1 2 3	This Transcript has not been proof read or corrected. It is a working tool for the Tribunal for use in preparing its judgment. It will be placed on the Tribunal Website for readers to see how matters were conducted at the public hearing of these proceedings and is not to be relied on or cited in the context of any other proceedings. The
4 5	Tribunal's judgment in this matter will be the final and definitive record. IN THE COMPETITION APPEAL TRIBUNAL
6	BETWEEN:
7	Case No.:1304/7/7/19
8	1305/7/7/19
9	JUSTIN GUTMANN
10	Duamaga d Class Damagantativa
10	Proposed Class Representative
11	– and –
12 13	(1) FIRST MTR SOUTH WESTERN TRAINS LIMITED ("FIRST MTR") (2) STAGECOACH SOUTH WESTERN TRAINS LIMITED ("STAGECOACH")
14	Proposed Defendants
15	AND BETWEEN
10	AND DET WEEK
16	JUSTIN GUTMANN
17	Proposed Class Representative
40	
18	– and –
19	LONDON & SOUTH EASTERN RAILWAY LIMITED ("LSER")
20	Proposed Defendant
21	
22 23	PHILIP MOSER QC, STEFAN KUPPEN and ALEXANDRA LITTLEWOOD (Instructed by Hausfeld & Co LLP and Charles Lyndon Ltd) appeared on behalf of Mr. Gutmann
23 24	TIM WARD QC and JAMES BOURKE (Instructed by Slaughter and May) appeared on
25	behalf of First MTR
26	SARAH ABRAM (Instructed by Dentons UK and Middle East LLP) appeared on behalf of
27	Stagecoach
28	PAUL HARRIS QC, ANNALIESE BLACKWOOD and MICHAEL ARMITAGE
29 20	(Instructed by Freshfield Bruckhaus Deringer) appeared on behalf of LSER
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38 39	

1	Thursday 11 March 2021
2	(10.35 am)
3	THE PRESIDENT: Yes, good morning. Ms Abram, is it?
4	MS ABRAM: Good morning, sir.
5	THE PRESIDENT: Mr Moser wants to say something.
6	
7	Housekeeping
8	MR MOSER: I have forewarned Ms Abram, it's just a housekeeping point, sir.
9	Yesterday we were asked about the agreements. We have looked into what
10	we've been given.
11	What we appear to have is the original 1995 agreement.
12	Then, secondly, the 2018 amended version we showed the Tribunal yesterday.
13	Yesterday, MTR sent us a further set of documents which we understand are about
14	its accession to those agreements.
15	There's also a set of 2005 and 2015 documents, but we think those only relate to
16	one-day Travelcards.
17	We are very happy to forward those to the Tribunal as they are, they run to about 350
18	pages. The Proposed Defendants are happy for us to do so that. What I have
19	said to my learned friends is that if the Tribunal has any questions about what
20	each of these is, then they are going to be or their solicitors are going to be
21	best placed to deal with that.
22	Also, on confidentiality, all parties are happy for these to go in within the
23	confidentiality ring in that way.
24	If at some stage any part were to come out of the confidentiality ring, or essentially if
25	you wanted to refer to it, then the Proposed Defendants have suggested that it
26	would be best dealt with by correspondence later because they would need,

1	I think, Transport for London also to consent to that it will be a matter for them.
2	THE PRESIDENT: Yes, that seems sensible. Thank you.
3	MR MOSER: It will be done.
4	THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Ms Abram.
5	
6	Submissions by MS ABRAM
7	MS ABRAM: Thank you.
8	I will be focusing on two aspects of the case, first the abuse allegation, and, second,
9	whether the proposed claims should be certified on an opt-out basis.
10	For shorthand, as in my skeleton, I am going to refer to customers who could have
11	bought boundary fares but instead bought another ticket type as "Eligible
12	Customers".
13	I will start by summarising my submissions on abuse.
14	First, all of the cases cited by my learned friend Mr Moser on the abuse requirement
15	concern the imposition of a trading condition by a dominant undertaking on
16	a counterparty. They have nothing to do with the real issue in this case, which
17	is whether the dominance concept, the abuse concept, imposes an obligation
18	on a dominant undertaking to try harder to promote the purchase of cheaper
19	products by customers that would meet customers' needs. That's my first and
20	my main point on abuse.
21	Second, there's no support elsewhere in the existing case law in the law for the
22	proposed claim and there's no reason to think that the law will develop to
23	encompass the kind of claim that's proposed here.
24	Third, the claim alleges a bundle of distinct types of conduct which have too little in
25	common, as a matter of law or fact, for collective proceedings to be appropriate.
26	I propose to take my submissions on abuse in four stages.

1	First, I would like if I may just to take you to one case on the test for summary disposal.
2	That is in authorities bundle 2, tab 16.
3	To set the scene, sir, the PCR has emphasised that it's not usually appropriate to
4	dispose summarily of a claim or a defence that raises an issue of law in an area
5	where the law is developing. That's true as far as it goes, but the point I want
6	to show the Tribunal is that it only applies where there's a real prospect of the
7	law developing in such a way as to enable the claim or the defence to succeed.
8	The case at tab 16 is a Court of Appeal case in Hudson v Treasury, the facts don't
9	matter too much but just to set the scene, it's a restitutionary claim relating to
10	pensions rules for former members of the armed services. It came to the Court
11	of Appeal having been struck out, the claim had been struck out at first instance
12	and the claimants appealed.
13	All that really matters is the statement of the principles, which are at paragraphs 66 to
14	67 on page 536.
15	THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Just one moment.
16	(Pause)
17	Yes. So the question is it was a non-contributory pension scheme, but they are making
18	a restitutionary claim. That was the response, is that right?
19	MS ABRAM: That's right, so the idea was that although there had not been specific
20	deductions from pay from these armed forces members while they've been
21	serving members of the armed forces, they ought to have a right to have
22	a pension because surely their pay would, even if not openly, have taken into
23	account the fact that there were contributions to a bigger pension scheme.
24	There had been a change in the law for some members of the armed forces
25	not others and these people said, "Well, we want a piece of that pie".

1 develop in such a way as to enable it to be covered? It's really just the principle 2 that I want to take from, as I say, the top of page 536, paragraph 66. 3 Lord Justice Jonathan Parker had reviewed some earlier authorities and 4 picking up at the start he said: 5 "As I read these authorities, they do not in any way erode the well-established principle 6 that claims which are plainly and obviously bad should ... be struck out." 7 Then he refers to another case, and picking up just a line further down he says: 8 "It follows that the proposition that it is not appropriate to strike out a claim in an area 9 of developing jurisprudence cannot be an absolute one." 10 Then he gives some reasons and I pick up again on the penultimate line of the 11 paragraph: 12 "If it were otherwise, the court's jurisdiction to strike out hopeless claims would be 13 unexercisable in any case where the hopeless claim purports to invoke an area 14 of developing jurisprudence." 15 I obviously lay particular emphasis on that. Then paragraph 67 equally: 16 "In my judgment, therefore, where an application to strike out a claim is resisted on 17 the ground that, notwithstanding that the claimant may currently have no cause of action, nevertheless by the time the action comes to trial the relevant area of 18 jurisprudence may have developed sufficiently to enable the claim to succeed, 19 20 the court will require to be satisfied that there is at the very least some real 21 prospect of that occurring." 22 Of course, Mr Moser says to the Tribunal that his claim falls squarely within the existing 23 authorities, but I am about to attempt to show you, sir, that it does not fall 24 squarely within the existing authorities. That then means that the PCR has, by 25 definition, to rely on the prospect of the law developing in his favour and I say 26 there's no reason also to think that the law will develop in any relevant respect

1	between now and a trial.
2	That's why I take the Tribunal to Hudson as my starting point.
3	THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
4	MS ABRAM: Second on abuse, I would like to address the five cases which Mr Moser
5	took the Tribunal through on the first day of this hearing, although I am going to
6	avoid taking the Tribunal back through all of them.
7	In my submission, those five cases logically fall into two groups. On the one hand you
8	have United Brands and on the other hand you have got the other four cases
9	altogether.
10	I will start with United Brands. My submission really on United Brands is that the
11	Tribunal isn't going to derive a great deal of assistance from that case.
12	Mr Moser really relied on it as the starting point for the subsequent case law
13	rather than as laying down principles that can be directly applied here. For your
14	note that was transcript Day 1, page 29. I will give you transcript references
15	where possible, but I am not expecting you to look at the transcript at any point.
16	The reason it is not directly relevant in this case is that the true complaint here is not
17	about the prices that customers paid actually for any fare really, the real
18	complaint in this case is about the products that they bought or perhaps the
19	way in which those products were sold.
20	There is only really an unfair pricing allegation in this case in the sense that the PCR
21	might say that any price that was charged for a full journey fare was kind of
22	inevitably unfair in the sense that it is to be inferred that any price for a full
23	journey fare included an element for the transport in London, which was already
24	paid for by the Travelcard on the PCR's case.
25	That's why I say that the pure excessive pricing cases, like United Brands, don't really

take one anywhere in this case.

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Moving on then to the other four cases that were relied on. The kernel of what I am going to say about them is that in each case the conduct that was found to be abusive in Deutsche Post and DSD and the conduct that was alleged to be abusive in Preventx and BVA was a condition imposed by the dominant undertaking on its counterparties. I will just run through each of the cases briefly to illustrate why I say that; the only one I intend to take the Tribunal to is Preventx.

that case, transcript Day 1, page 32, that customers who wanted to post letters in large quantities from abroad had no choice but to pay the full amount of internal postage in addition to the terminal dues. The ECJ, consistent with that, characterised Deutsche Post's abuse as its demands -- that was the word used -- for the entire internal postage. That is paragraph 61.

That's a case where customers who wanted to send large quantities of mail had no choice but to pay both charges.

Second, DSD, Duales System Deutschland.

THE PRESIDENT: Pausing there, if there were no boundary fares at all, so you have your Travelcard, you go to the ticket office as an informed consumer and say, look, I've already paid free travel to this station and they said, "Well, no, you've got to -- we don't recognise that". Would that be more analogous to Deutsche Post?

**MS ABRAM:** May I address head on that point, which you also put to Mr Harris yesterday. I will take that bit of the case out of order if I may and cover that off now and then come back to the other cases.

I respectfully agree, sir, that there is a factual difference between the very vast majority of routes on which a boundary fare was available in the sense that it existed,

so for most origin/destination pairs there was a boundary fare, and a very small minority of routes on which no boundary fare existed. In the case of the South Western Respondents that is for historical reasons due to an anomaly in the way that the rail regions developed over time.

May I take you to the factual position on that, which is --

THE PRESIDENT: I know it's very small. I wasn't really looking at the impact of that,

I was thinking more conceptually. I mean just suppose -- it's a hypothetical
question -- that on all routes there was no boundary fare, or the vast majority,
not the case, but suppose that was the situation. Would that be then analogous
to Deutsche Post?

**MS ABRAM:** We deny that there is an abuse in those cases and if this case were to go further, then we would be asking the Tribunal to find that there's no abuse in those circumstances.

What I say about it is that, first, I accept that there is a closer analogy between the Deutsche Post and DSD kind of cases and those facts. We say that there are reasons why they're different, but we accept that they will require evidence and a trial to be determined. What I say about it is critical is that pragmatically, the Tribunal just doesn't actually need to engage with the hypothetical question that, my Lord, you asked, sir.

**THE PRESIDENT:** Can we explore that a bit. Of course, there may be an objective justification defence, one can see that, but that's not for this stage.

If it were the case that one can say, well, that would be an arguable abuse if you didn't make them available at all, is it such a big leap to say well if they're notionally available but you don't tell people about them and actually at most of your outlets you cannot buy them, you have to stand in the queue at the ticket office to get them. Well, yes, that's, you may say, the method of selling but it's actually

restricting the sale of them. Why is that such a great leap from the proposition that you've accepted is arguable? It may not be right but you accept it's arguable for summary judgment purposes, that not making them available at all is arguably an abuse.

**MS ABRAM:** There are two differences, one factual difference and one legal difference.

The factual difference is that because the routes on which there were no boundary fares are such a really tiny corner of the claim, if the Tribunal were to consider that there's an arguable case of abuse in respect of those situations, there would be no question that it would be appropriate to certify the claim on that basis because, assuming that was the only bit of the legal case that was arguable, the little bit of the claim that is affected by those routes on which there were no boundary fares at all, is just tiny out of all proportion, vanishingly small, compared to the class as a whole. It would not just be a sledgehammer to crack a nut, it would be something much greater to crack something much smaller.

That is why it matters factually that they are a really, really small bit of the claim.

Secondly, I say that the distinction between the situation where a boundary fare didn't exist and a situation where it did exist and the PCR says, "Well you should have done more to go out and get people to buy that fare" is a really fundamental distinction, according to the authorities, because there is no case in which it has ever been found that a dominant undertaking has an obligation to go out and encourage or facilitate at the time, purchase of the cheapest possible product for a customer.

THE PRESIDENT: It's not so much encourage, it's make it available for purchase. As I say, I struggle to see there's such a conceptual difference to saying "well it's arguable you should have the product", to say "well it's arguable you should

1	have the product and make it available to purchase from the outlets where
2	customers purchase."
3	You say that's a fundamental difference in terms of abuse in what a dominant
4	companies is expected to do.
5	Given that competition law is about substance rather than about form, I mean formally
6	it clearly is different, I can see that, we can all see that, and there is a bright
7	line, but in substance, in terms of sort of effect on a market if you said yes
8	you can get a boundary fare but only on the first Tuesday of the month, you can
9	then buy in advance, but you can't get it when you turn up, you cannot get it
10	from the vending machine you cannot get it online but it's there, you just have
11	to go through these particular procedures to get it. I mean that would not really
12	have been offering boundary fares, would it?
13	MS ABRAM: I agree that you proffer a hard case, sir, but that isn't this case.
14	THE PRESIDENT: No, I understand that.
15	MS ABRAM: That isn't what's may I use the facts of DSD to illustrate why I say that
16	there's such a big difference?
17	THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
18	MS ABRAM: You will recall that DSD was the packaging case where the ECJ, as it
19	then was, found that the abuse consisted in requiring all customers who bought
20	the packaging also to pay for the waste management system, regardless of
21	whether they were actually going to use the waste management system.
22	Although we say that this case is different in respect of those routes where boundary
23	fares didn't exist and I am not accepting the contrary one sees, I accept,
24	an arguable parallel between the facts of that case and the very few routes
25	where they didn't exist.

argues for in this case, is two further steps that the ECJ didn't take.

First, there's nothing in the judgment of the ECJ to say that DSD would also have committed an abuse unless it made sure that materially all customers who weren't going to use the waste management bit of the service didn't pay the waste management bit of the charge. All the ECJ said was, "Look, you have to unbundle the two charges and offer a packaging-only version".

So that is a significant further step.

Also a further point is that there's nothing in DSD, for example, or in any of the other case law, that says that one determines whether or not -- one measures whether or not there has in fact been an abuse by looking at whether all the customers in DSD, for instance, had bought the cheapest service that they needed. That's the PCR's case here. It's that unless materially all eligible customers buy boundary fares, then hey presto, you've got an abuse. Again, there is no, authority for that.

I say those two steps that are further than Deutsche Post and DSD and so on are significant distinctions from the previous case law.

Could I take you -- before I move on from the case law -- to Preventx. DSD was the second of the four cases, Preventx is the third.

It's at authorities bundle 5, tab 57, the relevant page is 2556. So, as you will recall, sir, there were three arguably abusive elements of Royal Mail's conduct.

Your finding on the first is at paragraph 99. That's your finding as to the requirement that packages containing the STI testing kits should be labelled "tracked" in large characters. You will recall that there was evidence that this requirement would have a deterrent effect on the use of the Preventx service. You found at the end of paragraph 99, sir:

"It seems to me that if the word 'Tracked' may have such a deterrent effect as alleged,

1	an unnecessary insistence that this word is used may well constitute an unfair
2	term."
3	I emphasise there insistence, of course.
4	The second is at paragraph 101, which addresses the threat by Royal Mail to destroy
5	the samples that might be returned by free post or to refuse to process those
6	samples. In the middle of that paragraph, you say there's an arguable abuse
7	there in the fourth line because it's, in effect, " a coercive threat to persuade
8	Preventx to agree".
9	THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
10	MS ABRAM: Again, I emphasise the word "coercive" there.
11	The third point is at paragraph 102, and that addresses that requirement for Preventx
12	to migrate to the other means of sending the testing kits, otherwise Royal Mail
13	would withdraw the licence within three months.
14	Again, you find that the insistence on the right to do that, on the contractual term, is
15	unarguably an unfair trading condition, is the finding at the end of that
16	paragraph.
17	What again all of these forms of conduct have in common is that they involve the
18	imposition by a dominant undertaking of a requirement on its counterparty.
19	The final case in that group is BVA. My Flemish isn't as good as Mr Moser's, so I will
20	not attempt the name in full but, again, as Mr Moser said, this concerned the
21	pricing structure that was imposed by the Belgian collecting society for
22	copyright fees. The complaint was about the alleged inflexibility of the tariff
23	applied by the collecting society.
24	Actually, this isn't a case where there's a ruling on whether there's an abuse, it was
25	a preliminary reference and the CJEU said it was for the national court to
26	decide. The point that I take from the case is that it related to the lawfulness of

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a tariff imposed by the Belgian collecting society. Again, customers had no choice about whether to pay the tariff and that was the gravamen of the complaint that was made.

Before I try and tie those cases into this one, could I just add an observation about the wording of section 18. It's so well known as really not to require study, but it might be helpful just to go back to it. It's at authorities bundle 1, tab 1.

of section 18(2)(a) on which Mr Moser relies for this claim. You noted that the words of that provision refer to imposing unfair trading conditions. You noted that this case is really about trading arrangements more than trading conditions. I respectfully agree with that and I submit it's of real significance in the light of the case law that I have just taken the Tribunal through. Of course, I accept that section 18(2), just like Article 102, doesn't exhaustively enumerate all the different types of abusive dominance that there can ever be, it doesn't. But it is significant that it refers to imposing and trading conditions because, as the facts of Preventx show, whether or not a dominant undertaking imposes a trading condition is entirely within the control of the dominant undertaking. It's clearly something that Royal Mail or Deutsche Post can desist from doing, the customer doesn't have any choice.

The reason why I respectfully would say that Deutsche Post and DSD and the other cases are a very long way from this one is that that is a great distance from a positive duty to put in place selling arrangements to encourage customers to buy the cheapest product that meets their needs.

I am not intending to parse the language of the abuse in the terms that Mr Moser puts it or doesn't put it, I am not seeking to make a clever point about "encourage" versus "facilitate" or "promote", I think we are all talking about the same thing.

MR HOLMES: You may be coming to this in a moment, but can I connect with what you were just saying in relation to these three cases to what you said about Hudson a moment ago. In effect, in these cases you are saying that they concern the imposition of unfair trading terms on a counterparty as opposed to a positive obligation to make the customers aware of things. When you spoke about Hudson I think you were saying that the point there was that the fact that something was novel might be a reason not to strike it out, unless there was a sense that the law might be developing in that direction. I am paraphrasing what was said in that judgment.

Are you going to say anything about whether the law or presumably in your case, you think the law is not developing in that area, because we have seen and our attention has been drawn to things which are pushing in that direction. For example, our attention was drawn I think to the fares and ticketing, a document of the ORR, which talks about the need for greater transparency and so forth.

Are there not things that are suggesting the law might move in that direction?

**MS ABRAM:** Thank you, sir. I would make two points about this.

The first is that if you look at the hard law, so the cases, there is no indication whatsoever of any relevant development in this field. Deutsche Post was a case decided nearly 25 years ago. BVA was a case decided a few months ago. They're very much of a piece. I don't think Mr Moser is suggesting that there's some kind of trajectory of inevitable expansion of this bit of the abuse concept.

I would say that, on the cases, there's no indication that the law is developing.

You refer, sir, to consumer-facing documents that indicate that it's good practice to help consumers out by getting them to buy the best product for them, and I emphasise the word "consumer" there, because what the Tribunal is inevitably

concerned with in this case is whether there's an arguable case of abuse of dominance. The fact that it may be good for consumers to buy boundary fares when they're eligible for them and they happen to be the cheapest fare is absolutely not to be equated with it being abusive not to ensure that materially all customers buy boundary fares in those circumstances.

I put the point in my skeleton, and I press it again that it's very important that Parliament having legislated for there to be opt-out collective proceedings within the scope of competition law, the scope of Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, that Parliament defined the limits of that procedure and it should be kept within its proper bounds.

The truth is that this isn't an abuse case at all, it's a consumer protection case. It's very important that the abuse concept shouldn't be expanded kind of by the back door to encompass what are really consumer protection concepts. I would respectfully submit that the documents that you mentioned, sir, just underline that point.

MR HOLMES: Thank you. That's helpful.

MS ABRAM: I am grateful.

Having been through the cases, I would like to make a couple of points about the way that the case is put by the PCR. This is the third area of my submissions on abuse.

I will approach it by reference to the different strands of the abuse case that's argued against us, and I will start if I may with the best endeavours limb or the best efforts, the promotion of sales limb, because that's obviously the true heart of the case against us.

Mr Moser said that he's not alleging a positive duty to ensure that materially all customers buy boundary fares. But my learned friend also says that if the TOCs

1	things that they are particularly wanting to sell that week, but they are not hidden
2	away behind a locked door. So, with respect, I would say that's not a fair
3	analogy and it's not actually the case that's put against us.
4	The second thing I would say is that even if the supermarket did pursue that policy,
5	there's absolutely nothing in the law of abuse to say that it would be dominant
6	for the supermarket that the supermarket has any kind of duty to say to its
7	customers, "Look, I know where you can get a good deal"
8	THE PRESIDENT: Sorry to interrupt you, I think you misspoke, when you said
9	"nothing to say it would be dominant", you meant "would be abusive".
10	MS ABRAM: Would be abusive, yes, I did misspeak, yes, I'm sorry.
11	There's absolutely nothing on the law on abuse to say that it would be abusive for the
12	cashier at the supermarket not to say, "Look, I'll tell you what the best deal that
13	you can get in the supermarket is today". So, I say it's not on point.
14	Also, that even if it was on point then it would be a step beyond the current case law.
15	PROFESSOR MASON: Okay, thank you.
16	MS ABRAM: I am grateful.
17	I was about to start on the lack of particularisation and the question of whether the
18	PCR's job is to tell us what the abuse consists of.
19	The way that that's approached by the PCR is at paragraph 33 of their skeleton, on
20	page 14.
21	THE PRESIDENT: This is Mr Moser's
22	MS ABRAM: Mr Moser's skeleton.
23	THE PRESIDENT: Mr Moser's skeleton, and his juniors', yes
24	MS ABRAM: If I just ask you to remind yourself of that.
25	(Pause)
26	THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

1	MS ABRAM: Mr Moser explained this again yesterday (transcript Day 2, pages 29 to
2	30). I submit that there are two different points here and that the PCR is
3	perhaps hiding a bad point behind a good point. There are two questions.
4	There is, first, the question of what the PCR's case is that the TOCs should have been
5	doing all along in respect of the sale of boundary fares.
6	Then, second, there's the question of whether, if there is an abuse, the TOCs might
7	need, in the short or medium term to take additional steps which might not have
8	been needed in the counterfactual to bring customer awareness of boundary
9	fares back to where the PCR says it should be.
10	Mr Moser says, "I cannot possibly state any case on the second question, I would
11	need to have evidence to know what the TOCs would now need to do". I quite
12	accept that the PCR doesn't need to answer that question at this stage, but
13	what that doesn't excuse the PCR from doing is having a case about what the
14	abuse actually consisted of.
15	So, what the PCR is saying that the TOCs were required to do, have always been
16	required to do and should still be doing on their case.
17	The PCR just hasn't explained what it is said that we should have been doing all along.
18	I say that that means that the PCR hasn't met its obligation to plead its claim in
19	terms that can be understood.
20	MR HOLMES: Can I ask, is this not quite a common problem in abuse? For example,
21	in a case where there's a refusal to supply or a refusal to supply a licence on
22	FRAND terms or not at all, the authority or the complainant will allege:
23	"The abuse consists of not providing me with a licence or only giving me a licence at
24	a royalty of 100 per cent which is outrageous and abusive"
25	Is it not frequently the case that the abuse doesn't consist of not providing me with

are determined the non-abusive conduct is often not clear, indeed it's one of the problems of crafting remedies.

MS ABRAM: In fact FRAND cases are a really good example of why it is the PCR's obligation to set out what it says should have happened because, as you will know, sir, the way that a FRAND case works is that the parties have negotiations and the patent holder will ask for 50p per mobile phone and the implementer, alleged implementer will offer 1p per mobile phone and the implementer's case will be your 50p offer isn't FRAND, it's abusive because the true FRAND rate is 1p or okay even if I should have offered more than 1p, that there isn't a FRAND rate above 5p. That absolutely is part of making a FRAND case.

The only way that a court can determine a FRAND case, or any abuse case, is to know what the wrongful conduct is said to consist of and what the delta, in econometric terms, is between the parties.

MR HOLMES: Thank you.

MS ABRAM: The leading case on how this translates into a claimant's obligations at the pleading stage is another case decided by the President, sir, Sel-Imperial, I will not take you back to it because it's too well known to require going back to, but I cited the relevant bit of it at paragraph 54 of my skeleton on page 15.

We particularly emphasise of course the underlined sentence there:

"A Defendant faced with such a claim [that is a competition claim] is entitled to know what specific conduct or agreement is complained of and how that is alleged to violate the law ..."

We say that the allegation that the TOCs were obliged to take reasonable steps, or some equivalent, to sell boundary fares is just too vague to meet that standard.

The point that I wish particularly to underline is that it shouldn't be assumed

from the vagueness of the PCR's case that within that case there is concealed some identifiable and legally recognisable allegation of abuse. It's for the PCR to identify what the arguable allegation of abuse is. If I'm right that just doing more or trying harder isn't legally recognisable, then what's done isn't good enough and it shouldn't be assumed that there is some kernel of arguable case with some arguable merit somewhere hidden away within that greater whole.

That's what I wanted to say about the best endeavours element of the claim. I would like now just to address the three more specific types of conduct that are wrapped up in the claim as well, caught up, because of the expansiveness of the class definition, including all eligible customers.

These really matter because they add to what the eligible customers in those three categories would have to prove at a trial of any of this case and what they need to establish in order to show that there's any arguable claim at this stage.

For example, if you're an eligible customer who bought an advance fare, they have to show that there's an obligation on TOCs to create advance fares. It's not enough just to show there was a general best endeavours obligation, you have to have the advance fare creation obligation as well, particularly because advance fares for example, as we know, are often cheaper than boundary fares, so absent that allegation there is no claim.

I have already covered in response to your question at the outset, sir, the first of the three categories, which is the creation of boundary fares for certain routes where they don't exist.

All I would add to that, just by way of signposting, is that the factual position, including references to the underlying materials, is all set out at paragraph 13 of my skeleton on page 4. That shows just how marginal and vanishingly small these situations are.

1 The second point of the three is the suggested obligation to create new boundary fare 2 ticket types. That's the idea that a TOC committed an abuse unless it created 3 a boundary fare for every single ticket type. The example often given is 4 advance fares. 5 You asked Mr Harris yesterday, sir, what the difference is between a situation where 6 there's no boundary fare at all for a particular route and this aspect of the case 7 where there may be no advance boundary fare, for instance. 8 As I say, we deny that either is an abuse, but I submit further that the argument that 9 the TOCs were obliged to create new products in order to be able to provide 10 further discounts on a fare that was already discounted, is particularly lacking 11 in merit. The idea that it was an abuse not to create a double-discounted 12 product. I have addressed the facts on this point at paragraph 38 of my skeleton, which is on 13 14 page 11, and again I have set all the references for the evidence out in there. 15 The fundamental factual point here is that train tickets aren't priced per mile travelled, 16 there's no direct correlation between how far you go and how much you pay. 17 It's obvious really, but different rail fares are created for a whole range of reasons, and their purpose is to incentivise various different types of consumer 18 19 or customer behaviour. 20 For example, if you have an advance fare, that gives the passenger the benefit of 21 a discounted price, in return for that, the TOC gets certainty about a spread of 22 passenger numbers across its services. 23 On that, my submission, against that factual background, is that it's perfectly proper 24 for a TOC to decide what value to attribute to incentivising travel on a particular 25 service, for example by means of reducing the ticket price. In some cases that 26 will result in a full advance journey fare costing less than a boundary fare for

and that's what we are here to determine today.

within the claim.

The third specific area which I need to address, the final one, is sales of non-boundary fares to eligible customers by third parties. Just to be clear, these cover a number of different types of third parties. There are other TOCs, there's TfL and there are the third-party ticket sellers like Trainline.

Between them, they are non-negligible, they sell over one-third of relevant tickets.

I will not take the Tribunal to it, but Mr Holt gives a figure of 37 per cent in total for those groups of sales. That's, for your note, Holt 1, paragraph 5.6.4, which is core, tab 5, page 140.

In my skeleton argument at paragraph 41, I did focus on a particular type of third-party arrangement. I just want to be clear that the particular third-party investor licence that I mentioned there isn't the only arrangement through which third parties sold tickets, either on behalf of TOCs generally or any individual TOC. I am also not making any submission about whether the third parties or any of them were the agents of the TOCs under national law or under competition law. Instead, I am making what I hope are two hard-edged legal points about third-party sales.

The first of those is directed at the PCR's submission on this point, which focused on whether the TOCs could have taken further steps in respect of third-party boundary fare sales. So, whether it would have been open to the TOCs to do more than they did in respect of third-party boundary fare sales.

I say there's a logically prior question. Before you ever get to whether the TOCs could have done more in respect of third-party sales, there's the question of whether they were obliged, arguably obliged for current purposes, under the abuse concept to ensure that the third parties made boundary fares available.

It's important to remember here that the third parties themselves aren't actually alleged

to have acted unlawfully in any respect. This isn't, for instance, the classic civil law case where you're talking about attribution of liability for a tort committed by an agent up to the principal, for instance. There's no allegation of unlawful behaviour on the part of the third-party sellers.

It's a much more fundamental question. The question is what is the TOCs' duty in respect of the promotion of the sale of boundary fares by third-party agents?

It's a further step, again, beyond the kind of generic best endeavours allegation.

Because even if the TOCs had some positive duty in respect of their own sales, which
I say they unarguably don't, it would be another extension to say they also have
a duty to promote sales by third parties of boundary fares.

The point that I am making goes to a prior point in the analysis to that that was addressed by Mr Moser.

The second point that I would like to make about the third-party sales is just to mention that in the reply, as I flagged in my skeleton -- I think Mr Moser described it as a Greek gift in his oral submissions -- the PCR identified this alternative way of putting the third-party sales point, describing them as something that appeared to be an umbrella basis of sales. This argument is that if the TOCs had done more to sell boundary fares themselves, that would have had the practical effect, in the words of the PCR, of giving third-party retailers every incentive to make them available too. Mr Moser said yes that has a limited parallel with an umbrella claim, but it's not an umbrella claim.

Since the umbrella point is not pursued, then I don't want to take up a lot of time on it.

What I would say is that if the argument is other than the TOCs have a hard-edged legal duty to ensure that their third-party retailers sell boundary fares, so if it's an indirect causation point in the style of the Kone case for instance, then that would call for a completely different approach to the

quantification of loss, to causation and loss, in respect of purchasers from thirdparty sales.

Mr Holt -- it's not a criticism -- treats third-party sales as just the same as sales by the TOCs themselves. Of course, if there is an umbrella basis for the case, then you have to have a whole further stage of looking at causation, at what the third parties would have done if the TOCs had the duty to promote sales themselves, whether the third parties would have responded in the way that's claimed for, what effect that would have had, how many customers would then have bought boundary fares in those circumstances.

Again, in my submission that's something that can't just be fudged by the PCR, it needs to be tackled head on what the basis for the claim is.

That's the end of my third submission on abuse.

The fourth aspect of my submissions on abuse relates to the common issues requirement for certification. That's going to be addressed by Mr Ward, so all I want to do is just tie in what I have said about abuse to common issues and then make one point that's specific to Stagecoach.

This point is considered, at paragraph 55(b) of the PCR's skeleton on page 23. What the PCR says there is, look, liability is a common issue because in each case the conduct complained of is the fact that a ticket other than a boundary fare was sold to an eligible customer. The point is expressed in terms of compelling customers to pay twice, but of course we don't accept that characterisation. But the idea is that every customer in the class bought a ticket other than a boundary fare.

That approach confuses the experience that class members had, the fact that they bought a ticket other than a boundary fare, with whether they suffered the same legal wrong or any wrong at all. Just because they have all bought the same

I	your client's evidence, Stagecoach Stagecoach, did you offer boundary fares
2	for sale for online purchase?
3	MS ABRAM: On Stagecoach's own online sales platform, I would need to check that.
4	I will take instructions and come back to you on that, if I may.
5	THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
6	Secondly, on ticket vending machines, your ticket vending machines and your stations,
7	did you offer boundary fares?
8	MS ABRAM: Yes. On that I do know the answer and it's that we are in the same
9	position as First MTR, who were our successor of course, as opposed to LSER,
10	so yes, we did.
11	THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
12	MS ABRAM: That's what I wanted to say about abuse. I now have to cover opt in
13	versus opt out. I probably have another 15 or 20 minutes, which I have
14	discussed with Mr Ward and is fine, we are well within time. I don't know
15	whether it would be more convenient to have the break now or afterwards?
16	THE PRESIDENT: I think perhaps if it's 15/20 minutes, let's take a break now and
17	come back at just after 11.50.
18	Thank you.
19	(11.41 am)
20	(A short break)
21	(11.52 am)
22	THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Ms Abram, can I just ask you following on from my questions
23	before we took a short break, were Stagecoach, because you were dealing with
24	Stagecoach-specific issues, were boundary fares for travel on Stagecoach
25	journeys available from Trainline in 2016/2017 until, I think, August you lost the
26	franchise?

1	MS ABRAM: That's it, yes, they were available from Trainline. I will need if I may to
2	come back to you a little later on the online question, if that's all right.
3	THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
4	MS ABRAM: Thank you. I was about to move on from abuse to address two points
5	going to whether the claim should be certified on an opt-out basis specifically.
6	The first of those goes to the strength of the claims. That is the argument that even if
7	these claims get over the summary disposal threshold, they are not strong
8	enough for certification as an opt-out claim.
9	This point wasn't addressed by Mr Moser orally, which isn't a criticism, but I do need
10	to address it because in the amended reply at paragraph 115 I am not asking
11	you to go to it now it says that the threshold for certification as an opt-out
12	claim is no higher than the summary disposal threshold.
13	So, if the claim meets the summary disposal threshold then it meets the threshold for
14	certification as an opt-out claim. That's wrong, with respect, and I just want to
15	show the Tribunal why it's wrong.
16	The starting point is rule 79(3)(a), so that's in authorities bundle 1, tab A3, page 25.
17	Of course, this is very familiar. 79(3)(a):
18	"In determining whether collective proceedings should be opt-in or opt-out the
19	Tribunal may take into account all matters it thinks fit, including (a) the
20	strength of the claims"
21	In order for that rule to have any effect, it must by definition require something more
22	than merely getting over the summary judgment or strike out threshold.
23	That was clearly the view that the Supreme Court took in Merricks as well. If I may
24	just show you two paragraphs of Merricks to explain why that's clearly the case.
25	That's in authorities bundle 5, tab 59.
26	The relevant page is 2596.

This is Lord Briggs's judgment, and we all know this judgment almost off by heart by now, but of course as we all know paragraph 59 says subject to two exceptions the certification process doesn't involve a Merricks test. The two exceptions are, first, summary disposal applications and, second, addressed at paragraph 60, considering the strength of the claim as between opt-out and opt-in proceedings.

That's the first three lines of paragraph 60.

The Supreme Court must have thought that that second exception added something to the first exception, the summary disposal point, because otherwise there would have just been one exception, and this wouldn't have been part of it.

**THE PRESIDENT:** As I understand it, Lord Briggs is saying: it's not relevant to whether you certify for collective proceedings, but it's relevant to, if you are going to certify, the choice between opt in and opt out. Is that right?

MS ABRAM: Well, in my submission that can't be the beginning and the end of the analysis, because using this case as an example, the PCR says that they are only going for certification on an opt-out basis, they don't want certification on an opt-in basis so it can't be that just by saying we don't want certification on an opt-in basis you can somehow bring the Merricks threshold for opt-out proceedings further down so that the Tribunal has to say, "If you had offered us the choice between opt out and opt in we would have said it's not strong enough for opt out, so because you are not offering us the choice we have to certify because it gets over the threshold".

That cannot be the answer.

MR HOLMES: You took us to paragraph 60, which refers, as the President says, to the choice between opt in and opt out, but a bit further on down that paragraph Lord Briggs refers to:

1	" factors relevant to whether the claims are suitable to be brought in collective
2	proceedings do not include a review of the merits."
3	Isn't that saying, as the President suggested, that it's relevant to the choice between
4	opt in and opt out and that only?
5	<b>MS ABRAM:</b> In my submission, that sentence has to be read subject to paragraph 59,
6	which says that there's the provision for summary disposal, which of course as
7	we all know is also in issue in this case. It's not the case that there's absolutely
8	no consideration of the merits at all in certification per se. It's that there's
9	a summary disposal threshold and then there's the question of whether it's good
10	enough for opt out.
11	As I say, it can't be the case that you can just, by saying, "I don't want opt-in
12	certification", somehow bring the merits threshold further down, that would not
13	be rational.
14	THE PRESIDENT: What you say is that if you were asking for opt out only, then the
15	strength of the claim comes in. If there was a real alternative of opt in, then it
16	will only be relevant to which of those two alternatives is appropriate. Is that
17	essentially your submission?
18	MS ABRAM: Yes, yes. In a case where there isn't the alternative of opt in, either
19	because that isn't pursued or because for other reasons the Tribunal does not
20	consider that appropriate then that can't magically take away the force of this
21	part of the rules, is what I say about that.
22	To make the submission on the point, as the Tribunal knows, in the guide at
23	paragraph 6.39, the example is given of a follow-on claim as a claim that will
24	generally have sufficiently immediately perceptible strength to satisfy the
25	opt-out merit threshold for certification.
26	THE PRESIDENT: That is quoted, isn't it, by Lord Briggs at paragraph 29 of his

1	judgment?
2	MS ABRAM: It is. I am not seeking to disagree with that part of the CAT guide, I was
3	using that as a starting point for my submissions, sir, I was not seeking to
4	undermine
5	THE PRESIDENT: The way it's put in the CAT guide supports your submission
6	MS ABRAM: Yes.
7	THE PRESIDENT: and I don't think Lord Briggs is suggesting, when he quotes it at
8	paragraph 29 of his judgment, that there's anything wrong with it.
9	MS ABRAM: No. It's cited with approbation by the Supreme Court, I respectfully
10	agree, sir.
11	THE PRESIDENT: Whether it's approbation or at least without any sense that it needs
12	qualification.
13	MS ABRAM: Without disapproval.
14	THE PRESIDENT: Yes, without disapproval, yes, there are other bits that clearly do
15	need reconsideration. Yes, that does seem to me to tie in with what you are
16	saying.
17	MS ABRAM: I am grateful.
18	If one uses the follow-on claim as a yardstick, and of course I am not suggesting that
19	those are the only circumstances you could ever have an opt-out claim but just
20	to measure this standalone claim against that example, this is a claim that does
21	not fit into any established category of the law on abuse, where the PCR has
22	not identified the specific conduct that's said to be abusive and where, as I say,
23	the case law relied on is irrelevant to almost all of the claim.
24	I say it's just not strong enough to be certified on an opt-out basis, even if it gets over
25	the summary judgment threshold which we say it doesn't.
26	That was my penultimate point.

1	My final point is on the cost benefit issue. May I take you first on cost benefit to answer
2	directly the questions that you asked yesterday, sir, about the Litigation Funding
3	Agreement.
4	THE PRESIDENT: Can we put Merricks away?
5	MS ABRAM: You can put Merricks away. You can put all the authorities away in fact,
6	sir.
7	I need now the Litigation Funding Agreement which is in the supplementary bundle,
8	bundle 11, tab 16. This submission is directed to the costs of the present
9	proceedings, or the proceedings that are in prospect.
10	THE PRESIDENT: Parts of this are confidential.
11	MS ABRAM: This is a non-confidential bundle, sir, so everything that you can see is
12	fair game, everything you can see is not confidential.
13	THE PRESIDENT: Right, I am just looking at it. That's why things are blanked out in
14	part of the document.
15	MS ABRAM: It is, yes. But the only relevant bits are non-confidential, so that won't
16	cause us any difficulties as a process.
17	THE PRESIDENT: I understand.
18	MS ABRAM: Of course, when we are looking at the costs of the proceedings, they
19	are in various categories, there is the respondents' costs, Tribunal time, public
20	expense and for present purposes I am just looking at the PCR's costs.
21	By way of background, to give the context, you were taken yesterday, sir, to the
22	litigation costs budgets. You will recollect that the PCR's cost budget to trial
23	was £11 million, including CFA uplifts.
24	You asked about the funder's return under the litigation funding agreement, either
25	under a settlement or after judgment.
26	The clause that addresses that in this document is clause 10, which starts at page 239

of the bundle.

Clause 10.1 addresses what happens if the funder is seeking payment of its fee under CAT rule 94(4)(b), so that's following a collective settlement. You will see to start with under 10.1, from the words above the table, that the funder's fee will be the higher, the greater, of a fixed fee or a percentage of the proceeds. The proceeds are essentially the damages, for current purposes.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

MS ABRAM: The top line of the table shows that the funder's fee depends on the funder's outlay, which is a defined term, and it's essentially the costs of funding the action. It's important to remember for the purpose of understanding this table, as you will recall from the exchange with Mr Moser yesterday, the funder's obligation under this agreement is to fund up to £6 million worth of costs. Just for your note, that's clause 4.1.5 of this agreement.

It's also important to know that, under clause 5.11, that figure can be increased by agreement.

Given that figure, I would submit that line 3 of the table in clause 10.1 is the relevant one. That says that if the funder's outlay, which is X, is more than £4 million, the fixed fee is £15 million and the percentage is a quarter of the proceedings.

The equivalent fees are higher in the context of an application for a rule 93(4) payment out of undistributed damages. You can see that from clause 10.2. So, over the page on page 240, the Tribunal sees from clause 10.2.1 that it applies if the Tribunal approves the payment to the PCR under rule 93(4).

Line 3 of that table shows that where X is over £4 million, so outlay is over £4 million, the funder's fee is the larger of £21 million or 34.5 percent of the proceeds, so the damages awarded again.

There's then an equation that we don't need to bother with to determine what happens

2 The final bit of the agreement that I do want to take you to is clause 10.4, to complete 3 the picture. That's on page 241. This addresses what happens if the funder 4 agrees to increase the action costs, so its contribution to the costs of the 5 litigation, to above the £6 million limit. 6 The keywords there are under clause 10.4.5, at the bottom of page 241. You see 7 there that the percentage funder's fee increases by 1 per cent for every 8 £100,000 increase in the costs limit. 9 Of course I am not attacking the lawfulness of the agreement, and I also -- to get my 10 retaliation in first -- accept the point that will doubtless be made against me that 11 payments under either rule 93(4) from undistributed damages or payments in 12 the collective settlement context under rule 94(4) would be subject to the control 13 of the Tribunal. I do take that point, but nonetheless the kind of black letter 14 agreement that's been struck does raise the spectre of proceedings in which 15 the funders have a great deal to gain and potentially very much more than the 16 class that they represent. 17 THE PRESIDENT: Yes. 18 MS ABRAM: May I just conclude, just before I let Mr Ward have his say at last, with 19 one final submission on costs versus benefits. 20 The PCR's position is, look, neither opt-in proceedings nor individual claims are 21 practical alternatives in this case because too few class members will 22 participate. We say, in itself, that really reflects an implicit acceptance that very 23 few people are going to take up their share of the award. 24 In any type of claim, whether it was individual or opt in or opt out, at some point every 25 eligible customer who wants to get some money out of the claim would need to

if payment is partly under one head and partly under the other.

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show that they have suffered the relevant loss. In an individual claim you would

put in evidence, in an opt-in claim you would produce evidence when you opt in. In an opt-out claim it's at the time of take up. So, all types of proceedings have materially the same obstacles in their way in that respect.

The only question is the stage of the proceedings at which that obstacle arises. The difference is that opt-out proceedings have this additional disadvantage that a judgment risks potentially the very large majority of any damages award being left unclaimed by class members, in circumstances where the main beneficiary would be the funder.

As to the PCR's point, well, actually the real choice is between opt-out proceedings and nothing. In my submission when the Tribunal is weighing up that question, whether the proceedings are suitable for certification as opt-out proceedings, you have to consider how different for the class members opt-out proceedings and nothing really might be. Because if the reality is that the class members just aren't going to take up their share of the award, although in dollar terms the suggested benefits might be large, the practical benefits are almost entirely ... "illusory" is unfair but "unrealistic/unreal" is the submission that I would make.

In my submission you need a real-world approach to weighing up the costs and the benefits of the proceedings.

That's all I wanted to say, sir, unless there's anything else I can assist you with.

- **THE PRESIDENT:** I will just pause.
- 21 We will just withdraw for a moment because we cannot all confer.
- **(12.10 pm)**
- 23 (A short break)
- **(12.13 pm)**
- **THE PRESIDENT:** Thank you, Ms Abram, we've nothing to ask you.
- **MS ABRAM:** I am very grateful.

1	THE PRESIDENT: Mr Ward.
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3	Submissions by MR WARD
4	MR WARD: Thank you, sir, I appear with Mr Bourke for First MTR. As you will have
5	noted the Applicant alleges that my client is liable from August 2017 when it
6	began operating the South Western franchise.
7	Under the division of labour between the respondents, my task is to address the
8	Tribunal on the conditions for certification. Of course I am not going to repeat
9	what you have already heard, which extensively overlaps with that, but I am not
10	dealing with a matter of strike out, even though my clients do have a strike out
11	application.
12	Under certification, Mr Moser bears the burden of persuading the Tribunal he has met
13	the conditions.
14	What I propose to do is address the conditions principally through the lens of suitability
15	and make some particular points of emphasis from the perspective of First
16	MTR, and answer a number of Mr Moser's points.
17	I want to start with commonality.
18	As the Tribunal will be aware, rule 79(2)(a) asks whether collective proceedings are
19	an appropriate means for the fair and efficient resolution of the common issues.
20	For the reasons that have been developed at length by Mr Harris, it is our
21	submission that it is not possible to try the supposed common issues of breach,
22	causation and quantum fairly or efficiently because of the myriad of individual
23	factual questions that they arise.
24	Mr Moser's strategy has been to emphasise that the common issues need not be
25	identical, but he is quite clear there will be no trial at all of any individual issues.

I	to common issues, commonality, which is strongly redolent of the Canadian
2	case law you have already seen.
3	It's in the authorities bundle under tab 4, and I would like to go, please, to page 46 of
4	the bundle numbering.
5	We see, under the head "The claims must raise common issues", the core notion of
6	collective proceedings is that they group together similar claims which raise
7	common issues. Then, in the last three lines:
8	"It is important the claim form identifies the common issues which it is contended can
9	suitably be determined on a collective basis."
10	"Suitably", of course, means "fairly and efficiently". The next paragraph is also very
11	important because, just as in Canada, it makes clear that it's not necessary that
12	all of the issues should in fact be common:
13	"Although the claims must raise common issues to satisfy the criteria for approval, the
14	final resolution of the claims will often require the assessment of individual
15	issues. The existence of such individual issues is not fatal to an application for
16	a CPO. For example, the determination of liability for an infringement may raise
17	common issues of fact and law which justify a CPO, while causation and the
18	quantification of any damages may not be common to the class. In such
19	circumstances, the Tribunal may decide to approve collective proceedings in
20	relation to only part of the claims Once a judgment in those proceedings on
21	the common issues is given, if an aggregate award of damages is inappropriate
22	the claims will continue thereafter on an individual basis."
23	Then if we could look, please, just at the very final paragraph of this topic, which is on
24	page 47, just before the next subheading.
25	MR HOLMES: Sorry, which paragraph of the guide are you on, please?
26	MR WARD: I was just reading from page 46 of the bundle numbering, which is the

1	second paragraph under the heading "The claims must raise common issues".
2	THE PRESIDENT: So that's under 6.37
3	MR WARD: Yes.
4	THE PRESIDENT: the second indent, "The claims must raise common issues".
5	MR WARD: Exactly so, sir.
6	Then I was going to go to the next page, which is the second paragraph, or the first
7	full paragraph, again just above the subheading, where it says:
8	"Where only certain issues in the claims constitute common issues, there is no
9	requirement that those must predominate over the remaining individual issues
10	in order for it to be suitable for the part of the claims covering the common
11	issues to be brought in collective proceedings. However, the common issues
12	must be significant such that resolution of those issues will significantly advance
13	the claims of the members of the class."
14	That is exactly the approach in a number of the Canadian cases. I will not take time
15	with them, but just to give you two references if you would like to see that.
16	In Pro-Sys, which is authorities bundle 6, tab 13, at paragraph 112, the judgment
17	envisages the court dealing with divergences that may arise.
18	Then a case that's been mentioned often but not shown to you, which is Dutton v
19	Western Shopping, which is quoted with approval in Pro-Sys, authorities
20	bundle 5, tab C4, paragraphs 42, 50 and 54.
21	What these cases show is that there can be judicial determination of those individual
22	downstream issues and it's not necessary that all issues should in fact be
23	common.
24	It is just the Applicant's choice to bring the case on the basis that all of the issues in
25	this case are common, because they do not wish there to be any determination
26	of any individual issues.

1 2 3 4 In our respectful submission that is an entirely misconceived complaint. The collective 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

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Mr Moser, in his opening observations, said it would be both case ending and jurisdiction ending if there was a requirement to consider individual circumstances in this case. (Day 1 transcript, page 79, lines 19 and 20).

action procedure is there for claims which have genuine commonality, whether in part or all. The parts that do have such commonality can be tried collectively. What makes this claim so unsuitable is it seeks to airbrush out all of those necessary individual items and it is not jurisdiction ending to say, "A claim based on 100 million ticket transactions is too disparate to satisfy that requirement". That is very far indeed from the kind of claims in Pro-Sys and others to do with whether they are competition follow-on claims, whether they are product liability claims. What's needed in all cases is that there is enough commonality in the common issues that they can be adjudicated on a common basis fairly.

A major strand in Mr Moser's argument to defeat this proposition relies on the Supreme Court's judgment in Merricks. I would like to go back to that very briefly. It's authorities bundle 5, tab 59. Mr Moser's argument was that this somehow swept away the need to consider any individual issues arising in respect of liability. We disagree and we respectfully adopt the points made by Mr Harris about this yesterday. The majority do not hold that this is the effect of section 47C(2), that provision is only concerned with a calculation of aggregate damages.

Mr Moser's argument draws upon the obiter observations of the minority. I would like to address those, even though my primary point is, just as Mr Harris: they do not state the law.

The key passage, of course, is paragraph 97, which is at page 2606 of the bundle numbering. You will recall Mr Harris took you to this yesterday. Lord Sales and

1	Leggatt say, picking it up in the third line:
2	"Section 47C(2) is phrased in broad terms and is properly read as dispensing with the
3	requirement to undertake 'an assessment of the amount of damages
4	recoverable in respect of the claim of each represented person' for all purposes
5	antecedent to an award of damages, including proof of liability as well as the
6	quantification of loss. Such an interpretation better accords both with the
7	language used and with the statutory objective of facilitating the recovery of
8	loss caused to consumers"
9	Certainly, the majority did not use language of this kind. But I want to look at this
10	dictum through the lens of suitability.
11	As Mr Harris said yesterday, and he knows better than I, that Merricks itself was
12	concerned only with the question of assessment of loss. It was a follow-on
13	claim, a live issue was about the adequacy of economic modelling.
14	There was no live issue, as far as I understand it, in Merricks of the kind of factual
15	breach and causation issues that are at stake here. In other words, what
16	happened on Waterloo station when the ticket was bought or not bought?
17	In our submission, if if this paragraph 97 is to be taken at its highest and these
18	kind of fundamental building blocks of liability do not have to be proved
19	individually, then a collective claim would have to be suitable for determination
20	in this way.
21	In other words, the degree of commonality in those issues would have to be strong
22	enough that there was no need to address individual issues.
23	One thinks, for example, about overcharge in a follow-on claim that might be accepted
24	by all parties to be uniform.
25	Because otherwise, if this is taken to mean an unfair or inefficient way of dealing with
26	these issues, it would violate rule 79(2). 42

In my respectful submission, there are good indicators in this dissenting judgment that this is how their Lordships saw the point as well. Might I ask you, please, to turn on in the judgment to page 2611 of our bundle numbering, where we look at what their Lordships said about suitability. This is of course where Mr Moser does want to cherry pick. He doesn't like the dissent on suitability, but he does like the bit that we have just seen. However, I will show you that they are in fact inextricably linked. We can see in paragraph 120 Lords Sales and Leggatt say: "In determining whether the claim sought to be combined ... are suitable ... one of the matters specifically identified ... is 'whether the claims are suitable for an award of aggregate damages'." Then if I can just ask you to skim on to just above letter D:

"Such an award dispenses not only with the legal requirement to calculate damages on an individual basis, but also with the legal requirement ... to prove individual loss ..."

So, they are restating the contentious proposition from paragraph 97.

## Then at 121:

"In our view, 'suitable' has a similar meaning in considering whether the claims are suitable for an aggregate award of damages to its meaning in considering the more general question of whether the claims are suitable to be brought in collective proceedings. In determining whether a class of claims is suitable for an aggregate award of damages, the focus is on whether the claims are suitable to be grouped together as a unit for the purpose of proving and assessing loss, justly and at proportionate cost."

That is precisely my submission, that if Lord Sales and Leggatt's dictum is to be taken at face value, then the claims must be suitable for a process where liability will

1 only be decided on this basis. 2 The same thought resonates in paragraph 123 of the judgment. 3 Of course -- of course -- the majority did not follow Lord Sales and Leggatt's approach 4 to suitability. However, precisely the same point that I rely upon could be made 5 through the lens of the majority view of suitability. 6 Even if suitability is relative, it is still essential that if there is a unified determination of 7 liability, that liability itself must be a truly common issue and not dependent on 8 the facts of individual cases. 9 If necessary, we would say this dissent is wrongly decided. But in our respectful 10 submission, firstly, it's not the law and, secondly, it can in fact be read so as to 11 dovetail with the requirement of suitability that does not eliminate the rights of 12 defendants to test the facts of individual cases. 13 I was just going to move on from there and talk about the way individual issues arise 14 in this case. Mr Harris addressed you at length on that, I am not going to repeat 15 it. I am going to focus on a few small points and one slightly larger point. 16 It is important to keep in mind that the claim on the South Western franchise is 17 100 million in-scope journeys. We get that from Mr Holt's report at CB4, 18 page 173, table 6.3.3. 19 Of course, the claim dates back to October 2015, albeit against my client only from 20 August 2017. We heard yesterday that Mr Moser plans to seek damages all 21 the way to judgment. We reserve our position on that, but if that claim is made 22 there will need to be evidence governing the entirety of the period. At that point, 23 by the time there's a trial it's likely to be an eight-year period. The current year, 24 and perhaps years to come, may look very different to what has happened in 25 the past.

So, the vast amount of factual evidence that will be required --

I	THE PRESIDENT: The current year claim is likely to be vasily smaller, isn't it?
2	MR WARD: Indeed, and the whole question of travel patterns have obviously been
3	turned on their head and nobody of course can know when, if ever, they will
4	revert to normal.
5	THE PRESIDENT: When you say you reserve your position, is that on the point that
6	I raised, about
7	MR WARD: Yes.
8	THE PRESIDENT: You don't have an answer to it that helps me?
9	MR WARD: No, not in the time available, sir. We saw the passage in McGregor, we
10	pay great respect to McGregor, like no doubt all practitioners do, but we cannot
11	be taken to make a formal concession that that is certainly available in the
12	Tribunal without giving the matter full consideration.
13	THE PRESIDENT: I am not sure the Tribunal is really, in this respect, different from
14	the court because he doesn't rely on anything now in the rules other than the
15	overriding objective really, which we have the equivalent.
16	MR WARD: Quite so, sir.
17	THE PRESIDENT: It's very odd that there's no clear authority on this.
18	MR WARD: It is, and I am sure you can understand, sir, that my clients would like the
19	opportunity to think carefully before making a concession in open court on such
20	an important point.
21	THE PRESIDENT: No, I understand that.
22	MR WARD: I just want to make a few really short points on the facts from the First
23	MTR perspective. Then I am going to talk about point-to-point fares, which are
24	particularly important for First MTR.
25	The first concerns ticket machines. You already have the point, I think, that boundary
26	fares are available through most of my client's ticket machines. The reference

1 for that is Mr Cameron's witness statement, paragraph 55, which is core 2 bundle, tab 6, page 328. 3 I want to just make one minor clarification here in respect to something Mr Harris said 4 yesterday, which was correct for his client but not quite right for mine. 5 He mentioned that a Travelcard holder has to hold a Travelcard prior to the purchase 6 of a boundary fare, and that's yesterday's transcript, page 103. In our client's 7 position, the position is slightly more nuanced, because of course if you buy one from the ticket machine you don't have to show the ticket machine that you 8 9 already have a Travelcard. 10 If you buy it from a ticket office, you will be asked. You can find that in Mr Cameron's 11 witness statement at 55B, page 333. 12 You also asked about virtual ticket office, what is a virtual ticket office? The answer 13 Mr Moser gave was broadly correct. It's a machine which you can find on South 14 Western stations, for example, that allows a customer to talk face to face with 15 a call centre. 16 There were times in Mr Moser's submissions that it sounded as if he was tempted to 17 argue there was an obligation to proactively prompt people to buy boundary fares, and he talked about separate windows and big arrows, but I take it that 18 19 was just for illustration. 20 But when he was discussing the Decidedly report for example, he complained that one 21 of its findings, based on its very limited sample, was that passengers had to ask 22 for a boundary fare. Sometimes it was asked without the passenger prompting 23 the clerk, even without them telling them they had a Travelcard, but sometimes 24 it had to be prompted. 25 This complaint really does need to be put into context. Mr Cameron's evidence is 26 there are 30 core types of fares out of a total of 1,000 products, that's

ı	paragraph 21 of Mr Cameron.
2	It's just not realistic to imagine that all of these can be put up in bright lights, with or
3	without arrows, in separate windows. Obviously marketing decisions have to
4	be made to make messaging and systems manageable for consumers.
5	Here I would like to show you something that Decidedly say, another of Decidedly's
6	criticisms. It's in tab 3 of the claimant bundle, not the core bundle I am using
7	the South West version, but I suspect the South East one is exactly the same.
8	It's under tab 3, page
9	THE PRESIDENT: Sorry, when you say tab 3 of the claimant bundle, we have them
10	numbered is it bundle 3?
11	MR WARD: I hope so.
12	THE PRESIDENT: 3A or B?
13	MR WARD: Sorry, sir, it's not 3 at all, it's tab 3. It's bundle 1, which is not the core
14	bundle, but numbered bundle 1. Tab 3 is the Decidedly report. If I could ask
15	you to turn to page 202 of the pagination.
16	MR HOLMES: Which page of the report, please?
17	MR WARD: Page 25.
18	MR HOLMES: Thank you.
19	MR WARD: You will see this is talking about ticket machines. On the left, in the
20	middle of the page, South Western Railway. The second bullet point is
21	a complaint, which in my respectful submission just lacks any reality. It says:
22	"No less than two steps are involved to access boundary tickets."
23	Well, with respect, there are 30 core types and 1,000 products, they cannot all be, as
24	it were, on the front page, or rather like in Google terms, the top search pick.
25	In my respectful submission it's not surprising that this product, which whilst
26	it may be the focus here today is not in truth the focus of the railway system,

1	might not be put up in bright lights.
2	Putting that aside, I want to come on to a specific issue in terms of ticket types which
3	has been ventilated but not in my respectful submission exhausted, which is
4	point-to-point fares.
5	THE PRESIDENT: Can we put the report away?
6	MR WARD: Yes, please do. Thank you very much, sir.
7	We are going to want Mr Cameron again in a moment, if you still have that.
8	THE PRESIDENT: He is in the core bundle.
9	MR WARD: He is indeed.
10	Point-to-point fares, suppose a passenger standing on Waterloo station wants to travel
11	to Guildford. If they have a zone 1 to 2 Travelcard, they only need a ticket from
12	Clapham Junction. Clapham to Guildford, not Waterloo to Guildford.
13	In fact, that's something they may not even think about, and if they don't, Mr Moser will
14	still say they have a claim. But let's suppose that they do think about this and
15	that it occurs to them they have this Travelcard and it might save them some
16	money, £4.09, or whatever the figure is that Mr Holt has.
17	Let's also suppose they have never heard of boundary fares, because the complaint
18	is they are not made sufficiently available. But if that was right, there was, and
19	is indeed, an obvious solution, which is to buy a so-called point-to-point fare,
20	which is a fare from Clapham to Guildford.
21	Mr Moser called this a very specific kind of point-to-point fare (Day 1, page 64, lines 5
22	to 6), but it's really foreign appreciate point-to-point fares are not some other
23	exotic category of fares or niche product like boundary fare, they are just fares
24	from A to B.
25	THE PRESIDENT: I think, to be fair, all he meant was the expression "point to point"
26	is often used to mean origin to destination and here it's not, we are talking about

1	a supplementary purchase, just as a matter of language.
2	I don't think he was suggesting it's a different category in that sense.
3	MR WARD: I am glad that is understood, because this is important. I want to show
4	you what Mr Cameron says about this, if I may. For that, we go back to the
5	core bundle, his witness statement is under tab 8 and I would like to start at
6	paragraph 31, which is on page 318 of the bundle numbering.
7	What Mr Cameron says is:
8	"A boundary fare is a permanent fare that covers a journey from/to the edge of the
9	boundary [skimming down about six lines] The price of a boundary fare is
10	updated using the same formula as applied to the equivalent point-to-point
11	fare."
12	He uses the example of Surbiton to Southampton, like my Clapham to Guildford. Then
13	at 32:
14	"'Point-to-point' is used in the industry, and in this witness statement, to describe
15	a journey between two physical stations. There is at least one point-to-point
16	fare available for every origin and destination, between two physical stations
17	Point-to-point fares are generally available through all sales channels"
18	Well of course they are because it just means fares:
19	" meaning a customer could purchase a point-to-point fare from Clapham to
20	Southampton from a TVM in Richmond."
21	There's a footnote that says that's generally the case but not absolutely all ticket
22	machines is that true for.
23	In the next paragraph, as I know you know he says, I have done a comparison for
24	zones 4 and 6, which is where he said is the majority of boundary fares sold by
25	First come from, and he's found the boundary fare is within 10p for the vast
26	majority of cases and sometimes the point-to-point fare is as much as £2

1 cheaper. 2 Then, just to finish this piece of his evidence, a very important point at paragraph 51, 3 please, which is 326 of the bundle numbering, and this is a point that has been mentioned a couple of times. If I could just ask you to look at the end of 4 5 paragraph 51: 6 "Where a passenger holds a valid point-to-point fare (or boundary fare) in combination 7 with a Travelcard, the train does not need to call at the last station in the 8 relevant TfL ... zone." 9 In other words, you could get a non-stop train from Waterloo to Guildford in the happy 10 event that such a thing existed, it does not need to call at Clapham. 11 THE PRESIDENT: Yes, the footnote --12 MR WARD: The footnote is very important, it was changed in 2016, and you can find 13 that date in fact in Mr Joyce's witness statement for Stagecoach, which is under 14 tab 12 at page 418. Of course, that means that for the purpose of my client's 15 claim -- I am sorry to do my learned friends down slightly with this point -- this 16 rule has been in place for the entire period. If you wanted to see the most 17 up-to-date rules which express this, they are in authorities bundle 6 under tab D8. The critical paragraph is 14.2, which Mr Moser didn't read out. I can do it 18 19 now if it's helpful or it's there for your note. To make sense of it, one needs to 20 trace through to the definitions section. 21 **THE PRESIDENT:** I think we understand. 22

MR WARD: Thank you very much, sir.

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One of the ways that this has been dealt with is by the Applicant complaining that, as it was put in the reply, point-to-point fares are only marginally less obscure than boundary fares themselves. That's in the reply at paragraph 88.

In our respectful submission, this does miss the point, as I have already said, these

1	just are fares, and indeed when they first drafted their claim form they described
2	them as "universally available". That's in the claim form, paragraph 37a.
3	That, in my respectful submission, is much closer to the truth.
4	Why does any of this matter? It does matter. The first question which is actually
5	surprisingly difficult to answer is whether any of these point-to-point fare
6	purchases are within the claim. I confess, we have heard Mr Moser say that
7	they are, but we hesitate, at least, to just accept that logic without applying
8	some scrutiny to it.
9	It's probably useful to turn up again the class definition, even though I know how
10	familiar it must be at this stage. In the core bundle, of course, the claim form is
11	under tab 1 and the class definition is at paragraph 88, page 19.
12	The proposed class is of course essentially, to put it colloquially, people with
13	overlapping tickets is what it really amounts to.
14	If we take the first paragraph it is:
15	"All persons who purchased a rail fare which is not a boundary fare"
16	That could include for example my ticket from Clapham to Guildford, where the person
17	who purchased it held a Travelcard and b, "the rail fare was for travel in whole
18	or in part on the services of the defendants from a station within (but not on
19	the outer boundary) those zones to a destination beyond the outer boundary of
20	those zones"
21	In other words, you could buy your Clapham to Guildford ticket and you are in if you
22	also had a Travelcard for part of that journey, is how I read that, putting it in
23	simple terms.
24	This is where matters get a little bit more complicated.
25	THE PRESIDENT: Just pausing there, the rail fare is what we've been calling the
26	point-to-point ticket.

1 MR WARD: I think so, that's how I read this. 2 **THE PRESIDENT:** That's the only rail fare that's been purchased, so it has to be. 3 MR WARD: Yes. 4 **THE PRESIDENT:** From a station but isn't the point to point on the outer boundary, isn't that --5 6 MR WARD: Sir, that's exactly what I am about to come to because this is where it 7 gets a little bit more confusing because some stations sit on a zone boundary 8 and some sit within a zone. If you have the willingness to look at a very tiny 9 map I can actually show you this or I can just explain it. 10 Clapham Junction, my example, is the last station in zone 2 towards Guildford, but not 11 actually on the boundary. Because where a station sits on the boundary it's 12 effectively in two zones, so a station on the boundary of zone 2 and 3 is in both 13 zones. Putney is in fact on the boundary of zone 2 and 3, it's not actually on 14 the route to Guildford, but it's at least reasonably local. 15 Putney is in both, Clapham is in one. That means that a person who buys a point to 16 point from Clapham has notionally, or by reference to the map at least, also 17 bought a few hundred yards more track in the general direction of Guildford. Although that is a very artificial way of looking at this, because, as Ms Abram 18 19 said this morning, rail fares are not actually sold by the yard or the mile at all. 20 But if the ticket is bought from Putney, then the journey is completely outside the class 21 definition as far as we can understand it, because there's just no overlap. You 22 have a Travelcard to Putney and a point to point from Putney to Guildford. 23 We are not sure if Mr Moser shares this analysis and we are not sure --24 **THE PRESIDENT:** It's a question of whether the words "not on the outer boundary" 25 are to be read in a very literal way, whether it means the last station in the zone.

1	paying for 200 yards of track past Clapham. But I raise the question rather than
2	proffering an answer. But either way, if any of these tickets are caught, we do
3	respectfully wonder what on earth the abuse can be.
4	THE PRESIDENT: I see that. If it meant the last station in the zone, that would
5	exclude what you've been calling the alternative to a boundary fare, as it were.
6	MR WARD: Yes, and at various times sorry, sir.
7	<b>THE PRESIDENT:</b> Then would that I fully appreciate the point you are making.
8	That would then have the effect of excluding the alternative, which you say was
9	always available?
10	MR WARD: Yes. I am going to come on to why that is so important. Because it raises
11	the point about whether in fact Travelcard holders did take this option. In other
12	words, they exercised their common sense when they were standing on
13	Waterloo station and if they were at all price sensitive thought, "Hang on
14	a minute, I don't need a ticket all the way, do I?"
15	It also raises a very important point if they didn't think about that. That's mitigation,
16	because, of course all claimants are under an obligation to reasonably mitigate
17	their loss and bluntly if they are standing on Waterloo station travelling to
18	Guildford and not thinking about the fact that their Travelcard covers them as
19	far as Clapham, in my respectful submission that is not something that my client
20	can be held responsible for.
21	That point is just as powerful even if boundary fares are top secret, locked away in a
22	cupboard at the back of the supermarket, because the point-to-point fares are
23	universally available in the Applicant's terms.
24	I am not running this point in the hope
25	<b>THE PRESIDENT:</b> You need to know though you would have to have some sense,
26	of what is the outer station in your Travelcard zone.

- MR WARD: You would and it's not stretching credulity that a reasonable claimant could have a look at a map on that, which are generally plastered around all stations and about 4-foot wide, but I am giving evidence on that point.
- **THE PRESIDENT:** You said you had a map.
- **MR WARD:** I wish it were 4-foot wide, sir, it's very, very small. It's in bundle 3A, tab 3.1.
- 7 Luckily if you are --
- **THE PRESIDENT:** Wait a minute, 3A?
- **MR WARD:** 3A, tab 3.1.
- **THE PRESIDENT:** I don't have a 3.1, I have a 1, 2, 3.
- **MR WARD:** Well under 3 I have some sub tabs, maybe I've been blessed.
- **THE PRESIDENT:** You have been blessed, Mr Ward. What's the page number?
- **MR WARD:** Page 1.
- **THE PRESIDENT:** Yes, that is indeed a Rail and Tube map.
- MR WARD: This hopefully looks familiar. Indeed, you will be able to find it on the TfL website and apply some zoom, if it would help. I am so sorry because it is extremely hard to read. Just to see the example I've been discussing, if you look in the bottom left-hand corner just above the box that says "Planned engineering works", you can see "Towards Woking and Guildford", which is the example I've been using. If you follow the dotted red line back up, you can see a big cluster, which is Clapham Junction, sitting as the last station within zone 2. Then, as I was just casting around looking for a good example, we can find Putney --
- **THE PRESIDENT:** Where do you see the boundary of zone 2?
- MR WARD: If you see the zones are shaded dark grey, light grey, dark grey, light grey in order to distinguish them.

1	THE PRESIDENT: Not in our copy.
2	MR WARD: That's very disappointing news, sir. Perhaps you can take it from me and
3	if I can invite to you look online. We will send a better copy of this.
4	THE PRESIDENT: You say that
5	MR WARD: Clapham is sitting in zone 2. Then the next station along, which I think
6	says Earlsfield, is actually in zone 3.
7	But, if you follow the dotted red line out towards the left, you can see Putney, and
8	Putney is sitting on the boundary of zones 2 and 3, which might be why Putney
9	is in a white box, I suspect, but that's a guess on my part yes I am looking at
10	some other stations that are sitting on both.
11	That's where I took the example from.
12	THE PRESIDENT: I see. You say that there is a does this show zone 3 and zone
13	4?
14	MR WARD: Yes. I am so sorry you cannot see the shading. Zone 2 stops just before
15	Earlsfield and zone 3 stops just before Raynes Park and then zone 4
16	encompasses Berrylands, and Surbiton is in sorry, that's zone 5; I have lost
17	count somewhere and Surbiton is in zone 6.
18	We will send a colour A3 version that shows the shading for the zones, but it is on the
19	TfL website too, because I admit I zoomed it on the TfL website to make sure
20	I was reading it correctly, as the type is certainly too small for me.
21	My key point, sir, about all of this, which I hope I have not laboured excessively, is this
22	is an obvious point of mitigation. In other words, if you could buy one of these
23	tickets, there's clearly a fact sensitive question, at the least, as to why it wasn't
24	reasonable for you to go and buy just such a ticket.
25	This also has a very powerful bearing on quantum, because if for some reason it
26	wasn't viable for you to buy a point-to-point ticket, then the claim that you have

1	is not the £5 that Mr Holt has posited, but it may be as little as 10p or you might
2	actually be £2 better off, according to the limited exercise that Mr Cameron has
3	done.
4	There is one further point I would like to make about point-to-point fares, which is
5	important as regards Mr Holt's methodology.
6	Because, as we understand it, Mr Holt's methodology makes no allowance for this.
7	He assumes that every passenger who held a valid Travelcard and purchased
8	a non-boundary purchased a non-boundary fare but could have made
9	a saving. In my example, Mr Holt assumes that the holder of the zone 1 and 2
10	Travelcard would have bought a ticket from Waterloo to Guildford rather than
11	a ticket from Clapham to Guildford.
12	So, he assumes that nobody had the common sense to carry out this elementary piece
13	of mitigation.
14	I can show you why we think that, briefly. Of course, if there's doubt about it or it's
15	contested, Mr Holt can no doubt explain this afternoon. But would it be helpful
16	to show you why we think that just follows from the steps in his report?
17	THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
18	MR WARD: Sir, thank you. It's in the core bundle, as you know, under tab 5 I am
19	now looking for my core bundle
20	Tab 5, page 173, please. These are just the now I think quite well rehearsed steps in
21	Mr Holt's analysis.
22	At 6.3.3, he starts with total journeys in-scope, and that's where we see the figure of
23	100 million.
24	Secondly, he applies the potential savings that would apply if all such journeys would
25	have benefited from the weighted average boundary fare saving. So, he
26	applies the weighted up average boundary saving to all of these journeys and

1	comes up with a figure of £500 million.
2	Thirdly, he makes various adjustments.
3	Then over the page, he says:
4	"The value of losses depends on the proportion of journeys where the boundary fare
5	could have been validly used."
6	And he uses the number of people with Travelcards to make that adjustment. So, he
7	assumes in the case of every journey from Waterloo to Guildford that
8	18 per cent of people who use Travelcards could have made a saving. Rather
9	than considering whether the people who held Travelcards might have had the
10	wherewithal to buy the ticket from Guildford.
11	THE PRESIDENT: That's the mitigation point, isn't it?
12	MR WARD: It is, sir. Mitigation is the most obvious.
13	<b>THE PRESIDENT:</b> He is not counting the people who did buy the ticket from Clapham
14	Junction or Putney. He is counting the people who bought the full ticket. Your
15	point is
16	MR WARD: He is applying the full Travelcard percentage. So if, say, the number is
17	18 per cent of people have Travelcards, he says, "Well there we are,
18	18 per cent of the people who travel from London to Guildford must have failed
19	to buy a boundary fare".
20	What I am suggesting is, of those 18 per cent of Travelcard holders, the ones who
21	were interested in going to Guildford might have had the good sense to buy
22	a ticket from Clapham.
23	<b>THE PRESIDENT:</b> If the 18 per cent is a reasonable estimate of the number of people
24	who bought the Waterloo to Guildford fare, then subject only to
25	mitigation which is what I think he's doing, subject only to mitigation, which is
26	separate argument, your point is right: they didn't buy a Clapham Junction to

1	MR WARD: Sir, I am grateful for the indulgence.
2	THE PRESIDENT: We will return at 2 o'clock. Thank you.
3	(12.59 pm)
4	(The luncheon adjournment)
5	(2.02 pm)
6	THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Mr Ward, we have over lunch, with great efficiency on the
7	part no doubt of different solicitors, received not one but two slightly different,
8	but equally coloured, maps with different presentations, but both of them being,
9	I think, National Rail and TfL maps of the Rail and Tube services.
10	MR WARD: Thank you, sir, I am very grateful to those who managed to generate
11	those so quickly.
12	I was going to move on to a different topic, which is a general observation about the
13	nature of the Applicant's case.
14	The Tribunal will be well aware that we have challenged what we have seen as a strict
15	liability approach in the Applicant's claim. That, for example, just for your note,
16	is in the claim form at paragraph 3, where the complaint was failing to ensure
17	that customers are aware and buy an appropriate ticket.
18	Now, of course, if you take that strict liability approach, then all of the problems of the
19	individual circumstances that we complain of are substantially ameliorated. The
20	problem is it's been rightly abandoned, because it is of course unarguable.
21	What was striking was that, on Tuesday, when Mr Moser was making his submissions,
22	even though he disavowed the strict liability approach, he could not help but
23	lapse into it on a number of occasions. I just want to mention a couple.
24	Right at the very outset of his submissions he said the breach was charging customers
25	twice (Day 1, page 5, lines 1 and 2).
26	But that case proceeds on the basis that any time a customer fails to buy a boundary

1 ticket, that is a breach. 2 Again, he said, in a realistic counterfactual we will see "materially all eligible customers 3 purchasing a boundary fare". 4 I am sorry, sir, I can hear some interference, I hope you can hear me. 5 **THE PRESIDENT:** I can hear you, perhaps someone does not have their microphone 6 muted. 7 MR WARD: As long as you can hear me. He said "materially all eligible customers 8 purchasing a boundary fare", and that's in the transcript on Day 1, page 99, 9 lines 11 to 12. 10 That too is a form of strict or almost strict formulation. But once you abandon that, as 11 they had to, and focus only on best endeavours, it does become inescapable 12 that individual circumstances matter. I have already talked about Merricks, but there was another way that Mr Moser tried 13 14 to avoid this conclusion. He argued that these kind of factual issues didn't 15 matter, because it was not necessary to consider them to prevent overrecovery 16 (Day 1, page 81). 17 The argument was that the aggregate amount would be unaffected, but in our 18 respectful submission that is quite wrong. The driver for the quantum, the 19 aggregate quantum, is the number of journeys affected. The more journeys 20 that are in the pot, the more the aggregate damages. So, it becomes critical to 21 establish whether individual journeys are in or out. This has implications for the 22 quantum modelling and the class identification. Starting with the quantum, of 23 course Mr Harris has made a lot of quite sophisticated points about this 24 vesterday and I want to just make a much simpler one, which will be familiar 25 from our, and indeed my friends', skeleton arguments.

As Ms Abram was submitting this morning, this notion of best endeavours is very

1 imprecise. One can see it's quite difficult to formulate a methodology which 2 would capture at an aggregate level all of the people who had somehow fallen 3 on the wrong side of the line in terms of not getting guite enough information. 4 It's not the case that there is no information, it's that there is according to the Applicant not enough. 5 6 So, when Mr Holt says, in his second report, he can adjust the methodology to remove, 7 for example, advance fares, that doesn't help at all with what we would 8 respectfully submit is the more fundamental issue, which is: where does the line 9 lie between lawful and unlawful conduct here? 10 Mr Moser used a very revealing example here. He said, both in his skeleton and 11 indeed orally, that off-peak fares were a good example of what he would regard 12 as sufficient availability. That's on Day 1, page 105, line 6 and in his skeleton 13 argument at paragraph 34. 14 In fact, they illustrate the problem not the solution because off-peak fares are not 15 available on all flows. 16 Mr Cameron gives the example of Waterloo to Woking, that's in paragraph 60D of his 17 evidence at page 335. 18 Also, one can see immediately that knowledge of passengers is not likely to be perfect 19 in this regard. If we consider my example of someone at Waterloo station 20 wanting to travel to Guildford, supposing it's 3 o'clock on a Wednesday 21 afternoon and they are coming back the next morning, how confident are they 22 likely to be that an off-peak fare is available? They may feel that it's necessary 23 to make further enquiries to get the answer. 24 This is, in my respectful submission, a good example of why, even on Mr Moser's 25 preferred version of his case, there is a very imprecise and fact-sensitive 26 question about which kind of journeys would be caught.

1 That matters for the next head of both certification and suitability I want to talk about. 2 which is the requirement to have an identifiable class. You will recall that rule 3 79(1) says the claim must be brought on behalf of an identifiable class and rule 79(2)(e) under suitability asks "whether it is possible to determine in respect of 4 5 any person, whether that person is or is not a member of the class". 6 Here we make no complaint about the ability of people to identify whether they are in 7 the pleaded class. Subject to the questions of proof, which I am going to come on to, it's quite a black and white question whether you have the right type of 8 9 tickets, although we were discussing this morning there may be some unclarity 10 about it in the detail. 11 The problem with that class definition is that too reflects what I'm calling the strict 12 approach. It's any buyer of overlapping tickets, so it doesn't match the best 13 endeavours allegation that we are now facing. In the language of the Canadian 14 cases, it lacks what the courts call a rational relationship with the breach. Just 15 for a reference for that, there are many, Hollick is one such case in authorities 16 bundle 5, tab C5, page 2972. 17 Our criticism here under identifiable class is not really about the pleaded class, but it's 18 just that class cannot stand. The problem is there is no other class which would 19 enable people to identify whether they are within it. 20 I would like if I may to go back to the CAT guide at this point to see what is said about 21 this. It's in the first authorities bundle, tab 4, page 45. 22 THE PRESIDENT: Yes. 23 MR WARD: Thank you. Right at the bottom of the page there is an indented 24 subheading: 25 "The claims must be brought on behalf of an identifiable class." 26 It explains the purpose --

1	THE PRESIDENT: Paragraph 6.37?
2	MR WARD: It is, sir, yes:
3	"It must be possible to say for any particular person, using an objective definition of
4	the class, whether that person falls within the class."
5	Then it explains why that's needed:
6	"An identifiable class serves several purposes. It sets the parameters of the claim
7	by delineating who is [in] the class and who is not It affects the scope of
8	the common issues And it has practical implications in relation to the
9	requirements to give notice."
10	In addition, we place emphasis on the next paragraph which says:
11	"Accordingly, class definitions based on subjective or merits based criteria (for
12	example 'persons having suffered loss as a result of the conduct') should be
13	avoided."
14	That would be obviously unsuitable because it would not define the parameters of the
15	claim and would not enable anyone to know whether they were in the class or
16	not.
17	Here the problem is the claim is compiled of individual journeys and one of the
18	functions of the class definition is to delineate the journeys that would be within
19	the scope of the claim. But it must not be subjective or merits based. So how
20	does one formulate a class to match the allegation that the fares were not made
21	sufficiently available?
22	We are looking for people who were not enabled to buy a boundary ticket because
23	they didn't receive sufficient information. That is obviously not a bright line
24	criterion, such as whether you bought an optical disk drive or a defective tractor,
25	as in one of Mr Moser's other examples.
26	Any definition that involved whether a person believed they didn't have sufficient

1 information or anything of the kind would be subjective or merits based. Any 2 definition that said a person who does not know about the boundary fares fails 3 to match the allegation of breach, because of course it's guite possible that people will not all know about boundary fares, even if there is sufficient 4 5 information. 6 We made these points at the outset in our initial response and there really hasn't been 7 any satisfactory answer to them. 8 In our respectful submission, this lack of precision in the allegation, which would be 9 quite tolerable in a single claim, single abuse of dominance claim, is simply fatal 10 to a claim brought on a class basis. 11 With that, I was going to turn very briefly to some of the remaining criteria in respect 12 of suitability. 13 The next one is costs and benefits. Our overarching submission is that the costs would 14 be exceptionally high, and the action would be for very little benefit other than 15 for funders and their lawyers. Ms Abram this morning mentioned some really 16 quite eye-catching fees. What I would like to do is respond to some of what 17 Mr Moser said in regard to the practicalities of making a claim. 18 Firstly, he recognised that the Epiq plan, the claim administration plan, meant that 19 class members would have to bring forward significant documentary evidence. 20 To quote from the transcript, Day 2, page 17, he said: 21 ... Travelcard and rail journey details, along with supporting documentation, receipts, 22 bank account histories, et cetera, necessary to validate, process and calculate 23 payments." 24 That was a fair summary of what is said in the Epig plan, and I will not turn it up unless 25 you would like me to take you there, but it's paragraph 10.6 of the Epiq plan in 26 volume 1, tab 11, page 338.

It's our respectful submission that it is highly unlikely that many people will have this material. It could be as much as eight years after the claims began before any of this is resolved, and what's required here to make a claim is not just a bank statement that shows a debit was made out to a railway company, it's necessary to know what kind of journey it was and what kind of ticket.

Of course, it is possible there are some people who keep old train tickets for eight years. But in our respectful submission that is not likely to be 100 million people. As the President said yesterday, this is very different from the kind of consumer good where one is much more likely to keep a receipt, whether it be a car or a computer like in Pro-Sys.

The second point is that Mr Moser said that people will be incentivised to claim once the fund is in place, even for smaller sums. That was Day 2, page 15.

But that still would only be the case for claims that were actually worth the bother. We know that Mr Holt's weighted average per journey is £5.09 for South Western, and of course as Professor Mason said yesterday -- I'm so sorry, it was Mr Holmes -- that that may conceal a great deal of variation within that average. There may be people who made a lot of journeys, but that's not a person -- so this person may have a larger claim but that large claim is still itself built up of all of these individual journeys, where the average benefit might be £5. It might be as little as 10p of course, if there was an equivalent point-to-point fare.

If a person has a lot of claims they are going to need a lot of proof, a lot of old railway tickets or something of the kind.

Of course, all of this is for the Applicant to satisfy the court and the Applicant could have come to court with some material to show that it is more plausible than it sounds that people will be able to prove the claims. They might, for example, have produced evidence that people have come forward to them or expressed

1	their willingness or interest in bringing a claim.
2	Part of their litigation plan is that there was a claims website launched in 2019 and the
3	litigation plan said significant efforts will be undertaken to promote it and
4	consumers will be invited to register their details.
5	That, for your note, is in bundle 1, tab 10, page 302, paragraph 35.
6	We haven't had any evidence that anyone has ever come forward, still less people
7	armed with old railway tickets and all the necessary forms of proof.
8	Then finally under this head, my third point is that beyond these concrete types of
9	evidence referred to in Epiq, Mr Moser at least hinted at the possibility that other
10	sorts of indirect evidence might suffice. Again, on Day 2, page 15, he said:
11	"This may require taking a view on the evidence and that passengers would give
12	evidence."
13	But of course, by the time passengers are proving their claims, we are at the
14	administrative not the judicial phase. This court will decide a question of
15	aggregate damages, but their claims handling will be dealt with by Epiq or
16	somebody similar.
17	Once we get into the territory of claims administrators having to make evaluative
18	judgments, with the best will in the world and without any discourtesy to Epiq
19	and the people who work for it, that is fundamentally different from a judicial
20	determination of a claim.
21	Stepping back and summing all of this up, we would respectfully submit that this fails
22	the test set in Merricks at paragraph 58 in respect of distribution, where
23	Lord Briggs said:
24	"The only requirement, implied because distribution is judicially supervised, is that it
25	should be just, in the sense of being fair and reasonable."
26	In our submission, it is neither fair nor reasonable to have a significant damages award

1	for which very few of the millions of supposed class members will ever claim.
2	Sir, very, very briefly now, I see the time, stepping back and looking at all these factors
3	in the round, we submit the claim fails the tests for certification and suitability in
4	particular.
5	The Supreme Court made clear that what's required is a multifactorial balancing
6	exercise, that is Merricks paragraph 64, and the factors against certification are
7	in my submission overwhelming.
8	There is one factor I haven't mentioned yet that the Applicant prays in aid, which is the
9	uneconomic nature of the individual claims. He says the claims are suitable for
10	certification because the value of the claims is so low.
11	In my respectful submission, that cannot be enough on its own. Otherwise, there
12	would be no need for all of this complex machinery and any low value class
13	action would fall to be certified.
14	What we submit, in a nutshell, is the claims cannot fairly be tried by collective action
15	and so the Tribunal should not certify them simply because individual claims
16	may be uneconomic.
17	That takes me to what one might call suitability in a relative sense. Lord Briggs's
18	formulation for the majority in Merricks, where their Lordships said:
19	"The question is whether the claims are suitable to be brought in collective
20	proceedings, rather than individual proceedings."
21	We know the minority differed on that. In our submission, all of the difficulties we have
22	identified, except perhaps the one of proof, arise because the proceedings are
23	pursued collectively.
24	The consequence is the proceedings would be simply unfair and not an effective
25	means of disposing of the claims, because they cannot proceed by
26	determination of any of the vital individual issues.

1 As a result, using the relative formulation, the claims are not more suitable to be 2 brought collectively than as individual claims. The burden is on the Applicant 3 to show that they are more suitable and he has entirely failed to do so. 4 That's all I was going to say, subject to what is essentially a housekeeping point, if 5 I may. 6 These are just two short notes I wanted to make, really for the Tribunal and for the 7 transcript. They both deal with the position of third-party vendors. The Tribunal will have noted 8 9 that unlike LSER, my client and Stagecoach did not make a strike out application in respect of third-party vendors based on the factual relationship 10 between third-party vendors and TOCs. We do have our own strike out 11 12 application, which is in the core bundle under tab 17, and if successful that 13 would of course include the third-party claims because it was an application in 14 respect of the entirety of the case. Also, Ms Abram developed some legal, 15 purely legal, submissions about third-party vendors as part of that. 16 But, unlike LSER, we haven't brought a challenge, at this stage at least, based on their 17 factual relationship to the TOCs. 18 Just really for the Tribunal's note, we are not seeking to take the benefit of, or adopt, 19 the parts of LSER's submissions that dealt with that factual relationship, which 20 include their skeleton argument from paragraphs 55 to 58. 21 My second, related point, relates to our evidence, which was filed as you know on 22 behalf of Mr Cameron. Again, just for your note, at paragraph 28 he gives some 23 very brief evidence about the position of third-party retailers by reference to the 24 third-party investor licence. There is more detail about that in Mr Backway's statement. But, as Ms Abram explained this morning, there are other types of 25 26 third-party agreement.

1	I don't have detailed instructions on those, but if Mr Cameron's evidence is read, it
2	should be seen in that light. It is incomplete, and in fact we don't need to rely
3	on that paragraph for any purpose that we are advancing.
4	Sir, and members of the Tribunal, unless there's anything further I can assist on, those
5	are the submissions for First MTR.
6	THE PRESIDENT: No, I think what we will do is take a ten-minute break before
7	Mr Holt comes to give evidence. If we have anything to ask you, Mr Ward, we'll
8	ask you then.
9	Thank you very much.
10	MR WARD: Thank you, sir.
11	THE PRESIDENT: We will come back at just after 2.35.
12	(2.26 pm)
13	(A short break)
14	(2.35 pm)
15	THE PRESIDENT: Thank you, I think we have Dr Holt with us.
16	Can you hear me?
17	THE WITNESS: It's Mr Holt but, yes, I can hear you. Thank you.
18	THE PRESIDENT: I think for form's sake we ask that you be sworn or affirmed, which
19	will be done by the member of the Tribunal staff.
20	
21	MR DEREK JAMES HOLT (affirmed)
22	
23	Questions from THE TRIBUNAL
24	<b>THE PRESIDENT:</b> Thank you very much. We have read your two reports, the reports
25	of February 2019 and September 2019. It seems a long time ago now.
26	A. Yes.

1	THE PRESIDENT: We are very conscious of the fact that these are just preliminary
2	reports at the outset of this litigation and nothing like the sort of full report that
3	you might put in for trial if these cases came to trial and have all the caveats
4	that result from that.
5	We see that the method that you have developed, which you summarise in your first
6	report at 3.4 you have your reports with you, I assume, have you?
7	A. I do, sir, thank you.
8	THE PRESIDENT: Yes. At 3.4 of the first report, where you have set out the four
9	steps that you've used
10	A. Yes.
11	THE PRESIDENT: which we have looked at.
12	Then, in your second report, you explain I think it's at paragraph 3.1.7 that when
13	dealing with the calculation of this kind, where you are having to make
14	estimates and assumptions and so on, plus incomplete data, the concerns
15	being one of bias and imprecision.
16	A. Yes, that's correct.
17	THE PRESIDENT: You've now, I think, seen all the witness evidence, including some
18	supplementary statements from some of the witnesses, explaining what data
19	and what information the TOCs have that you might have access to in due
20	course.
21	What we wanted to do really is just to go through these four steps, make sure that we
22	have understood them properly and explore which of the assumptions you have
23	had to make have the greatest significance in the final estimate of aggregate
24	loss, or, put another way, which are the most sensitive assumptions in terms of
25	the calculation.

Perhaps just to clarify that, you have had, I think, some estimates, but is it right

that you should get information on all outward journeys and tickets sold in the

25

1	relevant period from the TOCs on disclosure, that that will be a known data?	
2	A. Yes, I think that's what I'm expecting to receive upon disclosure.	
3	I'm aware of course that under the LENNON system there are some elements of	
4	estimation that go into that in terms of the allocation of fares across different	
5	TOCs, where there are multiple TOCs using the same stations and so forth.	
6	But, essentially, I do expect to get that data and would replace certain	
7	assumptions I made with that data.	
8	THE PRESIDENT: Yes, that should not be problematic.	
9	Then we go to step 2, the savings, perhaps Professor Mason may want to explore that	
10	with you.	
11	PROFESSOR MASON: Thank you. In fact, if it's all right, just before we move on to	
12	step 2, if we could just do one last check on step 1.	
13	I'm still getting an echo. Mr Moser, I know you may well need to come in at some point	
14	but I wonder whether if you were to mute that might help the problem.	
15	MR MOSER: I am muted, I think.	
16	<b>PROFESSOR MASON:</b> It didn't look like it on the there you go, that's muted now.	
17	Okay, well we shall proceed as best we can.	
18	Mr Holt, if I could take you to just so that we could understand in a little bit more	
19	detail what we have just discussed. Table 6.4 of your first report that's at	
20	tab 5, core bundle, page 152 of the bundle numbering.	
21	A. Yes, I have that.	
22	PROFESSOR MASON: Very good.	
23	This obviously relates just to South West, but I just thought it might be helpful to have	
24	a specific set of figures in front of us.	
25	If we look at that table, I would find it very helpful if you could just clarify which numbers	
26	you expect to be exact about on further disclosure and which numbers you feel	

Then I will ask you a third question in just a moment, but I will pause there.

**A.** Okay. So, I think the total entries might well be quite accurate already, in the sense that they already reflect data which is from the ORR, which reflects the underlying fares data that I was alluding to, but I do expect to update several of the other aspects.

Just to make a brief point about the way that this data set has been constructed. With that data I have then constructed an origin destination profile, which is not the actual one because I do not have that data, but which is instead based on essentially station size driven estimates of the proportion of traffic between any

given two points.

I have made some other adjustments which relate to removal of season tickets, which is a known item, so I think that should be relatively accurate, even post-disclosure. I have made some other estimates as to the adjustments that might need to be made for example for certain fare types such as Pay As You Go, so that might be more accurate once we have disclosure. So that's one of the adjustments there.

I think I would get more accurate data in terms of things such as assumed return journeys, because I've used a proportion which is sourced from the ORR in terms of the mix of different types of fare types, but is not precise to each individual TOC. So that one would also be updated.

I think that ... sorry, the other key issue of course is that instead of my approach which estimates the origin destination matrix by station size, with a couple of further adjustments which I propose not to go into in detail but they are set out in the report, I would have the actual origin destination, so that would be a substantial improvement in accuracy in terms of what origin and destinations people are

1	buying tickets for.
2	PROFESSOR MASON: Thank you, that does help.
3	Let me just, if I could, follow up very briefly on a couple of aspects.
4	The Oyster/Pay As You Go line, which currently is estimated at 80 per cent.
5	A. Yes.
6	PROFESSOR MASON: And clearly, therefore, has a substantial effect on the
7	journeys that flow through to the bottom line, as it were.
8	Do you anticipate being able to determine that with complete accuracy or will there still
9	be some residual assumption that needs to be made about that proportion?
10	A. I have to admit I am not sure about that, that would depend on the nature of the
11	data held by the Proposed Defendants.
12	If their data does track the Pay As You Go status, then it would be a more precise
13	adjustment.
14	At the moment, it's an overall adjustment, which is informed by TfL evidence on the
15	overall network as opposed to being specific to any specific stations.
16	PROFESSOR MASON: Understood, thank you.
17	Similarly, I'm assuming that on the assumed return journeys and proportion of returns
18	that are out of scope, which you currently estimate or assume to be 27 and
19	50 percent based on, I understand, average data. Again, you would get
20	improved accuracy but still some residual uncertainty about those parameters?
21	A. I would get improved accuracy. The question I guess is whether I would get the
22	actual returns data. I think I would get that so I don't think there would be much
23	remaining uncertainty on that.
24	I think the disclosure of the fares data should give a precise indication of this on
25	a TOC-by-TOC basis.
26	PROFESSOR MASON: Okay thank you that's helpful

1	As the President suggested, perhaps we could move on to the second step of you	
2	calculations. Here, if we could go forward a short distance in your first report,	
3	so we are now going to page 155, and it's that page and over the page, so	
4	tables 6.6 and 6.7. Particularly, if we look at paragraph 6.2.35, which sort of	
5	brings it all together. This is for journeys beginning in zones 3, 4 and 5 you give	
6	an illustration that assumes 80 per cent of passengers for zones 1 to 3 and so	
7	on.	
8	Again, if you could just say a little bit more about two things.	
9	First of all, the choice of 80 per cent for that particular model parameter and the	
10	sensitivity of the final number, the aggregate loss, to that parameter	
11	assumption.	
12	THE PRESIDENT: Mr Holt, sorry to interrupt, have I rightly understood that when you	
13	say 80 per cent of passengers, you mean of passengers holding a Travelcard?	
14	Is that right?	
15	A. That is correct. That is correct.	
16	This segment is on essentially the distribution of the Travelcard holdings for the people	
17	with Travelcards, assumed according to what zone the Travelcard applies to.	
18	The information set is based on TfL evidence on the actual mix of the Travelcard sales,	
19	according to different sort of zone coverages and periods of time.	
20	Then I make a number of assumptions at the moment as to what the mix of holdings	
21	will be for any given station.	
22	Those assumptions would be updated but they would be updated through the	
23	proposed survey. As has been discussed previously, I would not expect the	
24	TOCs to have specific information on Travelcard holding.	
25	PROFESSOR MASON: I see, okay.	
26	That is one where a further survey may help to well, I suppose increase confidence	

1	Having said that, that is at the aggregate level for TfL not relating to holdings in any
2	particular set of stations.
3	I think the further evidence that I would expect to get in that regard would allow for
4	more precise estimates on that. I don't have a view as to which direction that
5	could go or indeed whether it's likely that the outcome would be significantly
6	different. It's possible, and Mr Ward made one point that is an interesting point
7	earlier today, and that would be the sort of issue that might be aired out in the
8	survey.
9	But then there are equally plausible factors that might suggest that, for example, my
10	80 percent assumption on holding the smallest Travelcard that covers the
11	station in question for the other stations might be conservative. I don't have
12	a good way of knowing at this stage.
13	PROFESSOR MASON: Okay, thank you.
14	Again, it might not be answerable immediately, but just to crystallise the question that
15	I'm asking. Again, if you look at 6.2.35, if you look at that assumption that
16	80 percent of passengers have the respective Travelcard and the other
17	20 percent are split according to the proportions mentioned in the earlier table.
18	So just focusing on 80/20.
19	A. Okay.
20	<b>PROFESSOR MASON:</b> Which is the assumption that you don't base on other data?
21	A. That's true, the 80 percent in that case is not informed by specific data. I think it's
22	broadly reasonable that the sort of rationale is that for these outer stations it is
23	quite likely that many of the people attending those stations would be living in

PROFESSOR MASON: Forgive me, Mr Holt, sorry, I am not questioning the reasonableness, it's the sensitivity. I am not suggesting that 50 percent is

the area, so that's the reason for the assumption.

24

25

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Α.

a more reasonable number, but if the assumption were 50/50 rather than 80/20 would that have a small, medium or large effect on the final calculation?

I think it would have at least a medium effect, the reason being that with an 80 per cent assumption as it currently stands, a large percentage of journeys would be having a lower boundary fare saving compared to the scenario where it would only be 50 percent. The difference between a boundary fare saving if you have a zone 1 to 3 versus a zone 1 to 6, for example, could be quite significant. I think it could be in the order of a couple of pounds, which in the context of a £5 average could be very significant.

PROFESSOR MASON: Okay, thank you. Thank you very much.

- If I could take us on to an issue which spans step 2 and step 3, so step 3 being estimating travellers holding Travelcards. We are particularly interested -- I know you will no doubt have been following earlier discussions and submissions made -- about the treatment of travellers who hold point-to-point tickets.
- A. Yes.
- **PROFESSOR MASON:** We would just like to check with you, first of all that such ticket holders are within your numbers, as it were, currently.
- A. Yes.
- **PROFESSOR MASON:** Just to check, that is the case?
- **A.** Let me just make sure I understand the precise question before I just give a blanket yes or no answer.
- PROFESSOR MASON: Of course.
- A. "Point-to-point" being in this context a passenger who actually did buy a point-to-point fare towards -- at the outer boundary of the last station before the boundary of their Travelcard holding, as opposed to one from the station at

which they actually got on. That's my understanding of the point-to-point definition. So let's just -- unless that's not your interpretation -- proceed.

PROFESSOR MASON: No, so I'm with you on that. We have yet to apply in your model the proportion who hold a Travelcard, which is going to come at the next step. I am just checking that in all of the journeys which are currently included in your in-scope number --

A. Yes, okay --

**PROFESSOR MASON:** -- that does include journeys which could be taken as point-to-point fares by a traveller who has travelled part of their total journey with a Travelcard and then the final leg of their journey with a point-to-point fare.

- A. I think the answer is yes. The reason for that is that if the station is not on the boundary, so it's, for example, the Clapham Junction that was discussed earlier today, then my data will include cases where the fare purchase was for Clapham Junction onwards, and that is despite the fact that passenger may have got on at Waterloo for example. So that would be showing up as an entry at Clapham Junction in terms of the fare.
- My data does include the point-to-point traffic that would be associated with that particular case.
- It may be that, depending on the Travelcard assumption holding of the mix of passengers at that particular station, obviously then there is some proportion of those who are deemed to have a Travelcard under the methodology.
- A significant proportion of those would be for the zoning in question. For example, zone 1-2 for the Clapham case. So people getting on at Clapham, some percentage of those would be assumed to have a zone 1-2 Travelcard, a small or zero boundary fare saving would be assessed in that case. It might be zero, it might be small.

I think that perhaps answers your question. I understand that there's some debate -- oh, sorry, I think Mr Harris has a question.

**MR HARRIS:** No, I'm so sorry, Mr Holt, I do not have a question.

- A. I'm sorry. So yes, I think at the moment -- unless sort of instructed otherwise because there would of course be a means of saying anyone who is assumed to have a -- you know, a journey where the Travelcard matches up to the station just before the boundary, that exclusion could be made for that case. That would obviously have some implications. It would have a modest amount, almost virtually nil I guess on the aggregate damages part because these cases are generally the lowest possible savings, but it would take out a number of affected journeys or in-scope journeys that are paired with a Travelcard.
- So, through the class size estimate that would reduce the estimated class size estimate, and therefore increase the average loss per claimant to some extent, I think.
- PROFESSOR MASON: I am not sure about the latter, but I am not sure we need necessarily to -- at the moment, I just want to understand the mechanics of the model and how any particular set of journeys, if necessary, could be excluded under the current set of assumptions and in the event that there are further data from disclosure.
- Just to go back, and forgive me if I missed part of your explanation. I think at the moment journeys that are made as a point-to-point component to complement a Travelcard portion of a journey, they are within the in-scope number of journeys in your data set. I think that's correct, isn't it?
- **A.** Yes, I think there's an exception in cases where the station is on the boundary, the Putney example from before, because we treat that as a zone 3 station, not zone 2, so there would be no crossing of a boundary in that particular case, so

one or the other?

- **A.** I don't think I have the data to do that at this time.
- **PROFESSOR MASON:** Right.
- 4 A. So that would be the evidence that would be derived from the further survey --
- **PROFESSOR MASON:** Okay.
  - **A.** -- because that's the evidence that would provide a more specific breakdown of the Travelcard holding status of people at any given station.
- **PROFESSOR MASON:** Okay, thank you.
  - **A.** I don't know that anybody is doing that, that particular route, ie getting on at Waterloo but getting a point to point from Clapham Junction. Obviously to the extent that people are doing that, then that will increase the number of trips in the Clapham Junction origin part of the model.
  - So, if that is happening, then it will feature in the evidence in the model, and indeed in the evidence to be disclosed, as an increase relative to people not using this strategy, in the level of Clapham Junction originating trips as opposed to, for example, London Waterloo.
  - MR HOLMES: Sorry, can I just clarify that: my understanding is that you have the data in this example from Clapham to Guildford as a point to point, used in the general sense, but you can't distinguish at the moment between those which are journeys originating in Clapham and finishing in Guildford, from those where it was a Waterloo to Guildford journey, where somebody was using the Clapham to Guildford point to point as a supplement to Travelcard and you would need that from the survey evidence. Have I understood that correctly?
  - **A.** That's right, because in each of those two cases the fares data would basically say "Clapham Junction to Guildford".
  - **MR HOLMES:** Understood, thank you.

**A.** Yes, that's right.

**PROFESSOR MASON:** Thank you, Mr Holt, that's very helpful.

Let us, if it's okay, move on to step 3 of the model and the set of calculations. This is the estimation of the proportion of train travellers holding a Travelcard.

We understand that you've used data from the TfL termini report in 2010/2011. We just wanted to get a better understanding from you of the -- I suppose the potential for any bias there that we ought to be aware of. I know you responded to this in part in your second report, but it would be helpful for us to hear it again and to discuss it with you.

Given the set of travellers surveyed, would you be able to comment on how representative that set of travellers is of the entire set of travellers in your in-scope journeys? I hope I expressed that well enough, I think you know what I mean.

A. Yes, sir, I do know what you mean, thank you.

I acknowledge that there is not a data set that reflects in-scope journeys. Therefore,

I have used the best estimate available, based on other sources. That includes
the central London termini report, but also other sort of evidence from TfL
relating to Travelcard usage on other modes.

I think your question was about whether it's representative. It's clear that the central London report focuses to a greater extent on commuting than what would be like -- than the in-scope journeys, so the in-scope journeys are not themselves commuting journeys and so I acknowledge that.

I think it's important to understand though that what I'm using this evidence for is to understand not the Travelcard usage of these trips, given they are not in-scope journeys, but rather to inform the likelihood that people making in-scope rail journeys will have a Travelcard.

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On the basis that people making in-scope journeys would fall into a number of categories, including regular rail users, less regular rail users, people who use other modes and so on, then at least for some part of that set of in-scope journeys, this evidence would be relevant.

Just to be a bit more precise about that, I would expect that amongst the people being surveyed in the central London report would be a material amount of in-scope journeys. In part because some share of the journeys are not commuting journeys at all, so there's, I think, about 20 percent of those. But then even for the 80 percent of commuting journeys, which are acknowledged and agreed not to be themselves in-scope journeys, the people who are using rail in those cases will, I would expect, be making a material number of in-scope journeys. They are showing themselves to be rail users and so I think that that is in part why I have used that evidence.

You asked about the risk of bias, and I think clearly if it were the case --

PROFESSOR MASON: I'm sorry, just to be clear, as in all of these, these are not direct questions about the reasonableness of your assumptions, it's more about sensitivities and bias one way or the other actually, so we're very interested just to -- so it's not questioning the reasonableness, it's just understanding the sensitivity and bias.

**A.** I certainly understand that.

I think I have acknowledged that there is certainly uncertainty about this parameter, and that's why I've carried out a crosscheck on it and I have also proposed how to derive more evidence that would be more specific to the in-scope journeys.

So, I think that is clear.

As to factors that might sort of push it in either direction, I think it may well be that there are some in either direction. I think the concern that the respective defendants

to have a Travelcard in general. I think just perhaps to add another sort of comparison that one can make, if the people who are not in the Central London Termini study and therefore are not doing rail commuting on a daily basis, but are nonetheless London residents who are doing in-scope journeys, then they may very well be doing other modes on a regular basis. The evidence from the other surveys that I quoted in the report, which relate to Travelcard usage on the Underground and on the bus networks, tend to show much higher levels of Travelcard holding than what I have assumed in my model.

There are a number of reasons why I think therefore I don't have any particular concern about bias in this particular case.

**PROFESSOR MASON:** Okay, thank you, but it was helpful to have a little bit more detail about the factors on either side of the central estimate that you have taken.

I think we are quite close to moving on to questions about any future survey that you might run. Before we get there, just a few smaller questions to clear up ambiguities.

I think at some point yesterday we were trying to determine whether the TfL termini survey involved only arriving rail passengers at the London stations or arriving and departing. I will confess that, having read the appendix of that report, I struggled to be absolutely confident that I knew the answer. I wondered if that was something that you might be able to educate us about.

**A.** It's both, it's both arriving and departing, they look at AM and PM peaks, they look at people both arriving and departing and they look at access and egress journeys.

PROFESSOR MASON: Very good, thank you, that's helpful.

MR HOLMES: Can I just ask in terms of survey methodology, they are standing on

the concourse and they are surveying people getting off TOCs' trains coming into London and people coming into the concourse through other means, whether it's on foot or by coming out of the Underground or whatever it may be. In a sense it's a random cross-section of people on the concourse at the time?

**A.** Yes, I think they are getting them before they know what mode they are about to use. Obviously if they watched them walking in, then they would know that they're walking. I think it's meant to be from the concourse before -- to understand what will be their subsequent mode.

MR HOLMES: Thank you.

A. Yes.

## PROFESSOR MASON: Okay --

**A.** Sorry, could I just make one specific point. It has been made I think in my reports, but I think there was a bit of misunderstanding about the implication of it in the discussion yesterday, which is the fact that while I do clearly want to understand holding of a Travelcard amongst people making in-scope journeys, this evidence looks at onward modal travel and then I use a further source to assess the use of the Travelcard on those modes.

I think there is an important distinction there. I am essentially measuring the usage of a Travelcard on a specific journey and of course that's an underestimate of the holding position in terms of that Travelcard, because it's obviously a necessary condition to have a Travelcard in order to make a Travelcard journey, but it's not symmetric, it's not a necessary condition to make a Travelcard journey if you have a Travelcard. You could be walking that day, you could always walk but use other leisure trips and have a Travelcard for those reasons. I think it is something that I have pointed out in my reports, but I wasn't sure if that point had been clarified in the previous discussion.

1	PROFESSOR MASON: I think we understand that usage cannot be an overestimate
2	of holding
3	A. Thank you.
4	PROFESSOR MASON: since the one is a subset of the other.
5	A. That's right.
6	PROFESSOR MASON: Okay. If we could move on and discuss with you, just so that
7	we better understand how it might work, any further surveys that you may carry
8	out to refine some of the estimates.
9	A. Yes.
10	PROFESSOR MASON: To go in part to Mr Holmes's previous question: how you
11	might it's rather technical but it's an important question, I think construct the
12	samples that you'll need to take, how many stations, how many people and so
13	on, to give sufficient data given the level of information that you are wishing to
14	extract from these data, thoughts that you have about the sampling process.
15	A. Okay. So, I think what you would need to do is to have a representative sample
16	across the types of stations in the respective TOC's networks. You would want
17	to weight that to some extent by your sort of prior expectations on where are
18	the most relevant sort of stations for in-scope journeys being made.
19	You would, I think, obviously want a substantially sized sample in order to allow for
20	some variation at any given station between people who are doing different
21	types of journeys by origin, destination and fare type.
22	Then you would also obviously want a sufficient size of sample, again across those
23	boundaries, in order to understand Travelcard experience for those individuals.
24	I think that would not necessarily mean that you need to have a huge survey at every
25	single station, because there would be groups of stations that by some degree

of prior assessment could be grouped together to share certain characteristics.

I think that would be one way to sort of ensure that you have efficiency in the survey design.

I have to say that I haven't yet formalised or spoken to a survey design company, that normally would be the sort of organisation that we would work with, in order to sort of specify the precise nature in which the survey would be operated. But that's what I would propose to do.

Often, what we would do is explain the relevant parameters and sort of relevant degree of confidence that we would require, which would obviously be to have sufficient understanding of the issues that we're asking the survey to address. Then, using statistical principles, we would identify what a reasonable sized survey would be.

I don't have -- since we haven't sort of carried out that process, any sort of number that I would throw out, it would be a little bit speculative, I would hesitate to do that without perhaps having some further thought to it.

**PROFESSOR MASON:** That's fine. I think for now that's probably sufficient detail, although I reserve the right to come back to it once we have covered a couple of other questions.

Of course, an obvious concern is that a survey run now may have limited information about travel patterns and behaviour in the past, potentially quite a long way in the past, and certainly under quite different circumstances. Again, you address some of those issues in your second report. But again, I think we would find it helpful to just have a brief discussion with you as to what kind of adjustments you might apply, without going into great detail, but also how you will have confidence that the adjustments that you apply are bringing you closer to the actual numbers that you are trying to estimate through the surveys.

**A.** Yes, yes, okay.

I think the key question now is really if the survey is carried out at some point in the future, but obviously it needs to be -- the information needs to be applied to the relevant period, then what do we do about that?

I think the sorts of issues that we need to take into account in that respect would include changes in Travelcard holding behaviour and changes in in-scope journey behaviour. Those are essentially the two issues that the survey is designed to address. It's to help understand the more precise pattern of in-scope journeys, albeit that I would have a good understanding of that from their disclosure, but we could obviously use that to tailor the survey to the mix of surveyed passengers. Perhaps that wasn't very clear.

Given that we would know the disclosed actual in-scope journeys over the relevant period, we could construct a sample that would reflect that and ask people making those types of journeys, even if the actual pattern of journeys in 2022 or whenever this survey would be carried out, might have been modified through circumstances, even post-Covid environment and so on.

I think that particular concern would be largely addressed. To the extent that the sorts of journeys that had been happening before, even if they had been modified, they're still happening, so you can still survey people doing those types of trips.

I think that would be one way to sort of ensure that the survey is sort of representative in terms of the relevant period for in-scope journeys.

In terms of the Travelcard holding, as has been alluded to, I think the most concerning issue in that in terms of getting the evidence to the relevant period is the increasing popularity of contactless and Pay As You Go. It's something that I took into account previously in terms of my earlier estimates, to reduce the Travelcard holding over time, given the knowledge that at an earlier date it was higher but then it was falling over time as people were switching to Pay As You

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I would expect that that pattern has continued over time and therefore the share of Travelcards in use now, there are still some, but they will not be as prevalent as they might have been in the relevant period.

I think that is clearly an issue that needs to be adjusted for. I have proposed two ways of addressing that.

The first would be to look at TfL-level evidence to look at the trend that has actually been happening. I think it's fair to say that that does require one assumption to be made, which is that the trend in Travelcard holding for the in-scope journey makers would be consistent in terms of the move from Travelcard to Pay As You Go, as has been observed at the level that TfL is carrying out its surveys or recording its data. So that is an assumption, I think, that is likely to be needed to be made in order to apply that approach. Although I don't see any particular concern in making that assumption in terms of bias.

The other potential approach that I would adopt would be to speak -- through the survey of people doing actual journeys, this is journeys at the time of the survey, to understand, particularly for those who are not using Travelcard, whether there's any important factors that lead to that. In particular, the interesting question would be that they did indeed tend to use Travelcards but have moved on, like many people, to Pay As You Go, as contactless has become more and more popular. That would be a line of questioning that I would propose to include in the survey.

**THE PRESIDENT:** I follow that, and you have sketched out, obviously at a preliminary stage, the sort of questions you might ask in your second report.

A. Yes.

**THE PRESIDENT:** On page 28 of the report at paragraph 3.6.10. Of course in most

**A.** Yes. I think the way to best do that would be to focus on the purpose -- basically

to do a split by the purpose by which they would have had a Travelcard. Some

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people would have had a Travelcard for a long period of time, or for commuting purposes. I think the risk about hazy recollection would be far less for that subset of the people than those who say, "Yes, I did have a Travelcard, I think I used one on 12 February 2017". I am not expecting people to off the top of their head remember that.

The interesting questions would be the people who would have good recollection of Travelcard patterns of behaviour because they would have been using it on a regular basis over a significant period of time, but then either have continued to do so or perhaps have for some reason not continued to have Travelcards.

That might be because they just have no need for them or it might be because they have switched to Pay As You Go.

**PROFESSOR MASON:** Okay. Sorry, I missed, how do you combine those responses there? They are qualitatively different types of responses in terms of the confidence that you can place on the responses that are being given to you.

A. Yes, yes. In terms of the confidence being much higher for the group that would have used it sort of more systemically or for a certain period of time I think that's fair. Whereas it would be a bit less confidence instead of people who sort of irregularly might have used it for a short period of time.

I think I would focus more on the results that would be more -- you could have more confidence in, as a better sort of estimate of the two trends as opposed to the much more uncertain responses from people who didn't really use it very much.

**PROFESSOR MASON:** Okay, thank you. I think if I could go back almost to where we started, just to give you another opportunity to comment on -- we understand that in an exercise of this nature you have to break some eggs to make an omelette, you have to make some assumptions in order to arrive at a final calculation.

anomaly -- is how I would call it in my mode, because there's a negative

boundary fare which is driven by for example the need to take an average across two fares in a given circumstance.

I am aware that there are some uncertainties in terms of exactly how the Tribunal would come to a view on some of those points. But, leaving those aside, the actual fares data would be disclosed, and I think subject to very little remaining uncertainty.

Then the third area, the Travelcard holding, and I think it is fair to say that's the one where there's the greatest uncertainty, it's the one where the actual overlap data is, as I acknowledged, doesn't exist and I don't expect it to be forthcoming from the train operating companies. That's the area where the survey-based approach will be used to refine the existing estimates.

## PROFESSOR MASON: Thank you.

Understood that in three largely independent modules to the final number, because I think that's what you are -- the number of in-scope journeys is largely ... your estimate of it, or calculation of it is largely independent from the average boundary saving that you calculate.

A. That is, I think, true in the sense that ... I'm hesitating because the average boundary saving does depend on the mix of in-scope journeys. It's not quite right to say that there is no interaction between the two, but certainly for -- if you just change the total number of in-scope journeys without changing the mix of O/D pairs and fare types then that would apply, that would be independent. But it is because of a mix issue, i.e. origin/destination and fare type.

Those things can have an impact on the average boundary saving. But, again, I think while that is true, I think in those two aspects the disclosure data would be relatively precise in fact. I don't think there would be a significant amount of remaining uncertainty. Again, leaving aside the areas of dispute as to exactly

in what case a boundary fare should be made and so on, which I think can be adjusted for in any event.

**PROFESSOR MASON:** Okay, thank you, you're right that there is that interrelation between steps 1 and 2, I think, what I referred to it as rather than modules.

Therefore, after disclosure, I think your response is that there will be residual uncertainty about Travelcard holding. That will be subject to any survey that you are able to run to improve upon your current estimates. I think we agreed also that there would be some uncertainty about the point-to-point fares in the way that we've been using them in this discussion.

**A.** Yes, that's right, and that would also be addressed in the survey. Yes.

PROFESSOR MASON: Indeed. That's about sensitivity.

I understand that you haven't, in this instance, presented, as you did with the number of claimants, a low, middle and high scenario, but just again to return to that to get any further thoughts and to check that I understood your reasoning for that. It is surely possible to present the uncertainty that's in your model in that way, because there is some uncertainty about the parameter values that you have to estimate or assume.

A. Yes. No, absolutely, sir. One could always, for each and every assumption, apply a lower value and a higher value and assess the sensitivity of that. I think in this case while I could have done that it would have obviously added a lot of complexity and length to the report. For relatively modest benefit, I feel, because it's a preliminary estimate that would be subject to refinements in a number of areas post-disclosure. Then, perhaps more importantly, the sort of alternative lower and higher values that I would potentially have plugged in in order to then have a low-high range would be in a sense fairly arbitrary.

By which I mean I could obviously say here is some assumptions that are 10 percent

1 lower and some that are 10 percent higher, but given that for the reason 2 I mentioned, that the three things multiply together and a 10 percent increase 3 in any one of those affects the overall result by 10 percent, that doesn't really 4 take you any further than saying well if the central estimate is, whatever it is, 5 80 million for example, then a plus or minus 10 percent on that is fairly obvious, 6 without even really stating it. That was essentially my thinking. 7 PROFESSOR MASON: Thank you. 8 That's certainly helped me to understand much better your approach, Mr Holt, thank 9 you. 10 **A.** Thank you. 11 **THE PRESIDENT:** Yes, Mr Holmes, do you have a question? No. 12 I think what we will do is we will give Mr Holt a ten-minute break and we will confer as 13 to whether there's anything else we want to ask and then we will have half 14 an hour if counsel want to put any supplementary questions to him. 15 Yes, Mr Harris? 16 MR HARRIS: I wonder, sir, if we might take either a 15-minute break -- because I for 17 one would like to take instructions as to whether or not to ask questions or 18 questions of a particular type. What I would absolutely be confident about is 19 that, if I have questions, they will not take long and it may be that if we have 15 20 minutes rather than 10 there will be no questions or there will be fewer. 21 **THE PRESIDENT:** I understand. If you have more time, you write a shorter letter. 22 We will take 15 minutes and we will come back at 4.05 pm. 23 (3.49 pm) 24 (A short break) 25 (4.05 pm)

1	you made submissions.	
2	Mr Harris, any questions?	
3	MR HARRIS: No, sir, no questions.	
4	THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.	
5	Ms Abram, any questions?	
6	MS ABRAM: Nothing from me, sir.	
7	THE PRESIDENT: Mr Ward, any questions?	
8	MR WARD: Nothing at all from me, thank you, sir.	
9	THE PRESIDENT: Mr Moser, is there anything you want to ask by way of	
10	supplementary?	
11	MR MOSER: There is not, sir.	
12	THE PRESIDENT: Thank you very much, Mr Holt, for making time to come and give	
13	evidence.	
14	I think sensibly would it then be appropriate that we adjourn now and we resume at	
15	10.30 for your reply, Mr Moser.	
16	We are on target, time wise?	
17	MR MOSER: We are on target time wise, sir.	
18	There was in the plan, which I confess I was slightly baffled by, a suggestion that the	
19	defendants would have a further reply to themselves, or perhaps it was to	
20	Mr Holt on Friday morning, but I don't sense that that's something my learned	
21	friends are planning to do tomorrow morning.	
22	So, I am just going to make my reply tomorrow, unless told otherwise.	
23	THE PRESIDENT: Yes. I think just a minute. (Pause)	
24	They took their applications, which effectively overlapped, as they all recognised with	
25	their opposition even though the test might be slightly different, as part of their	
26	submissions, so we have points on that. So, I think it's for you to reply.	

- 1 Just one moment.
- 2 Mr Holt, you are released formally.
- 3 Mr Ward, you want to say something?
- 4 (The witness withdrew)

## Housekeeping

MR WARD: Thank you, sir. Not that I wish to make an additional reply or anything of the kind, but I would like to make some really quite brief remarks about the submissions that Mr Holt has made this afternoon.

I am entirely in your hands about when would be appropriate. I think the maximum time required for that would be five minutes.

**THE PRESIDENT:** I think that's reasonable. We will allow each defendant counsel five minutes at the start tomorrow and then, Mr Moser, you can kick off.

Mr Harris?

MR HARRIS: Yes, sir.

As I think was mentioned in one of the letters to the Tribunal, because technically we are strike out applicants, if -- it may of course not happen -- and insofar as Mr Moser makes a new or a different point in his reply as regards those applications, then I would like the opportunity to make a very short, if you like, response/reply, call it what you like, but it's not, if you like, "I'm going to have another go", it's he's responding to my application and technically it's my application, so if there's something new in a matter of words, the response to that. Given that we have plenty of time and we drew your attention to this in the letter, we hope that ought not to prove too controversial.

**THE PRESIDENT:** I think we will see how we get on, but I tend not to be over technical about these things. If there is some point -- we don't want to cause an endless

1	toing and froing you want to pick up, and obviously if there's any new authority	
2	referred to, you are entitled to address us on it.	
3	The other thing to mention is we have had a note under cover of letter from Freshfield	
4	from you, Mr Harris, Ms Blackwood and Mr Armitage. We were given that just	
5	as we came in this morning so we haven't digested it. If, when we have, we	
6	have any questions for explanation or anything, obviously we will ask you, but	
7	meanwhile we will read it overnight.	
8	MR HARRIS: Just so that you know, the topic was to put into writing what I submitted	
9	orally as to where we say the table that Mr Moser introduced as an advocacy	
10	piece and placed so much reliance upon, we say is, in a non-pejorative sense,	
11	untrustworthy and it's simply an aide-memoire of those points that I made	
12	orally.	
13	THE PRESIDENT: That's helpful.	
14	Mr Moser, you obviously have it, so you can incorporate it in your response.	
15	Very good, 10.30 tomorrow morning.	
16	(4.11 pm)	
17	(The hearing adjourned until 10.30 am on	
18	Friday 12 March 2021)	
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## Key to punctuation used in transcript

	Double dashes are used at the end of a line to indicate that the
	person's speech was cut off by someone else speaking
	Ellipsis is used at the end of a line to indicate that the person tailed off
	their speech and did not finish the sentence.
- XX XX XX -	A pair of single dashes is used to separate strong interruptions from
	the rest of the sentence e.g. An honest politician - if such a creature
	exists - would never agree to such a plan. These are unlike commas,
	which only separate off a weak interruption.
-	Single dashes are used when the strong interruption comes at the end
	of the sentence, e.g. There was no other way - or was there?