IN THE COMPETITION APPEAL TRIBUNAL Case No. 1014/1/1/03

and 1015/1/1/03

[2003] CAT 10

New Court Carey Street London WC2A 2JT

Wednesday 21 May 2003

Before:

The President SIR CHRISTOPHER BELLAMY (Chairman)

THE HONOURABLE ANTONY LEWIS MRS VINDELYN SMITH-HILLMAN

BETWEEN:

ARGOS LIMITED (1)

and

LITTLEWOODS PLC (2) Applicants

- and -

THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF FAIR TRADING Respondent

Mr Mark Brealey QC and Mr Mark Hoskins appeared for Messrs Argos Limited.

Mr Nicholas Green QC appeared for Messrs Littlewoods plc.

Mr Brian Doctor QC and Ms Kassie Smith appeared on behalf οf

The Director General of Fair Trading.

CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE

RULING

Transcribed from the shorthand notes of Harry Counsell & Co. Cliffords Inn, Fetter Lane, London EC4A 1LD Telephone 020 7269 0370

THE CHAIRMAN: This is the first Case Management
Conference in an appeal lodged by Argos Limited and
Littlewoods plc, who are both well known multi-channel
retailers, against a Decision dated 19 February 2003 in
which the Director General of Fair Trading, now the
Office of Fair Trading, found that Argos, Littlewoods
and a company known as Hasbro (UK) Limited had
infringed the Chapter 1 Prohibition of the Competition
Act 1998 by entering into certain alleged price fixing
agreements or concerted practices in relation to toys
supplied by Hasbro and sold by Argos and Littlewoods
respectively. For that infringement Argos has been
fined £17.2 million and Littlewoods has been fined
£5.37 million.

The Director's evidence of the alleged infringing agreements or concerted practices is based on certain internal documents, mainly e-mails, but also on certain notes of interviews with Hasbro employees.

Argos and Littlewoods deny that the e-mails and notes of interview prove the Director's case. They say that no infringing agreements or practices have been made or have occurred.

Each company made that submission in response to the Rule 14 Notice, which is issued at the stage of the administrative procedure which takes place before the decision is taken. Both companies tendered witness statements at that stage in support of their position contradicting the Director's case.

The Director in the Decision gives his reasons for rejecting the arguments of Argos and Littlewoods but continues to rely essentially on the e-mails and notes of interview.

Argos and Littlewoods now advance the same case before the Tribunal. They allege that the e-mails and notes of interviews do not amount to strong and compelling evidence of the infringement which the Director alleges and are contradicted by witness statements served by Argos and Littlewoods.

The Tribunal is, thus, in this particular case confronted with an issue of disputed fact.

 Argos and Littlewoods submit that the Tribunal should resolve that issue of disputed fact on the papers, not hearing oral evidence and giving the various documents such weight as the Tribunal thinks fit.

The Office of Fair Trading disagrees with that proposition. The Office proposes to produce witness statements from some, at least, of those who were interviewed, at least those witnesses who are prepared to give such witness statements, in order to clarify the notes of interview and to tender those witnesses in support of the Office's case and to permit them to be cross-examined if the applicants so wish. For other possible witnesses, there is a suggestion that the Tribunal itself should issue witness summonses if witnesses are unwilling to cooperate.

Both the applicants strongly object to that course on the grounds that the Director should not now be allowed to embroider or embellish the case made against the applicants at the Rule 14 stage. They rely in particular on an earlier judgment given by the Tribunal in NAPP, that is to say, the decision of the Tribunal dated 8 August 2001 in which the Tribunal rejected certain attempts by the Director General of Fair Trading to add new evidence, but also allowed certain other new evidence to be admitted. The Tribunal said in that case at paragraph 77:

"It is particularly important that the Director's Decision should not be seen as something that can be elaborated on, embroidered or adapted at will once the matter reaches the Tribunal. It is a final administrative act with important legal consequences which in principle fixes the Director's position. In our view, further investigations after the Decision of primary facts and an attempt to strengthen by better evidence a Decision already taken should not in general be

countenanced."

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38 39 The applicants rely strongly on that passage.

The OFT submits that if it is correct that there can be no oral evidence at this stage of the proceedings, it puts the Director at a great disadvantage. There is no proper opportunity for cross-examination at the administrative stage and the Director does not have at his disposal means for testing the evidence of particular witnesses by crossexamination. It is only at the judicial stage that such opportunity arises. According to the OFT, disputes of fact which reach the Tribunal should be disposed of by the traditional methods of oral evidence and cross-examination, as various provisions of the Tribunal's rules plainly contemplate. This is an appeal on the merits, says the OFT, and if such procedure is not followed it will be almost inevitable that in most cases the Director will lose, because he will never be in a position to entirely contradict the untested evidence put forward by way of defence.

The applicants, for their part, continue to submit that the course proposed by the Office is unfair because proper witness statements should have been presented at the Rule 14 stage and it is too late now to add to the material.

This is clearly an important issue which the Tribunal must come to grips with. We are not, however, persuaded by Mr Brealey's submission that we should resolve this question now, in the abstract.

The existing decisions of the Tribunal, including the NAPP case, to which we have already referred, show that while in general the Director may not bolster or embroider his decision at the stage of the appeal, there are also circumstances in which new evidence may be admitted before the Tribunal, notably to rebut new allegations by the applicants. The Tribunal itself may also exercise powers to obtain evidence, as the substantive later decision in the NAPP case also shows.

The Tribunal is at this stage still evolving its

practice in the interests of fairness. The procedure set out in the Act is to a certain extent a hybrid procedure where there is, first, an administrative stage, and then a judicial stage. There is no right to test the evidence of witnesses before the Director and it is only at the judicial stage of the proceedings that it is possible to test by cross-examination the evidence of all relevant witnesses.

Although the Tribunal said at paragraph 79 of its judgment in the first NAPP case as follows -

"Our provisional conclusion is that there should be a presumption against permitting the Director to submit new evidence that could properly have been made during the administrative procedure ...

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it is right to say that that was only a "provisional conclusion" and that at paragraph 80 the Tribunal goes on to say that -

"there may well be cases where the Tribunal is persuaded not to apply the presumption we have indicated."

The Tribunal goes on:

"As stated in the Guide [the Guide to Appeals under the Competition Act 1998] the procedures of this Tribunal are designed to deal with cases justly, in close harmony with the overriding objective in civil litigation under Rule 1(1) of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998. That includes, so far as practical, ensuring that the parties are on an equal footing, saving expense, dealing with the case in ways that are proportionate, proceeding expeditiously and allotting to the case an appropriate share of the court's resources. considerations may militate against permitting new evidence by the Director, but in some circumstances considerations of fairness may point in the other direction. An obvious example is where a party makes a new allegation or produces a new expert's report which the Director seeks to

counter."

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There the Tribunal is only dealing with one particular example of where it may be appropriate to admit new evidence. The Tribunal goes on in paragraph 81:

"One factor that may well be relevant in this connection is the fairness of the appeal process itself. In accordance with the Act, the first occasion on which the Decision receives full public judicial scrutiny is in this Tribunal. appellant will often have submitted voluminous pleadings, witness statements and documents unconstrained by the evidence presented to the Director. The Director at the administrative stage may not always be able to foresee, although of course he should endeavour to do so, from what direction or in what strength an attack may come at the appeal stage. A situation whereby the appellant could always have a free run before the Tribunal, but the Director was always confined to the material used in the administrative procedure, could lead to a significant lack of balance and fairness in the appeal process."

Against that background we would not wish this afternoon to rule out the possibility, in principle, of the Director adducing witness statements of the kind to which he has referred. Obviously it would be more difficult if what the Director was suggesting was the possibility of producing wholly new evidence, for example, of an undiscovered fact not previously relied on. But what the Director is proposing here, as we understand it, is witness statements clarifying the notes of interview that already exist.

In the circumstances with which the Tribunal is confronted, we take the view that we cannot determine what would or would not be fair in this appeal until we see the witness statements that it is proposed to adduce. Only when we have concrete statements in front of us can we make any assessment as to whether or not it would be fair or just to admit them, whether those

statements are confined within proper limits, whether they are helpful to one or the other parties, and so on. In our view it is premature to make any ruling this afternoon on the point of principle that is before us.

What we propose, therefore, to order is that the Director's defence should be served by the due date. We are not minded at this stage to grant any extension of time. If, together with the defence or within 14 days thereafter, the Director wishes to adduce further witness statements as part of his case, it is for the Director to make an application with the witness statements annexed and to serve those witness statements on the applicants. We shall then be in a position to adjudicate on whether or not it is fair to admit those statements, in full knowledge of the background facts and indeed with a better knowledge than we presently have of the detailed contents of the present file.

We do not accept the submission made on behalf of Argos that this represents "the oldest trick in the book" on the grounds that, even if the Tribunal rejects the witness statements, it will have read them. We followed a similar course in NAPP, where a number of witness statements were in fact excluded from the file and no further attention was paid to them. We take the view that this Tribunal is equipped to put out of its mind matters that have been excluded from the file, if necessary returning the witness statements to the parties concerned. If there were continuing doubts on that point, it would always be open to the applicants to make an application that their appeal should be heard by a different Tribunal.

That is our ruling on the matter we have been discussing hitherto.

MR DOCTOR: There is one further point, which is the question of disclosure. I am happy to say that we are not going to proceed. There are three categories. In

fact we have acquired two of them.

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 THE CHAIRMAN: So we do not need to rule on that?

MR DOCTOR: There is no need for a ruling on that.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

That, I think, takes us more or less through the agenda. We have two more points. We have 11 and 12, which are confidentiality and timetable.

As far as confidentiality is concerned, for my part and my colleagues' part, I do not think it is useful to go into confidentiality in detail this afternoon, but we would observe in a preliminary way that some of the claims to confidentiality at the moment seem to us to be rather wide. The Tribunal may need some persuading that confidentiality can attach either to a ground of appeal or to a document which is relied on as part of the evidence in the case. But I suggest that when we have the position of all parties on confidentiality that is a matter we can come back to in due course. We may not need to resolve it at the moment.

As far as the timetable of the case is concerned, we have just said that we would expect the defence to be filed by 3 June in accordance with the normal rules. We have in terms of the Tribunal's diary pencilled in the possibility of a further Case Management Conference on the provisional date of 2 July, where it may be that we need to come to grips with the question of witness statements if matters have not been resolved by that date, and other outstanding matters. It may be only at that stage that we can see properly the shape of this case.

As far as the progress of the case after that date is concerned, at present, without being definite, it looks to the Tribunal as if dates, roughly speaking, in the period of the second and third week of September are likely to be the relevant window for the purposes of the hearing. That is to say, it seems to us unlikely that this case will be sufficiently mature for a hearing before the end of July. For various reasons

the Tribunal is not anxious to fix major hearings during August, which takes us effectively to September. That is our provisional thinking at the moment on the timetable.

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In the light of that, I do not know whether there are any other points or issues that the parties would like to raise?

MR GREEN: Can I make one observation about timetabling? THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

MR GREEN: September may be an appropriate time. If we are going to have a trial with a large number of witnesses, the logistics of trying to ensure that the witnesses turn up and are not inconvenienced by holidays and so on, is going to be something of a nightmare, so we may need a degree of flexibility in scheduling in appropriate windows to get the maximum number of witnesses to be able to attend.

Although Mr Doctor submitted that THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. cross-examination of witnesses was the only way of doing it, with the hallowed and sacred principle of common law procedure, the Tribunal is not in general particularly keen on prolonged cross-examination sessions that last for days and days and days. It may very well be that when we get down to it, there are only a few points in relation to a few documents that need to be examined more closely. We shall see. may very well be, even if we get that far, that if there is to be any cross-examination, it does not by any means involve all the witnesses. It may just involve one or two, or some or a part of a witness's statement, or something. It seems to us probably, at the moment at least, that the answer to this case lies somewhere in the middle. I hope it is to the lower end of length in terms of hearing days rather than towards the higher end.

MR GREEN: I think that is sensible. There are potentially up to 30 individuals who have given witness statements. We imagine that only a portion of those would need to be called and of those statements there

1	will be a number of issues which, certainly from the
2	applicants' side, we may wish to explore, but I suspect
3	that they will be in a relatively confined compass.
4	THE CHAIRMAN: There is a certain amount of background that
5	probably won't need to be explored orally. But the
6	factual allegations of whether particular arrangements
7	or agreements or practices were made are within a
8	relatively small compass and do not involve dozens of
9	people but only involve some.
10	MR GREEN: Yes.
11	THE CHAIRMAN: Let us leave it there and proceed on that
12	basis and return, if necessary, to the fray in early
13	July.
14	Is there anything else that anybody else wants to
15	raise?
16	Thank you all very much.
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18	(The hearing concluded)