearing arises. So I'm sure that your very capable junior would be able to 11 deal with matters on those two days. The fact is I can't do the week 12 commencing 12 July. 13 MR BEARD: I understand. 14 **THE CHAIRMAN:** I'm doing the Forex draft certification that week. 15 MR BEARD: Yes. 16 THE CHAIRMAN: And I don't think it would be before 12 July. 17 **MR BEARD:** No, there's no point. There's no point. 18 THE CHAIRMAN: I'm afraid it's the 19th and the 20th. 19 MR BEARD: Understood. 20 THE CHAIRMAN: All right. 21 **MR LASK:** Sir, may I just comment briefly on that proposal? 22 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. 23 **MR LASK:** The initial reaction from those instructing me is that they could live with 24 that, subject to one point, which is that they would like an opportunity to check

with Professor Baker to ensure that that works in terms of his diary. Because

obviously the dates have been shifting around during the course of this

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hearing, and it would be helpful if we have that opportunity.

MR BEARD: I will need to check on our side. Mr Lask proposes a very sensible point. There are emails going backwards and forwards but I don't have all the dates for our experts either so that will have to be confirmed. But I anticipate that is why, sir, you are indicating that this is not an order but a: go away and see what you can do to sort it out instruction.

THE CHAIRMAN: That's it. I mean I think that is true of a number of the dates.

I think if we have certain points set in stone, then you can very sensibly work around the date set in stone, and I know that you will both be, and your teams of course, sensible in terms of making it work. So if we have set in stone 7 May, 18 June and 19 and 20 July and the trial on 1 November, those are dates that I am ordering and then you can work out all of the other moving parts in your own time. I think that makes sense.

MR BEARD: Yes. And inevitably, as with all these things, it's implicit in the Tribunal's position there must be liberty to apply.

THE CHAIRMAN: Absolutely. I think that is something that I include almost as a matter of course in almost any order. But I think I should put down this marker. I have I think rightly given the CMA nearly all that it wants in terms of the timing of the defence. I do think that we have -- and I think this is right -- erred on the side of generosity. The marker I'm saying, it's simply this: I do regard this as a difficult timetable to extend, given where we're at. And I would take some persuading that the CMA in particular, but equally your clients, would need to stretch the dates for the pleadings. Of course circumstances change, and there will be the liberty to apply but I think that is a marker that I do need to put down.

MR BEARD: The marker of course is well understood. I think the only caveat we

need to place, and perhaps it's an appropriate moment to deal with this, that in relation to Professor Baker we hear the indications of the CMA and we hear the position of the Tribunal in relation to his evidence. And to be clear in relation to our submissions, we are not trying to take issue with the ability of the CMA to provide rebuttal evidence and we're not trying to prescribe who it is that provides rebuttal evidence. But we do have real concerns that the decisions have to be based — the challenges to the decision and the reasons it was based on, and we do put down the further marker that we have concerns about Professor Baker giving evidence in relation to effects and coverage, which is what it is suggested he will give, and that there will be no one from the CMA who is involved in the decision doing that. And instead the intention is that the witness from the CMA would be dealing only with market definition, or at least proffering evidence only in relation to market definition.

But those are matters we can raise in due course. And the reason I mention them now is because if it were to transpire that we thought there were concerns that needed to be ventilated or created difficulties in relation to our reply then obviously those are matters we'll have to pick up in due course.

THE CHAIRMAN: Well, I won't, Mr Lask, invite you to respond to that unless you feel the need.

I entirely understand, Mr Beard, why you say that. For my part I can see if there is a dispute, whether it's well-founded or not, regarding the CMA's evidence, that has the potential to derail the whole process and I think I would only invite your clients, Mr Beard, to raise any question regarding scope as soon as possible after the defence material is served.

MR BEARD: Yes.

THE CHAIRMAN: I'm sure you would in any event. But I will give you this indication, that we would do our very best to slot a hearing, if it was needed, in May, rather than to let the matter run. So this Tribunal would want to have the position resolved as early as possible. Clearly it can't be earlier than mid-May. And I understand that that is later than one might want. But given the rulings we've made on the pleadings that's what we have. That's how we'll proceed.

MR BEARD: We do too, sir, that's very helpful. And I'm grateful for the dates and we will go away and discuss the further issues.

And perhaps -- I'm conscious of the time on a Friday as well, in relation to the process for skeletons and timing for bundles and so on, it might be sensible if we take those away and produce a draft order in relation to these matters, rather than trailing through further dates and detaining all concerned now.

THE CHAIRMAN: I think that's very sensible. We haven't discussed the agenda items almost at all, but it seems to me that we can take as read that the forum is England and Wales. Interventions: we're going to do what the parties have suggested, given the timing for them. The confidentiality ring is agreed.

MR BEARD: Yes.

THE CHAIRMAN: We've dealt with timings to the extent I think necessary. The only point on my list before I invite others to add to it is that we note that essentially the bundles are going to be electronic. It seems to us that when the parties have agreed bundles they can provide them electronically, as well as with an index, and we would then take a view as to whether we wanted any of those bundles in paper, but you wouldn't have to serve paper bundles unless we requested specific volumes from the list, just to save the trees.

MR BEARD: We're very happy to proceed on that basis and that's very helpful,

1 thank you. 2 THE CHAIRMAN: In that case I will look around, see if Ms Lucas or Professor Ulph 3 have anything to say and I will leave it to you, Mr Beard, and you, Mr Lask, to 4 raise any other points you might have of concern. 5 Ms Lucas, is there anything? 6 **MS LUCAS:** No, I think we've covered everything. 7 THE CHAIRMAN: Professor? 8 **PROFESSOR ULPH:** Nothing from me, no. 9 THE CHAIRMAN: I am very grateful. 10 Mr Beard, you --11 MR BEARD: I think we've covered most of the issues that we wanted to cover. I'm 12 just going to put down one quick marker that may need to come back before 13 the Tribunal but we'll try and deal with it in writing. There are a couple of 14 issues on disclosure that may arise. In particular we'd asked the CMA for 15 underlying code in relation to some of the modelling that they have in 16 Annex R. We asked for this back in December and they refused. 17 In those circumstances we're not content with the position that the CMA have 18 adopted and indeed we will be raising those matters with the CMA. But if we 19 don't get co-operation on that sort of disclosure then there may have to be

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further applications.

And the other matter on disclosure may relate to the somewhat unusual circumstances in which this investigation came into being, because as the Tribunal knows there was an enquiry into digital comparison tools which we very fully cooperated with. There was no intimation that an investigation was to start as we were producing all that information. But then at the end of the process an investigation has begun and all of that material used. So we

may have one or two queries on disclosure in relation to those matters.

But we will liaise with the CMA because obviously in these sorts of circumstances if they hold material that wasn't provided on access to the file or workings that may be either non-probative or exculpatory, then that sort of material would need to be provided in any event. But we can park that. I just mention it for today, rather than raising it as any sort of order.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. I'm grateful that you have.

Mr Lask, I'm not going to invite you to resist or push back on that because I'm not going to make any order today. But it does seem to me that if at all possible we want to resolve this both quickly and on the papers, rather than -- well, I suppose it could fit in the post-defence CMC but that's probably a bit late.

MR LASK: Sir, I am in a bit of difficulty because this issue wasn't canvassed in the skeleton arguments and I have no prior knowledge of it. So I'm limited in what I can say, other than we will of course wait and see what BGL say in their correspondence and consider it very carefully.

THE CHAIRMAN: I'm grateful.

Mr Beard, I think probably best to bring this issue to the boil as quickly as possible.

MR BEARD: Yes, absolutely. That's the reason I mention it today. I didn't want us to leave the CMC today and then be sending letters next week and the CMA say: "but you never mentioned this". I think that wouldn't have been right. But I'm very much content to proceed on that basis.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much.

Mr Lask, is there anything more that you want to raise?

MR LASK: Sir, I think you have enough markers laid down for one day so I don't intend to (inaudible) more or indeed raise any other matters with you this afternoon.

I	THE CHAIRMAN: I'm very grateful to both of you and to your legal teams for
2	assisting us in what has not been a straightforward directions hearing. So
3	thank you both very much. I will end the hearing now.
4	MR BEARD: Thank you and thank you for sitting late.
5	THE CHAIRMAN: Not at all.
6	MR LASK: Thank you.
7	(5.20 pm)
8	(The hearing concluded)
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