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IN THE COMPETITION APPEAL TRIBUNAL

Victoria House, Bloomsbury Place, London WC1A 2EB

8th April 2005

Before: SIR CHRISTOPHER BELLAMY (The President) PROFESSOR PAUL STONEMAN DAVID SUMMERS

Sitting as a Tribunal in England and Wales

BETWEEN:

PERNOD-RICARD SA & CAMPBELL DISTILLERS LIMITED

Appellants

Respondent

and

OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING

supported by

BACARDI-MARTINI LIMITED

Intervener

Mr. Nicholas Green QC (instructed by DLA) appeared for the Appellant.

Mr. Jon Turner and Miss Kassie Smith (instructed by the Solicitor to the Office of Fair Trading)

appeared for the Respondent

Mr. James Flynn QC (instructed by Simmons & Simmons) appeared for the Intervener.

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CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE

Case No. 1017/2/1/03

1	THE PRESIDENT: Good morning ladies and gentlemen. The Tribunal is provisionally of the view
2	that there are four matters that we would like to discuss today:
3	1. Whether the proposed revised assurances are in fact agreed as to the terms of
4	those assurances being voluntarily offered by Bacardi.
5	2. Whether and to what extent the new regime relating to binding commitments is
6	relevant to the situation that presents itself in this case.
7	3. The formal mechanism of disposing of the Appeal, if that is what we decide to do;
8	4. The question of costs.
9	I do not know whether those issues are sufficient for a working agenda or whether anyone has
10	any further points they want to add to that. If not, perhaps we can just make sure first of all
11	that the assurances that have now been offered by Bacardi, and on which Pernod has had the
12	opportunity to comment are essentially acceptable to the three parties and form a basis upon
13	which the Appeal need proceed no further. Mr. Green, what is the position on that so far as
14	your clients are concerned?
15	MR. GREEN: I have taken instructions, they are acceptable.
16	THE PRESIDENT: And that, I imagine, is true of you too, Mr. Turner, is it?
17	MR. TURNER: That is the Office's position.
18	THE PRESIDENT: And since Bacardi has proffered them, presumably they are acceptable to
19	Bacardi?
20	MR. FLYNN: Naturally Bacardi thinks they are satisfactory as a means of resolving the proceedings
21	and for that purpose.
22	THE PRESIDENT: Yes, thank you. I think that takes us on, if I may turn to you, Mr. Turner, to a
23	question that has been raised by Pernod, which we would just like to explore for a moment,
24	which is whether these commitments should take the form of binding commitments under what
25	is now s.31A of the Act – which I happen to have in front of me. As I understood it, the OFT's
26	position is that that question does not arise because the investigation that the OFT had begun
27	was closed, and that therefore we are not in a situation where the OFT has begun an
28	investigation within the meaning of s.31A(1). As to that, two points perhaps occur. First of
29	all, strictly speaking – and literally speaking – the OFT had begun an investigation in this case
30	and had not made a Decision within the meaning of $s.31(2)$, that is to say an infringement
31	Decision. So that is the first point that arises on that subsection.
32	The second point is that although the OFT purported to close the investigation that it
33	had begun, the effect of the Tribunal's Judgment was that there were (according to us)
34	procedural errors in that course having been taken without first consulting Pernod, and we left
35	open at para.255 of the Judgment the question of what relief, if any, should be granted, so that

formally speaking it would seem to us – at least provisionally – that we could say that the closure of the investigation was set aside, which would mean that the investigation is still on foot, which would mean that the s.31A(1) conditions are met. So we would like to invite any comments the OFT has either on that point or more generally on the use of these new powers to accept binding commitments in a case like this.

MR. TURNER: May I give four reactions to that? First – and I will be corrected if I am wrong about this – our impression is that the request for commitments, at least on the correspondence, is not persisted in by Pernod – for commitments to be the mechanism for bringing this to an end. The flavour of the correspondence is that this can be arrived at by agreement in the Tribunal today through the making of an appropriate order. That, we understand from the correspondence, to be Pernod's position.

Secondly, the point you make about s.31(2) is well taken. On the other hand, it is the Office's position that there is no administration investigation afoot for the purpose of the commitments' regime. The Office had closed the file. While it is true that the Tribunal has found that the case is admissible, and that the decision to accept assurances was an appealable decision, that is a different matter from saying that the investigation is still afoot. We do not consider that it is the case that when the Tribunal entertains an appeal in a file closure case – let alone all non-infringement cases – that the result of that is that the administrative investigation is to be deemed to be afoot.

Thirdly, one of the components for the acceptance of commitments is the identification of a competition problem and of the framing of commitments designed to fit that competition problem. In this case that is very important, because the position of certainly Bacardi as we understand it, and of the Office of Fair Trading is that no competition problem has been demonstrated by Pernod, or otherwise appears.

THE PRESIDENT: In your original press release you said that the original undertaking solved the competition problem.

MR. TURNER: Yes, the original undertaking solved the competition problem as then appeared and that was the conclusion of the investigation at that stage. What we are talking about now, as I understand it, is a change to the assurances because of Pernod's case that there are some lacunae, flaw or problem with the existing assurances so that they do not meet the competition problem. The position so far as we are concerned, and I believe Bacardi as well, is that that is not the case, there is no flaw, there are no lacunae. What has been proposed is a device to try to break the deadlock and bring these proceedings to a close. I am not even sure that if commitments are required in a case of this kind that Bacardi would be prepared to continue with its proposal, but Mr. Flynn can speak to that.

1 The fourth point is that we are in a rather interesting position where the decision to 2 accept assurances was made in 2003 prior to the introduction of commitments regime, and the 3 Tribunal is therefore in the transitional position, as it were, straddling the introduction of the new regime. It is our submission that in these circumstances in making an order which we 4 5 would invite the Tribunal to do today, the Tribunal is looking backwards to the Decision that 6 the Office made and, assuming the Office got it wrong, what the Office should have done at 7 that stage, prior to the introduction of the commitments' regime. 8 Those, in my submission, are four points which lead to the conclusion that there is no 9 need for the parties to engage in the procedures required under the new commitments' regime 10 in the circumstances of this case. 11 Sir, I can deal with the remaining two issues that you canvassed in opening. 12 THE PRESIDENT: Just before you do that, Mr. Turner, and it may be you do not have any 13 instructions on the point, but is there any general policy by the Office as to the circumstances it 14 will go down the binding commitments' regime, and the circumstances in which it will, as it 15 were, accept more informal assurances, now that the binding commitments' regime exists and 16 is there? 17 MR. TURNER: I am aware of the Office's internal consideration of that issue. I will take 18 instructions but I am not sure that we have arrived at a final position on that point. Shall I take 19 instructions for a moment on that? 20 THE PRESIDENT: I think it would be of some interest, yes, thank you. 21 MR. TURNER: (After a pause): It is a point that the Office has considered – I am aware of that, 22 and the position we are at is that the legal view is about to be put to the Office's Board, and we 23 would prefer if we may ----24 THE PRESIDENT: To reserve. 25 MR. TURNER: -- to reserve that point. 26 THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. 27 MR. TURNER: Because there is an issue, Sir, as you say, as to the scope for accepting informal 28 assurances, in view of the new regime, and that is the issue which is yet to be finally resolved. 29 THE PRESIDENT: Yes, it also has various ramifications for the procedural remedies that follow if 30 it is a situation of binding commitments, or it is not, both from the point of view of the 31 enforceability of the commitments, and from the point of view of any review by the Tribunal if 32 that becomes inappropriate. 33 MR. TURNER: The Office is well aware of that and intends to define its position shortly. 34 THE PRESIDENT: Yes, thank you. You were going to deal with the two other issues.

1	MR. TURNER: The two other issues are the form of the appropriate order and costs. I will develop
2	these submissions only briefly for present purposes.
3	THE PRESIDENT: Yes, thank you.
4	MR. TURNER: So far as the form of the order is concerned, there is an issue whether it should be a
5	withdrawal under rule 12 of the Rules, or in the form of a consent order under rule 57 of the
6	Tribunal's Rules. We say this, Pernod was content to withdraw the Appeal as the Tribunal
7	may have seen in a letter that it wrote on 6^{th} April. It then withdrew from that position later
8	yesterday afternoon.
9	THE PRESIDENT: Just a moment, let me catch up with the correspondence.
10	MR. TURNER: If you have the bundle which was supplied for the hearing.
11	THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
12	MR. TURNER: At tab 18 of that you will find a letter from DLA, first point out that the discussion
13	about commitments, s.31A was noted, and it was said that that would be addressed in due
14	course. The Tribunal will have seen that DLA since then put in a long letter the following day
15	which did not touch on that point. There is then a proposal and you will see that under the
16	recitals in italics the Tribunal gives permission for the Appeal to be withdrawn, so that was
17	what was being canvassed at that stage.
18	Then late yesterday afternoon, at about 10 past 4, we received a letter saying that they
19	had reflected and did not consider it appropriate for them to withdraw the Appeal after all. I do
20	not know if the Tribunal has a copy of that?
21	THE PRESIDENT: Yes, we have it.
22	MR. TURNER: So this we take to be the up to date position now, and you will see from the middle
23	paragraph that Pernod are now saying that they do not, on reflection, believe that they can
24	withdraw the Appeal. The reason that they give is that a large part of the Appeal has already
25	been dealt with in the Tribunal's Judgment on admissibility and procedural fairness, that is 10^{th}
26	June Judgment last year and, as such, we do not believe it would be an appropriate step for the
27	Appellants to withdraw the Appeal. Then what they say is they are therefore leaving it for the
28	Tribunal to decide on the correct procedural mechanism.
29	THE PRESIDENT: Yes, so they do not withdraw it, on the other hand they do not wish to prosecute
30	it?
31	MR. TURNER: Yes. They say also in the last sentence, and this is the explanation for what I was
32	saying about commitments: "This proposal is made on the basis that provided it is agreed
33	between the parties that the assurances will be amended as agreed" and those are the
34	voluntary assurances, "we fully agree that the proceedings should now be brought to an
35	end."

1	We say about that that we note Pernod's reservation in the letter. We feel that it is
2	misguided because withdrawal of the Appeal is certainly an option. It affects matters going
3	forward not going back. It is a way for them to end the Appeal at their instance at this stage,
4	and it does not upset in any way the Judgment that has already been given.
5	Further, we consider strongly that withdrawal is the natural course to be taken in this
6	case. Not only did Pernod accept that apparently in its letter of 6 th April, but it said as long ago
7	as 15 th March that exit strategies could be discussed, and I would ask the Tribunal just to pick
8	up the agreed note of the meeting that was held with the Office on that date, and you should
9	have that in a small file submitted to the Tribunal as the Office's progress report on 31 st March.
10	THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
11	MR. TURNER: It is paginated, there is an agreed note of the meeting beginning on p.85, from
12	which you can see who the attendees were. The material parts are right at the end on pages 88
13	and 89 of the bundle. Just at the bottom of that page you have this:
14	"CK (Miss Kent, OFT) asked how Pernod saw the appeal going forward.
15	"MP (Solicitor, DLA) said that the OFT had shown that it was prepared to investigate
16	Pernod's concerns and took the policing of the assurances seriously. Pernod still
17	wanted the CAT to consider the text of assurances (although it was unlikely to
18	happen). If the textual analysis route could not be pursued he did not see much point
19	in Pernod pushing on with the Appeal."
20	THE PRESIDENT: Is this an open meeting, Mr. Turner?
21	MR. TURNER: It has been agreed, and it is not a "without prejudice" offer of compromise.
22	"On the basis of what the OFT had found it seems that Bacardi was being co-
23	operative by taking the assurances seriously [the existing assurances] and Pernod was
24	comforted by the OFT's openness to investigating breaches or new allegations.
25	However [fair reservation] Pernod would need to discuss this with counsel."
26	Then if you turn over the page you have AA [Mr. Ageletakis, OFT] asking whether there were
27	any specific comments that Pernod wished to make on our report. That was the Office's report
28	dismissing effectively a raft of allegations that had been made by Pernod about a competition
29	problem current in the market.
30	"MP said that he had nothing to add. He added that Pernod had seen value in the
31	proceedings before the CAT as Bacardi had had to take the assurances seriously.
32	However, it was not possible to keep the proceedings running for ever and exit
33	strategies could be discussed. Pernod would contact the OFT after it had discussed
34	matters with counsel."

It was an open and agreed note. That was some two weeks before the Bacardi offer landed, unexpectedly for both Bacardi and the Office I should say, so I say straight away that there is o linkage between Pernod's readiness to end these proceedings and the subsequent Bacardi offer. Pernod has made clear that it has achieved what it wanted because Bacardi has taken the assurances seriously and the OFT has shown its willingness to be muscular. Pernod was considering an exit strategy. It is for those reasons that we say withdrawal is the more natural route.

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Thirdly, and finally, withdrawal is also straight forward. The consent order route has certain problems and these were in a sense identified when the Tribunal drew to our attention the provisions of Rule 57 of the Tribunal's Rules.

THE PRESIDENT: It is a bit complicated, is it not?

MR. TURNER: They appear primarily to envisage a consent order in an infringement case, or at any rate a case where there has been some significant movement affecting the state of regulation.

THE PRESIDENT: Did we not have to look at this in the very first *Napp* Judgment – the very first Judgment the Tribunal gave?

MR. TURNER: Yes. We may well have done, and I confess that I have forgotten – Mr. Green was in that as well. I do not know if he remembers what happened.

THE PRESIDENT: I do not think any of us can remember now what it was we considered. I seem to remember we looked at it briefly.

MR. TURNER: There are two points to make. First, that under rule 57(1) the pre-condition is that the parties agree the terms on which to settle all or any part of the proceedings. Costs, I apprehend, will be a term that is not agreed. Secondly, and perhaps of more significance, there needs to be an agreed consent order impact statement. That is a problem here because there is no agreement about impact. Bacardi and the Office say that the impact on competition of the Bacardi offer in practice is nil. Pernod, I apprehend, has a different perspective. So that is the route and all I have to say about that.

In terms of the content of the order there is then perhaps an issue that we do not need to spend very much time about, between the parties, about the content of the recitals – what an order should look like. The Office's position, which we believe to be agreed by Bacardi, is that the recitals should make clear the parties' respective position in relation to Bacardi's offer, and that the operative paragraph of an order should record simply that the Tribunal gives permission for the Appeal to be withdrawn.

Pernod has produced a proposal, a counter proposal, which you can find in their submissions at tab 1 of the big bundle, p.8 and, if you have that open, you will find a copy of the Office's proposal at tab 18B of your bundle.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

MR. TURNER: Looking first at the Office's proposal, the first two recitals are making clear that the Intervener and the Office (the Respondent) maintain the position that there is no need to amend the original assurances in order for them to be effective, although they are proposing and expressing their willingness to accept certain amendments. Then you will see that Pernod's proposal removes those qualifications and is framed in terms of Pernod itself also agreeing the amendments. Without wanting to spend too much time over what I hope are not too trivial points, the problem that the Office certainly has with Pernod's proposals are, first, that they do not record the parties' positions and that gives a false message about the significance of the changes, and it does not reflect in our submission the outcome of these proceedings, nor the attitude of ----

THE PRESIDENT: So we do not have an agreed consent order, in other words?

MR. TURNER: Not yet, no. Secondly, Pernod's proposal refers to Pernod agreeing the amendments whereas in our submission Pernod does not have locus to agree, as opposed to being consulted on any changes to these assurances. So that is all there is to say about the order. We do not have an agreed form of words. I do not know whether there is going to be an issue about the route, whether withdrawal or consent order will be a matter of dispute.

THE PRESIDENT: Can I just raise two other possibilities, Mr. Turner? One is that the Appeal should be simply dismissed on terms, perhaps. The other is that we should simply make no order, we should simply say, as the Court of First Instance would say, there is no need for the Tribunal to make any further ruling in these proceedings, and we close our file.

MR. TURNER: Yes, it sounds as though one is achieving the same result.

THE PRESIDENT: It is true that the matter is not specifically dealt with under the Rules, but the Rules are fairly widely drawn.

MR. TURNER: The Office would have no objection to either of those proposals. Our only concern is to find an efficient way of bringing these proceedings to an end, and we do not want to be technical. If Pernod are happy with that and if Bacardi are, then there could be no objection.THE PRESIDENT: Yes, the consent order impact statement is discussed in the very first *Napp* case,

that is to say the application to suspend the original *Napp* Decision, very briefly at paras. 60 and 61, where the Tribunal, which in that case was the President sitting alone, said:

"61. I take the view that, if such a consent order impact statement is necessary for the purpose of disposing of interim applications such as the present, the statements made by the parties, in this case in writing and orally, explaining the circumstances of the consent order and its anticipated consequences for competition, suffice in an interim

1	context to comply with the requirements as to consent order impact statements under
2	[the then] Rule 28(2)(b) and (3)."
3	I am not sure that the consent impact statement would be a particular problem here. You could
4	simply say that the consent order arises as a result of changes to the assurances, that they arose
5	in the light of the proceedings before the Tribunal and that the anticipated effect on
6	competition is either neutral or to reinforce or clarify the assurances originally given so they
7	are to the same effect as to the original assurances. That is all you need to say.
8	MR. TURNER: That would certainly satisfy us. Whether Pernod would live with such a
9	formulation is the problem.
10	THE PRESIDENT: It is not quite clear whose impact statement it is under the Rules. It is a bit of a
11	dog's breakfast this rule, actually.
12	MR. TURNER: It appears to envisage that there is an agreed position on it. Frankly, the
13	circumstances on which there will be an agreed position on the impact on competition
14	THE PRESIDENT: No, I think the rule is probably envisaging a much more complicated situation
15	than the one we have here, where the OFT and the infringer have come to terms in quite a
16	complicated case, and the OFT wishes to settle, and the infringer and the OFT between them
17	agree that that can be done. Then it is a question of, if necessary, going out to third parties to
18	make sure that everything has been taken into account. I think that it is not really envisaging
19	the procedural situation we have here, where there is a third party Appellant and the Office and
20	the alleged infringer are, as it were, on the same side. That is not the situation that is envisaged
21	by this rule at all I do not think.
22	MR. TURNER: No, we are quite firmly of the view that the primary situation is a non-infringement.
23	THE PRESIDENT: So we could perhaps say we do not think this rule is in point in this situation.
24	MR. TURNER: That would also satisfy the Office as a general matter, if the Tribunal were to
25	express that view.
26	THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
27	MR. TURNER: The final issue is costs. The position can be simply stated. Pernod desires all its
28	legal costs, as we understand it, up to today. The Office says that the just order is that costs lie
29	where they fall; alternatively, a reduced contribution to Pernod's costs of contesting the
30	admissibility issue, and we have contended for slicing half off at the least.
31	THE PRESIDENT: You mean half the total?
32	MR. TURNER: Half of their total costs, reasonable costs of contesting the admissibility issue.
33	THE PRESIDENT: Sorry, what are you saying? That they should have half their total costs or they
34	should have half the costs of contesting the admissibility issue?
35	MR. TURNER: The latter.
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- 1 THE PRESIDENT: Half the costs of contesting the admissibility.
- MR. GREEN: I wonder if I might help? We are only seeking costs up to the date of the Judgment
 on the preliminary issues. We take the view that the order of the court in July of last year was
 effectively a direction that the matter be attempted to be resolved informally by administrative
 procedure, not in proceedings before the Tribunal, so we are only seeking costs up to
 effectively June/July 04.
- 7 THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I think it is 10th June.
- 8 MR. TURNER: That is helpful. Bacardi's position as expressed in its submissions ----
- 9 THE PRESIDENT: And just on the admissibility issue, what is the argument for saying they should
 10 only have half their costs of that issue?
 - MR. TURNER: It is to reflect events since the admissibility issue was contested, and the impact of those should be taken into account in deciding the amount of costs that they should be entitled to recover.
- 14 THE PRESIDENT: What events are you referring to? What events do you mean?
- 15 MR. TURNER: I am just going to develop that.
- 16 THE PRESIDENT: I am sorry.
 - MR. TURNER: Essentially there are two aspects. First, that subsequent events have shown that the substantive basis of their Appeal has been thin or absent, and more particularly that the way they have conducted the Appeal has put the Office to a considerable amount of unnecessary expense over a long period. I will develop that in a moment, but Mr. Green, as you have just heard, says that that is all irrelevant in a way because it all forms part of an administrative investigation and is outside the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.
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Finally, Bacardi's position is that they want Pernod to pay a proportion of their costs, and Mr. Flynn will develop that.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

MR. TURNER: The Office's position can be developed in this way. First, we say that unreasonable conduct should normally be penalised by making some adjustment to a costs' order so that an appropriate deterrent message should be given, and we believe that that principle must be uncontroversial. Secondly, that that principle should apply all the more strongly where the unreasonable conduct is at the instance of a very large, well resourced and expertly advised corporation such as Pernod, and where the conduct concerned has led, on our case, to a substantial diversion of public resources and, quite frankly, a waste of public money.

In the present case the admissibility judgment was handed down 10 months ago in
 June of last year, and since that time what has happened is that Pernod has, in our submission,
 behaved unreasonably in the conduct of this Appeal, not in some administrative investigation

beyond the Tribunal's purview. As I say, it has similarly become clear that the merits of its Appeal, as opposed to admissibility and procedural considerations, did lack substance. If I may, it might be convenient for me simply to develop that and then it is done, rather than come back to these points.

First, if you have a small bundle of correspondence that accompanied the main bundle for the hearing, it was correspondence I believe accompanying Pernod's submissions of yesterday. In it, and I am afraid my copy is not paginated but it is in chronological order, there is a letter of 13th July 2004, which was just before the Case Management Conference on 22nd July.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, we have it in front of us, thank you.

MR. TURNER: The first point was that at the end of its admissibility Judgment the Tribunal had requested the parties, as you will remember, to get together on what the issues were going to be going forward now that that admissibility issue had been decided, and this letter was written in that context. In the first full paragraph (the second paragraph of the letter) Pernod's solicitors said:

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"The principal live issue now remaining in this appeal for consideration at the next hearing is the first of those referred to by the Tribunal, namely, that the assurances do not adequately address the Competition law problem."

Then there is reference to the second of the live issues which was fettering of discretion by the Office, and the position was that was essentially an aspect of the principal live issue, and Pernod would not propose to argue it as a separate issue. Then as to the third issue referred to by the Tribunal of the OFT's reasons – the adequacy of reasoning:

"This would no longer arise for consideration if the matter is remitted for consideration by the OFT."

So the first point was that there seemed to be agreement at that stage that there was only one live issue, which was the adequacy of the assurances, and that the other aspects of the Appeal were not the main focus for the Appeal proceedings. However, you will also recall, and we can go there if need be that Pernod retrenched its position at the hearing on 22nd July through counsel, and said that all of these issues were still in play. That is reflected in the Ruling, but the reference in the transcript (tab 24) is p.4.

In the same letter Pernod announced its aim of conducting what it called a textual Appeal, in which there would be no evidence about the practical effects of the assurances on the market, about how they work in practice or about the possibilities in the real world for circumvention, given the drafting. You see that beginning at the bottom of that letter:

1	"In our view there are advantages in the Tribunal deciding this issue without hearing
2	evidence. The hearing would need then only be short and would focus on the cogency
3	of the assurances."
4	and so on. If you turn the page you will see the (to us quite startling) proposition:
5	"One consequence of the Tribunal determining the case without evidence is that it
6	would not be open to the OFT or the Bacardi to contend that the assurances were, in
7	fact, adequate, contrary to the impression given by the languages of the assurance,
8	because of some factual matter. If the appeal is determined without evidence then the
9	appeal is, of necessity, a more limited exercise."
10	Well, it is quite true that the Appeal would be a more limited exercise, but for the very reason
11	given in that paragraph it would also be a sterile exercise, namely, that there would be no way
12	in which the Tribunal could determine whether the assurances were, in practice, adequate.
13	The Tribunal will recall that what then happened was that Pernod's counsel asserted
14	that Pernod was litigating the case in truth because there was a real problem in the market
15	place and that it did have evidence to show the inadequacy of the assurances, in line with what
16	it said in the Notice of Appeal. The Ruling made by the Tribunal was that it should then
17	produce evidence in support of its Appeal
18	THE PRESIDENT: Was this 22 nd ?
19	MR. TURNER: Yes, this was the Ruling of 22^{nd} July at that Case Management Conference – it
20	should produce evidence show it to the Office of Fair Trading and see what could be done,
21	because there may be a practical and efficient way of resolving this Appeal.
22	Now, unfortunately between then and now a lot of what has happened has been
23	invisible to the Tribunal, but we have engaged in a very considerable amount of work. I
24	should just pause for a moment to say that Pernod, of course, characterise what happened as
25	effectively a remission to the Office of Fair Trading, and that is the hook for Mr. Green's
26	submission that this then fell into the administrative ambit rather than being part of the judicial
27	hearing. We say that it was not. The Tribunal's Ruling and what then happened was squarely
28	within the ambit of these Appeal proceedings. You gave Pernod an opportunity to show the
29	colour of its case, and that is important given what Mr. Green says you must disregard for cost
30	purposes. The reference to remission – I hear Mr. Green muttering – is in the DLA's
31	submissions of 5 th April, tab 1, at para.3.19.
32	THE PRESIDENT: I do not think we have formally remitted anything to the OFT.
33	MR. TURNER: You did not remit anything.
34	THE PRESIDENT: Let us see – on you go, Mr. Turner.

1	MR. TURNER: The evidence to flesh out the assertions in the Notice of Appeal then arrived a
2	month later on 27 th August.
3	THE PRESIDENT: I think we were copied
4	MR. TURNER: You were copied in.
5	THE PRESIDENT: with various representations and witness statements, but we have not had
6	occasion to consider them as far as we know.
7	MR. TURNER: Absolutely, but the Office has, and the gist of our case on costs really boils down to
8	all of the work that has gone in to looking into this and the outcome, because it was looked into
9	in very great detail by the Office, and that included attention from the legal team to try to
10	discern what in it was of relevance of weight in Pernod's claim for the purpose of this Appeal.
11	THE PRESIDENT: Relevant to the assurances, or relevant to something else.
12	MR. TURNER: Relevant to the assurances, the question of the adequacy of the assurances and the
13	points made in the Notice of Appeal, specific points listed about the possibilities of
14	circumvention. We understood that the evidence was going to back up the claims made in the
15	Notice of Appeal. If I may ask the Tribunal to pick up the Office's progress report bundle?
16	What you may not have had occasion to look at is the report that the Office produced after it
17	had finished its work and which was the subject of the meeting on 15 th March, the meeting
18	note which we have already looked at.
19	THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
20	MR. TURNER: You should have three tabs, and in the final tab
21	THE PRESIDENT: "Report on Pernod's submission, 27th August."
22	MR. TURNER: Yes, that is the confidential version; I believe that there is a non-confidential
23	version in the previous tab. So just so the Tribunal is aware of the identity of particular
24	retailers is a matter of confidentiality.
25	THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
26	MR. TURNER: What you see when you read through this
27	THE PRESIDENT: So who has had the confidential version? Bacardi has not had the confidential
28	version?
29	MR. TURNER: Bacardi has not had the confidential version. They had the prior version, but the
30	confidential version is what was discussed with Pernod. To cut a long story short, we went
31	through each and every claim and we found nothing in it. In some cases when we approached
32	retailers and asked them who had been named by Pernod and asked them what had happened,
33	we were told we simply did not understand what had been said and that it was not right. In no
34	case was there anything of any substance, and nor did any of the claims relate to the questions
35	of circumvention that had been highlighted in the Notice of Appeal. They related either to
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extraneous matters, introduced for the first time, or to allegations that the assurances had been broken by Bacardi in various ways, which we had always said we would look into straight away.

I will take you to just a few of these points. If you turn to para.13 – I am not going to go through each and every one of these – an allegation there that Bacardi has a solus house pouring agreement with a particular Style Bar. That was an allegation therefore that there was, contrary to the assurances, a solus pouring agreement of a certain kind. In para.13 you will see what was set out in the witness statement submitted by Pernod that they were told by the owner of Style Bar B that Bacardi has a solus house pour arrangement with them, and Pernod said that the Havana Club was refused any kind of listing.

If you turn to para. 15 over the page, you will see there we contacted Style Bar B and spoke to the owner. The owner stated that Style Bar B does not have any kind of exclusive agreement with Bacardi. When asked about having refused Havana Club listing, he stated that Pernod must be mistaken as Style Bar B considers Havana Club a valuable premium brand and stocks three types of Havana Club rum.

Then the next allegation that there was an exclusive cocktail list agreement with Style Bar B, you will see in para.16 an allegation that Bacardi paid an inflated sum of money and that in return they require there to be no other competing brands in the cocktail list.

Paragraph 18, we contacted the Style Bar B, spoke to the owner – if you read through you will see the gist of that is that there was nothing in the allegation.

If you go to para.24, this is also helpful in demonstrating the diffuse nature of the allegations that were made. There is an allegation that Pernod was refused inclusion in a Salsa night promotion poster with Style Bar B, and para.24 recites what the witness evidence submitted was, namely, information that Pernod sought to include the Havana Club brand on a poster advertising a Salsa night, and that it was rejected because it was said that they would lose too much money paid by Bacardi.

At para.26 we have gone to the owner and he explained that the bar decides on promotions and then goes to suppliers for sponsorship to help with the cost. He thought it would be strange to allow another supplier to take part in a salsa night promotion for which sponsorship had already been paid, and so on. In the final sentence he said that he would have no hesitation in hosting a similar night sponsored by Pernod if he thought it would generate interest and revenue.

Paragraph 28 was a rather larger allegation; we call it the "fat bottles" argument. You will see from para.28 it was an allegation that Bacardi had requested almost total distribution of 1.5 litre white rum bottles, instead of the usual 70 cl. bottles in the estate outlets

1	of a particular retailer, together with optic status. You will see at the bottom of that paragraph
2	the effect of that was meant to be that it excluded, it squeezed out the display of a competing
3	brand on the back bar.
4	At para.29 there is a meeting with Pernod subsequently, and Pernod explained that
5	there is a general trend in bars to upscale to 1.5 litre bottles of spirits; it is generally thought to
6	be a more efficient way of dispensing spirits, especially as people are buying larger measures.
7	"Pernod elaborated further on the allegation during the same meeting by explaining
8	that it believed that a 1.5 litre bottle takes up the optic space of two 70 cl. bottles.
9	Finally they clarified that optics which are intended for 1.5 litre bottles cannot be used
10	for 70 cl. bottles, and that most retailers decide the mix of optics themselves which
11	usually includes a set number of small and large optics."
12	THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Turner, I think all we need for present purposes is the conclusion of this
13	report.
14	MR. TURNER: The conclusion was that there was nothing in it. I am simply seeking to
15	THE PRESIDENT: You had investigated it.
16	MR. TURNER: drive home that there was really quite a lot to do, that the Office treated it very
17	seriously and engaged in an awful lot of work. The cash value of this, because I apprehend
18	that Pernod will say, "Look, it was too difficult to look into, no one could really get to the
19	bottom of it for one reason or another" is this: Pernod itself did not contend that the Office's
20	examination of this had been superficial or flawed at the time. I have shown you the meeting
21	note which was agreed, and they accepted the Office's work. Indeed, they said that there was
22	no problem with the manner of the Office's examination and that they were satisfied with what
23	it had shown. That was the same passage in which Pernod said they wanted an exit strategy
24	from the Appeal. That was pages 88 and 89 of this bundle.
25	THE PRESIDENT: Meeting of 15 th March?
26	MR. TURNER: Yes, and we rely on that.
27	THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
28	MR. TURNER: Obviously the Tribunal cannot form a view about these bits and pieces itself, but
29	what they can see is what Pernod said when we met with them and asked them for their
30	comments on this report – they did not have any. At the top of p.89:
31	"AA asked specifically whether there were any specific comments that Pernod wished
32	to make on our report. There was nothing".
33	They had nothing to say. They wanted an exit strategy for the Appeal and that is the basis of
34	our strongly felt submission that Pernod has run an essentially hollow case. It has put the

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respondent to this appeal to very great and unnecessary expense spanning many months. The nub of what I say is that that should be reflected in the final costs award.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

MR. TURNER: Against this, as I understand it, there are two arguments made. First, that Bacardi's offer itself demonstrates that there was some substance in Pernod's case and also that the Office has essentially sold the pass by admitting that the assurances would be strengthened or clarified – it is true those were the words used by the Office. That is, in my submission, quite wrong. There has never been any need to amend these assurances in practice. Statements made by Pernod at that meeting show the Tribunal that they were happy that Bacardi was taking the existing assurances seriously.

Secondly, and perhaps if I may refer only to one paragraph in the report which we have not looked at, para.58, which is on the last page, you will see beginning at para.55 on the preceding page, that there were allegations about so-called "cloaking" arrangements. What was said was that actually Bacardi has direct agreements with retailers and that it was wrong to think that there were mere promotional arrangements of the kind envisaged by the existing assurances. If you turn to para.58 you will see the conclusion:

> "The Office asked Pernod during the meeting 22nd September 2004 for any example (other than certain alleged rebate schemes discussed above) of promotional activity which would not be covered by the assurances as a result of a cloaking agreement which was their contention. Pernod has not provided any specific evidence of such examples or even any hypothetical scenario which might give rise to this."

and they make no comment about that subsequently. So we are not saying that existing assurances were flawed, we are not conceding that, we are recognising merely that Bacardi's offer gives more than was previously there, that is obvious to anybody, and so certainly why not take it? Bacardi's offer and the Office's willingness to accept it does not prove that there was substance in Pernod's case. Although Pernod also says that the Bacardi offer meets its concerns, and says there you are, it has met our concerns, we are now happy to close this Appeal off, it would be interesting if, even with Mr. Green's inventiveness, he would be able to find how Bacardi's offer meets any of the points raised in the material that Pernod submitted on 27th August – certainly we can find no coverage there.

The other point is that Mr. Green says the Office was at fault in not having sent Pernod the proposed amendments from Bacardi as soon as they arrived, and I assume that the point is that this should be taken into account by the Tribunal when weighing up conduct. THE PRESIDENT: They arrived on 29th March ----

MR. TURNER: Last Tuesday, 29th March. The position is that Pernod had already indicated two 1 2 weeks previously in that meeting that they had no comments on the Office's findings rejecting 3 their evidence, and that Pernod was happy that the existing assurances were being taken seriously and that they wanted an exit strategy. The offer arrived in the afternoon of 29th 4 5 March, that is true. Pernod was notified of the offer and was sent Bacardi's letter, although it 6 is true by an oversight without the attachment after only a gap of one working day. There was 7 no question on of any error on the part of the Office – certainly anything that counterbalances 8 the material that I have shown you about what has transpired over a period of many months. In 9 substance our conclusion is that the costs of contesting admissibility proceedings, such as they 10 were, effectively in January 2004 when the hearing concluded, but for well over a year we 11 have been engaged in a lot of work which has turned out to be fruitless, and which Pernod has 12 not even seen fit to defend, and that is why we say the just order to make is for costs to lie 13 where they fall at the end of the day. If the Tribunal nevertheless considers that there should 14 be a costs' award in Pernod's favour, in respect of the admissibility issue dispute, and we can 15 understand in normal circumstances there should be some reflection of that, then there should 16 be a reduction to mark what has happened for over a year since that point was reached. There 17 is one further point that I should just flag up. Mr. Flynn's submissions have reminded me of 18 something of which I was unaware, and Miss Smith has also reminded me of the same point, 19 that even in relation to the admissibility issue part of the area of dispute at that stage was that it 20 was being alleged that a decision had been made as to the past – a non-infringement decision 21 effectively – rather than as to the future, but that was simply abandoned. Nevertheless, both 22 the Office and Bacardi ran up costs preparing to meet that issue – we did so in our draft 23 Defence and in our skeleton argument. In case I have not made it clear, our point is not 24 simply that it is only behaviour since July, it is what the events since July have demonstrated in 25 terms of the absence of merit in the case being brought from the start. 26

Sir, those are the Office's submissions.

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THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. It will be easier, I think, to have Mr. Flynn first and then let you finish, Mr. Green.

29 MR. FLYNN: Sir, members of the Tribunal, I can probably be fairly brief, Mr. Turner having gone 30 over the matters pretty thoroughly and Bacardi being I think more or less in entire agreement 31 with that. Perhaps it would be helpful if I just explained how we got to where we think we are 32 today? The Tribunal's Judgment on admissibility obviously said that there was an admissible 33 Appeal here. The Tribunal decided against remitting the matter to the OFT for consultation on 34 the Rule 14 Notice as it was in those days, or on the draft Decision, and the Tribunal indicated 35 then, and has subsequently indicated most clearly that it is not interested in a debate purely on

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the textual adequacy of the assurances if it cannot be persuaded that there is some actual competition problem in the market, such a debate would be sterile as Mr. Turner has explained. THE PRESIDENT: Where did we say that, Mr. Flynn.

4 MR. FLYNN: You said that at the case management conference back in July, Sir. You made it quite 5 clear to Pernod's counsel that you were not at that stage interested in a debate on the text and 6 without evidence of there being some problem in the market; and in the letter convening this 7 Case Management Conference the Tribunal has also indicated that it is not currently minded -8 I am not quoting the letter – the indication was the Tribunal did not currently see the point in 9 such a debate. So in our submission it was left to Pernod at that time (in July) to supply 10 evidence to the Office of what it had said to the Tribunal were actual competition problems in the market. That evidence was provided, or rather representations were provided with witness 12 statements, with some extensive redactions for confidentiality, so to this day Bacardi does not 13 actually know who these retailers are. The Office has examined it extremely thoroughly over a 14 lengthy period. The bottom line is, as Mr. Turner has said, that there is nothing in it. Pernod is 15 running on empty, it has nothing to gripe about and not a shred of evidence that Bacardi is 16 either breaching the assurances or doing anything else which causes at least the Office to have 17 any concerns. It was when that position was reached, which was only a couple of weeks ago -18 in other words, after the meeting to which Mr. Turner has referred to – it was only at the stage 19 when the OFT had examined the matter and concluded that there was no competition problem, 20 and that it saw no need for any amendment to the assurances to resolve any such competition 21 problem, only at that stage did Bacardi offer these voluntary amendments to the assurances. It 22 did so principally to allay any concerns that the Tribunal might have because of the provisional 23 and tentative indications which were made at the Case Management Conference back in July. 24 This was intended to assist the Tribunal in bringing the proceedings to a close, whether that be 25 by withdrawal of what in our submission has turned out to be a sterile and empty appeal or, as 26 you have suggested might be a possibility earlier today, by dismissing it. If it could be simply 27 dismissed, or that the Tribunal makes no order on it, which of those courses is taken is a matter 28 of indifference to Bacardi – I do not mean that in any disrespectful way – any of those would 29 do. We think the appropriate course would be to withdraw it because it has been shown to be 30 empty, but if Pernod are not prepared to take that step then in our submission it should be 31 dismissed.

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Sir, I do not know if you want me to address you on the s.31A point? THE PRESIDENT: I think at this stage probably not, Mr. Flynn.

34 MR. FLYNN: It is not being sought by way of statutory commitments by Pernod.

- THE PRESIDENT: It does not seem as though it is being pressed, and the overall situation is a bit complex.
 - MR. FLYNN: I will come back to that should it raise its head, but on the basis that these are voluntary amendments to voluntary assurances offered by Bacardi and not sought by the Office and, indeed, offered of course at a time when s.31A was not in force, then perhaps I do not need to say more about it than that. In relation to the form of the order ----
 - THE PRESIDENT: Just in case you want to comment, it may well be that the Tribunal may think it appropriate to say something about the desirability of s.31A being made use of (now that it is there) in cases that arise after it has come into force but I am not that we want to pursue the issue in relation to ----

MR. FLYNN: If it is not in relation to Bacardi, Sir, then I will ----

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THE PRESIDENT: -- this particular case which, as it were, straddles the change of regime and has a complicated procedural background.

MR. FLYNN: Yes, I do not think Bacardi, as Bacardi, has a position on how s.31A should be used in the future. It would certainly have a position as to how it should be used in this case which is that it should not.

In relation to costs I think Mr. Turner has essentially told you what our position is on that. While Pernod succeeded on the admissibility they did so on a narrow basis, which was definitely the minor and secondary argument in their application, having abandoned without notice and at the hearing, the major plank of their admissibility case as set out in the Notice of Appeal.

THE PRESIDENT: The major plank being that there was a Decision as to the past?

23 MR. FLYNN: That there was a Decision as to the past that Bacardi had not infringed prior to giving 24 the assurances, and that case was simply abandoned in a rather jaunty way by Mr. Green – said 25 to be irrelevant – at the hearing. So although they succeeded on admissibility plainly costs, and 26 unnecessary costs, were racked up there. Subsequently, and for the reasons given by Mr. 27 Turner, as we see it - I think you have already stated, Sir - the Tribunal did not remit this 28 matter to the OFT, it did not submit the subject matter of the original complaint to the OFT. It 29 called on Pernod, should it wish to do so, to provide evidence of continuing problems in the 30 market, going to the live points in its Notice of Appeal. So in our submission this plainly was 31 a matter connected with the proceedings before the Tribunal – it is effectively a Tribunal 32 supervised procedure. I know that the Tribunal has not seen every bit of paper, and it should 33 be grateful for that, but it has seen the essentials and it has called for progress reports, and here 34 we are at a Case Management Conference for that progress to be assessed. From the Bacardi 35 point of view that has necessarily involved considerable resource of the legal team – myself

and Simmons & Simmons have, of necessity been very closely involved in this extremely thorough investigation. In our submission, for all the reasons Mr. Turner has given you orally, and which are set out in more detail in their report, which summarises the contents of these two large files that exercise has been shown to be a waste of time in which Pernod has made quite wide ranging allegations that it has simply been unable to support, and some fairly trivial allegations that have also been shown to be entirely baseless. In our submission that should be reflected in a contribution from Pernod towards Bacardi's costs of intervening in this Appeal, which it was inevitable that it would have to do given the consequences of the relief that Pernod has continued to seek.

If I may just add, they continue to slur Bacardi by suggesting that Bacardi is beaching the assurances, even if they cannot prove it – that is said in recent correspondence and you will have seen the course of events over the last two or three weeks when there have been radical changes of position as to whether they are prepared to withdraw the Appeal or not, they simply cannot make their minds up and of course there is an immense amount of expense which we would like to see reflected in a costs' order.

Those are my submissions.

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you, Mr. Flynn. Yes, Mr. Green?

MR. GREEN: First, so far as s.31(2) is concerned, as you have seen, Pernod requested clarification on the basis on which the OFT was to accept the new assurances. It does not feel strongly about the issue either way.

THE PRESIDENT: So you are not pressing that?

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MR. GREEN: We made the request, the Tribunal has asked for clarification, we are happy to see the assurances given, and we have accepted them on the basis that they were given. So if you wish me to address it I will, but not otherwise.

THE PRESIDENT: No, I do not think we do, thank you, Mr. Green. There are two issues then remaining. One is next steps, how the matter is brought to a conclusion and otherwise costs, and I will deal with them in that order.

28 First, what should now happen? There are, in fact, four alternative ways of bringing 29 these proceedings to a close. All the parties are agreed that the proceedings before the 30 Tribunal can and should be brought to a close, and I think there are two aspects to this. First, 31 how technically this should be done and, secondly, what should be recorded in any order. As 32 to the technical aspects, there are a number of provisional points to bear in mind. The first is 33 that there has already been order and heard preliminary issues arising out of some of the issues 34 in the Notice of Appeal, in particular relating to admissibility, and Pernod's right to be consulted, and Judgment was given of course last year in June. 35

1	Secondly, since the Judgment on the preliminary issues was handed down on 12 th
2	June, the parties have followed the Tribunal's indication set out in the order of 22 nd July, and if
3	you just look at that – I think it is important – tab 25 of the main bundle. This is also relevant
4	to the question of costs, and what is meant by "proceedings before the Tribunal". It is correct
5	to say the Tribunal did not remit the matter to the OFT. The Tribunal, as was made clear in its
6	Judgment of the same date, was anxious to find an informal route for the matter, if possible, to
7	be resolved, and the Tribunal simply indicated – in other words, it did not even make an order
8	– in the third recital:
9	" with regard to the further progress of this case that (1) Pernod should provide to
10	the OFT such evidence as it may be advised to submit within 28 days; (2) the OFT
11	shall, in the light of that evidence, consider what action to take, including whether
12	appropriate amendments to the text of the assurances given by Bacardi can be agreed
13	to meet any competition concerns"
14	So you were contemplating that there be an agreement between the parties to meet any
15	concerns which the parties debated; and
16	"(3) Pernod should be given an opportunity to make any observations on any action
17	proposed by the OFT, or on any proposed amendments to the assurances before they
18	are accepted."
19	So the Tribunal, as was made clear in its Judgment of the same date and if you go back a
20	couple of tabs – you should just see the order, you simply ordered adjournment of the case
21	management conference, that was the order. So there was no order that anybody do anything,
22	there was simply an indication that that is how matters should stand. You made clear in your
23	Judgment, in the previous tab, on 22^{nd} July at para.14 – p.4 of the Judgment – you stated:
24	"14. We note, as the discussion today has indicated, that there are possible
25	difficulties with the drafting of at least one part of the proposed undertaking, but that
26	it seems to us is a matter that could well be resolved between the parties without the
27	Tribunal needing formally to have a necessarily costly hearing to determine it.
28	However, we have endeavoured to establish the framework in which this matter can
29	be taken forward respecting the position of all the parties and with a view to seeing
30	whether it can sensibly be dealt with at the minimum of cost and expense and, in
31	particular, dealt with at the appropriate level."
32	In other words, at the informal administrative level in front of the OFT.
33	"So that is the course we propose to take as far as today is concerned."

You will see that in the discussion following the Judgment, when Mr. Turner asked for an indication that Pernod should be limited as to the matters it put before the OFT the President is recorded (half way down) as saying:

"I do not think it is really for us to make any direction what Pernod should submit to the OFT."

And that tracks the debate which was held at the CMC, and in particular a recognition – and it must, of course, I think have been a provisional recognition that in the Tribunal's view there were at least some inadequacies in the text of the assurances (p.3 of the transcript of the CMC, tab.24, lines 1-4). So the procedure which was adopted and which is really the pre-cursor to my submissions about next steps, was that as of July 2004 the matter should endeavour to be resolved informally, away from the Tribunal as a matter of administrative procedure and it was not even ordered that the matter be so dealt with, it was simply indicated. That is the basis of my submission when I come to costs, that costs are relevant but only up until the date of the CMC and cannot, because they do not fall within rule 55, encompass whatever happened thereafter, which I will address later.

The third relevant matter, and I have given you the background to it already, is that in the Judgment I have shown you the Tribunal did identify – at least provisionally – what might well have been viewed as inadequacies in the assurances, and as to that it is significant that the Tribunal had so indicated, and it is plainly significant that Bacardi on 29th March offered to amend the assurances in two material respects which, as my client has indicated, meet its concerns – not entirely but sufficient for my client to say there should be an end to the proceedings now.

In this context a number of conclusions can be drawn which we submit are relevant to the way forward. First, concerning withdrawal of the Notice of Appeal it simply seemed to us to be inappropriate to withdraw the entirety of the Notice of Appeal when the Tribunal has ruled upon certain aspects of the Notice of Appeal.

THE PRESIDENT: It is discontinuing, I think, rather than withdrawing.

28 MR. GREEN: Applying to withdraw it, or applying to discontinue.

29 THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

MR. GREEN: But it requires us to make an application. On the other hand, and it may be there is a
 measure of common ground here, two of the other three alternatives may well be satisfactory.
 We certainly have no objection to saying that we do not pursue the residue of our Notice of
 Appeal on the basis of certain statements which would be recorded in an order, and we have
 no difficulty with either Bacardi or with the OFT recording such matters as they think it
 appropriate to record. Pernod would wish to record that Bacardi had offered the amendments

to the assurances, that the OFT had agreed to the same, and that they had had an opportunity to comment upon them and did not demur from them.

THE PRESIDENT: That is quite close to the wording the OFT proposes, is it not?

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MR. GREEN: Yes, there is not much difference between the OFT's wording, save that we would then add at the end of that that the Tribunal simply makes no further order, not that on that basis we withdraw. We, likewise, recognise the OFT would wish to record its agreement to the assurances without prejudice to its contention as to their necessity and so on, and for Bacardi that it had offered the assurances – again without prejudice to its contentions that it was not dominant, or it was not engaged in abuse and so on and so forth. Those indeed may be relevant and I can see the public interest in the parties recording their respective positions because any interested third party who wished to look at the website to see why the proceedings had been closed would then learn what the parties' respective positions were. So there is not a great deal of difference between the parties. We believe that the respective positions should be recorded.

We submit that the proper way is for the Tribunal simply to say that in those circumstances that no further order is required or needed, or no further utility in the proceedings going ahead. That is, we submit, a sensible way forward in these circumstances, but we do not think it is proper for us to apply to discontinue, given that the Tribunal has already ruled upon a portion of the Notice of Appeal. We are happy to say we do not press our further arguments in those circumstances, and the Tribunal simply makes no further order.

So far as dismissing the Appeal is concerned, we would submit that this is quite inappropriate, because the Tribunal has not heard argument from the parties on the pros and cons, and rights and wrongs of the various positions adopted by the parties subsequent to the preliminary issues having been heard, and there are undoubtedly some complex issues. You have not had argument on the material that Pernod submitted to the OFT, there were witness statements, representations. You have heard a very selective number of comments from Mr. Turner on his side of the affair, but what my client said to the OFT, and which is evident in the documents and portions you have not seen, is that we had difficulty in getting statements from retailers. They were reluctant to show us documents and contracts they had with Bacardi. We did get some statements, and there are discrepancies between the statements they made to us and the statements they made to the OFT. If you are going to get to the bottom of all that there is a great deal to be heard and argued about and, with respect, you should not assume following the meeting with the OFT – which was not a "without prejudice" meeting, it was an open meeting – that if Bacardi had not made its offer of amended assurances we would be here

1	saying "we are throwing our hand in", and agreeing to discontinue the proceedings, there
2	would have been issues we were seriously considering.
3	The reality is that it is not sensible for the Tribunal to get engaged in that sort of
4	collateral or satellite litigation
5	THE PRESIDENT: Anyway, you do not want to withdraw, and you do not think it should be
6	dismissed, but you are happy with an order that the Tribunal makes no order?
7	MR. GREEN: Absolutely.
8	THE PRESIDENT: Whatever recitals the parties, within reason, each of the parties want to include.
9	MR. GREEN: We think that is an appropriate way and interested third parties will see the reasons
10	why it has come to the position it has come to.
11	So far as costs are concerned, these are governed by Rule 55. Plainly, the Tribunal
12	has a discretion, but that discretion is, however, bounded by the provisions of Rule 55 and
13	costs can be awarded in relation to the proceedings before the Tribunal. We believe there is an
14	issue as to the meaning of the words "before the Tribunal".
15	As we understand the policy behind those words in Rule 55
16	THE PRESIDENT: Just a moment.
17	"(2) The Tribunal may at its discretion, subject to paragraph (3), at any stage of the
18	proceedings make any order it thinks fit in relation to the payment of costs by one
19	party to another in respect of the whole or part of the proceedings"
20	I do not think the words "before the Tribunal" quite
21	MR. GREEN: They come in, they are
22	THE PRESIDENT: We have to take into account the conduct of all parties in relation to "the
23	proceedings".
24	MR. GREEN: No, the words "before the Tribunal"
25	THE PRESIDENT: (After a pause) I am not sure it is there – just in relation to "the proceedings".
26	You can say by implication "the proceedings" means the proceedings before the Tribunal but
27	not the administrative proceedings.
28	MR. GREEN: I am sorry, yes, the answer to that is in the definition of "proceedings", and the
29	definition of "proceedings" is "proceedings before the Tribunal".
30	THE PRESIDENT: Where is the definition of "proceedings"?
31	MR. GREEN: We set that out in our note to you – I am sorry, I had forgotten that point for the
32	moment.
33	THE PRESIDENT: Oh yes.
34	MR. GREEN: Rule 3(a).
35	THE PRESIDENT: "All proceedings before the Tribunal".

1 MR. GREEN: And Parts 1 and 5, and Part 5 include the provisions on costs.

2 THE PRESIDENT: So it has to be proceedings before the Tribunal, thank you.

3 MR. GREEN: So far as proceedings before the Tribunal are concerned, we understand the policy 4 behind this to be quite an important one and in this respect I am somewhat surprised by Mr. 5 Turner's submissions, because in the context of the Tribunal one is dealing with a case where 6 the Tribunal is governing the conduct of a Regulator, today the OFT – it could be another 7 Regulator, such as Ofcom – and in many instances the Tribunal quashes and remits the matter 8 back to the Regulator, for example that happened in Littlewoods and in Freeserve, and there 9 are then administrative proceedings. When parties implement an order of the Tribunal, and 10 this involves conduct before the Administrator, these are not proceedings before the Tribunal; 11 they are now back before the Administrator. In the present case we do not even have a 12 remission, we have an indication they should happen pursuant to your previous order, and it is 13 one level down. I have always understood this to be part of a policy which indeed protects the 14 decision maker from paying the costs of a person before it subject to a remission, because 15 otherwise when it came to costs, on Mr. Turner's analysis in another case, the Tribunal may 16 find itself engaged in satellite litigation determining who said what to whom, and who was 17 reasonable in the course of the administrative proceedings at the end of the case to determine 18 costs. That is why "before the Tribunal" has a limiting effect to the judicial part or parts of an 19 ongoing process, which involves the decision maker and the supervisory Tribunal. 20 THE PRESIDENT: If the boot were on the other foot you say you could have run up a huge sum in

legal costs during this grey area procedure ----

MR. GREEN: Yes.

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23 THE PRESIDENT: -- which, on the OFT's argument you say, we could order ---

24 MR. GREEN: The OFT to pay.

25 THE PRESIDENT: -- to be paid.

26 MR. GREEN: The Tribunal has not had to grapple with it here, but for example, in *Freeserve* and 27 Wanadoo there may be aspects of the procedure before the Regulator which could have given 28 rise to a lot of costs, and one can think of other cases, *Littlewoods* where there was a remission 29 and Aberdeen Journals again. Dealing therefore with the issues concerned, when we came to 30 the preliminary issues, there were a limited number of matters. Admissibility accounted for 31 approximately – and this is a very rough approximation – adding up numbers of pages and so 32 on, 45 - 50 per cent. of the hearing and the written skeletons. The Office of Fair Trading said 33 that if you decided the case against them (para.28 of their skeleton) that you would be 34 "torturing the language of structure and purpose of the Act." Well, you did so torture it and 35 you found in my client's favour. The only point that is said against me in relation to

admissibility is that we ultimately won not on the basis of a decision as to the past but on a more temporally limited basis, and that argument evolved in the course of argument – the same arguments went to other temporal aspects of admissibility whether it was the past, or a fractional period in the past, the Tribunal had to engage in and analyse in the Judgment. We won on admissibility and the normal rule in relation to admissibility should be reflected in costs. Bacardi agreed with the Office of Fair Trading, the OFT took a strong view against admissibility on the basis that you would "torture the language, structure and purpose of the Act" if they were to lose.

There was another issue which did not account for much of the time, which was in relation to the Rule 14 and whether it should have been disclosed. This was an issue ordered by the Tribunal, it was not a point specifically raised in the Notice of Appeal but you asked for it to be addressed, and I can give you the references, but I shall not take you to them. THE PRESIDENT: I do not think you need trouble us on that, Mr. Green.

MR. GREEN: I said in submission that the amount of time taken was miniscule, I calculate it is 5 to 10 per cent. of the total amount of time. The other issue was consultation. The OFT said there was no duty to consult (skeleton, para.54) Bacardi agreed, we said there was. We prevailed upon that point and approximately 40 per cent. of the time. Those are the very rough percentages.

There was a fourth issue that you asked for observations of the parties in relation to whether the OFT had a right to accept assurances at all. We accepted that they did. We did not take the point which we could have taken because the law is not quite the same in the UK as it is at the EC, but we said that they had an *Automec* type discretion based in ordinary administrative law, we did not challenge the OFT's position – we set that out in the skeleton and in oral argument – and I believe we acted reasonably in that respect. So of the arguments advanced we prevailed in all respects, and there is no reason why we should be deprived at least a significant portion of our costs in that regard.

So far as any relevant exceptional circumstances are concerned, I have dealt with that because it seems to us it is a question of the construction of Rule 55 – what is meant by "proceedings before the Tribunal", and the matters which Mr. Turner relies upon are outside that ambit. But I should say in relation to that that you have not examined our evidence, the representations made with the witness statements. As I explained, we had real problems obtaining information from witnesses – we did get some, but this was retracted by some retailers when the OFT went to them, and a real issue of evidence arises. We said to the OFT that they should use their statutory powers, and they declined. We have issues as to the process they used.

THE PRESIDENT: But you did apparently say, in the course of the meeting of 15th March, that you had no comments to make on their report.

MR. GREEN: We made comments which are recorded in the previous five pages of that, "no further comments". We had made comments to the effect that we recognised there was a clash of evidence. We recognised we were not going to be in a better position to go back to these people and get better evidence, because they were not going to co-operate with us. It is undoubtedly the case that this was a provisional view because they have not spoken to either myself or Mr. Robertson as they made clear. It would not be fair to take that somewhat stray comment out of proper context.

If the OFT is right then any procedure whereby any litigant goes back to the administrator and then has a barney with the administrator, and the administrator disagrees then is going to result simply because the administrator disagrees in that litigant having to pay costs, even though the Tribunal has not had a chance properly to go into the detail of it. If you really were going to take Mr. Turner's submission seriously we would submit that you would need to convene a hearing to go into that evidence in detail, and we submit that is plainly not sensible – it is undesirable satellite litigation, but not justified in the light of Rule 55.

So far as Bacardi's position is concerned, given (a) that the Tribunal had indicated (albeit provisionally) that it perceived some difficulties with the textual analysis of the assurances in July 04, it could be said against Bacardi that if they had really wanted to save costs and time they could have made their offer in July, August or September instead of waiting seven or eight months and there is every possibility that that would have brought the proceedings to a close at a very much earlier stage, but they did not. We do not know why and we have not had that explained. There is no reason why Bacardi should have any portion of costs. So far as costs are concerned we simply submit that it is the costs up to the date of the hearing and we should be entitled to our costs, to be assessed if not agreed.

Unless I can assist further, those are my submissions.

27 THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.

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28 MR. TURNER: I think there is only one point I want to come back on.

29 THE PRESIDENT: Yes, very quickly, Mr. Turner.

MR. TURNER: It is the question of whether it all fell into the administrative area, or whether it was
 proceedings before the Tribunal. As, Sir, you remarked at the conclusion of the hearing on
 22nd July in the passage that Mr. Green took you to, the matter that the Tribunal was seized
 with was the adequacy of the assurances. The purpose of the direction that was given at that
 stage was this: it was a case management measure to enable Pernod to provide evidence to

support its case in the Appeal on the inadequacy of the assurances. That was not a remission and the analogy with a remission is ill-founded.

So far as what occurred is concerned, it is not right to say that there needs to be a hearing to go into the rights and wrongs of the evidence. The note of the meeting does not only say that Pernod had no comments on the report, at the bottom of p.88 it says:

"On the basis of what the OFT had found it seemed that Bacardi was being cooperative by taking the assurances seriously and Pernod was comforted by the OFT's openness to investigating breaches or new allegations."

That was an agreed note. It was circulated to them, they thought about it and it came back, so it cannot be referred to or dismissed simply as "stray comment". It shows their attitude as to the events that had taken place. We say it must be right that what has taken place should be taken into account in the costs order, both in terms of what occurred and the expense to which everybody was put, and it does fall as part of the proceedings; and, as to what it reflects about the underlying merits of the case. On that issue we rely on what Pernod said in relation to the meeting on 15th March – not just that they had no comments, but on the basis of what the OFT had found, about which there was no complaint, Bacardi was being co-operative by taking the assurances seriously. That was an end of the matter.

18 THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. The Tribunal will rise.

(The hearing adjourned at 12.05 p.m. and resumed at 12.10 p.m.)

(For Ruling see separate transcript)