2 3 4	judgment. It will be placed on the Tribunal Website for readers to see how matters were conducted at the public hearing of these proceedings and is not to be relied on or cited in the context of any other proceedings. The Tribunal's judgment in this matter will be the final and definitive record.
5	IN THE COMPETITION Case No.: 1370/5/7/20 (T)
6	APPEAL TRIBUNAL
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9	Salisbury Square House
10	8 Salisbury Square
11	London EC4Y 8AP
12	(Remote Hearing)
13	Monday 28 th June 2021
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15	Before:
16	The Honourable Mrs Justice Joanna Smith
17	(Sitting as a Tribunal in England and Wales)
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20	<u>BETWEEN</u> :
21	V (C 11 AD 0 O)
22	Vattenfall AB & Others
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26	Prysmian S.P.A & Others
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29	APPEARANCES
	ATTEARANCES
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31	Sarah Abram and Khatija Hafesji (On behalf of Vattenfall AB & Others)
32	Anneli Howard QC (On behalf of Prysmian)
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Ruling on disclosure costs

MRS JUSTICE JOANNA SMITH: I will deal first with the guestion of budgeting in relation to disclosure. However, some overarching points about budgeting have been made on both sides and I should first briefly set out my views on those points. On the issue of proportionality, Ms Howard QC on behalf of the Defendants submits that whilst this case is complex, the Defendants do not consider that its total value is the £37 million identified by the Claimants, but rather (if it is worth anything at all) a more modest figure of between £6-12 million. Against this figure she points to combined costs budgets of over £12 million. Ms Howard accepts that the Claimants have a greater burden in proving their case at trial and she also accepts an asymmetry of information between the Claimants and the Defendants which will inevitably increase the Claimants' costs of the proceedings, but she submits that this disparity does not justify the costs in respect of which objection is made today. Amongst other things, she points out (i) that the Defendants have sought to streamline the disclosure process by giving access to the Defendants to key documents straight away, (ii) that at least two of the experts on the Defendants' team have been involved in other parallel proceedings and so should already have a regression model in place or at least developed an appropriate methodology and (iii) that although there are obviously restrictions on the use to which the Defendants' experts can put material obtained in different proceedings, some of those restrictions have "broken down" owing to the fact that one of the parallel sets of proceedings has been heard in open court.

Ms Abram, on behalf of the Claimants responds that £37 million is not in fact the maximum value of the case, that there are two claims relating to wind farms

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24 25 26 that have not yet been quantified and that this case dates back to 1999 and that interest, whether calculated on a simple or compound basis, will be substantial. On the question of the involvement of her clients' experts in parallel proceedings she points out that the obligations under CPR 31.22 are binding and must be respected.

On the question of the value of the claim, I cannot determine at this early stage whether it is presently over-valued by the Claimants. Accordingly, by reference to the notes at CPR 3.15.3, it seems to me that I must err on the side of accepting the Claimants' position. As against a value of £37 million plus interest (and in circumstances where there appear to be two claims that have not yet been quantified), I cannot see that the present cost budgets are disproportionate. I note, however, that if the claim succeeds, but it transpires that the Defendants' assertion as to the real value of the claim has been correct, then it will be open to the Defendants to argue that this amounts to a good reason to depart from the last approved budget.

I shall return to the involvement of the Claimants' experts in other proceedings when I come on to deal with the Claimants' Estimated Costs in relation to Experts.

Against that background and bearing firmly in mind that there is no basis to find that the costs estimated on either side are disproportionate to the overall value of the claim, I now turn to deal specifically with the questions that arise on the Claimants' proposed Cost Budget for the Disclosure stage in relation, first to incurred costs, and second to estimated costs going forward.

Insofar as the incurred costs are concerned, approximately £1.3 million has already been incurred by the Claimants in relation to disclosure. This has involved the review of something in the region of 51,000 documents, with disclosure being given of approximately 15,000 of these documents. By comparison, the

Defendants have spent approximately £460,000 and have disclosed 19,000 documents. I am invited by Ms Howard QC, on behalf of the Defendants, to record my comments in relation to these costs and to take them into account when considering the reasonableness and proportionality of the budgeted costs (see CPR 3.17(3)(b)).

On the face of it, the costs that have already been incurred appear to be very substantial. However, I do not consider, in light of the arguments that Ms Abram, on behalf of the Claimants, has rehearsed before me today, that I am in a position to assess with any degree of confidence whether those costs have been properly incurred. In particular, I note that (i) much of the disclosure provided by the Defendants has been "re-packaged" from disclosure given in other proceedings; (ii) given the Defendants' involvement in other parallel proceedings they are likely to have conducted many similar disclosure exercises and to know where documents (not otherwise disclosed in previous proceedings) would be located. This contrasts sharply with the fact that the Claimant has had to start from scratch with a disclosure exercise spanning five jurisdictions and dating back over 20 years. Ms Howard very reasonably accepted that, in the circumstances, there could be no expectation of parity between the Claimants' costs and the Defendants' costs.

Having said that, I certainly accept from Ms Howard that there does appear to be, if
I can put it in this way, at least some uncertainty around the very substantial
costs that have been incurred at partner and senior associate level in relation
to disclosure to date. On the face of things, these costs seem to me to
exceed the costs that one might expect to be incurred in simply providing
direction and instruction to an eDisclosure provider so as to facilitate and
inform the contracting out of the disclosure to a different firm of solicitors, in

the way that Ms Abram has described.

However, I have no evidence about that, just as I have no evidence about the costs incurred by the experts in relation to disclosure (which Ms Howard suggests may be duplicated elsewhere in the budget). Accordingly I am not in a position, it seems to me, to judge whether there has been, or will be, a duplication of costs in relation to the experts, or indeed whether there has already been inappropriate and disproportionate time spent by solicitors at a senior level in relation to disclosure.

Therefore, whilst I make those comments, I am not going to take the incurred costs into account when considering the reasonableness and proportionality going forward, because I don't think it's appropriate that I should do so where I am simply not in a position to judge one way or the other the reasonableness of those incurred costs.

Looking then at the question of the estimated costs going forward, and having regard to the offers made by the Defendants in relation to those costs, I am bound to say that the difference between the parties does not appear to me to be terribly great.

I am grateful to the Defendants for indicating their agreement to the costs of the eDisclosure provider, and so I accept the budget of £65,000 presented by the Claimants in relation to that.

That leaves only two items in dispute, namely (i) the time costs of £290,000, which for practical purposes now concerns the review by the Claimants' legal team of the Defendants' and the Third Parties' disclosure going forward, and (ii) the expert costs of £190,000 in relation to the experts' review of that disclosure.

Dealing first with the time costs, the Defendant has offered £200,000 and I am bound to say that, in light of the extent of the disclosure that the Claimants will now

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need to review (and having regard to the comparison suggested by Ms Abram between the likely cost per document for the Claimants and the Defendants in carrying out their respective reviews), it doesn't seem to me that £290,000 is either unreasonable or disproportionate.

The Claimants have substantially more documents to review than the Defendants, something in the region of 22,000 (as opposed to 15,000 to be reviewed by the Defendants) and doing the best I can and taking a relatively broad brush approach, the £290,000 it suggests for completing this exercise doesn't seem to me to be out of kilter.

In my judgment, the same applies to the proposed expert costs of reviewing the disclosure; the Defendants are offering £125,000, and again I do not at the moment see that £190,000 is disproportionate or unreasonable, in light of the extent of the review that will be necessary. I see no basis for inferring that there is any duplication between these costs and the costs of preparation of the expert report.

So, I am going to approve the claimants' budgeted costs for the disclosure stage.

And insofar as I've made comments about the incurred costs they can no doubt be raised in future should that be appropriate or necessary.

Ruling on experts' costs

I am now called upon to assess the costs in relation to the expert reports stage of the Claimants' budget. The Claimants' incurred costs in relation to this stage are approximately £370,633, and their estimated costs going forward are just shy of £1.7 million, which would make a total of just over £2 million if I were to permit that.

The Defendants have offered circa £477,000 for the estimated costs stage going

forward, and the Defendants themselves are looking at a spend on experts of £674,700, so roughly a third of the total that the Claimants anticipate spending on their experts.

I am afraid that I have considerable sympathy with Ms Howard's submissions as to the costs of this stage. It does seem to me that the amount that the Claimants are proposing to spend (whilst an amount that they are entitled to spend with a view to ensuring a 'Rolls Royce' service) is not one that should be visited on the Defendants in this case.

I hear Ms Abram's submissions that the Claimants are required to deal with two sets of Defences, that they have to go first in the sequential exchanges of experts' reports and that they have to reply, and further that they have no visibility over the evidence that is going to be served by the Third Party, Nexans. But taking all of that into account, and whilst I do not consider that there should be parity with the Defendants' costs, I consider that the current proposed estimated costs are not reasonable or proportionate. I accept that two of the Claimants' expert team have had an involvement in the parallel proceedings and whilst they cannot breach their obligations in relation to those proceedings, they will have gained an understanding of the infringement and the market which will no doubt be of assistance here.

Accordingly I am going to reduce those costs. It is inevitable that I must take a broad brush approach, and doing the best I can I am going to allow the Claimants a further £1 million in total to deal with the expert stage going forward (to include experts' fees, solicitors' fees and counsels' fees). In my judgment this should provide them with a reasonable and proportionate amount having regard to the factors that Ms Abram has identified. That the Claimants' recoverable spend will then be a little over twice what the Defendants will

spend appears to me fairly to reflect the asymmetry of information between the parties.

Ruling on trial costs

MRS JUSTICE JOANNA SMITH: I can deal with the Claimants' estimated Trial Costs quite briefly.

The Claimants are seeking solicitors fees for the trial stage of roughly £487,000 and expert fees of £61,000 which Ms Abram tells me equate to roughly eight or nine days of the experts attending the trial. The offers made by the Defendants as against that are £307,000 in relation to the solicitors' fees and £50,000 in relation to the experts' fees. I don't know what that £50,000 is based on in terms of attendance by the experts at trial.

Doing the best I can, I consider that the figure as it currently stands for solicitors' fees is disproportionate and unreasonable in circumstances where it includes 10 hours a day for a partner for the full five weeks of the trial. It does not seem to me that that is reasonable or proportionate. Of course, the Claimants are fully entitled to instruct and pay a partner to do ten hours work a day for that period of time, but it doesn't seem to me to be appropriate for the Defendants to pay for that.

So, again taking a broad brush approach, I am going to allow solicitors' fees at £400,000 for the trial stage. I am going to allow the whole amount of £61,000 in relation to the experts because I have been told by Ms Abram that it is likely that the expert evidence may take two weeks of the trial. Ms Howard has not dissented from that and in the circumstances, it seems to me that £61,000 is likely to be a realistic and proportionate estimate.

Ruling on counsels' fees

MRS JUSTICE JOANNA SMITH: I can deal with the Defendant's estimated counsel

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fees for trial quite briefly.

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I was taken to an authority, Deutsche Bank AG v Sebastian Holdings Inc [2020] EWHC B24 (costs), in particular paragraphs [57] and [59], as to the question of what a reasonable brief fee may be in any given case and in particular at paragraph 57 a citation from a well-known passage in the judgment of Mr Justice Pennycuick in Simpsons Motor Sales (London) Ltd v Hendon Corporation [1964] 3 ALL ER 833, to the effect that the reasonable brief fee that should be allowed is the fee that "a hypothetical counsel, capable of conducting the case effectively, but unable or unwilling to insist on the higher fees sometimes demanded of counsel of pre-eminent reputation, would be content to take on the brief: but there is no precise standard of the measurement and the judge must, using his or her knowledge and experience, determine the proper figure".

The Defendants seek approval for £1,540,000 in relation to their leading counsel and £311,250 in relation to their junior counsel, together with refreshers of £309,000, a total for their counsel at the trial stage of circa £1.8 million, excluding refreshers. By comparison, the Claimants, who have a counsel team of three, are seeking a total of £875,000 together with refreshers of £282,000) for that stage; their leading counsel, who is also a leading counsel in this field, seeks a brief fee of £412,500.

In my judgment, the Defendants are perfectly entitled to instruct whoever they wish to instruct with a view to obtaining a Rolls Royce service, but it is unreasonable and disproportionate for the Claimants to be required to pay for that in the event of a costs order against them at the end of the trial. In this

situation, I have a very good comparator by way of the Claimants' fees, which I consider provide me with a realistic indication of the price of obtaining a counsel team to conduct this case effectively. Accordingly I am going to limit the Defendants' counsel fees for the purposes of the costs budget to the same level as the Claimants' fees (both in respect of brief fees and refreshers).

Key to punctuation used in transcript

	Double dashes are used at the end of a line to indicate that the person's speech was cut off by someone else speaking	
	Ellipsis is used at the end of a line to indicate that the person tailed off their speech and did not finish the sentence.	
- xx xx xx -	A pair of single dashes is used to separate strong interruptions from the rest of the sentence e.g. An honest politician - if such a creature exists - would never agree to such a plan. These are unlike commas, which only separate off a weak interruption.	
-	Single dashes are used when the strong interruption comes at the end of the sentence, e.g. There was no other way - or was there?	