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IN THE COMPETITION
APPEAL
TRIBUNAL

Salisbury Square House 8 Salisbury Square London EC4Y 8AP (Remote Hearing)

19 April 2021

Case No.: 1282/7/7/18; 1289/7/7/18

Before:
The Honourable Mr Justice Roth
(President)
Dr William Bishop
Professor Stephen Wilks
(Sitting as a Tribunal in England and Wales)

BETWEEN:

UK Trucks Claim Limited

V
Fiat Chrysler Automobiles N.V. and Others
and
Road Haulage Association Limited

V
Man SE and Others

1	Monday, 19 April 2021
2	(10.00 am)
3	HOUSEKEEPING
4	THE PRESIDENT: Morning everyone. This case, as you all
5	know, is being heard remotely, but it is, of course,
6	just as much a full Tribunal hearing as if it was taking
7	place physically in the courtroom of the Tribunal where
8	I and one of the other members of the Tribunal are now
9	sitting, the third member is, himself, joining us
10	remotely.
11	There are a large number of you on the Teams
12	platform, and still more watching on the live stream. I
13	must, therefore, start with a warning. An official
14	transcript of these proceedings is being produced in the
15	usual way, but it is strictly prohibited for anyone else
16	to make any unauthorised recording, whether audio or
17	video, of the proceedings, and to infringe that
18	prohibition is a contempt of court. This is no mere
19	idle threat. The BBC was recently fined a significant
20	sum for almost inadvertently making a recording of a
21	planning case in the High Court, so this prohibition is
22	being strictly enforced.
23	The fact that we have so many participants on the

Teams platform for this hearing, obviously, is

a challenge in technological terms. If, at any time,

24

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you lose connection please send a message through to the Tribunal Registry and we will try and pause until you can rejoin, and, also, I would ask you, please, to put your microphone on mute when you are not speaking, or we will get background interference.

There is, we've noticed, some confidential information in the bundles. It may well be that it's not necessary for anyone to refer to confidential material. If you do need to refer to it, if you can do it by just drawing our attention to the page, and I hope arrangements have been made for the Opus document retrieval to be constrained in a way that it doesn't reach anyone outside the confidentiality ring, but it may well be that we don't need to look at any of those confidential matters at all. If absolutely necessary we can, of course, go into camera, but I hope that can be avoided.

We will take a short break mid-morning and mid-afternoon in the usual way, perhaps a slightly longer break because of the strain of doing everything on the screen. When we take our break you may wish to remember to mute your microphone as the recording continues to operate so -- not that I can imagine anyone would wish to make any rude remark about the Chairman of the Tribunal -- but in case you might be so tempted, I

Τ	expect you don't want it to be recorded and go on to
2	potentially the transcript.
3	Thank you all for your helpful skeleton arguments
4	which, of course, we've read. I can't pretend that
5	we've read everything that's been produced in terms of
6	the voluminous experts' reports. We've tried to divide
7	up the reading a bit between us, but, as I say, this is
8	not a case where it's just been physically possible,
9	given the volume of material, but I hope we've read the
10	key aspects.
11	As I understand it, it's been agreed that UKTC will
12	begin and, second, the other applicant in the other
13	matter, RHA, will then go second.
14	So, with those words of introduction I think
15	Mr Thompson, it's over to you.
16	Submission by MR THOMPSON
17	MR THOMPSON: I'm grateful, Sir. Can I just ask, before I
18	commence, whether the members of the Tribunal will all
19	be looking at hard copy or whether some will be looking
20	at hard copy and electronic? What is going to be the
21	most convenient reference system?
22	THE PRESIDENT: We will probably be doing a mixture,
23	certainly on my part I will, so that for such documents
24	as the key documents skeletons, claim form, reply and
25	so on we will be looking at hard copy, but Opus

1 should bring up an electronic copy as well, so if you 2 could give both references. If you need to go into exhibits at any point, I think they will be purely 3 electronic. So if you can give both references, and can 4 5 I just say it may be somebody isn't muted because we are getting a bit of a resonance. 6 7 MR THOMPSON: I'm not muted, and can I just say on behalf of Mr Pickford and myself that we inadvertently turned on, 8 I think it was the Ring Central function and we heard 9 some remarks from members of the Tribunal, but I don't 10 11 think they added to the source of wisdom or caused any 12 injustice, so it is just an apology on our behalf. 13 We've now made suitable arrangements so it won't happen 14 again. Just to inform the Tribunal. 15 THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Thank you. 16 MR THOMPSON: The structure I was going to follow broadly is the same as our skeleton argument. I was going to make 17 18 some introductory remarks about the nature of the test, 19 the statutory regime and the nature of the UKTC 20 application, and then I was going to address six, 21 perhaps not very surprising topics, namely 22 identification of the claims in the class, the authorisation condition in relation to the class 23 24 representative, the two eligibility conditions, commonality and suitability, and the opt-in opt-out 25

1	question, and then, finally, as it were, by way of an
2	introduction to next Monday's events, some remarks about
3	the expert evidence, and clearly I will seek to move as
4	quickly as I can because Mr Flynn needs his time which
5	starts at some point this afternoon.
6	So, first of all, the correct approach, and I think
7	the obvious place to start is the judgment of the
8	Supreme Court in Merricks, and, in particular, the
9	introductory paragraphs, paragraphs 1-5 and 19-21. I
10	suspect the Tribunal is very familiar with them, but it
11	may be worth just bringing them up for a moment. So
12	that's {JA/68/4}.
13	THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Just a moment. This is joint
14	authorities bundle at tab 68.
15	MR THOMPSON: Yes, and page 4 in the bundling. There is
16	obviously a summary of the regime throughout paragraphs
17	1-5, but, in particular, the first sentence of the
18	entire judgment:
19	"This appeal concerns the procedure for collective
20	proceedings introduced by amendment to the Competition
21	Act 1998 for the purpose of enabling small businesses
22	and consumers more easily to bring claims for what may
23	loosely be described as anti-competitive conduct in
24	breach of the provisions of the Act".

Then at paragraph 3 the Supreme Court sets out

a number of characteristic features, and then at
paragraph 5 the principal criteria, first of all, the
just and reasonable authorisation criterion, and,
secondly, the two eligibility criterion which I think
have been called the, "Commonality", and, "Suitability",
criterion, and then, in the passage at 19-21 which is
${JA/68/8}$, there is a comment on the nature of the
regime, and I was particularly going to draw the
Tribunal's attention to the indented passages at
$\{JA/68/9\}$ at B, D and E, and the comment after that at
F, and, in particular, the first comment:

"The aim of these proposals is, therefore, two-fold;

1) to increase growth by empowering small businesses to
tackle anti-competitive behaviour that is stifling their
business, and, secondly, to promote fairness by enabling
consumers and businesses who have suffered loss due to
anti-competitive behaviour to obtain redress".

So that's by way of the shape of the regime and its intended beneficiaries, and then at paragraph 11 of our skeleton argument which is at {A/1/3} to 4, we pick up three features from the judgment, first of all from paragraph 64 of the judgment, where this is a multifactorial issue. Secondly, at paragraph 59, that the certification process is not a merits test, except in limited regards, and, thirdly, and that's the core

part of the judgment at paragraphs 47-54, that once a class has identified that it has, on the balance of probabilities, suffered at least some loss, then it is for the Tribunal to do its best on the familiar broad axe principle which applies in a particularly extreme form in a large scale collective claim, as, of course, was the case for Mr Merricks and his multitudinous claim against MasterCard.

Just adding to those points, the basic point which was picked up both by the Court of Appeal and by the Supreme Court, is that section 47C(2) provides for no individualised assessment of common issues or of damages is needed for an aggregate award, and that's picked up at paragraph 58 of the Supreme Court judgment. I don't think we need to go to it, but that's at page 23 of JA/68, that this is a radical modification of the compensatory principle in collective claims.

The Supreme Court also referred to Canadian precedent by analogy, at least, with approval, while making it clear that its ruling was based on UK statute and UK principles of civil procedure and that's at paragraphs 37-42. That's {JA/68/16} to 18.

So that's a bit of a whistlestop tour of the judgment, and there are obviously a lot of details in there, but I'm aware that the President, in particular,

is very well aware of the nature of this judgment and very familiar with the issues in the Merricks case.

Our overarching submission in relation to Merricks is that the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court have, in the first major claim brought under this new legislation, indicated clearly at least three things. First of all, this is an exceptional statutory regime that is being deliberately adopted by Parliament to facilitate properly formulated collective actions in the field of competition law.

Secondly, it was always intended to benefit not only consumers, but also small businesses. Indeed, some of the objectives appear to have given primacy to the fair treatment of small businesses, and, thirdly, and in accordance with Canadian precedent in reflecting basic principles of the common law as amended by the statute, the certification process is to be conducted in a realistic way that will contribute to rather than impeding the achievement of that statutory objective, and I think that runs through the entire Supreme Court judgment.

There is obviously more to be said in terms of the regime, and we've said some of it in our pleadings and our skeleton arguments, but that is by way of introduction.

Secondly, the three mandatory conditions identified by the Supreme Court for certification under the 1998

Act. Again, I'm aware that particularly the President is very familiar with these rules, indeed he may have written some of them, and that Mr Hoskins and Mr Harris are very familiar with this regime. Mr Harris, indeed, from a variety of perspectives.

The three mandatory conditions for certification in the Act, and under the 2015 Rules, are at tab 6 and 11 of the joint authorities bundle, and I think it's worth looking at them just to set the parameters for the debate.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, just pause a moment while we ...

MR THOMPSON: Can I bring up on screen {JA/6/4}? That sets out the core provisions relevant to today's, or this week's proceedings. First of all, 47B(5) which says that the Tribunal may make a collective proceedings order only under two conditions. The first one, (a), is if it considers that the person who brought the proceedings is a person who, if the order were made, the Tribunal could authorise to act as the representative in those proceedings in accordance with subsection 8, and so subsection 8 has a further condition at 8(b) that the Tribunal may authorise a person to act as the

1	representative only if the Tribunal considers that it is
2	just and reasonable for that person to act as
3	a representative in those proceedings.
4	Then the second condition is at $5(b)$, so relating to
5	the claims:
6	"In respect of claims which are eligible for
7	inclusion in collective proceedings"
8	And then the issue of eligibility is dealt with at
9	subparagraph 6, and is subject to two conditions, first
10	of all that they raise the same, similar or related
11	issues of fact or law, and, secondly, that they are
12	suitable to be brought in collective proceedings, so the
13	commonality and suitability conditions.
14	Then this these requirements are given effect by
15	the rules which are at $\{JA/11/1\}$, and again, if one goes
16	to {JA/11/20}, Rule 78 sets out a series of conditions
17	in relation to authorisation of the class representative
18	for giving effect to section $47B(5)(a)$ and (8) , and
19	Rule 79 on the next page, {JA/11/21}, sets out a series
20	of conditions in relation to eligibility, and that
21	relates to the claims.
22	THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
23	MR THOMPSON: So, it is all pretty elementary stuff, but the
24	authorisation condition, which was applied by the
25	Tribunal in Merricks, relates to the quality of the

class representative, and the only issue raised by MasterCard in relation to Mr Merricks was whether he had sufficient funding. In the other respects I think he was accepted as a suitable representative, and the Tribunal will obviously be aware that that issue was also raised in this case, and it was addressed in the funding judgment in terms that were only appealed on the single issue of the DBAs which the Tribunal will recall was then the subject matter of the judgment in the Court of Appeal, or rather the Divisional Court and there is an application for permission to take that forward in the Supreme Court which is pending, and the reference there is at K/5, I think.

So the authorisation condition relates to the quality of the class representative, and the eligibility conditions relate to the claims. Those three conditions are the three statutory conditions limiting the ability of the Tribunal to grant the certification. Obviously, the eligibility conditions are now to be considered in the light of the judgment in Merricks in the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court.

In UKTC's case, UKTC is, of course, the proposed class representative, and the relevant claims are, as we have put it, the claims of direct purchasers or direct long-term lessees of a new UK-registered truck during

1	the cartel period and shortly thereafter, so one claim
2	for a new UK-registered truck acquired during that
3	period, and one sees that from the draft order which one
4	finds at tab 15 of Bundle B, which is the first B1
5	bundle. $\{B/15/3\}$ at pages 3-6.
6	THE PRESIDENT: It's Bundle B, tab 15?
7	MR THOMPSON: That's correct. B1, 15. Grateful, Sir. The
8	claims are defined at paragraph 11 on page 6 {B/15/6}.
9	The first sentence where you will see that:
10	"The claims, covered by the collective proceedings
11	set out in this order relate to follow-on damages claims
12	for loss and damage allegedly caused in the UK to
13	members of the class by various truck manufacturers
14	which are addressees of the decision of the European
15	Commission dated 19 July 2016".
16	That obviously incorporates the definition of,
17	"Class", which is set out at paragraphs 8-10 of the
18	draft order, but the core definition is, "Persons who,
19	between 17 January 1997 and 18 January 2011 acquired one
20	or more new medium or heavy trucks registered in the
21	United Kingdom". That's B/15/3.
22	THE PRESIDENT: Just looking at the exclusions, which are in
23	paragraph 10
24	MR THOMPSON: Yes, Sir?
25	THE PRESIDENT: You have excluded dealers. At 10(d):

1	"Finance providers, converters and lessors are"
2	lessors as defined at 9(h).
3	MR THOMPSON: That's right.
4	THE PRESIDENT: Now, as I understand it, it's lessors who
5	there is a lot of background noise. It may be that
6	someone who is on Teams but not counsel is not muted, so
7	I would ask everyone on the Teams platform, other than
8	Mr Thompson, please, to mute themselves.
9	Lessor leases out an operating lease or long-term
10	financing agreement, so if have I understood this
11	correctly if someone buys new trucks for a truck
12	rental business, other than where it is an operating
13	lease or long-term financing, they will be in the class?
14	MR THOMPSON: Yes that's right. I think that's a notable
15	distinction from the RHA class.
16	THE PRESIDENT: Yes. So that's because of the way lessor is
17	the exclusion, and the way that's defined.
18	MR THOMPSON: Yes. I think it was an issue that was raised
19	originally in the original responses, and we responded
20	in our original reply, and then I think it's been the
21	subject of some correspondence, even since the amended
22	reply, but we have now clarified the position as best we
23	can to distinguish on the basis of leases of more or
24	less than a year, because our understanding is that it's
25	wirtually unknown for for example a finance lease to

1	be less than a year.
2	THE PRESIDENT: So what is the exclusion? Is it who rents
3	out for more than a year or is it as defined here or has
4	it been refined, the definition?
5	MR THOMPSON: I think the definition obviously
6	purchasers, we've defined in 8, "Acquired", is a defined
7	term, and then 9(a) has two possibilities. One,
8	purchase the truck as owner, and, secondly, took
9	possession of and operated a truck pursuant to an
10	operating lease, or alternative long-term financing
11	arrangement, not conferring rights of ownership, and
12	acquisition shall be construed accordingly, and then we
13	define, "Operating lease", and, "Long-term finance"
14	THE PRESIDENT: Oh I see. The 12 months is there in the
15	definitions of, "Long-term financing", and, "Operating
16	lease".
17	MR THOMPSON: So providing you have a lease which lasts more
18	than a year, and you are not a finance house, then you
19	are within the class. So it's intended to draw a clear
20	line
21	THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
22	MR THOMPSON: I think we partly accepted in our original
23	reply, and we do accept that that is the one issue which
24	is where there needs to be a demarcation, and we have
25	drawn it as best we can at that point, and it appears to

Т	us that that is a realistic distinction to draw, and
2	certainly a workable one, because it is perfectly clear.
3	THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Thank you.
4	MR THOMPSON: Then just in terms of the before we turn
5	away from that, my Lord Sir it may be worth just
6	looking very briefly, then, at paragraphs 15 and 19 of
7	the draft order which is at page 8 of $\mathrm{B}/15$. So
8	$\{B/15/8\}$. It partly goes to the point that I think the
9	Tribunal will be familiar with from an earlier case
10	about defunct persons and companies, but there is
11	a provision in the draft order for a successor in title,
12	both in the opt-in and the opt-out class at paragraphs
13	15 and 19. That's just to draw that matter to the
14	Tribunal's attention.
15	THE PRESIDENT: Well, how is paragraph 15 supposed to work?
16	I mean, suppose they don't. Someone if it is an
17	individual who has died, I don't know who the successor
18	in title is, they have personal representatives.
19	I don't know who the successor in title would be, and
20	suppose they don't give notice.
21	MR THOMPSON: Well, I think if they don't give notice then
22	they are deemed to still be within the class, but,
23	obviously, there may be a question of practicality later
24	on. I accept that, Sir. It was intended to address
25	this issue, but in my basic submission on this, it is

1	someching of a side show to the main questions before
2	the Tribunal. I simply brought it to the Tribunal's
3	attention as a feature of our draft order.
4	THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Well, it may not be a side when you
5	say, "A side show". It may I can see it is not the
6	central point, but it is not, necessarily,
7	insignificant, because the period is so long, of the
8	cartel, since the time since the end of the cartel is
9	also so long, for reasons we all know, that quite
LO	a lot certainly not an insignificant number of
L1	people will have died and, more particularly,
L2	businesses will have closed down, and there does need to
L3	be some mechanism of dealing with that. I'm not sure
L 4	paragraph 15 is really an answer.
L5	MR THOMPSON: I don't want to belittle the issue in terms of
L 6	statistics or the facts. It is just as a matter of
L7	principle, if it were a good point as a matter of
L8	principle, it would rather render the entire regime null
L 9	and void unless it was only intended for short-term
20	cases where you could be confident that nobody could
21	possibly have died in the middle of the claim class.
22	THE PRESIDENT: Well, you may be able I'm not sure that's
23	quite right, Mr Thompson. I mean, you may be able to
24	estimate there is a lot of estimation that goes on in
25	these cases the numbers that have gone, and make an

Т	adjustment, therefore, to the aggregate damages
2	accordingly where you are claiming aggregate damages,
3	and make an assumption that X per cent of trucks sold in
4	that period will be to businesses that no longer exist.
5	MR THOMPSON: Yes. That was very much the if we were
6	going to get into the substance, that was very much the
7	point I was going to make to the Tribunal, that
8	actuaries and other persons are quite familiar with
9	making estimates of that kind, but I was merely drawing
10	to the Tribunal's point
11	THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Well, you may want to come back to it
12	at some point, but I don't think, for my part, paragraph
13	15 of the order is really going to help very much.
14	MR THOMPSON: Okay. I move on.
15	Can I just draw the Tribunal's attention to the
16	provisions that UKTC has made in relation to run-off?
17	That's most easily seen in the original claim form, or
18	the amended claim form, rather, which is at $B/1$?
19	THE PRESIDENT: That's the same bundle, tab 1?
20	MR THOMPSON: Yes, and it is page $\{B/1/64\}$. So the effect
21	of this is not to amend the UKTC class, but it is
22	intended to say that in relation to purchases, our
23	understanding is that the price lists are set at the
24	start of the year, and so it is reasonable to assume
25	that any cartel effects that were still going in 2011

- would run for the year, and, likewise, that at least
 some finance and operating leases would have been
 entered into, certainly those that were lasting at least
 a year, would have been entered into during the cartel
 period, and would, therefore, be working their way out
 during 2011.
- 7 So it's not intended to be any more than a modest footnote, as it were, saying that the issue of run-off 8 is live, and that there is reason to think that it will 9 10 be material, and Dr Lilico has taken the relatively conservative approach of treating it as a straight line 11 12 deduction during 2011. So I think he has averaged it at 13 half the effect during the cartel period, so that's the modest extent to which we have made provision for 14 15 run-off in relation to our claims.
- Just returning to the statutory regime --
- 17 THE PRESIDENT: But it is only run-off for people who have
- 18 bought --
- 19 MR THOMPSON: Indeed.
- 20 THE PRESIDENT: -- before 18 January 2011.
- MR THOMPSON: Yes.
- 22 THE PRESIDENT: That's to say, during the cartel period.
- No, sorry, it goes beyond the cartel period. Yes. To
- the beginning of 2011. Is that right?
- 25 MR THOMPSON: I think that is the cartel period.

THE PRESIDENT: That is -- yes. It is the cartel period,

yes, so it's for people who purchased -- I was right

3 first time -- within the cartel period, therefore losses

4 continue, if they have losses continuing one more.

MR THOMPSON: The purpose of that is so that we've got

a clear class, because otherwise our concern is that the

class definition would be either circular or ambiguous.

The further point on the statutory regime arises out of Rule 79(1)(a) which is at {JA/11/21} where the Rule says that the Tribunal may certify claims and it specifies not only the commonality and the suitability conditions in 79(1)(b) and (c), but also it requires that the claims are brought on behalf of an identifiable class of persons, and that doesn't correspond to 47B(5) or 47B(7)(b) of the Act, but it is nonetheless a further condition imposed by the rules, and, in practice, it is critical to the certification process, and it is so for a number of reasons.

First of all, it reflects one of the mandatory terms for an order in section 47B(7) and Rule 80. 47B(7) we don't necessarily need to go to it, is at {JA/6/4} and Rule 80 is at the bottom of this same page, {JA/11/21} and the very last line is 80(1)(c) where it requires the order to describe or otherwise identify the class and any sub-classes, so it is a requirement of the order

L	process. It's one of the three conditions in 47B(7)
2	which is also authorisation for class representative and
3	classifications, opt-in or opt-out.

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It's also a necessary feature of the application which one finds at {JA/11/18} at the top of the page.

It is the first requirement of the collective proceedings claim form to provide a description of the proposed class.

In practice, if we go back to Rule 78 and 79 on ${JA/11/20}$ and 21, so starting on 20, the first condition under 78(2)(a) is that the class representative -- is whether the class representative would act in the interests of class members. 78(2)(b) relates to possible conflicts of interest of the class representative with members of the class relative to the common issues, and then in relation to eligibility on the next page, $\{JA/11/21\}$ there are three aspects where the class definition is relevant. 78(2)(c), alternative proceedings by members of the class, 79(2)(d), the size and nature of the class, and 79(2)(e), the identifiability of class members, and then for good measure it is also relevant to 79(3)(b), the practicability of opt-in proceedings for class members, including the likely level of individual recovery.

So the identification of the claims is critical for

the commonality and suitability conditions, and the identification of the class is critical for the terms of the order and the application of those principles.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr Thompson, may I then ask you this; you took us to paragraph 15 of the draft order which is clearly prepared with the intention that those businesses that no longer exist, or if a sole trader who is no longer alive should opt out, that's the intention of -- indeed, they seem to be ordered to opt out. I'm not sure why we necessarily have power to order them to opt out, but that's what has been intended in the draft. Why isn't the class definition simply stating that such persons are not within the class, that it excludes -- just as you have excluded converters and lessors, you exclude persons who are no longer alive at the time of the making of the order if a sole trader or businesses that are no longer in existence, so that they are not within the class to start with.

MR THOMPSON: With respect, I think in principle they are within the class. I think it is a question of whether they can or do bring claims, and as I understand it the real point that is being got at is that, particularly in the context of an aggregate award, the aggregate award should be discounted by some degree to take account of the fact that, in practice, some dead persons will not

have any representatives who will bring claims, and some defunct companies may not be able to be revived, but that's, in my submission, a contingent question that the Tribunal will, in due course, have to grapple with, but, in principle, there is no reason why a claim can't be

brought on behalf of a deceased person.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, there is quite a lot of law on the inability of a deceased person to bring a claim, unsurprisingly, that there are some problems if someone is dead, starting an action, and, similarly, a defunct company. It can be revived in certain circumstances, it has to be restored to the register, but at the moment the class is defined, as you say, to include them, but isn't that a problem?

MR THOMPSON: In my submission no, for the reason I have given, but the Tribunal may be against me on that question, in which case we would have to address it, but at the moment my basic submission is that there is no reason why the claim can't be brought in principle on behalf of the deceased person, and it is just a question of whether or not there is a representative capable of bringing it, but we can perhaps come back to that when we've heard how Mr Harris puts it, and I know that the President has heard arguments on both sides of this question fairly recently.

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         THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Well, a deceased person, it is
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             well-established, can't start an action. Personal
             representatives can, but they bring it not on behalf of
 4
             the deceased person, they bring it on behalf of the
 5
             estate, which is a different entity. Similarly,
             a defunct company just can't start an action at all. No
 6
 7
             one can do it.
         MR THOMPSON: The position we have here is that we have
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             a class representative who brings it on behalf of a
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             class, and also -- or on behalf of the persons who opt
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             into the class, if I can put it in that way.
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         THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
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         PROFESSOR WILKS: If I may come in briefly for a moment --
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             can you hear me?
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         MR THOMPSON: Yes.
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         PROFESSOR WILKS: Yes. First is that although paragraph 15
             does talk about the deceased persons, it doesn't appear
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             to be -- as I read it in the order, so that it isn't
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             publicly notifiable -- sorry, there is a lot of
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             interference, isn't there -- that's my first point.
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                 My second point was, if these deceased persons are
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             going to be included at some point, will that be
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             reflected within Dr Lilico's methodology in terms of
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             volume of commerce?
         MR THOMPSON: Yes. Well, I think the answer to that
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question would be -- when you say, "Included", I don't 1 2 know whether you mean it would be taken into account and therefore excluded. 3 4 PROFESSOR WILKS: Yes, I do. 5 MR THOMPSON: I think that, as with other respects, Dr Lilico is a perfectly realistic person. If the 6 7 evidence is that 2 per cent or even 10 per cent of the people who bought trucks in 1997 will have died, then it 8 would be appropriate to make an adjustment to any 9 10 aggregate assessment, but if there isn't any such 11 evidence, then it wouldn't be. 12 PROFESSOR WILKS: Thanks. 13 MR THOMPSON: I see Mr Harris wants to weigh in. 14 reluctant to take any interventions, as it were, 15 because of the --16 MR HARRIS: Can I just say, sorry Mr Thompson, from our 17 perspective, it's not satisfactory for you to wait to 18 hear how I put it orally because this is a constrained 19 hearing. We put it in writing in our amended response 20 and we put it in writing in our skeleton argument, and, 21 in fact, I have to hear how you respond so that I can 22 respond to you. MR THOMPSON: Yes. Well (Inaudible). 23 24 THE PRESIDENT: It may be that it won't be necessary for you

to respond, Mr Harris. I mean, we've got the point, the

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1	objection that's being taken, and I put it to
2	Mr Thompson, and I have got his answers, which, as I
3	understand it, that he wants to maintain them in the
4	class, there is this provision in the order which I have
5	said I find troubling because I don't see that we have
6	jurisdiction to order people to opt out. They are not
7	individuals before the Tribunal, but at the same time he
8	says that if there is statistical evidence that
9	a certain and there clearly will be statistical
10	evidence of how many people die per year and so on, it
11	won't be people who run trucks businesses, but there is
12	some evidence of a number of hauliers that go out of
13	business, then that will be adjusted in the methodology,
14	and Dr Lilico could he will make an appropriate
15	reduction, but if he is making an appropriate reduction
16	it seems to me one is excluding them from the class.
17	MR THOMPSON: I mean, I am reluctant to get drawn into this
18	in any detail, but, with respect, Sir, I wouldn't agree
19	with you, that the claims, as claims, are not
20	appropriately within the class because claims can be
21	brought on behalf of deceased persons, subject to
22	certain conditions, and so, in reality, the actuarial
23	advice would not be sufficient, because they would have
24	to be people who are not only dead, but in respect of
25	whom claims could not be brought, and that might be

1	a more difficult thing for Mr Harris to advance as
2	a proposition, because it wouldn't be enough to show
3	that they had died, you would have to show and,
4	likewise, in relation to defunct companies they would
5	have to be not only defunct but not in a position
6	whereby they could be revived to claim what might be
7	significant sums against his client.
8	THE PRESIDENT: Yes. No. I understand your point.
9	MR THOMPSON: It seems to me inappropriate to debar them
10	now.
11	THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
12	MR THOMPSON: Then the fourth topic, which is something
13	I can be brief on because we've set it out in some
14	detail in our amended reply at bundle $\{B/2/5\}$ to 8,
15	paragraphs 10-15, is the character and nature of our
16	application as described in both the amended claim form
17	and the amended reply, and I will pick out five
18	features.
19	First of all, it is a damages action for harm caused
20	by an admitted and long-lasting international cartel
21	relating to the future list prices of a readily
22	identifiable industrial product, namely medium and heavy
23	trucks.
24	Secondly, and relating to section 47B(5)(a) and (8)
25	in particular

- 1 THE PRESIDENT: Sorry to interrupt you, where are you in the
- 2 reply?

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- 3 MR THOMPSON: It's paragraphs 10-15 of our amended reply.
- 4 THE PRESIDENT: 10-15.
- 5 MR THOMPSON: Starting at page 5.
- 6 THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
- 7 MR THOMPSON: I wasn't proposing to read it out, I was
- 8 proposing to --
- 9 THE PRESIDENT: No, no.
- 10 MR THOMPSON: -- to point out.
- In relation to the class representative, so relevant to section 47B(5)(a) and (8), we would say that we are a Special Purpose Vehicle with no other objective than to pursue these proceedings with an experienced legal chair and an expert board of industry specialists with

no links to the admitted cartelists.

- Thirdly, in relation to the claims, and section

 47B(5)(b) and (6), these claims relate to the direct

 acquisition, either by outright purchase or long-term

 lease, of the specific products which are the subject

 matter of the cartel, with a modest run-off period for

 those making such purchases or entering into such leases

 during the admitted cartel period.
- The class members are predominantly small and
 medium-sized businesses, the exact target group of this

legislation, for whom the prospect of litigation on this scale and complexity will be completely out of the question unless conducted on a collective basis, and even this hearing illustrates that proposition, and, fifthly, there are tens of thousands of actual or potential claimants, and hundreds of thousands of actual or potential claims in respect of claims on a scale and complexity that the Tribunal has already found in its disclosure judgment to be impossible to try effectively on a conventional and individualised basis, even in the individual cases. That's the Ryder disclosure ruling at paragraphs 40-43 which I don't think we need to turn up. The President clearly is clearly very familiar with it. It is at {JA/64/15} to 17 in joint authorities bundle 4.

We say this important guidance as to the nature of the litigation arising out of the settlement decision now, of course, falls to be considered in the light of the general guidance of the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court in Merricks as to the correct approach to be adopted by the Tribunal in collective proceedings.

We think in the light of that that it's not unfair to ask the rhetorical question of what possible circumstances could be more favourable for the statutory provisions to be applied than to the direct purchaser in the UK of products that were for 14 years the subject of

an admitted massive international cartel, involving tens
of thousands of claimants, the great majority of
claimants are SMEs, and hundreds of thousands of
transactions over a period of 14 years. We say if this
isn't a case for a collective proceedings order under
this regime, what is.

So that is much by way of introduction, and I'm then, as I indicated, going to address the following points; what are the UKTC claims defined in the ACF, the amended claim form, and the draft order, and to what extent do they overlap with the RHA claims? We say, as I have indicated, that this is a critical issue for the three statutory conditions, and for the first eligibility condition in Rule 79.

Secondly, is it just and reasonable for UKTC to be appointed as the class representative for those UKTC claims?

Thirdly, do those UKTC claims raise the same, similar or related issues of fact or law? Fourthly, are those claims suitable to be brought in collective proceedings?

Five, if an order is to be made whether those UKTC claims should be made on an opt-in or opt-out basis, sixthly, and this will transition into the hearing that's to be carried out on Monday, what is the

1	relevance of the evidence of Dr Liftco giving his expert
2	opinion on the way in which common issues, identified in
3	the claim form, may suitably be determined on
4	a collective basis, which is in the guidance at
5	paragraph 6.13 of the court guide, Tribunal guide, which
6	is at $\{JA/12/18\}$. I don't think we need to turn that
7	up.
8	So, first of all, the UKTC claims which we address
9	at paragraphs 42-45 and 66-78 of our skeleton argument
LO	which is pages 14-15 and 24-28 of Bundle A1. We've
L1	already looked at the draft UKTC order at $\mathrm{B}/15$, but
L2	we've tried to summarise our approach as against the RHA
L3	approach in the one-page annex at the back of the
L 4	skeleton argument which is $\{A/1/41\}$.
L5	THE PRESIDENT: Yes. That was very helpful.
L 6	MR THOMPSON: Having looked at the UKTC order, it's probably
L7	worth looking at the RHA draft order which is at C/10 in
L 8	Bundle 1.
L 9	THE PRESIDENT: Well, are you now doing a comparison between
20	the two applications? Is that what you are embarking
21	on?
22	MR THOMPSON: Well, it is background to that but I think it
23	is necessary for the Tribunal to understand the
24	differences between our application and the RHA
25	application, particularly

1	THE	PRESI	DENT	Γ:	I th	ink w	e've	got	a	pretty	good	picture	of
2		that,	so	I	don't	want	to	take	ир	time	with	that.	

3 MR THOMPSON: Can I just make a series of points then?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Make your points, I think, rather than taking us to the document.

MR THOMPSON: Yes. I mean, our basic point is that ours is a closely fitting definition which is directed to a clear category of claims, and we've discussed that already, and it's been specifically adapted to the facts of this case to be clear, simple, and non-discriminatory, and to avoid any possible conflicts now or in the future.

We would say that the contrast between our approach and the RHA one is a striking one. I hesitate to make analogies, but one of the most celebrated metaphors of our Prime Minister was to describe EU law as being uncomfortably tight in certain respects, and dangerously loose in others, and in my submission there is a similar contrast between our definition and the RHA one, and, first of all at paragraph 5 of the order that the RHA are seeking, it is said to apply only to road haulage operations, and one might ask why are other categories of truck usage excluded and note that there is no such exclusion from the UKTC claims, and the reason for that appears to have been the close proximity between these

1 claims and the RHA as --2 THE PRESIDENT: When you say, "road haulage", my understanding, and Mr Flynn will correct me if I'm wrong, of the RHA claim, it's not restricted to those 4 5 who purchase a truck for hire -- to use for hire and 6 reward. It also includes those who purchase a truck for what's described as, I think, "own account", so if 7 a grocery store purchases a truck to use for deliveries, 8 something that there has been a lot of in the past 9 10 months, that would be included. MR THOMPSON: Oh yes. I think -- but as I understand it, 11 12 there are words of limitation in paragraph 5 of the RHA 13 definition which refers to -- that they must be for road haulage operations. 14 15 THE PRESIDENT: Yes. 16 MR THOMPSON: -- and has permission for road haulage, so unless that's a meaningless addition, as I understand 17 it's the word of limitation. 18 19 THE PRESIDENT: But what's the limitation you say applies in 20 substance? 21 MR THOMPSON: Well, if something is not for road haulage 2.2 then I assume it is excluded. 23 THE PRESIDENT: Well yes, but what do you understand for use 24 in road haulage to mean? MR THOMPSON: Well, I think that there are other uses of a 25

1 truck than road haulage. I'm not sure that refuse 2 collection, for example, is road haulage. THE PRESIDENT: Yes. I thought that -- yes. You are saying 3 if it is used for refuse collection it wouldn't be 4 5 included. That's your reading of it, is it? MR THOMPSON: I don't know what this wording is here for if 6 7 it is not to exclude something. THE PRESIDENT: Well, can I just clarify with Mr Flynn, 8 9 then? Because we need to understand that. 10 Yes, Mr Flynn? Mr Flynn? I think you are on mute. 11 MR FLYNN: Let me try that. Can you hear me now? 12 THE PRESIDENT: We can. 13 MR FLYNN: Your understanding is correct, Sir and I will take you, if necessary, to the relevant part of our 14 15 order, but it's not just for hire and reward use of 16 trucks, but also for people who use it for their own purposes. You gave the example of a supermarket with 17 18 their own fleet, and the same would apply for local 19 authorities using refuse lorries as well. It is for own 20 use, I think, is the term. 21 THE PRESIDENT: Yes. So it's --22 MR FLYNN: I was just going to say, just to finish, you will 23 find a definition at paragraph 7.2 of our order, and I 24 just am struggling to get it in front of me, but the key issue is whether you have a licence, an O licence, an 25

1	operator ricence, and that's one way or cutting the data
2	as you will have seen, is by reference to licences, so
3	our class is essentially licence holders.
4	Sir, I'm not hearing you. I don't know if that's my
5	fault or
6	THE PRESIDENT: The only exclusion might be if it is
7	operated on only on private land or something and
8	never leaves private land, so you may not need
9	a licence, something like that.
L 0	MR FLYNN: I think there was, in the early days, some
L1	reference to farm vehicles that never went on public
L2	roads, but I think at the margins there might be cases
L3	of that kind, but the essence of it is the O licence,
L 4	and I can explore the fringes of this at a later stage,
L5	if that would be helpful.
L 6	THE PRESIDENT: No. Thank you very much. I think that's
L7	enough. Thank you, Mr Flynn.
L 8	So I think, Mr Thompson, I do not see that myself
L 9	there are many distinctions with the RHA claim, clearly,
20	but I do not see that as a particular distinction.
21	MR THOMPSON: Sir, if I could just clarify, I obviously
22	accept that if Sainsbury's Commissioned somebody else to
23	haul something or Sainsbury's hauls it on its own
24	account, that's clearly within the scope of the
25	definition, and I would also certainly accept that the

great predominant usage of trucks is for road haulage,

but insofar as something isn't for road haulage, it

3 appears to me that it is excluded by this definition.

THE PRESIDENT: Well no, my understanding is that that is not right, because if you use a truck on a public road you need an operator's licence, and it doesn't matter whether you are collecting refuse or carrying goods, and road haulage is defined in terms of the operator licence that the driver needs. That's my understanding. We can look at this later if necessary when Mr Flynn comes to address this.

MR THOMPSON: Perhaps we can then move on to the second one, which is the primary business exclusion where it is quite clear that there is a difference, namely that where the majority of the turnover relates to selling or leasing trucks, then that person is excluded, and, again, I think we see no reason why such persons should be excluded if they are overcharged for a new truck, and you will recall that this was the subject of some brief discussion between the Tribunal and myself at the start of the May 2019 hearing by reference to a letter that had been written by Messrs Charthire complaining that they couldn't bring their 500-truck claim because they were excluded by the RHA definition. Does the Tribunal recall that? The reference is {B/29/2} and also the

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             transcript was L/2, pages 3-5. We pointed out a number
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             of anomalies that arise from that which it appears to us
             to make it undesirable to have that restriction.
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                 The third one is the treatment of cost-plus
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             operators which is addressed in evidence by Mr Leonard
             in his first statement, and I think Mr Jowell in
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             particular has been exercised about cost-plus operators,
             and, as I understand it, I think it is necessary just to
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             look at this briefly, because it is not a particularly
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             easy -- or we haven't found it particularly easy to
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             understand. It's at \{C/1/27\}.
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         THE PRESIDENT: C1, what tab? You are in the claim form of
13
             the RHA or what document?
         MR THOMPSON: It is the amended claim form of the RHA,
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15
             and --
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         THE PRESIDENT: I see. \{C/1/27\}.
         MR THOMPSON: There is a footnote that hasn't been deleted
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             which is sitting at the bottom of \{C/1/27\}.
         THE PRESIDENT: Footnote 24?
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         MR THOMPSON: Yes. I don't know if the Tribunal has had
             a chance to consider this issue, but we found it
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             somewhat difficult to understand. I'm not sure if I
23
             need to read this out.
         THE PRESIDENT: Well, I think it is something we will take
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             up with Mr Flynn. As far as your claim is concerned, or
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your application, what's the position about a cost-plus operator? As I understand it, they are just included?

Is that right?

MR THOMPSON: Yes. As we understand it they don't form an identifiable class. Some people sometimes provide services on the cost-plus basis, but we don't think that it is easy to identify people who only do that, and even where they do, they probably do it under pressure from their customers rather than voluntarily, and they don't necessarily have a carte blanche simply to pass through their fixed cost anyway, and we say that at most this is a contested issue of evidence, but not a basis to tinker around with the class definition.

Then the final point is the treatment of sub-lessees, as it were, and whether purchasers of new trucks should be excluded insofar as they -- their trucks are actually used by other people, or supplied to other people, and there we have a concern that we don't really understand -- or there appears certainly to be a difference, and it is in the same tab, the amended claim form, paragraph 77, where it is pleaded that to the extent the proposed class members purchased or leased relevant trucks, other than from the cartelists, including from independent intermediaries, it is averred that the inflated prices for relevant trucks caused by

the infringement were fully passed on to the proposed class members, and the Tribunal will recall that the definition of, "Lease", in the RHA form is very, very broad, and includes spot hirers, and this appears to be a general exclusion of upstream suppliers on the basis of an assertion that their overcharge is fully passed on to lessees and sublessees, and that seems to us to be a very, very wide and uncertain pleading, and that as far as we are concerned the issue of pass-on is not a matter that we might plead positively, it is a matter for the cartelists to plead and prove, we having established an overcharge in relation to a new truck.

So those --

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but if I may interrupt you for a moment, you are quite right, it is not a matter for which you have the burden of proof, but given that there is, clearly, a potential for pass-on in this case, it is something that the -- and we know it is going to be raised -- and we know that new trucks are often sold on after a certain period of life, quite aside from the general potential for pass-on, it is something that any method of quantification or form of proceedings is going to have to deal with, and have to have a way of dealing with fairly. We can't just postpone it until we get a defence saying, "There is pass-on".

1 MR THOMPSON: I understand that. The point I'm making here
2 is that Mr Flynn's clients are positively pleading,
3 apparently as against purchasers of new trucks, that

their entitlement has been fully passed on to lessees,

5 and apparently spot hirers, which --

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THE PRESIDENT: Well, I understand that point, yes.

MR THOMPSON: Then the other side of it, and we've looked at it in terms of our definition, and we are concerned that the breadth of the RHA claim is potentially inconsistent and raises conflicts as against the UKTC claims that we are concerned with, first of all, in terms of duration where the claim is said to be for over 22 years and both for new and used trucks, and so in terms of new trucks it is even longer because, presumably, any used truck that was purchased after 1997, or, indeed, hired after 1997, was once a new truck, and so it does make the claim extremely wide, and it is particularly difficult to understand, given that, as we understand Dr Davis' detailed reports, he is intending to operate on a, "During/After", basis, and so it's not clear to us at the moment, and I think the estimate is that there could be as many as 150,000 claims arising after the cartel period, whether these claims were intended to be actual claims or whether they are not really claims at all, but, rather, comparators that are going to be used for

1	the purposes of Dr Davis' regression analysis, and so
2	there appears to be a radical uncertainty about
3	a category of approximately a third of the RHA's claims
4	as to whether they are actually claims at all, and, as I
5	sought to indicate, that was the reason why we have
6	identified our class by a very specific purchase or
7	lease, namely one that took place during the cartel
8	period, because otherwise there seems to be an
9	ambivalence, and we are not clear how that ambivalence
10	will be resolved because it appears to be that only once
11	Dr Davis has done his expert analysis that you will be
12	able to separate the sheep from the goats.
13	THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Well, we will take that point up with
14	Mr Flynn, and we see that.
15	MR THOMPSON: Yes. We are also concerned, and I think this
16	is an issue that has been raised by more than one of the
17	defendants, as to how the issue of used trucks and new
18	trucks interacts with one another, and whether there
19	are
20	THE PRESIDENT: Yes?
21	MR THOMPSON: and likewise, the size of the foreign
22	trucks, and whether or not they are actually part of
23	that.
24	THE PRESIDENT: Mr Thompson, we've got all those points
25	about the RHA claims, and which have been made not only

1	by you but by several of the proposed defendants.
2	MR THOMPSON: I think the point that I'm concerned with is
3	in relation to our claims. There is a risk of
4	significant prejudice to members of the UKTC class if
5	either conflicts arise with indirect purchasers or
6	lessees of new and used trucks, if it is unclear whether
7	post-cartel claimants are, in reality, being used as
8	comparators
9	THE PRESIDENT: You just made that point. Yes.
10	MR THOMPSON: and if there are additional costs and
11	uncertainty arising out of international claims, we are
12	concerned that the basis for that appears to be that the
13	RHA has one or two very large claimants with
14	international interests, and that it could be
15	prejudicial to the small UKTC claimants if a large
16	amount of time and money and complexity is involved in
17	pursuing these international claims, and then, finally,
18	if there is confusion on the claimant's side between
19	pass-on as a mitigation defence and some form of
20	positive claim by indirect purchasers within the RHA
21	class.
22	So we have a concern as to how this interacts with
23	a positive case in relation to UKTC claims.
24	I'm not in any way seeking to prevent the cartelists
25	in their case, but I am concerned that we should make

our case clearly, and if they have a defence to it, that they should plead it and prove it.

If I now turn to the authorisation of --

THE PRESIDENT: Well, would that be a convenient moment,

5 then, to take a short break?

case it might be here.

6 MR THOMPSON: Yes. I see the time. I can probably cover
7 that, and I will obviously do my best to make up any
8 time I have lost, because I think that would be a good
9 moment, Sir.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, and it may be, if it is possible over the break, for -- and we might ask for technical assistance -- for the Tribunal -- the sound quality has been somewhat disturbing in that there is a strong resonance. I don't know if that's the case at your end when hearing my observations, but it is certainly the case for us listening to you, Mr Thompson, which sometimes makes it -- it is no fault of yours, of course, personally -- but there is something in the connection that is causing a very strong resonance, and if it is possible for any technical assistance at your end to look at that over the break, that would certainly assist everyone, I think. I don't know -- people can just nod -- are others experiencing this as well, that it is resonating, or is it just -- no? Well, in that

1 MR THOMPSON: What I might try is to link my own computer 2 here and switch off the main one, but whether you would hear me better I don't know. 4 THE PRESIDENT: The volume is fine, it is the clarity. We 5 have a running transcript, so that's a help. We will investigate as well and we will resume in -- at 12.15. 6 7 MR THOMPSON: I'm grateful. 8 (12.07 pm)9 (A short break) 10 (12.26 pm)11 THE PRESIDENT: Mr Thompson, that's the cue to continue. 12 MR THOMPSON: I'm grateful, Sir. We've made various efforts 13 but I'm not sure how far we've been successful, but we can make more efforts at lunchtime if the sound is still 14 15 unsatisfactory. 16 THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. MR THOMPSON: I was now going to turn to the question of 17 18 authorisation, so the 47B(5)(a) condition, which we 19 addressed at paragraphs 37-39 of our skeleton, which is 20 at page 11 and 13 of A/1. 21 This was effectively not an issue in the Merricks 22 case. The only issue raised was one of funding, and 23 Mr Merricks was otherwise accepted as a suitable person 24 to act as class representative, and you find that, for the Tribunal's note, at paragraphs 90-93 of the Tribunal 25

judgment, which is at JA/54/30 but I don't think there
is any need to turn it up.

THE PRESIDENT: If I can interrupt you, as I understand it, the only issue on authorisation in this case is not about the make-up or constitution or governance of UK Trucks which is a highly responsible board of directors, it is an issue about whether the litigation plan takes account of what it is said that Dr Lilico may need to do by way of getting information, data, to operate his method, and whether that's been adequately reflected. I think that was the extent of the issue on authorisation.

MR THOMPSON: Yes. Well, I don't want to take up time on matters that are not in dispute, although, clearly, your multifactorial exercise has to take into account issues, positive and negative, plus and minus factors, and the first point I was going to make was that the role of Mr Kaye as chair of the UKTC board in many ways corresponds to the role of Mr Merricks in that where the public guardian, as it were, from the perspective of UKTC, and I was also going to say that while the issue of whether or not UKTC is an appropriate body so that it is just and reasonable for it to be appointed, is in contrast to the suitability requirement in relation to the claims, it is not a relative issue. It is not a relative issue

1 as against individual claims.

There is one respect in which the Tribunal isn't required to look at relatively, which is Rule 78(2)(c), where there is more than one applicant seeking approval to act as the class representative in respect of the same claims, and it was partly for that reason that I spent a little bit of time comparing and contrasting the approach to the UKTC claims of UKTC as against the RHA.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

MR THOMPSON: So to the extent that the RHA is seeking to act for direct purchasers and long-term lessees during the cartel period, and it appears that that is a subset of their claims in paragraph 6.1 to 6.4 of annex 6, then the Tribunal may need to consider the relative suitability of the RHA and the UKTC in respect of those overlapping claims because that issue is relative to the claims that overlap, and just to clarify, that's a different question from whether the Tribunal could, in principle, make two CPOs in relation to claims arising out of the trucks cartel, where we would submit that there is, in reality, no basis for -- I think it is largely MAN's argument -- that this is impossible, except in the case of two opt-out applications as in the FX case, but that doesn't arise in the present case.

It's perhaps rather obvious that just to state the

obvious, UKTC is not seeking to act as class representative for the rather motley selection of RHA claims that fall outside the scope of the UKTC class, for example used trucks, foreign trucks, trucks purchased in 2018 or 2019 or claims on behalf of persons who received cost-plus services who happened to be members of RHA's class on independent grounds. Those other RHA claims are only relevant to UKTC insofar as they appeared to undermine RHA's suitability as class representative for the UKTC claims, or generally.

Sir, as the Tribunal has already said, the other issues are not contested, and just knocking them down, of course they are statutory factors that the Tribunal needs to take into account as positive or negative, and we would say that, for the purpose of 78(2)(a), the sole purpose of UKTC is to act fairly and adequately in the interests of its class members, for (2)(b) it has no interest that is or could be in conflict with interests of the class members that it has been created to represent, for (2)(d) the Tribunal has already resolved the funding issues in UKTC's favour, for 78(3)(a) UKTC is not a member of the proposed class, and for 78(3)(b), unlike the RHA, UKTC is not a pre-existing body and has no other objective that could prejudice the interests of class members.

1	So as the Tribunal says, that leaves the question of
2	the litigation plan which is essentially for
3	notification of actual and potential class members, for
4	governance and consultation of class members, and we
5	would say that the creation of an expert board with
6	a highly experienced senior lawyer as its independent
7	chair is the best possible way, and has been designed as
8	such, to perform the requirements of the legislation in
9	this respect.

In terms of the challenges which I think Mr Harris 10 11 in particular had raised on behalf of Daimler, I think 12 it is relevant to look at the approach of the Canadian 13 courts on this very question, and I think the most 14 convenient place to look is the judgment which appears 15 at tab 104 of the joint authorities bundle, joint 16 authorities bundle 8, Godfrey v Sony, which draws 17 together a previous judgment on this issue, and approves it, and applies it. $\{JA/104/1\}$. If one turns to say 18 tab 104 --19

> THE PRESIDENT: Just one moment. This is joint authorities, Bundle 8, and it is the first case in that bundle at tab 98.

MR THOMPSON: Tab 104 Sir. 23

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24 THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Just pause a moment. Yes. Thank you.

25 This is Pro-Sys and Godfrey.

1	MR THOMPSON: Yes. As I understand it, it was an appeal
2	it is Godfrey v Sony Corporation. You have Godfrey and
3	then there are a lot of appellants or defendants.
4	THE PRESIDENT: I'm sorry, 104. Yes. Godfrey.
5	MR THOMPSON: Mr Godfrey was in effect what we would call
6	a class representative and he had been approved at first
7	instance and the question was whether that was properly
8	done, and the reasoning on that issue is right at the
9	back of the judgment starting at page 75. ${JA/104/75}$.
10	You find at 248 a conclusion on an issue about
11	umbrella purchasers, and then at 249 there were two
12	questions; one, whether Mr Godfrey was an appropriate
13	representative of the umbrella purchasers, and then,
14	secondly, in relation to Mr Godfrey's litigation plan,
15	and then there is a description of the nature of the
16	decision at 250, saying it is a discretionary question,
17	both in terms of the suitability of the representative
18	and also the litigation plan, and then the dicta at
19	paragraphs 252-255 quoting an earlier judgment of
20	${JA/104/76}$, quoting an earlier judgment of Goudge, J
21	about the nature of litigation plans, and in paragraph
22	95 of the Cloud v Canada judgment:
23	"The litigation plan produced by the appellants is,
24	like all litigation plans, something of a work in

progress. It will undoubtedly have to be amended

1	particularly in light of the issues found to warrant a
2	common trial. Any shortcomings can be addressed under
3	the supervision of the case management judge once the
4	pleadings are completed".
5	Then towards the bottom of the paragraph 77 quoted
6	from the Fakhri case, it says:
7	"It is anticipated that plans will require
8	amendments as the case proceeds, notably individual
9	issues as demonstrated by the class members".
10	Then at 255:
11	"As I have suggested above"
12	THE PRESIDENT: Well, perhaps 254 as well:
13	"It has been said that the detail of a litigation
14	plan should correspond to the complexity of the action".
15	MR THOMPSON: Yes, and then it goes on:
16	"Class proceedings are flexible and dynamic in
17	nature. At the certification stage, the standard that
18	a litigation plan must meet is not one of perfection; as
19	affirmed in Fakhri, the plan need only set out
20	a framework within which the case may proceed and
21	demonstrate the representative plaintiff and class
22	counsel has a clear grasp of the complexities involved
23	in the case", and then 256 applies that learning to the
24	particular facts.
25	THE PRESIDENT: But all that is being said in 256 is, this

has been considered by the judge, it is a matter of discretion for the judge, or at least it involves an exercise of discretion, and he was satisfied and that's entitled to deference, so it doesn't actually tell us the basis on which the judge was satisfied on that plan and on what criteria he applied. This is an appellate judgment saying, "We are not going to interfere with the judge's view that it was adequate".

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MR THOMPSON: With respect, I would say two things. it is certainly saying that, that they should grant due deference to the trial judge, but it is also saying that the nature of the exercise in terms of certification of litigation plans is inevitably a provisional one, and as such case management has to take place, and it is really that second point that we are going to here, and the Tribunal will, of course, be aware that almost three years has passed since the original litigation plan was drafted and there are statements by Mr Kaye, I think, three statements by him, there is the statement of Mr Leonard, there are two statements of Mr Surguy and there are the statements of Mr Perrin, and there is the litigation plan itself, and if I give the Tribunal the references, Kaye 1-3 are at B/4, B/6 and B/10, so Leonard is at B/13, Mr Surguy is at B/11 and B/12, Mr Perrin's fifth and sixth statements are at B/9 and B/14

and the litigation plan itself is at B/16, and given the

scale and scope of this hearing, it's not really

possible for me to go blow-by-blow through each of those

witness statements --

THE PRESIDENT: Well, we don't want you to, but what is important is there are particular criticisms that have been made, and to deal with those, and you know what they are because they have been set out -- we've got so many respondents here -- but we've set them out, in particular, that the -- what Dr Lilico says he will need or seek to have, is it covered in the litigation plan, and is it covered in the budget. That's the point that arises. Dr Lilico has obviously done a lot of work, he has given a list of the things that he thinks he needs to consider, and has it been taken into account, and is it adequately budgeted for. I mean, that's the only point we need to look at, but it is an important point.

MR THOMPSON: I understand that, Sir, but it is a point that needs to be addressed in a realistic spirit, as I'm sure the Tribunal will do, taking into account that we are proceeding on the basis of a Commission decision, but not the documents that are relied on in a settlement decision, and without any disclosure at all of the documents that the defendants have in their possession, and so I accept the very limited evidence that they have

already adduced, that some, at least, of the manufacturers, did have a pretty good grasp on the level of discounting that took place in relation to their trucks, and so this is obviously an issue that can be explored with Dr Lilico, but in my submission he would say, well, there is inevitably going to be a huge amount of information within the possession of the defendants, and the extent to which further information is required, possibly on the claimants' side, to essentially address two questions; what was the character of this cartel, and what was the character of this market, because, as you will appreciate, Dr Lilico's methodology, essentially models the impact of the cartel on this market, and so it needs to know enough for the Tribunal to reach intelligible conclusions about the nature of this market and the nature of this cartel, but he also, of course, needs a certain amount of information about the relationship between list prices and transaction prices so that the Tribunal can reach a view as to the likely level of actual transaction prices across the market, and also other issues relevant to questions such as the production costs and the elasticity of demand which are factors which he builds into his model, but I'm reluctant to go much further into that because that seems quintessentially the sort of issue that the

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1 Tribunal may wish to debate with Dr Lilico next Monday. 2 THE PRESIDENT: Well, I think this is the point, but I think 3 Dr Lilico has explained the sort of information that he 4 would like to -- and seek to have, and certainly that's 5 something that can be explored with him, but he's not 6 involved, of course, in the litigation plan or the 7 funding, and if he says, well, I think to operate my method it will be necessary or desirable to do X and Y, 8 that is his evidence, he can't go beyond that, it is 9 10 then a question whether your litigation plan has provided for doing X and Y and getting that information, 11 12 if it is needed by, for example, third party disclosure 13 or information from a sample of class members, and how that will be done, and that's where -- that's not 14 15 a matter for Dr Lilico, that's a matter for you, and 16 that's what the criticism, as I understand it, that has been advanced, goes to. 17 18 MR THOMPSON: Yes. 19 THE PRESIDENT: Just take an example. If you look at his 20 fourth expert report which is Bundle F, the first 21 Bundle F at tab 4, which starts at page 1. $\{F/4/1\}$. 22 That's the first page of his report, and then we go into the report at $\{F/4/8\}$. Dr Lilico has very helpfully set 23 out the sort of steps and tasks that his approach 24

involves, and on page 9 $\{F/4/9\}$ -- well, bottom of page

1 8, he says:

"My assessment of overcharge would draw on a range of sources of data and other information and these include the following", and then he has a list, and the fifth one from the bottom is, "Data obtained from claimants (eg perhaps sample data)". Now, has your litigation plan taken that on board, and how is that going to be done, given that it is an opt-out class that you are at the moment asking for, and what's the procedure, and that's a matter for the litigation plan, not for Dr Lilico. He just says, "I want this information".

MR THOMPSON: Yes, and -- well, we have addressed it in both

Mr Surguy's second and third statement and in the terms

of the litigation plan itself, but we've caveated it by

the fact that as that list helpfully indicates, there

are one, two, three, four, five, six, seven items above

that, a number of which are currently within the

exclusive knowledge and control of the cartelists.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I appreciate that, of course, that's not something -- you are going to get disclosure, and that's covered in your litigation plan, but the one above it includes third party, some data from third parties, and have you budgeted for third party disclosure. That's the sort of thing we need to take on

1 board.

2	MR THOMPSON: I think the answer is that we have done all
3	those things, but, of course, the Tribunal is by no
4	means a naive Tribunal, and so it is aware that third
5	party disclosure exercises come in a number of different
6	shapes and sizes, and if the test is whether our plan
7	and our budget includes the most extreme types of third
8	party disclosure exercise, or, indeed, the most
9	extensive sampling that Mr Harris could possibly demand
10	before he was prepared to entertain our claim, then the
11	case that's why the Canadian case is relevant,
12	because both the funder and the Weightmans is
13	a responsible litigation solicitor and indeed the board
14	as a responsible board, doesn't want to go haring off,
15	spending enormous sums of money on a task that is,
16	actually, a complete waste of time because Dr Lilico
17	says, "Well, I don't need any more data because when you
18	look at this the defendants are bang to rights." It is
19	perfectly obvious that they knew what the level of
20	discounting was, so (Inaudible) it is very much the same
21	sort of point as the Tribunal itself made in the funding
22	judgment, but there are two things. One, it is very
23	uncertain, and, two, this is an unusual situation
24	because the collective claims, for various reasons we
25	are all familiar with, have fallen behind the individual

claims, and so it is likely that a number of these
questions, indeed some of them, have already been
decided, and it is likely that a number -- more of them,
will be decided before this case comes to trial, so that
makes it particularly difficult to know what the
budgeting implications are going to be.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, let's think about pass-through which is clearly going to be a significant issue raised by the defendants. That's clear. Pass-through is something where Dr Lilico is going to be faced with the arguments about pass-through, it's only new trucks you are claiming for, and he is going to have to consider how he is going to -- what data is needed or what data you want for him to argue against whatever level of pass-through is being urged against him.

MR THOMPSON: I'm reluctant to intervene, Sir, but I don't think that's necessarily a given, given the implications of a plea of pass-on for the overall liability of this group of defendants. I know they make protestations about their enthusiasm for pass-on now, but MasterCard is less enthusiastic about pass-on in the context of Mr Harris' Merricks claim, and so it is possible that counsel will say, "Well, wait a minute, if we say there is so much pass-on from new trucks, we are going to be faced with very difficult situations in other cases",

1	and, indeed, you may be faced with arguments from
2	Dr Lilico that a lot of the claimants went bust because
3	of pass-on effects and volume effects, and so
4	THE PRESIDENT: Well, all I can say is that you have
5	referred to the individual claims, of which there are
6	quite a lot now, and in every one of them pass-through
7	is being run as a defence, quite vigorously with a lot
8	of disclosure resulting. So anything is conceivable,
9	but the expectation on the basis, now, of some
LO	experience of the Tribunal with trucks claims against
L1	these very defendants is that they do, indeed, as they
L2	have said they will, run a pass-through defence, whether
L3	you think they are wise to do it or not is not for me.
L 4	I think we would be rather naive if we approach this on
L5	the basis that there is not going to be a pass through
L 6	defence, particularly in your claim, given that you are
L7	not claiming for used trucks, so that makes the pass
L8	through defence particularly less unattractive, if
L9	you like, than where you have because the claim on
20	the resale of the truck isn't going to benefit your
21	class.
22	MR THOMPSON: I understand that. I was simply making the
23	point that the goose and the gander here may lead them
24	to have some reservations about saying what a very good
25	point it is on behalf of the used trucks purchased, but

I simply make that by way of qualification, Sir, but I accept the general point, and I think our more substantial point is that unless and until this case is actually pleaded against us, it's very difficult for us to predict what the likely scale and scope of it, or the nature of the issues that the cartelists will actually seek to raise.

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THE PRESIDENT: But we've got to be realistic, Mr Thompson, otherwise what we end up with, we ignore pass-through for now, and we say, "Yes, this all works", and then we get a defence, or defences alleging pass-through. then see it is a big issue. It is then said, "Now the methodology doesn't work", so we have another big hearing and then we set aside the CPO. Now, that can't make sense. Where there is -- of course there may be wholly unforeseen defences we can't take account of, but where there is something so central and fundamental, one has got to think about it at this stage, otherwise we end up in a mess, and it's not fair to the individual claimants whose interests we must bear in mind, that this is actually a case that is actually going to work in an effective way. It may be that there is a very good way of dealing with pass through, I'm not saying there isn't, but it is something that has got to be considered.

Τ	MR THOMPSON: Certainly. I don't think Dr Lilico is
2	reluctant to debate the issues with the Tribunal, all
3	I'm saying is that, at the certification stage, the
4	primary focus is on the case that we have advanced and
5	the reservation that we had about the RHA is that it
6	seems to have although it says pass-on shouldn't be
7	thought about at all as a part-issue, in fact the
8	positive case is a positive case on pass-through, and
9	that's a distinct feature from our case which is the
10	straightforward case about the position of direct
11	purchasers where the issue of whether or not there has
12	been pass-on is a matter for the cartelists to plead and
13	prove.
14	THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but your litigation plan has got to
15	plan for the realistic developments of the litigation,
16	the realistic and foreseeable developments of the
17	litigation.
18	MR THOMPSON: Yes. We are certainly not naive that the
19	cartelists are not going to defend themselves, and I
20	certainly am not naive that one of the things they will
21	think about are pleas in mitigation. Indeed, Mr Harris
22	in particular has produced quite a long list.
23	THE PRESIDENT: Yes, so the way of dealing with that is
24	something that Dr Lilico will have thought about, and we
25	can ask him about that, and your litigation plan should

1 take on board, and maybe it has. 2 MR THOMPSON: Well, in my submission also, the Ryder disclosure ruling is highly relevant to this, because 3 I think one of the issues that was indicated was that 4 5 that was going to be treated, in particular the issue of pass-on wasn't really feasible to be dealt with on 6 7 a micro basis, and a similar indication was given by the Supreme Court in Sainsbury's in relation to volume 8 effects, that they were going to have to be dealt with 9 at an economic level, because if Mr Harris and Mr Singla 10 11 say that the butcher, the baker and the candlestick 12 maker all had different pass-ons, then the issues would 13 obviously ramify and be completely unwieldy, but I think --14 15 THE PRESIDENT: Well, it is dealt with by the broad axe. 16 That has been established. It doesn't have to be done at a granular level. It is an estimate using the broad 17 18 axe to employ the well-worn metaphor, in just the same 19 way as the estimate of the overcharge. 20 MR THOMPSON: Yes. We don't know whether, by way of 21 defence, it is in the cartelists' interests to do it in 22 terms of the broad axe, or whether they may say we will be better making it all so very complicated and 23 24 expensive. THE PRESIDENT: Well, with a class, I think it is inevitable 25

that it will be dealt with by the broad axe, and that's the way that the Supreme Court has effectively said it should be dealt with where you have a complex claim, and that the only question I'm raising is whether that has been taken into account in the litigation plan and how it's going to be approached from your side in no doubt seeking to argue there was very little pass-on, and what sort of evidence which doesn't come, obviously, from the defendants in this case, how it's going to be approached, and what budgetary implications that has. It's as simple as that.

MR THOMPSON: Yes, and I think in a sense, as the Tribunal has very helpfully put to us, and as Dr Lilico has very -- in his usual, very clear way, has set out at F/4/9, he is relying on a wide range of data but the Tribunal rightly brings the focus in to the extent to which there may need to be, in due course, disclosure from third parties, all of which the Tribunal may direct some degree of sampling within the claimant class. The point I'm pushing back on is that unless and until the process of disclosure has gone some way down the track, it's going to be very difficult for the Tribunal, or, indeed, for UKTC, to reach any informed view about the extent to which sampling from potential or actual claimants is going to be a useful exercise, or on what

1	basis it is going to be conducted, and in relation to
2	pass-on, unless and until the and at the moment we
3	don't even know whether the claimants the
4	cartelists are going to say that they want to run
5	used trucks as a pass-on issue or some other issue,
6	whether they may say, "Used trucks moved up and down
7	because they are in competition with new trucks". We
8	just don't know what the argument is going to be in
9	relation to used trucks, and, likewise, whether they are
10	really going to say that sub-purchasers, or sub-sub
11	purchasers were passed on, and allow that to ramify, and
12	the extent to which that's going to be a complex issue
13	that we are going to have to deal with, or whether it is
14	actually going to be a high level economic argument, and
15	so it is only to that extent that we are saying it is
16	very difficult to estimate specifically what's going to
17	be needed, and we say that the guidance of the Canadian
18	courts is highly material to that sort of question, that
19	it's going to evolve, depending on the issues as they
20	emerge, and are pleaded, and the evidence, as it
21	emerges, and the guidance of the Tribunal.
22	THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Can you just take us, before we have
23	to break, to your cost budget, and what's in it for
24	contingencies on that basis?
25	MR THOMPSON: Yes. I should first I think it may be

1 worth --2 THE PRESIDENT: I don't know if it has been revised, given 3 the passage of time. MR THOMPSON: I was actually going to first take you to the 4 5 witness statement of Mr Perrin which is at tab 9, and you will appreciate that Mr Perrin, or persons related 6 7 to Mr Perrin --8 THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Tab 9 of Bundle B1? 9 MR THOMPSON: Yes. 10 THE PRESIDENT: $\{B/9/1\}$. MR THOMPSON: Go to $\{B/9/3\}$, it is, as it were, the other 11 12 side of the balance sheet, paragraph 13. Mr Perrin 13 makes the general comment that if there is a budget 14 overrun on the case --15 THE PRESIDENT: Yes. 16 MR THOMPSON: -- would be taken, as it has in many other 17 cases, but: 18 "Assuming the case continues to have merit, the 19 current investors will respond to the need to make 20 additional investment, because to fail to do so might 21 cause a collapse of the case from the loss of the very 22 substantial funds already invested". 23 So that's a point that I think the Tribunal picked 24 up in the funding judgment and I think it is obviously 25 part of the context that needs to be borne in mind in

1 this discussion. 2 THE PRESIDENT: Yes. MR THOMPSON: In terms of the budget itself, that's explained in the second and third witness statements of 4 5 Mr Surguy which are at tabs 11 and 12, and then the budget itself, I will be assisted, is -- I think it is 6 7 an annex to the litigation plan which is at tab 16, and that's at tab 17, which is the exhibit "JMAS 5". 8 THE PRESIDENT: Ah yes. Thank you. 9 10 MR THOMPSON: I see the time Sir. I don't know whether you 11 want to break now. 12 THE PRESIDENT: Well, I was saying if we just look at this 13 before we break. MR THOMPSON: If you are asking me about disclosure then 14 15 I think that is something we looked at, and the figure 16 is currently just over £5 million. THE PRESIDENT: I'm looking, really, at -- just at the 17 18 contingencies. There is a contingent cost A and B, but 19 what is A and what is B? I'm on page B/17/7. I fully 20 take your point that the funder has every incentive not 21 to leave you high and dry, but to put in more funds if 2.2 necessary {B/17/7}. Is that explained? Perhaps you can 23 take instructions over the lunch adjournment of what 24 contingent cost A and contingent cost -- well, contingent cost A, it is at the bottom, it is 25

Τ	a mediation, I think, and contingent cost B, an
2	allowance made for two CMCs post approval and pre PTRs.
3	Yes. I see. So it's not about additional disclosure.
4	MR THOMPSON: Is the question that's being put to me whether
5	there is or should be a generalised contingency element,
6	given the uncertainties? Is that the point that's being
7	put to me?
8	THE PRESIDENT: Well, as I understood it, what you are
9	saying is, well, we can't really be more specific
10	because we don't know how things on pass-through will
11	develop, and so we can't be more specific about how we
12	might need to deal with it, and so I'm saying, well, if
13	that's right, given the it seems to me inevitably
14	that it will be an issue, is it covered somewhere in
15	terms of a contingent fund that you can use to deal with
16	it.
17	MR SINGLA: Sir, I hesitate to interrupt but it may assist
18	to look at page 4 where there is a note. It is
19	Mr Singla here for Iveco.
20	THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
21	MR SINGLA: On page 4 you will see that Mr Thompson referred
22	to the approximate 5 million figure for disclosure, but
23	there is a note underneath that says this does not
24	include any applications required in relation to
25	disclosure and any third party aspects which will need

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             to be considered on an ad hoc basis. Now we don't
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             actually understand what that means, but if, Sir, you
             are looking for contingencies, I think that explains
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             that, in fact, there are no third party disclosure
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             elements to this budget.
         MR THOMPSON: Can I come back to this after the --
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         THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Perhaps this is something you want to
             talk to those instructing you. As I say, we don't
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             expect you to budget, obviously, at this stage, for
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             every detailed element, and sometimes it can be dealt
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             with for contingencies to deal with sort of issues
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             arising from the defence, or defences, but it is the one
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             issue on authorisation. I think there we should break.
             We will return at 2 o'clock. I would like to just tell
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             you, given the time and the plan of your submissions, we
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             do want to ask you quite a number of questions on the
             opt-out versus opt-in question issue, which we know you
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             are going to come to, but you will receive a number of
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             queries from the Tribunal on that point, so it is
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             something that you must allow time for. We will say
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             2 o'clock.
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         MR THOMPSON: I'm grateful, Sir.
23
         (1.07 pm)
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                             (Luncheon adjournment)
         (2.00 pm)
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1 THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Mr Thompson?

2 MR THOMPSON: I'm grateful, Sir. If I could just pick up 3 two issues from this morning's discussions, first of 4 all, just to tie together the threads on the deceased 5 persons/defunct companies issue, there was one point that I don't think I made, and I don't think they are in 6 7 the papers currently before the Tribunal, which is something which the Chair in particular will be very 8 well aware of, that this matter was debated at length 9 10 between MasterCard and the advocate for Mr Merricks in 11 a hearing on 25 and 26 March, and perhaps, ironically, 12 in that respect, we very largely adopt the submissions 13 made on behalf of Mr Merricks, so Mr Harris' client in that case, in relation to this issue, and, in 14 15 particular, perhaps the rather elementary point that 16 these are class representative applications not claims brought on behalf of individuals, and, as such, it would 17 18 only be a good point at the certification stage if it 19 could be suggested that there was a high percentage of 20 people or clients who were either dead or companies who 21 were either dead or defunct, so that the class action 22 was liable to totter over, and in my submission we are 23 a long way away from that as Mr Harris' clients were in Merricks. Otherwise, it is an issue that's either 24 appropriate for some form of discounting process, if 25

т	any, in relation to an aggregate award which could be
2	taken into account either in the CPO order itself or
3	probably, and we wouldn't accept that claims in relation
4	to dead persons which would normally accrue to their
5	estates are a nullity, and in relation to defunct
6	companies, although there are complications about
7	whether a defunct company can be revived, in principle,
8	defunct companies, the liquidator or administrator, can
9	bring such a claim, so it's not a straightforward issue
10	about whether or not some of these people may have been
11	defunct, it's a more nuanced question about whether or
12	not these dead people or these defunct companies,
13	whether their rights can be protected, either by
14	representatives of their estate or representatives of
15	the company. I think that's the gist of it. I don't
16	know whether it would assist the Tribunal to have the
17	transcript from the recent Merricks hearing because it
18	is obviously highly relevant to a lot of these
19	questions, as I'm sure Mr Harris in particular is well
20	aware and indeed Mr Hoskins.
21	THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Just to be clear, in Merricks, of
22	course, it was only about deceased persons. It wasn't
23	about defunct companies.
24	MR THOMPSON: Yes indeed.

THE PRESIDENT: Because it was a consumer claim. I don't

1	think we need a transcript, but I take your point that
2	you adopt those submissions, yes.
3	PROFESSOR WILKS: Can I just weigh in and point out that it
4	is quite a substantial class, as far as we can see, and
5	if we were to believe Burnett, the witness statement
6	from the RHA witness, he is talking about 145,000
7	potential purchases, so I think it is really quite
8	a significant issue.
9	MR THOMPSON: Oh yes, I am not disputing that, and I think
10	it may be something that, in terms of methodologies for
11	dealing with it, it may be that Dr Lilico, or indeed
12	Dr Davis, may be better able to debate it with you than
13	myself, but I'm not under any illusion that nobody has
14	died since 1997, so I can see that it is a potentially
15	significant statistical issue.
16	THE PRESIDENT: What I don't quite understand is, in your
17	draft order, and I don't want to take up time with this,
18	we've enough else to do, but you have actually envisaged
19	that we would direct that those people have to opt out.
20	That's what we are being asked to order. Well, if we
21	order them to opt out, why not just exclude them from
22	the class.
23	MR THOMPSON: It may be that it is an infelicity of
24	drafting. I think it was intended to give effect to the

legislation which envisages the Tribunal giving an

1	opportunity for people who wish to opt out of the
2	opt-out claim to do so, whether they are Royal Mail or
3	the representatives of a dead person.
4	THE PRESIDENT: Well, anyone can opt out, but I thought that
5	was specifically well, we will look at it separately
6	and look at it later. Yes. Okay. That was the first
7	point.
8	I think let's you said two points from this
9	morning.
10	MR THOMPSON: The other one was the budget and the question
11	of how it is allocated, and, of course, a short answer,
12	but I do not think it is going to be a sufficient
13	answer, is that many of these questions were debated
14	before the Tribunal and were the subject matter of the
15	funding judgment, and, likewise, I have taken the
16	Tribunal to Mr Perrin's sixth statement in the general
17	assurance given at paragraph 13, the sort of pragmatic
18	assurance that, in reality, he's not going to suddenly
19	abandon ship if things get expensive if he regards the
20	voyage as still a worthwhile one.
21	There is also, of course, the point made in the
22	wider ruling about proportionality which I think is also
23	made in the funding judgment, and against that
24	background we would say that this is certainly only

a factor, and we would say not a significantly negative

factor that the application and the litigation plan and the budget cannot, and has not attempted to anticipate or finance everything that might go wrong with this litigation, and how expensive it might be, if the cartelists make a number of very expensive pleaded cases, or cases that would be very expensive to determine, and the Tribunal rules that disclosure must be made to enable them to litigate those questions, and in my submission that is a reasonable approach, and that any other approach would threaten destroying the whole regime, because it would give a very obvious incentive which, to some extent, was manifested in some of the submissions of Mr Bacon at the funding where I think he was talking that at least £60 million or £70 million was going to have to be put up to fund this, but it is, as it were, a green light to the cartelists to say, "This is all terribly, terribly complicated and going to be very expensive and therefore you shouldn't certify it unless more and more money is put into the pot", which, as you will anticipate, this is a very, very expensive thing for a funder to do, to tie up money to specific claims, and where -- I don't think it is something I have taken the Tribunal to yet, but Mr Perrin's sixth statement evidences that the funder on the UKTC side has, indeed, done what it was required to do under the

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terms of the funding judgment, and it is a very difficult thing, if that's a moving target, and after the funding judgment comes along two years later, it is said that the funder must put up yet more money, and so I accept that the budget does not anticipate every contingency, and I think Mr Surguy has been quite open that the litigation plan is still a work in progress, partly because the board and Weightmans don't wish to incur the costs of potentially very expensive claims management services, until it is clear 1) whether the order is going to be granted, and 2) what's actually required, and I think Dr Lilico would be very happy to discuss, first of all, what's likely to be needed, for example, on transaction prices where we strongly suspect that the truck manufacturers like the car manufacturers monitor like a hawk the transaction prices of the UK market, and we suspect that there will be very substantial evidence available on that issue, and then in relation to pass-on, it's not directly relevant, but it's the best authority we have which is the Sainsbury's judgment of the Supreme Court where the issue of pass-on and the application of the broad axe was debated, and one finds that at joint authorities bundle 5, tab 66, and the reason why I say it's not directly an issue is because of the question of the aggregate award, and

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1	whether or not the compensatory principle applies,
2	that's at paragraph 217 at {JA/66/61}. Page 61 of
3	JA/66.
4	THE PRESIDENT: That's it. Thank you.
5	MR THOMPSON: It is headed, "The degree of precision
6	required in establishing the extent of pass-on of
7	overcharge", and then there is general discussion of the
8	approach which has some similarities to the discussion
9	in the Merricks case, and then over the page at
10	${JA/66/62}$ there is this passage towards the end of that
11	paragraph:
12	"The task of valuing claims for purely monetary
13	losses may also lack precision if the compensatory
14	principle is to be honoured, particularly when one is
15	dealing with complex trading entities such as the
16	merchants in these appeals. We see this, for example,
17	in AAM's alternative case which seeks to assess the loss
18	of profit caused by the volume effect where the
19	overcharge was passed on to their customers in the form
20	of higher prices. Such a claim is likely to depend in
21	considerable measure on economic opinion evidence and
22	involve imprecise estimates".
23	In my submission, certainly under the UKTC

In my submission, certainly under the UKTC application for an aggregate award, any defence is also, in reality, going to be an aggregated defence, and so

the issues of pass-on and volume effects are, in reality, going to be conducted as battles between economists at the global level about the UK trucks industry, and we would say that reflects the approach in the Ryder disclosure judgment, and it is also worth, perhaps, noting that there is quite a lot of information about the UK trucks industry, and no doubt there will be more, but we provided the Tribunal with the overview report, both for 2011 and I think also 2016 in the papers, and it appears to us that it is realistic that the pass-on issue will, in fact, be debated by economists at an aggregated level, and that the suggestion that there is going to have to be disclosure from the butcher, the baker and the candlestick maker, in my submission, is an unrealistic one which is essentially self-serving by the cartelists. THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Can I just -- on the budget which we were looking at just before the break -- can I just make sure I have understood one thing which was at B/17? So

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were looking at just before the break -- can I just make sure I have understood one thing which was at B/17? So {B/17/5}? We have an expert fee summary. You see that on the right, right half of the page. Just to make sure I have understood that correctly, what I think is said there is that 114,000-odd has been incurred, for future, what we've got there is -- it is a very precise figure for some reason, but it is -- rounding it, it is about

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             840,000. That's what's been provided for future expert
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             fees for the future. Is that right?
         MR THOMPSON: Yes. That appears to be the figure.
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         THE PRESIDENT: I just want to make sure I had understood it
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             properly.
         MR THOMPSON: That may partly reflect the different
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             methodological assumptions that are being made which no
             doubt the Tribunal will want to discuss with Dr Lilico
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             and Dr Davis next week.
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         THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
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         MR THOMPSON: But as I understand it, there are the
             estimates that have been given --
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         THE PRESIDENT: Yes. I see.
         MR THOMPSON: -- for the settlement.
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         DR BISHOP: Could I ask a question? Dr Lilico says at
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             several points that he hasn't ruled out doing the more
             traditional, during the cartel/after the cartel,
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             econometric estimates if that should be needed. Now,
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             those will entail very substantial data gathering
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             exercises and quite a lot of work in the modelling in
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             addition to what's currently budgeted for Dr Lilico's,
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             in theoretical optimisation model, that is his main
             model. If he does find that he needs to do more
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             econometrics, then where is the money going to come
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from?

MR THOMPSON: Yes. I'm certainly not dodging that as a question that's right for me to make, but I think the nature of Dr Lilico's anticipated econometrics is probably a matter for him, but my understanding is that, sitting where he is now, he sees considerable problems with the during/after model given, in particular, the circumstances of this case, and how long the attribution would have to go back to before the creation of the Euro, et cetera, and I think he is anticipating econometrics as a form of cross-correct rather than as a freestanding basis for his evaluation, and, of course, he will, by the time this comes on, have the benefit of whatever the Tribunal has found in other cases, but I'm reluctant to go much further, because that will only display my ignorance and Dr Lilico will say things better next week, but I don't think at the moment he is anticipating a freestanding econometric exercise on the scale that Dr Davis has in mind. I think I have been handed a note, if I could just ... (Pause) Apparently some allocation has been made by

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Apparently some allocation has been made by

Dr Lilico for some econometric work and clearly the

allocations will depend on methodological decisions

which are taken further down the track, but I wouldn't

want to go any further than that if the Tribunal, and in

particular Dr Bishop want to debate that, I think it

Τ	will probably be a matter to raise with br bilito if
2	that's an acceptable answer.
3	DR BISHOP: It is acceptable to me. I think it is
4	I think you are right that it is better pursued with
5	Andrew Lilico next week. Yes. I agree.
6	MR THOMPSON: (Inaudible) clear answer when he gives
7	evidence next week.
8	Given the indication from the Tribunal and the
9	passage of time, I'm aware that we are on a fairly
10	constrained timetable, and I see that it's now 2.20.
11	I have addressed the suitability, or the just and
12	reasonable criterion in relation to UKTC, and the
13	positive factors, plus factors that need to be taken
14	into account, I would invite the Tribunal to treat as
15	plus factors in the wording of the Supreme Court, Rule
16	79(2)(a), (b) , (d) , (e) , (f) and (g) . We would say
17	that I'm sorry, I'm in the wrong part. I have jumped
18	over myself. I'm sorry, Sir.
19	I'm sorry, I'm in my 79s when I should be in my 78s.
20	THE PRESIDENT: Yes. You took us through 78(2) and the
21	various sub-rules, and you say that we should and the
22	point you make is the fact that they are not contested
23	is one thing, but you say these are actually plus
24	factors that we should weigh in the evaluative exercise,
25	Tunderstand

1 MR THOMPSON: I got out of my sequence.

2 So that, then, leaves the 78(2)(c) issue which is the relative question, and I think I have largely 3 addressed that already in discussion of the class 4 5 definition, both in terms of clarity and absence of 6 conflict, and then there is also a point which we make 7 in our skeleton argument, that certainly if the order is made on an opt-out basis, there is a significant 8 financial advantage to claimants in that they receive 9 10 any payment out of an aggregate award on a gross rather 11 than a net basis, because in substance they are at the 12 top of the waterfall in relation to opt-out, and at the 13 bottom of the waterfall in relation to opt-in, and so that, to some extent -- anticipates the opt-out/opt-in 14 15 debate but the Tribunal, and in particular the 16 President, will be well aware that under the particular rules of section 47C(6), the recovery of the funder's 17 fee comes at the discretion of the Tribunal after 18 19 distribution to the individual claimants, and so as 20 against the RHA opt-in application, and as against the 21 UKTC opt-in application, the most financially 22 advantageous way of distributing the aggregate award will be to the individual claimants under an opt-out, 23 and so that is a point which is relevant in our 24 submission to the overall discretion in relation to 25

suitability or just and reasonableness under Rule 78.

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Turning to the eligibility criteria, the two eligibility criteria, the common issues and the suitability for collective proceedings, the first one is at -- addressed in our skeleton at paragraphs 46-7, A/1/15 to 17, and by way of general submission this issue is now governed not only by the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court in Merricks which in our submission confirmed that an issue can be common, even if it is likely in practice to raise different specific factual issues for different members of a proposed class, as, for example, the perhaps slightly frivolous example we gave of the cash purchaser of a cup of coffee as against the MasterCard purchaser of a flight or a summer holiday, that there are going to be very different issues, and that didn't seem to put off the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court in Merricks, but in this case the issue of commonality has, to some extent, been anticipated both in the Ryder disclosure ruling that we've already discussed, but also in the guidance of the Tribunal and the Court of Appeal in their respective recitals judgments which I don't think we need to go to, but which are at tabs 60 and 68 of bundles 4 and 5where, clearly, the question of the legal effect of the settlement decision has been the subject of extensive

submission and rulings, both by the Tribunal and the Court of Appeal, and is quite obviously a common issue of law which applies to all of the UKTC claims, so we were surprised to see Mr Singla say that the only common issues were issues of jurisdiction and simple interest at paragraph 2.2 of his skeleton argument.

In reality, we've identified a series of issues common to the proceedings at paragraph 55 of our amended claim form, which is at B/1/26, the most basic and obvious of which is whether the cartel led to an overcharge for members of the UKTC class {B/1/26} all of whom were the purchasers or lessees of new trucks. We would say that, obviously, that is a common issue.

We would say that Iveco's own skeleton illustrates the fact that there are, in fact, a series of common issues which the cartelists themselves will raise, for example the nature of the cartel as bound by a settlement decision which all of the cartelists and their experts raise, for example, at Iveco's skeleton argument, paragraphs 19-24, the character of the actual and potential competition on the UK trucks market nearer the time which Iveco raises at paragraph 25-29, the relationship between list prices and transaction prices which all of the cartelists raise and which Iveco raises at paragraphs 51 and 52, and the nature of the collusion

between the cartelists in respect of delay compliance with emissions technology requirements, all of which the cartelists raise, for example, it appears at paragraph 74.3 of the Iveco skeleton.

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There are also a series of economic issues that have been identified by Dr Lilico as relevant in his four expert reports, for example, the degree of differentiation of the UK trucks market, the elasticity of demand, and the nature of the price competition between the cartelists who would have existed on the UK trucks market in the absence of a cartel. For example, paragraph 4.5 and 5.1.8 of his first report, which is F/1/23-25 and 33-36. Although the answers to those questions are likely to be contested in various ways and it appears that the cartelists may wish to challenge Dr Lilico's methodology, even as a matter of principle, we would submit that there are obviously common issues across all the individual claims that cannot be resolved either individually at the application stage, but that are matters for the Tribunal to determine at trial. For good measure we would say that the cartelists intend to run a number of common issues by way of defence in order to argue mitigation of loss, notably that of pass-on of any overcharge or at least they indicate that that is what they intend to do to customers and to purchasers of

used trucks, and we also anticipate that a number of issues that the cartelists seek to propose and individualise would, in practice, resolve themselves into common issues, possibly at the stage of distribution, notably the issues of the correct approach of interest and tax, and whether or not compound interest should be awarded, and we say it would be premature to suggest that they are not capable of being addressed on a common basis at this stage.

The other point that Iveco makes, and to some extent is shared by Daimler, is whether the UK trucks market is too heterogeneous for the commonality requirement to be satisfied. This forms no less than an entire section of the Iveco amended response and also paragraphs 30-36 of its skeleton at A/3/15-17. We would say that that is a completely hopeless argument and that there are two straightforward answers. One, it is obviously self-serving and would emasculate the regime if it were to be accepted otherwise than on the clearest evidence. Here both Mr Leonard and Mr Burnett clearly dispute that evidence, and here, at least a common cause of Mr Flynn, in that he has made helpful reference to Canadian and US precedent on this issue at paragraphs 98-103 of his amended reply, which is at C/3/50-51, and so we say this is an exaggerated and self-serving argument that cannot

possibly succeed, and, indeed, if it had any merit, which we seriously doubt, it is an issue that can be perfectly well pleaded by the cartelists as an element of their defence, if it proves to be a good argument supported by evidence, it might reduce or conceivably eliminate an award of damages if UKTC fails to establish its case. However, we would submit it is obviously premature to decide that issue now at certification. Ιt is a matter for evidence at trial, and we would say essentially similar points are made in relation to the lengthy dispositions, particularly from Daimler in relation to interest and tax. If these are good points they can be raised by the cartelists and determined by the Tribunal as issues at trial, possibly on the basis of sub-classes, so we would say that the commonality requirement is plainly and obviously satisfied, and that Iveco draw the short straw in trying to argue to the contrary.

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I say that subject to my next point, which is the suitability point is equally hopeless, and there,

Daimler has taken the lead. The Tribunal will be aware that paragraph 56 Merricks, which is at {JA/68/22}, the eligibility requirement of suitability and the claims for collective proceedings, and also for aggregate award was to be decided on a relative rather than absolute

1	basis, on the basis that the question of this multitude
2	of parallel claims was more suitable to be litigated
3	collectively, rather than in a series of individual
4	claims, so that if the same or greater difficulties
5	beset individual claims, then that didn't undermine the
6	application on grounds of suitability, and that's
7	paragraphs 54-56. On the contrary, the difficulties
8	facing individual claimants were recognised as a key
9	reason for this innovative statutory scheme, including
10	the possibility of an aggregate award, and that's at
11	paragraphs 54 and 57.

We would say against that background there is only one answer to the general question whether resolution of the UKTC claims are more suitable for collective proceedings than for individual claims. We would say that is obviously the case. The number and scale of these claims --

THE PRESIDENT: I don't think we need to hear you on that,

Mr Thompson, at this point.

MR THOMPSON: I'm grateful.

Equally, Daimler seek to take exception to our pursuing a top-down, aggregate approach, notwithstanding the fact that that appears to be the approach that was envisaged by the Tribunal itself in its disclosure document, and we would say the two stand and fall

1 together. 2 I think I have already jumped ahead and said that the -- we get a spectacular tick on 79(2)(a), (b) and 3 4 (d) to (g) so I wouldn't propose to take any more time on that. 5 It seemed to us that the only issue that was 6 7 arguable, I don't know whether the Tribunal is interested in that question, is 79(2)(c) which is the 8 existence of a number of individual claims and the 9 stayed RHA High Court GLO, and the fact that the RHA 10 11 itself has devoted a lot of effort to signing up 12 potential claimants to support its opt-in application, 13 and there is quite a lot of effort, both in the pleading 14 and in the evidence of Mr Burnett which indicates that 15 quite a lot of the RHA's efforts have been directed in that direction. 16 17 THE PRESIDENT: I don't think that goes to -- I mean, 79(2) 18 is collective as opposed to individual. 19 MR THOMPSON: I think I'm only going to it because -- it may 20 be worth just turning up for a second --21 THE PRESIDENT: I mean, it doesn't say, "As compared to 22 individual", but the Supreme Court has said that's what 23 it means. 24 MR THOMPSON: Yes. I will not enter any --

THE PRESIDENT: So that's what one is dealing with there,

but so we take the point you make, you say, well, we've read what you said about individual claims, on aggregate damages, which is a separate suitability question which -- and only one of them, which is at sub (f), you say there is the Ryder disclosure judgment that says it is not quite saying that a whole lot of claims from different claimants can be treated together, it's looking at all the Ryder trucks and saying you can't go truck by truck.

MR THOMPSON: Yes, but I'm merely making the point that I don't know if we need to turn it up. I suspect the Tribunal has it well in mind that the indication is that a bottom-up approach may not be feasible, and I anticipate that that means that a top-down one is the only realistic approach, and it's not a long way, indeed it is implicit in the Court of Appeal's approach that an aggregate award is characteristic in the top-down approach, but the only point I was picking up was, insofar as there are plus and minus factors, all of the factors are plus, except, possibly, for (c), which is that there have been some other claims bought, both by the RHA and by individuals, so I don't know whether, in my submission, that's, as it were, a pebble on one side of the scales, as against various bricks on the other side, but if the Tribunal would like me to address them

Τ	on that question, I m very happy to do so.
2	THE PRESIDENT: No, I think that's all right. Perhaps you
3	will move to 79(3) which is the opt-in/opt-out.
4	MR THOMPSON: Yes, and as I read the legislation, strictly
5	speaking this issue legally only arises for
6	determination if the Tribunal is satisfied that an order
7	should be made. It is then deciding what sort of order
8	it should make, because it is required under Rule
9	80(1)(f) to state whether the collective proceedings are
LO	opt-in or opt-out collective proceedings, but, in
L1	reality, as the Merricks case illustrates, the two
L2	issues of suitability for collective proceedings and for
L3	an opt-out award are often closely linked, as one of the
L 4	cost factors of collective proceedings is their
L5	suitability for an aggregate award, which is also one of
L 6	the principal justifications for an opt-out order.
L7	THE PRESIDENT: You can have an aggregate award for an
L8	opt-in proceeding.
L9	MR THOMPSON: I'm aware of that. I'm simply making the
20	point that, as it were, where there is an opt-out
21	I think there is necessarily an aggregate award, and so
22	that seems to be implicit in Rule 93(3) where there is
23	reference to that aggregate award which I think is
24	(Inaudible) the one that's in opt-out proceedings.
25	The advantages of the aggregate award are identified

in Merricks, and in particular at paragraph 57, in that

it radically resolves the disadvantages of a multitude

of individually assessed claims for damages, both for

the court and for all the parties.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Well, we appreciate that, but what we want to hear from you, as I have said, is about opt-out versus opt-in, not about aggregate award.

MR THOMPSON: Indeed, Sir.

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THE PRESIDENT: Because you say -- and I'm concerned about 9 10 the time -- you say in your skeleton argument at, 11 I think, paragraph 60, that the reality of the situation 12 is the Tribunal is faced with a choice of certifying 13 UKTC's opt-out class action for an aggregate award based on all collective claims, or, (ii), leaving the majority 14 15 of members of the class without any realistic prospect 16 of obtaining compensation, but it isn't that binary choice, is it. There is the third alternative of an 17 18 opt-in class, and, indeed, you have, in your 19 application, put that as an alternative, although not 20 your favourite alternative, and so -- and that is the issue we have to address under 79(3), and you have seen 21 22 the reference in the guide that opt-in, where practicable, has many benefits, and what we are not 23 clear about is what is the -- given the preference for 24 25 an opt-in for various reasons, what is the objection

1	here that you say to making the UKTC claim opt-in?
2	MR THOMPSON: Sir, if I may, the point I was seeking to make
3	by reference to the aggregate award is that many of the
4	advantages identified by the Supreme Court in relation
5	to an aggregate award are also advantages of an opt-out
6	order, in that they radically simplify the book building
7	stage and the distribution stage, and, indeed, the
8	issues between the parties in that they are conducted at
9	an aggregated level which
10	THE PRESIDENT: I'm sorry, I just don't understand your
11	submission. That is the advantage of an aggregate
12	award. Why is that an advantage of an opt-out
13	proceedings with an aggregate award as opposed to an
14	opt-in proceedings with an aggregate award?
15	MR THOMPSON: Well, I think one only has to imagine or
16	conceive of the possibilities in relation to an opt-in
17	class. Sitting here now, we have no idea how many
18	people there will be in it, whether there will be
19	10,000, 100,000, 500,000, and we have no idea of the
20	character, and depending on the answers to those
21	questions, the character of the class may vary very
22	significantly, and the Tribunal may have to exercise its
23	discretion as to whether or not particular parts of the
24	opt-in class should be the focus of its discussion,
25	whereas just as in relation to an aggregate award, if

you have an opt-out class you know exactly who you are

dealing with, you are dealing with the whole lot, and -
THE PRESIDENT: Well, if you have an opt-in class you have

a date by which people have to opt in, and when that

date is passed you know exactly who you are dealing

6 with.

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MR THOMPSON: Well, that is true, Sir, but you don't know, even when you do know, you will have to make an investigation of the character of the people who may or may not have -- or the people who have opted in, and, inevitably, that's going to be a quite different type of exercise from the exercise involved in assessing the opt-out class. That's -- I don't want to get bogged down in this point, it was, as it were, an introductory point that many of the advantages which the Supreme Court has identified in relation to an aggregate award also apply in relation to an opt-out class, which was not necessarily to be distinguished in Merricks because it was an opt-out application for an aggregate award, but if I turn to the specific statutory criteria where, again, we are looking at an overall assessment of the same kind, a multifactorial assessment of the plus and minus factors, the first one is the strength criterion where we are dealing with a massive international cartel, admitted, and we would say that we fulfil that

1 very considerably, so that the complications of a 2 questionable claim don't arise here, and in terms of the feasibility of the opt-in proceedings, and to some 3 4 extent we debated this, I think, in relation to whether 5 there should be a stay in the first place, is complicated, not only by the scale, duration and 6 7 complexity of the infringement at issue, but also by the passage of time and the uncertain position of the 8 cartelists in respect of limitation which is an issue 9 10 that we debated before, but it remains a factor that was 11 of concern to UKTC when it started these proceedings and 12 knocked out (Inaudible) and given the history of what's 13 happened since in terms of procedural challenges brought 14 by the cartelists, notably DAF we have no reassurance at 15 all that that is not still a legitimate source of 16 concern. THE PRESIDENT: Well, can I just try and understand the 17 18 limitation point? You say limitation is a point for 19 opt-in, is a potential problem for an opt-in claim, and 20 is this on the basis that you have set out in the --21 I think in the appendix to your reply? Is that right? 22 MR THOMPSON: Yes. If I could take it in stages, Sir, the 23 first stage is in relation to the High Court where 24 I think Mr Flynn, his client, have started proceedings on a precautionary basis for a GLO, presumably because 25

1 of concerns over limitation if his opt-in claim is not 2 granted, so that's one thing. There has been no assurance in relation to that. THE PRESIDENT: Yes. 4 5 MR THOMPSON: The second one is in relation to opt in. are not making any concessions that this is a good 6 7 argument. THE PRESIDENT: Yes. 8 MR THOMPSON: But the fact is that there is a process for 9 10 opting in to opt in proceedings, and few, if any, of the 11 claimants, either in the RHA or UKTC opt in cases were 12 made by October 2018 which I believe is the original 13 cut-off for claims in the Tribunal. THE PRESIDENT: Well they can't be made because we haven't 14 15 had a CPO. So nobody can opt in. There is nothing to 16 opt into. MR THOMPSON: I understand that, but certain individual 17 18 claims have been made, and I believe that they were made 19 in the Tribunal within that timetable, so the question 20 is, what do you have to do to opt in to the claim, and 21 what happens if the limitation period expires before you 22 opt in? 23 THE PRESIDENT: Yes. MR THOMPSON: Now, in relation to opt-out, that is 24 25 a completely hopeless case because bringing the

1 proceedings brings the proceedings on behalf of all the 2 members of the class, and so it is simply a matter of 3 defining the class, and since our class is extremely 4 clear, it is quite plain who we've brought the claims on 5 behalf of. The concern is whether or not somebody may 6 seek to argue, were there to be only an opt in case, 7 that the claims have not been brought, and so that the people who wish to opt in are now out of time, and we 8 haven't heard any assurance --9 10 THE PRESIDENT: Yes, although if that was a good argument it 11 would knock out the great majority, effectively, of the 12 RHA application. 13 MR THOMPSON: It would indeed. THE PRESIDENT: That would just dispose of it, but it's not 14 15 an argument that any of the respondents have now raised, 16 because if they wanted to run it, they can run it now and we would say, "Goodbye RHA", save, perhaps, for 17 18 those limited numbers who have perhaps started an 19 independent action. 20 MR THOMPSON: Those are obviously various tactical 21 considerations here, just as there may be in relation to 22 pass-on, as I think was indicated by the Supreme Court 23 in Merricks in relation to pass-on, but MasterCard is sometimes enthusiastic about the pass-on argument and 24 sometimes not so much, and it's not impossible these 25

1	cartelists are thinking this limitation case doesn't
2	look very good against opt-out, but if only we can get
3	the opt-out kicked out because opt in is such
4	a brilliant opportunity, we can then bring a limitation
5	case and knock that out as well, and I don't know, given
6	the amount of money at stake, the cartelists have and
7	they have already indicated an almost infinite
8	ability to think of procedural points.
9	THE PRESIDENT: Well, I would have thought it is incumbent
10	upon them to raise the point now, not to sit silent,
11	allow the Tribunal to consider opt in and then to come
12	afterwards and say, well, actually, there is
13	a fundamental problem with opt in, we didn't tell you at
14	the CPO stage, but nobody can opt in, because the
15	limitation's expired.
16	MR THOMPSON: Yes, but from my client's point of view
17	THE PRESIDENT: That's bordering on abuse.
18	MR THOMPSON: From my client's point of view that's scant
19	comfort if we haven't got our opt-out award, and still
20	a very good for them if it's being knocked out.
21	THE PRESIDENT: I understand the point you make, and so
22	that's one reason you say it should be opt-out. Are
23	there any others? Because certain other points have
24	been made.
25	MR THOMPSON: There are others.

1 THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

2 MR THOMPSON: A number of opt in -- a number of individual claims have been brought, in particular by large 3 4 companies such as Royal Mail and Ryder, and the main 5 point we make is that there are tens of thousands, we would say over 99 per cent of potential claimants who 6 7 are, in reality, SMEs who are very far from being able to bring individual claims, and even in relation to an 8 opt in, given that the proceedings not only go back to 9 1997, but also have been delayed by -- through no fault 10 11 of anybody but because of the contingencies of the new 12 regime, have been delayed for three years, there is 13 obviously a risk that the energy of people to opt into these collective proceedings will have waned, 14 15 particularly for people going back prior to 2010, and so 16 there is every risk that only a proportion of those who have perfectly valid claims will claim, given the -- and 17 18 indeed, the -- it is the counterpoint of the point made 19 about deceased and defunct companies. There will be 20 people who are still alive and companies which are still 21 going, which were hammered by this cartel prior to 2005, 2.2 but who may well think, 20 years later, that it's all 23 water under the bridge, that they are not going to bring a claim, and so --24 25

THE PRESIDENT: Well, does the -- I mean, we've had evidence

from the RHA about the number of people, mostly very small businesses, who have responded to their campaign and signed up, you are dealing with not insignificant amounts of money, this is not -- first of all, these are not consumers, these are businesses, and, secondly, the amount is not in the tens or hundreds of pounds, even for one truck, on your case we don't know exactly what it is, but this is the sort of money where you certainly wouldn't bring an individual claim, I fully take your point about that, but if all you have to do at no cost to yourself is respond to the well-publicised information and send back a form, if you are serious about it, why wouldn't -- why should we assume people wouldn't bother, given, particularly, the evidence of what the RHA has been able to achieve by way of response from small businesses? MR THOMPSON: Well, I think I have made the submissions on the facts, and in my submission they are powerful, because the number of small claimants and the staleness of these claims -- I mean, supposing you have got someone who was driven out of business in 2005 by the cost of their trucks, you might say that's a fanciful possibility, but it is certainly within the scope of our class, they are still alive, but they might be retired

by now, and the prospect of them bringing an opt in

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T	claim must be questionable. It's not just a matter of
2	they are not going to litigate against Mr Jowell and
3	Mr Pickford and Mr Harris on their own, it's that,
4	basically, they have lost interest in this whole
5	question. That's not how this regime is meant to work,
6	and in my submission the guidance that is given in
7	relation to opt in and opt-out are much more in the
8	category of, for example, the BritNed case where you
9	have got a small number of large firms supposing the
10	only people who have been harmed by this were Royal
11	Mail, BT, Sainsbury's, Tesco's, and they said, "We want
12	a collective claim", and the claim is for
13	a million pounds each or more. You would obviously say,
14	"Ridiculous. If you want to do it collectively you
15	would do it on an opt in basis".
16	THE PRESIDENT: Well, I think we might say, "You can't do it
17	collectively, you can do it individually, as they are".
18	MR THOMPSON: Here, although this isn't a consumer claim, it
19	is right at the very end. It's very nearly a consumer
20	claim. You have got thousands and thousands of
21	individuals who are bringing claims for fleets of trucks
22	between 1 and 5, and where their claims, even at the
23	highest levels, are in the no more than £100,000
24	aggregated, and although that's a lot of money, it's not
25	a lot of money for the extreme aggravation of getting

involved in litigation against these people. As we've seen, it is a serious matter to get involved in a fight with these sort of defendants, and so in my submission it is not a heavy factor against us if one at all, and I don't want to remind something of which I'm sure the Tribunal is very well aware of, that one of the key points in the Merricks judgment was that these individual statutory factors are not to be treated as hurdles, but they are to be treated as factors, and we would say that when you look at the factors, there are things -- there are some factors weighing very heavily on the other side. I have mentioned some of them, I have mentioned the limitation issue, I have mentioned the scale and age of this case, and I have, in fact, in a different context, also mentioned the financial issue. For these individuals it is financially much more advantageous for them to get their fair share of an aggregate award assessed by the Tribunal than for them to wait their turn while the lawyers, the funders and the insurers and everybody else gets paid, and then they get a share of what's left at the end, and that's the approach that Therium have, for perfectly good reasons, adopted in the RHA case, and that Calunius, for perfectly good reasons, or Yarcombe, have adopted on the opt in basis because, you know, it's a different type of

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claim. From the perspective of the little guy who is actually what this is all about, the opt-out case both has, in my submission, its radical advantages analogous to those of an aggregate award, namely that the whole thing is debated at the industrial level rather than at the micro level of individual transactions, but also that they get the financial benefit of their share of the aggregate award, the distribution, and in my submission those are powerful factors in favour of an opt-out claim. It will be much easier for the Tribunal to adjudicate on in the same way as it is envisaged happened in the Ryder disclosure hearing, it will deliver on the objective of the legislation which is to effectively deter anti-competitive conduct at the expense of small businesses which you will recall is one of the primary objectives of this legislation, and it will benefit the individuals, so in my submission, even if the fact that, in principle, millions or -not millions, but thousands of these claims could be aggregated in an opt in case, the balance comes down heavily in favour not only of an aggregate award, but also of an opt-out aggregate award, so that's my general position on that, but when you do the multifactorial exercise, the scales, again, come crashing down in favour not only of a collective claim and an aggregate

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             award, but also of an opt-out claim, that will, in fact,
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             be the reality of this case, and will, actually, make
             this legislation which has been on the stocks for over
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             five years, actually bite in the way that Parliament
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             intended, and in my submission that's the right
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             approach.
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         THE PRESIDENT: Can I ask, if it is opt-out, what -- how do
             we deal with all the individual claims that exist?
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         MR THOMPSON: There are two possibilities, and they are
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             dealt with in Rule 82 I think which is at joint
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             authorities tab 11 \{JA/11/20\}. Yes. It is \{JA/11/23\}.
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         THE PRESIDENT: Yes. So they are just not included.
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         MR THOMPSON: Well, they --
         THE PRESIDENT: Unless they discontinue.
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         MR THOMPSON: Yes. Yes. So for some of the smaller
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             individual claims, they might think it was actually
             a better option to discontinue their claim, or to stay
17
             their claim and to throw in their lot with us. I don't
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             think Royal Mail or BT are very likely to do that,
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             but --
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         THE PRESIDENT: So the position is under Rule 82(4), if they
22
             don't discontinue, then they are not in the class.
         MR THOMPSON: Yes.
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         THE PRESIDENT: I see. That's the answer.
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MR THOMPSON: We can go back to the point that the Tribunal

1	was making to me about deceased person. I think the,
2	"Must", was meant to be under 82(1), but there is
3	a specified date for these things to be done. You have
4	to make your election by the date
5	THE PRESIDENT: Yes. I see. That answers the question.
6	Can we what we wanted to also ask you about, in your
7	skeleton on this point at paragraph 61 you refer to the
8	litigation funding arrangements that UKTC has got.
9	There is a further powerful plus factor, this is
LO	${A/1/23}$.
L1	MR THOMPSON: Yes.
L2	THE PRESIDENT: There is, in addition, UKTC submits there is
L3	a further powerful plus factor in favour of opt-out, and
L 4	you say it is more favourable to the interests of the
L5	individual members of the proposed class. You refer to
L 6	the priority of payment, but there is a footnote, at
L7	footnote 16, and you say:
L8	"The opt-out application also has the advantage that
L9	the funding arrangements are not subject to an economic
20	viability threshold"
21	Can you just explain what the point is there?
22	MR THOMPSON: Yes, and it goes right back, I think, to Mr
23	Perrin's first witness statement that there is
24	a difference in the I'm not sure we've got it in
25	front of us but I think it is the third addendum to the

1	original funding arrangements that there is an
2	economic viability threshold for the opt in claim, ie
3	that there is an estimate per truck and a number of
4	trucks, and this has been treated as a very confidential
5	issue as against the cartelists for obvious reasons.
6	THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Yes. Well, I don't want you to turn
7	up something confidential, but it is about the way the
8	funding works.
9	MR THOMPSON: Yes.
10	THE PRESIDENT: I see. We will find that if you give us
11	the reference, we can then look at it in our own time.
12	What is the reference?
13	MR THOMPSON: It is Mr Perrin's first statement at paragraph
14	22 which is at $B/3/7$. He explains but doesn't specify
15	the viability issue, and in relation to the
16	difference I'm not sure whether the Tribunal was
17	asking about the sentence and the opt in priorities
18	agreement, I think that was a point I was trying to make
19	about five minutes ago about the net and gross, that
20	there is an advantage to the individual because, under
21	the priorities agreement, the opt in priorities
22	agreement, it applies to the entire proceeds, and the
23	claimants come last, whereas under the opt-out, that is
24	at the discretion of the Tribunal.
25	THE PRESIDENT: Yes. That's the other point, and the third

1	addendum, again, I don't want to turn it up, can you
2	just give us the reference?
3	MR THOMPSON: I'm not sure it is in the current papers,
4	but I had it in the original papers. Perhaps I could
5	let the Tribunal know at the end of the day rather than
6	take up time now.
7	THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Yes. Absolutely. Yes. Thank you.
8	MR THOMPSON: The last topic I was going to address was the
9	question of Dr Lilico's evidence and its relevance to
10	the commonality and appropriateness or suitability
11	criterion, but I see the time. I don't know whether the
12	Tribunal wants to rise and then hear five minutes on
13	that or
14	THE PRESIDENT: Well, I think, why don't you continue and
15	complete your submissions and then we will take a break.
16	MR THOMPSON: Yes. Well, in terms of the general position,
17	I have referred already to paragraph 6.13 of the guide,
18	and I don't think it is necessary to turn it up, but the
19	reference is at $\{JA/12/18\}$. Joint authorities 1, and
20	the guidance is that such expert evidence and witness
21	evidence can be relied on in support of an application,
22	in particular in respect of the commonality and
23	suitability requirements but there is no statutory or
24	administrative requirement for such evidence, but,
25	nonetheless, and, again, being realistic, both in

1	Merricks and in this case the issue of expert evidence
2	has taken centre stage, or at least has been one of the
3	items on the stage.
4	THE PRESIDENT: And, indeed, in Pride as well, if I may say.
5	In every single and in Gutmann in every single
6	application.
7	MR THOMPSON: Yes, and I think in Merricks there was no
8	counter evidence, but in this case there seemed to be
9	I counted them up there seemed to be ten expert
10	reports already and four expert reports from the
11	respective applicants in bundles F2 and F3 in the
12	respondent's
13	THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
14	MR THOMPSON: So I just wanted to make a small number of
15	points which no doubt can be explored with Dr Lilico
16	next week. First of all, and perhaps the most basic
17	point, any implied suggestion that Dr Lilico's
18	simulation modelling approach is in some way eccentric
19	or out of the ordinary needs to be taken into account,
20	or needs to take into account the fact that it is
21	a methodology that was endorsed by the Commission in its
22	practical guide which is at joint authorities tab 20,
23	pages 7-9, by RHA's expert, Dr Davis, that's in joint
24	authorities 145, pages 17-20, and by Mr Noble, Daimler's
25	expert, both in the private capacity and in a report

done for the Commission, and you will find that at joint authorities 146, pages 99-100, and joint authorities 147 page 2.

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The second point is that [move up to page 104, line 22, to read "page 2 {JA/147/2}."] Dr Lilico, in my submission, has explained clearly the basis for these reservations about the use of regression analysis on the particular facts of this case, in particular in his first and his fourth reports at F/1/17, paragraph 4.2, and F/4/4-6, paragraph 2.3 to 8 in his fourth report, and he can no doubt put it better than me, but in summary his concern is that given the scope and scale of the admitted infringement, and the absence of any likely data before the start of the infringement in 1997, he is concerned about the availability of satisfactory counterfactual data that will enable a clear attribution, particularly for the early years of the cartel, and in passing this appears to be of particular relevance to the RHA methodology, which is based on a total period of 22 years, leaving only the period since May 2019 to provide data for Dr Davis' regression analysis, and that appears to us not only to make it very practically difficult, but also to build in an ambiguity into the class definition, for example for a truck purchased in 2017 or 2018. At the moment it is

not clear to us whether Dr Davis sees that as a claim or (Inaudible) basis for one.

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We say that by contrast, or Dr Lilico says that by contrast, truck manufacture is a very well-understood and traditional type of industrial process that should be susceptible to simulation modelling techniques, but given the scale and scope of the cartel and the findings in the settlement decision, there should be a lot of information available about the pricing of trucks and the character of competition on the UK trucks market, but there will also be significant documentary evidence which is based on admissions from the cartelists explaining the character of the cartel over a period of 14 years, so perhaps unusually he sees this as a very strong candidate for simulation modelling, and in assessing his view, it is necessary to bear in mind the guidance of the Supreme Court and the Canadian precedent, that a certification exercise is certainly not a time for assessment of the merits of expert evidence, and that's paragraphs 37-42 of the Supreme Court judgment. We would say that a recognised methodology and a carefully reasoned opinion from a reputable expert should be amply sufficient for this purpose, particularly in the context of a follow-on claim, and I think there are only really two criticisms,

apart from a general, "What is this simulation modelling all about", sort of response, which Dr Lilico can obviously explain much better than me, first of all there is a complaint that he assumes what he should be seeking to prove, and we say that that criticism is misguided for the reasons that Dr Lilico gives in his report, in particular section 3 at F/4/10 to 11, and there are various points that I would just like to draw to the attention of the Tribunal.

First of all, as the recitals judgment of the Court of Appeal and the Tribunal indicate, the terms of the settlement decision severely limit the ability of the cartelists to deny the nature of their infringement, and that's at joint authorities tab 65 and 67 in Bundle 4 and Bundle 5, and I know that the President in particular is very familiar with that set of issues, but I particularly draw his attention to paragraphs 45 and 50 and 69 in the judgment of Rose LJ, and paragraphs 131 and 132 in the judgment of Sir Geoffrey Vos.

Secondly, we would say that the character of the cartel is clear, for example, recital 71 and 81 of a settlement decision which is at K/2/17 and 19. I don't think it is necessary to turn those up but if I could ask the Tribunal to turn up Recital 121 which is at $\{K/2/27\}$, and the Commission says this:

Т	The Infilingement committeed by the Addressees
2	involves horizontal price collusion within the meaning
3	of point 25 of the guidelines on fines".
4	So it is relevant to look and see what those
5	guidelines say in terms of characterisation of this
6	infringement, and that's joint authorities tab 15.1. I
7	hope that's been added to the Tribunal's bundles.
8	THE PRESIDENT: Well, it's coming up on screen, I think.
9	MR THOMPSON: Joint authorities 15.1, page 2.
10	THE PRESIDENT: No. 15.1. {JA/15.1/2}.
11	MR THOMPSON: Yes. It's come up on screen. I think that's
12	probably sufficient.
13	THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
14	MR THOMPSON: And you will see paragraph 23:
15	"There is horizontal price-fixing, market-sharing
16	and output-limitation agreements, which are usually
17	secret, are, by their very nature, among the most
18	harmful restrictions of competition. As a matter of
19	policy they'll be heavily fined".
20	And then at 25:
21	"In addition, irrespective of the duration of the
22	undertaking's participation in the infringement, the
23	Commission will include in the basic amount a sum of
24	between 15 per cent and 25 per cent value of sales as
25	defined in Section A above in order to deter

undertakings from even entering into horizontal price-fixing, market-sharing and output-limitation agreements".

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I don't think there is any question of these being market-sharing and output-limitation agreements, so the reason I take the Tribunal to this is that Dr Lilico's in very good company in understanding that this agreement is tantamount to a horizontal price fixing agreement, and we would say that far from it being a fatal or fundamental flaw for Dr Lilico to carry out his preliminary assessment of that assumption, which is ultimately a matter for the Tribunal to determine at trial on the basis of the evidence and including the evidence supporting the settlement decision, we submit that it would be a strange assumption for him to proceed on any other basis. The cartelists are in no way precluded from arguing that, contrary to what they admitted in the settlement decision, the character is, in fact, innocent, as some of their experts suggest, but when I say that they are not prevented from it, that's subject, of course, to the recitals judgment that, in terms of substance, they are very heavily restricted in ability to resile from the admissions they made where they got financial benefits for admitting certain types of conduct which is characterised in this way, so in my

submission there is nothing in the suggestion that

Dr Lilico had done something unreasonable.

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The other point which I can take very shortly is the volume of commerce point. Although Daimler is particularly enthusiastic about it and makes it in various ways and shapes and forms in paragraphs 33-36, 37-40, 46-50 and 51-61, in my submission the point is completely hopeless. Dr Lilico has always been clear that his initial models were based on the available data at the time when he made those reports, and it is difficult to see how he could have proceeded on any other basis, ie the industry-wide basis of list prices, which is what he had. He has always been clear that if and when the size of the class and the transaction data is available to him, he will adjust his estimates accordingly, and that's basically the end of the volume of commerce point, and that takes us back, again, to the deceased and defunct companies, if the cartelists can show that there is actually some reason to believe that the class is dwindled away for some reason then that will need to be taken into account, but we would submit --THE PRESIDENT: Sorry, I think you were drowned by the Siren. Could you just repeat that? If there was some

reason to believe that the class is what?

1	MR THOMPSON: I think I said, "Dwindled away", or had shrunk
2	for some reason, then there might be an argument that
3	the aggregate award should also be reduced to take
4	account of the best evidence of the actual size of the
5	class, and the actual size of the loss, but we would say
6	that was an absolutely hopeless basis on which to refuse
7	certification to a very substantial class in relation to
8	a very substantial cartel lasting for a very substantial
9	period. The mere fact that the figures may shrink
10	somewhat, unless they were shrinked to an extensionless
11	point or a point which makes it not worth litigating,
12	the point is a completely hopeless one.
13	THE PRESIDENT: The point about the defunct companies is
14	that if they are in the class then you calculate the
15	damages for them. It's just there is no one who is
16	going to get the damages.
17	MR THOMPSON: Yes.
18	THE PRESIDENT: The distribution. You can't not if they
19	are in the class then you have to calculate the loss
20	MR THOMPSON: Yes.
21	THE PRESIDENT: include them. You can't exclude them
22	from the calculation if they are in the class.
23	MR THOMPSON: That's true, but the Tribunal has very wide
24	powers at the stage of distribution to decide what to do
25	about it, and, indeed, in making its award. It seems to

me these are arguments that can be had at trial if and when it is shown that there has been an overcharge, and how big it is. Mr Harris, or whoever may wish to advance this point can say there should be a discount because, in fact, lots of people would have died or lots of companies may have gone out of business, and won't realistically bring a claim so it would be stupid to make an award, but then there could, of course, be an argument that it would be better for it to go to charity than for the cartelists to keep it, but that's not for today.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

MR THOMPSON: I think I would finally just say that, in my submission it is clear, both from section 8 of Dr Lilico's first report at F/1/46 to 47, and from the passage that we've already looked at from Dr Lilico's fourth report, paragraph 2.18 to 2.19 at F/4/8-9, that he is under no misapprehension as to the litigation process, and the fact that his opinion evidence at trial will be based on the evidence then available, including the number of claims and the level of discounts, and he also makes the point that some of these issues will already have been the subject of rulings {F/1/46} from the Tribunal, and possibly, heaven knows, from the appeal courts before this comes to trial, and he will

1	obviously take those into account in reaching his final
2	expert opinion, but we would say that none of that comes
3	within a million miles of being a reason why these
4	basically straightforward and meritorious claims
5	shouldn't be certified to go forward on a collective
6	opt-out basis for an aggregate award. In our submission
7	there is really nothing in any of the respondents'
8	submissions that can weigh in the balance against the
9	points that I have put forward, so those are the points
10	that I wanted to make. I don't know whether there are
11	any further questions from the Tribunal.
12	THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Can I ask you, if you look at your
13	claim form in bundle $\{B/1/27\}$, it's come up on screen
14	very quickly, where you list in paragraph 55 common
15	issues, and issue number 6, what was the impact of the
16	cartel as to the timing for the introduction of emission
17	technologies in terms of operational cost or otherwise
18	on members of the class? Well, this is a financial
19	damages claim so we are only concerned with effect
20	impact in terms of damages.
21	MR THOMPSON: Yes.
22	THE PRESIDENT: Where is the methodology, or the proposal of
23	how that is going to be assessed?
24	MR THOMPSON: Yes. I think there are two points, and,
25	again, I think this is something that Dr Lilico would be

1 very well placed, better placed than me to debate. 2 THE PRESIDENT: Yes. 3 MR THOMPSON: In terms of the basic overcharge question and the collusion between the -- admitted collusion between 4 the cartelists, my understanding is that Dr Lilico sees 5 6 the emissions issue as similar to other largescale 7 issues. I mean, it could be, for example, something like the introduction of the Euro where they effectively 8 became focused for discussions between the parties, and 9 10 one sees repeated meetings at which not only future gross list prices but also delays in relation to 11 12 introduction of emissions technology compliant trucks 13 was debated. THE PRESIDENT: Yes. 14 15 MR THOMPSON: So in that sense, the issue is, as it were, 16 a focal point for the price collusion, and I think that's why it says, "Or otherwise". 17 18 THE PRESIDENT: But what is not clear is the impact in terms 19 of operational cost, that's not an overcharge in price, 20 it's some other financial impact. 21 MR THOMPSON: The second point is that -- and this is where, 2.2 prior to disclosure I think we are very uncertain about the viability of this case and how that works in terms 23 of scale and scope, but -- and it is certainly an issue 24 that has been raised by Dr Davis in, I think, somewhat 25

Т	more detail, is that one of the possible impacts of
2	delaying emissions technology improvements, if I can put
3	it that way, is that the cost of ownership of trucks
4	could have gone up, and all we are saying is that at
5	this stage it would be wrong to rule it out as an issue,
6	if, in fact, disclosure emerges, or if, in fact, it were
7	to emerge that complying with the rules actually
8	increased costs, and so it wasn't actually a good point,
9	then the case would fall away, but it's at least in
10	principle a claim, and I think Mr Flynn's skeleton has
11	gone into it in more detail than ours, that this could
12	well be the further head of claim.
13	THE PRESIDENT: I think we understand that, that it could
14	be, and we understand that if the evidence doesn't
15	support it, it will fall away, but the question I had is
16	how, on an aggregate basis for an opt-out class,
17	assuming it is a good claim, what is the method by which
18	the increased operational costs, it is proposed that
19	they will be estimated?
20	MR THOMPSON: Yes. I don't want to duck that issue well
21	I do actually want to duck that issue but I have two
22	reasons, one is the time, and the other is I think
23	Dr Lilico is a much better person to give the answer
24	than I am.
25	THE PRESIDENT: Fine. I don't want to deny you the

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             opportunity of -- we couldn't, I think, see it covered
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             in Dr Lilico's reports, and that's why I wanted to raise
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             it with you, but we are quite happy to raise it with him
             and no doubt he's listening, or will be told about it,
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             and can deal with it, but as things stand we couldn't
             see that he has explained where in his method he is
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 7
             addressing this point.
         MR THOMPSON: If I can say he has been put on notice, but
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             I'm not going to go any further until he has had his
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             chance to speak. Is that a fair way to deal with it?
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         THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
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         MR THOMPSON: In that case I think that's the end of our
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             submissions.
         THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Well, we will just take a moment,
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             Mr Thompson, so if you will all stay there for just
             a moment?
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         MR THOMPSON: Very well.
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18
         (3.25 pm)
19
                                (A short break)
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         (3.27 pm)
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         THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Thank you Mr Thompson. I can't see
22
             you but I assume you are there. Yes. I can see you.
23
             You are there. We've nothing further to ask you.
         MR THOMPSON: Sir, the reference to the third addendum is in
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             bundle H, tab 12.
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1 THE PRESIDENT: Sorry, bundle? 2 MR THOMPSON: H, tab 12. THE PRESIDENT: H/12. Thank you very much. Thank you. Yes. We will take 10 minutes and we will -- we were 4 5 asked to sit at 10 tomorrow, we said 10.15 as we've lost some time, we will sit at 10 o'clock tomorrow morning, 6 7 Mr Flynn, and we will see how we get on from there, so we will take 10 minutes now and then you can start your 8 submissions. 9 10 (3.28 pm)11 (A short break) 12 (3.39 pm)13 Submissions by MR FLYNN THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Mr Flynn? Mr Flynn, you are muted. 14 15 MR FLYNN: Is that better? Yes. I have a double-mute 16 system here which I haven't mastered, one on screen and 17 one in front of me. Thank you. Thank you, Sir. 18 On the timing, Sir, you have indicated you would be 19 starting early tomorrow at 10. What I am proposing to 20 do this afternoon is cover the competing CPO's point, if 21 you like, to pick up on the discussion that you have had 22 with Mr Thompson, and then deal with the more 23 thorough-going, as it were, respondent's objections to our application in my time tomorrow, and I think that 24 will make it more coherent and, as it were, in one go 25

1	and I should be able to do that in the time available
2	tomorrow. I mean, I haven't asked for extra time, it's
3	just I'm being squeezed at both ends, as it were.

THE PRESIDENT: We're due to rise at 4.30 today. 4

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Yes. I'm working on that basis. Please do tell me if I'm covering anything you don't need to hear today, but I thought it might be helpful just to pick up the intervention I made earlier about the scope of our class and the operators who are covered by it, just so that you have all the references.

> I mean, as I think our discussion this morning established, we cover all haulage operators with an O licence, with an operating licence. That's just about every truck on the road needs to be covered by one of those, and -- but they are held by the company rather than the driver, for example, so it's not every truck driver needs one of these, but it is the operators of the truck that needs them. There are also some vehicles on the road which do not require the statutory O licence. They are covered by exemptions, and Fire Service, for example, is one of those, funeral vehicles is apparently another, although how many of those are in the form of heavy trucks one doesn't know, but those are exceptions, but insofar as they are exceptions, we are also seeking to cover them, if they otherwise fall in

the definition of, "Trucks", and that is what the

definition of, "Road haulage operations", in our claim

form is intended to cover, and we say achieves, so if I

could give you the bundle reference for that, and you

might want to just take it up quickly, so it's C/1,

which is our claim form, amended claim form, and it's

paragraph 35 which is page 13, so {C/1/13}.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

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MR FLYNN: That's where what I have just said is compressed into 35.1, and you will see there is also a definition of, "Group", and, "Primary business", which we may need to come back to tomorrow. These are expanded on in Mr Burnett's evidence. Firstly, his first statement, which is at tab 4, so $\{C/4/1\}$, and if we turn up paragraph 17 of that statement, he describes the operating licence regime $\{C/4/6\}$ in a little more detail, and standard operating licences which can be national or international which allows carriage of goods on a hire and reward basis, and the restricted operating licence is the one that allows people to carry goods for their own trade or business, so the supermarket fleet is one example of that, and that's where the phrase, "Own account", is known, and he gives figures or there are references there to figures, the split being 55/45.

It's also worth looking at his second witness

statement which is behind tab 7, and, in other words, C/7, paragraph 31 of that statement. $\{C/7/12\}$. He again goes into -- I'm not going to read this out -- but the Tribunal may wish to note this, because it goes to the certainty of the class as well as the description of it, and you will see, so if you read 31-33 you will see at the end that part of this was to address questions or queries from the respondents to various types of vehicles, so cement mixers, cranes, refuse collection vehicles which we discussed earlier, skip wagons, all fall within the regime, and Iveco mentioned gritters, we said that's a fair point, and we made the adjustment to the class definition which you saw in the first document which I took you to, which is why it was in green in relation to those who would require an O licence unless an exemption or exception applied, and just to make sure that those are covered in the class, so all this definition came in part to meet earlier objections to what we had said.

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I hope that's sufficient references for the Tribunal's purposes for now.

Our overall position, of course, and that's what we will be spending time -- you will be spending time with me on tomorrow at any rate is that we are an eminently suitable class representative and that we amply meet all

the tests that follow from the various rulings in the Merricks case and others as regards the eligibility of our claim, and it is pretty striking that we are not facing any applications by any of these respondents either for strike out or reverse summary judgment in relation to any aspect of our claims which I suggest should be comforting for the Tribunal. Obviously the Tribunal needs to be satisfied for itself that no one is doing that, but -- so we will come back to those aspects of our pleadings and skeleton before you tomorrow.

There is just one point, and I might as well deal with it now, that's made by UK Trucks and not by any of the respondents about the RHA as a class representative, and that's the suggestion which was only fleshed out in the skeleton argument for no good reason that I can see, that the RHA is not a suitable class representative. It is conflicted, because it has, amongst its members, associate members, it has the cartelists, as Mr Thompson calls them, the respondents and objectors to this application, so UKTC said in paragraphs 96 and following their skeleton, "We get money from them, they are associate members, they query when we say these amounts are small, and we have vested interests in staying in with them, and this gives rise to a material conflict", and they seem to have picked up on this because of what

Mr Burnett said in his first statement about the fact that some truck manufacturers were associate members of the -- of the association, and the point he was making was it doesn't give them any possibility of influencing what the RHA does, and he can't see that there is any scope for any conflict, and the revenues that are derived from such membership are absolutely tiny.

Given the lateness of this attack, we obviously haven't had a chance to put in any evidence on it, but I have taken instructions which are to the effect that, with two exceptions, none of the cartelists have anything other than what is called, "Other", membership with the RHA, so no status but just a kind of, "We know about you", membership which doesn't involve any subscription or any outlay on their behalf, and simply, really, means that they are on our email list, and that is, of course, absolutely separate from the website arrangements for contacting potential class members, so they don't get any of that, they just get our mailshots and so forth.

The two exceptions are that DAF, apparently, has something called, "Bronze associate membership", which costs them £622 a year plus VAT. They make a charitable donation of £10 for which we are very grateful and they subscribe to the magazine called, "Roadway", at the

princely cost of £24. I think they might also get something off a stand at our exhibition and there may be other discounts they can get.

Top of the class is Volvo which has gone for silver membership, and here we are into the serious money of £1,949 plus VAT and has a few additional perks above what DAF is prepared to pay for and they get some member-only information and they can attend member briefings. I haven't asked anyone to check the register as to whether they actually turn up.

The principal point is that they have -- play absolutely no part in the RHA as an institution. They have no role, no vote, no possibility, for example, of being on the board, and this is really just a way of appearing in publications and helping us with a small amount of cost. In our submission there is absolutely nothing in this point, and I think if Mr Burnett were here, I dare say he would be able to tell you that relations with some of those represented in this hearing has not been all that cosy, over the last few years.

So that -- we say there is nothing in that point, and let me turn to the competing CPOs point which is, of course, a matter that's not covered by authority in this country, and is not, really, in some ways, covered by authority elsewhere, notably Canada, because opt in

isn't a known beast in Canada, so a lot of what is said is in relation to carriage motions and so forth, is where there are competing opt-out proposals.

Our bottom line, as I think is clear from our reply and skeleton, is that while, as a matter of legal theory, or as a matter of reading the statute, the Tribunal could certify two collective proceedings, sets of proceedings if both pass the scrutiny which is to be conducted over the next few days, we say it could do that, but it should not do that. That's our bottom line.

As I understand what Mr Thompson is saying today and has written in the documents before the Tribunal, is that they consider that the Tribunal should approve their opt-out and could, if so minded, also approve our opt in, and in his skeleton and in everything he has said today, Mr Thompson is placing all the weight on their opt-out proposition, and we understand that, not least as the opt in side of their application is sketchy to say the least, it is clearly the less-favoured last alternative approach.

So, that's where, as it were, the battle lines seem to be drawn. If we are right on the law and Mr Jowell and others will be trying to persuade you otherwise that the Tribunal could make an order approving two -- could

grant both CPOs, as it were, in this at the end of
this hearing, we say it is important, then, to look at
the rules and the guide, notably Rule 79(3)(a), I don't
know if we need to go to it now, you have looked at it
already today, but you have a wide discretion, a wide
discretion as to you can take into account all
matters that you think fit in deciding whether
proceedings should be opt in or opt-out, and you can,
when two applications are before you, consider their
respective merits, and, as you have already mentioned,
Sir, in your discussions with Mr Thompson, there is
a clear preference in the rules, and made explicit in
the guide, for opt in proceedings, for a collective
shall we say a collective proceedings to be on an opt in
basis where that is practicable, and we say there are
two consequences of that. One is that it places
a burden on an applicant for an opt-out collective
proceedings order in those circumstances, a high burden
to explain why the opt-out is preferable, and we say
that's not met in this case for a number of reasons
which I will come to, and we obviously say that for
a number of reasons we have already demonstrated that an
opt in set of proceedings is eminently practicable in
this in the circumstances of this case.

Now, one particular point, and perhaps the high

point of what Mr Thompson had to say, on why opt-out is preferable to opt in in the circumstances of this case, is his point about priority and who gets paid first. We will look at that in a touch of detail in a second, but if that really were the killer argument it would apply in every such case. If that were the winning argument it would effectively knock out opt ins, but both the opt ins in the present case are clearly on the basis that the funders get paid first, as it were, if I can put it in slightly crude terms, and that's fully understandable. The rules more or less dictate that it is the other way in opt-outs, and, of course, in opt-outs, one particular thing to guard against is that the funder is relatively relaxed about that as a possibility because there will be, they hope, a large pot of undistributable damages at the end from which the fee can come, even after the viable claims have been paid out, but that, I think, was the kind of high point of the submission to you as to why opt-out was preferable.

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Two things to say about that, really. One is that, actually, it's the -- you have the figures, you have our waterfall and so forth. The incidence of the funder's collection, if I can put it that way, in our case, assuming a substantial recovery is not enormous, it's

1	not as if a whole lot of claimants will get a paltry sum
2	whereas under an opt-out they might be entitled to
3	a substantial sum, the waterfall you can see and I don't
4	suppose you will want to look at it now, it's just lots
5	of rows of figures, but you will see at $\{C/42/73\}$ and at
6	page 73 of that you will see that the recovery is 5 per
7	cent at a 3 billion damages figure.
8	THE PRESIDENT: Just so we understand that, the 5 per cent
9	is what the funder gets in is that right?
10	MR FLYNN: That's the funder's fee to which one would add
11	the funder's initial I think it is called the
12	funder's, "Initial outlay", which is essentially
13	disbursements, and that covers, also, legal fees and so
14	forth and I think that the ATE premium would also be
15	added to that, but I can check the precise details if
16	that is necessary, but just as an order of magnitude
17	sorry, Sir?
18	THE PRESIDENT: No, go on.
19	MR FLYNN: Just as an order of magnitude, if the suggestion
20	is, or sounds as if a very substantial proportion of
21	damages award at the end of an opt in action would
22	actually be going to those who fund it rather than those
23	who should be recovering, that's certainly not the case
24	if one envisages a fairly successful action, and so just
25	to take one level, you know, it is 5 per cent if you get

1 a 3 billion recovery, and that will obviously depend on numbers of people who opt in, levels of overcharge and 2 so forth, but as you pointed out, these are not hundreds 3 4 of pounds claims, if there is anything in them they are 5 rather bigger than that, and so if you start adding up numbers of trucks involved, potentially involved in the 6 7 case, and translate that into any figure you like for recovery, it's clear that it has the potential, shall I 8 say, to be substantial, and where the fee for the funder 9 10 plus the other incidentals aren't taking a massive cut 11 out of the total award that the Tribunal might make, 12 that's --13 THE PRESIDENT: Yes. So I understand the waterfall, it's actually 6 per cent if it is just 3 billion, and it goes 14 15 down, and it is 8 per cent if it is 2 billion, as I 16 understand this, and then it -- and if it -- it's 13 per cent if it is 1 billion. I think that's -- is that 17 18 right? That's the correct way to read it? 19 MR FLYNN: Yes. It starts on page 1 with a million of which the funder would take 300,000. That wouldn't be a great 20 21 result, and it just works its way down in a kind of 22 inverse ratchet to the bottom of that waterfall, so you take a figure that accords with your -- you know, any 23

what the funder's return is. That's my simple point.

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instinct you might have, and you can see what the --

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         THE PRESIDENT: That's how it works, yes.
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         MR FLYNN: That's how it works. Yes. That's how it works.
                 The other point to mention, since it was raised in
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             relation to the UKTC opt in, is this issue of the
             minimum viability threshold, and you were given a bundle
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             reference by Mr Thompson just before the break. I don't
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7
             know if you interrupted your cup of tea by having a look
             at it, but --
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         THE PRESIDENT: Well, just be careful because there was some
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             suggestion it's confidential. I don't know if it is.
         MR FLYNN: My point is, it's so confidential that it's
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             redacted, and if you look at it, it's \{H/12/2\} and 3.
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         THE PRESIDENT: Just a moment. Yes. I see.
         MR FLYNN: So we don't know what it is, and as far as we
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             know, but we may be wrong, the Tribunal doesn't know
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             either, and it is an undisclosed but presumably material
             threshold which the UKTC opt in would have to pass
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             before it would even get off the ground.
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                 I mean, I can't help you further with it, except
             that we say it is obviously a point, whatever that is,
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             their application will crater if it's not met, and we
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             say that that is a problem, and I will come back to that
             briefly.
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         THE PRESIDENT: This is for -- there are, as I think,
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             speaking from recollection, so I might be wrong, there
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1 was, I think, an opt in and an opt-out LFA for UKTC.

2 MR FLYNN: Yes. I'm not an expert on their funding as I

3 wasn't involved in the funding hearings as such, but

I think that is correct, and this is the separate

5 arrangements for their opt in.

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6 THE PRESIDENT: This is dealing with the opt in.

Mr Thompson is saying the opt-out has a clear advantage for all the claimants, I have dealt with that point and I'm now saying that their opt in has a viability, an undisclosed but presumably material viability threshold and for reasons which I may not need to develop at length, the Tribunal should be concerned about that, but returning to the issue of practicability, leaving aside financial considerations, practicability of opt in proceedings in this case, these are, as you have already said, Sir, business claims, not consumer claims, and it was a significant feature of the reforms to the collective proceedings system under the Competition Act that allows businesses to make opt in claims, and so when people are talking about paradigm cases and so forth, there is no particular reason why an opt in claim for a business should not be a paradigm example of opt in claims under the developed regime, and I think you

have already made the point that a very large number of

MR FLYNN: That is dealing with the opt in, and so whereas

those signed up, a very large proportion of those signed up to our collective proceedings effort, are, indeed, you know, very small businesses, small and micro businesses, and we have attracted a very considerable number of such businesses, since launching the effort in 2016, leading up to the filing of the application before the Tribunal, and that's effort that's been undertaken by the RHA with its industry expertise and connections, using dedicated personnel for the task and assisted throughout by a committed funder, where -- so that today, we are in the position of having, I think it's now over 16,000 operators signed up to the potential class, so we say it's absolutely untenable to suggest that it is hard to reach the potential claimants in these proceedings, or, indeed, that there will be a substantial degree of inertia or ignorance, so that a lot of potential claimants will be left behind, and unless possibly they are dead, and I will come back to that in a short while. The fact that we are now told only 36 operators have contacted UKTC, we don't think is particularly persuasive or relevant to your considerations, so the binary choice in Mr Thompson's skeleton in paragraph 60 that you raised with him just seems to us incomprehensible. It's illusory. It is simply not the case that the only option for a very

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1 large number of small haulage businesses, for example,
2 is the opt-out option.

We have also spent some time and RHA expertise and resource in drilling down into the numbers, the numbers that are claimed, to see what might be left for the opt-out, once you exclude the trucks that are already in the numerous so-called, "Individual", actions, although of course they tend to be large groups, but the so-called, "Individual", actions before you, or signed up or registered with us, or, indeed, catered for, as it were, by proceedings in other jurisdictions, and you have a lot of information on those figures, and I probably haven't got time to go through them all now, and they are not all absolutely reconcilable, but they give you a sense of it, so, broadly speaking, you know, we think that something like two-thirds, two-thirds of the trucks which the UKTC says are available for its opt-out are actually already involved in other actions or in a waiting room, as it were, by being signed up to ours.

THE PRESIDENT: Can I just interrupt you on one thing?

22 MR FLYNN: Yes.

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THE PRESIDENT: I understand the point about other actions, but signed up to the RHA, what does that actually mean?

If -- suppose we were against you, we didn't grant you

1	a CPO, but we granted the UKTC CPO, does it mean that
2	people who have signed up to the RHA are then out of
3	can't be included in the UKTC class?
4	MR FLYNN: No it doesn't. It's I mean, they have signed
5	up and they have committed to allowing us to prosecute
6	their claims, as it were, and if, in fact, you refuse
7	our application and we may have some difficult
8	discussions with members of the class, and there may be
9	a bit of a power play, who knows, because we have got
10	the fallback option, and it is very much a fallback
11	option of the High Court proceedings which was taken in
12	pursuance of that obligation, we undertake, as it were,
13	when they sign up, which is to represent them and defend
14	their interests, so and we can go to the provisions
15	of the relevant agreement if we need to, perhaps
16	tomorrow, but they are they have committed themselves
17	to the RHA, but, ultimately, you know, as I say, there
18	may be a bit of a power play, if you refuse the RHA's
19	application it would hardly be for the RHA to say that
20	their claims were then sterilised, so I cannot say how
21	it would come out. They have committed to letting the
22	RHA defend their commercial interests in connection with
23	the infringement, but if there is no home for us at the
24	Tribunal, as it were, then who knows what would happen.
25	THE PRESIDENT: But you are not saying that you would the

1 RHA, as a responsible body, would say, well, tough,
2 there is another class action going ahead, these other
3 collective proceedings, very disappointing that ours
4 wasn't approved, and we think the Tribunal got it all
5 wrong, but there is this other CPO that it has approved,
6 and if you fall within the scope of that class, which of
7 course is narrower, we are not going to stop you joining

8 it.

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MR FLYNN: Well, I'm not going to say what form of words the RHA would use now, but the RHA is a responsible body which seeks to represent the interests of the UK haulage industry, and, you know, some form of reality would assert itself. As I say, if there is no home for us, not saying that -- and I'm not saying this in any in terrorem way but, I mean, you know, there might be other routes to explore, including the failsafe High Court proceedings, so I'm not saying they would be immediately released, there might be a difficult discussion, but currently they are signed up, they are committed to the RHA, but the point I'm obviously making to you at the moment is that these are reachable, committed people, and, furthermore, that they have entrusted their claims to the RHA because of who the RHA is.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Can you just -- don't turn it up, but

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             can you just give me the reference to the agreement
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             which they sign up?
         MR FLYNN: The litigation management agreement, I will do
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             that in just a ... C/25, I'm hearing from ... normally
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             when one opens a case of this kind one says, "I appear
             with". I appear by myself but there are -- Mr Went and
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             Ms Mockford are within reach and they are able to point
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             me to {C/25/1} which is the litigation management
 9
             agreement.
         THE PRESIDENT: Yes. I see, and that's what they sign.
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         MR FLYNN: Yes.
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         THE PRESIDENT: Yes. I see.
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         MR FLYNN: It is being suggested you might turn to clause
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             2.5.
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         THE PRESIDENT: 2.5:
                 "If the RHA does not obtain ..."
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                 Yes. I see.
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         MR FLYNN: So we have the authority to bring alternative
             legal proceedings, and that's been done on a failsafe
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             basis for some members of the class, and if they are not
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             available then the RHA will use its best endeavours to
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             find alternative representation.
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         THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
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         MR FLYNN: So if we can't do it for them we will find them
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a home.

1 THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Thank you.

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MR FLYNN: So with an eye for time, broadly, then, those are
the numbers. We think that UKTC's estimates of numbers
available for its opt out are wildly out, even though
probably no one knows exactly what the numbers are.

Then one comes to the issue of defunct companies, as I think we are calling them. Defunct companies and probably also deceased owner operators, one man bands is a relevant feature in this case, and it is not a side show, as I -- and I think Professor Wilks was on this point earlier, and they are within the UKTC claim and we say this is actually a structural advantage in favour of the opt in proceedings, because we -- obviously the RHA will only take the call from someone who is capable of making it, that if someone gets in touch and says, "Actually, I retired three years ago, can I still join", the answer may be, "Yes", because you can restore your company, if it was a limited company you can restore it I think within six years. I mean, you know, there are rules on companies being returned to the register for particular purposes, or they may be in liquidation, or people may -- I don't know that there has been any single example of this, but there is no actual reason why a person or representative shouldn't be in touch and have the possibility of their making

a claim be investigated, but the main point is, firstly, it would be pro-active, there would have to be an approach, and, secondly, it would be verifiable, so you won't have a large mass to be dealt with by, possibly, you know, some form of statistical evidence about the likelihood of someone who was in business in '98, you know, no longer being in business or whatever it might be, the opt in will only deal with real cases by real claimants.

10 THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

MR FLYNN: As I say, I have no sort of figures to give you on that, but that is -- that seems to me clearly the position, and the haulage community in some ways is quite close knit, and who's to say that someone won't say, "What about Alan's business", you know, and that could happen.

An additional point on the -- sort of -- which is preferable, opt in or opt-out, goes to the expert methodology. We've had some discussion of that today, and obviously the main show, as it were, is in a week's time, but I think it's fairly clear that a main reason for Dr Lilico's choice of approach is driven by the features of the opt-out regime. He won't have, as Dr Davis would have, the contact with real claimants from which data can be taken, and who are, in fact,

1	obliged to co-operate with us to provide it. He won't
2	have that until very late, if at all, in the process,
3	whereas in the opt in model it will be available at
4	a very early stage and enable the statistical models to
5	be, you know, properly populated and the regressions
6	specified and so on, but in my submission that is an
7	important consideration for the Tribunal to bear in mind
8	which might avoid some kind of unfairness or skewing
9	which would be based which would result from
10	a model a methodology that's essentially based on
11	assumptions about categories of data which are available
12	in these proceedings, and the other point about
13	methodology is consistency with the individual actions.
14	The Tribunal has already said, and I think we've been
15	taken to the order, or it has been quoted to you, but
16	the Tribunal has already explained that it is important
17	that there should be consistency of approach between the
18	various individual actions, and they are all zeroing in
19	on the econometric sort of regression models, and we say
20	the same consideration applies in relation to collective
21	proceedings. You should also be reassured by
22	consistency of approach, and wary of inconsistency of
23	approach, and that would be so also if you were to,
24	contrary to our submission, approve two opt in models.
25	There should also be consistency of approach. If there

are different models that presents great difficulties of co-ordination and reconciliation for everyone involved, for the Tribunal, for the representatives, those they represent, and, indeed, the defendants. One should spare them a thought once in a while. My friends are looking a bit tired, but I have their interests at heart.

THE PRESIDENT: I expect not too much Mr Flynn.

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MR FLYNN: Not too much actually, Sir, I would be quite happy to keep them here for another couple of hours, but the other -- if you were at all minded to approve two opt ins, we also say that there is enormous risk for confusion in the messaging, the way in which potential members of the class are contacted and so forth, and so this would require enormously careful managing, and I have already referred to the minimum viability threshold, which also would require some careful managing, because if people signed up to an action with that involved, something would have to be done for them or they would be just left without a seat in the game of musical chairs, so broadly, as we approach 4.30, let me say simply that whatever your legal options are in theory, this is a case where we would say, and obviously we are going to spend a few days now talking about that, but we would say that opt in, and our opt in, has been

shown to be workable. There is no showing that opt-out would be preferable and in our submission you are being guided by your version of the overriding objective, as Lord Briggs put it in Merricks, that cases should be decided not only justly, but at proportionate cost, clearly points in favour of approving only one opt in in this case, because otherwise you will be leading to wasteful duplication of costs, no doubt increased court time and all that sort of thing and ultimately could lead to class members being left high and dry as well for the reasons I have given.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. We understand.

MR FLYNN: Well Sir, I will stop there, unless I can help the Tribunal further this evening and we can pick it up at 10 in the morning.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Can we leave you with two thoughts to consider? Obviously one of the points being raised against your application is the problem of the inclusion of new and used trucks. You are well aware of that and I'm sure you are going to address it. We would like you to explain to us whether there is any particular reason why you are not seeking an aggregate award of damages which, as I mentioned to Mr Thompson is possible for opt in just as for opt-out. It's not confined to opt-out, and whether that could potentially overcome some of the

1	problems which are then left to be dealt with at the
2	distribution stage, or another potential route is
3	whether you have considered Rule 78, subrule 4, that's
4	to say, to have a sub-class with a different class
5	representative, as discussed in the guide at paragraph
6	6.35, precisely in the circumstances where there is
7	a potential conflict on certain issues between members
8	of the class, but, of course, not on all issues, and
9	perhaps you would like to reflect on those with your
10	team overnight.
11	MR FLYNN: Yes. Yes indeed Sir. Thank you.
12	THE PRESIDENT: We will resume at 10 o'clock tomorrow.
13	MR FLYNN: Thank you, Sir.
14	(4.32 pm)
15	(The hearing adjourned to 10 am on 20 April 2021)
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5	HOUSEKEEPING1
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7	Submission by MR THOMPSON
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9	Submission by MR FLYNN
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