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IN THE COMPETITION APPEAL TRIBUNAL

Case No 1024/2/3/04

Victoria House Bloomsbury Place London WC1A 25B

Monday 19th July 2004

Before:

MARION SIMMONS QC

(Chairman)

MR MICHAEL DAVEY and

MRS SHEILA HEWITT

BETWEEN:

FLOE TELECOM LIMITED (in administration)

Appellant

- and -

OFFICE OF COMMUNICATIONS

Respondent

supported by

VODAFONE LIMITED

-and-

T-MOBILE (UK) LIMITED

Interveners

MR EDWARD MERCER (of Taylor Wessing) appeared on behalf of the Applicant.

MR MARK HOSKINS (instructed by OFCOM) appeared on behalf of the Respondent.

MR THOMAS IVORY QC (instructed by Herbert Smith) appeared on behalf of Vodafone.

MR MEREDITH PICKFORD appeared on behalf of T-Mobile UK Ltd.

Transcribed from the shorthand notes of Harry Counsell & Co. Cliffords Inn, Fetter Lane, London EC4A 1LD Telephone 020 7269 0370

PROCEEDINGS - DAY 1

THE CHAIRMAN: Good morning.

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MR MERCER: Good morning, Ma'am.

THE CHAIRMAN: Before we start, can I thank everybody for the skeletons, which have been extremely useful and also the bundles, which I know you have had a lot of trouble with, but it has been very helpful to do it that way, so thank you very much.

Before we start, it may be helpful if I made some provisional comments on matters on which the Tribunal's understanding is presently unclear, so that everybody is aware of those matters which are troubling the Tribunal but which appear not to have been dealt with in the skeleton arguments.

The first question we have is what is the correct statutory distinction between public GSM gateways and private GSM gateways?

The Statement of Facts (at paragraph 8) refers to the 2003 Exemption Regulations which provide that if a GSM gateway provides a "telecommunications service" "by way of business" then it is a public GSM gateway. The Tribunal notes that the 2003 Regulations do not provide a definition of "public" or "private" gateways. It appears to us, from what we have read, that the parties accept that a public gateway is as identified in the 2003 Regulations.

In the light of that, the Tribunal's tentative view is that the exemption provided by the 2003 Regulations depends upon whether there is an intermediary between the mobile operator and the end customer who is providing a "telecommunication service" "by way of business".

It seems to us at the moment that the Regulations make no distinction between the situation where an intermediary provides a separate GSM gateway to each of its customers and where an intermediary connects each of its customers to a central GSM gateway. Both seem to us at the moment to be within the scope of the wording in the 2003 Regulations, so using shorthand both seem to be public gateways. That view seems to be supported by

OFCOM's skeleton argument at paragraph 65.

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That view also provisionally seems to us to be consistent with the manner in which the Exemption Regulations appear to have been understood, at least by OFCOM and Vodafone from the documents in the bundles.

It is probably not necessary to look at each one, but I will refer you to the tab numbers.

Tab 17 is the Consultation Document of November 2002. Paragraph 1.4 distinguishes between self-provision of a gateway and "use of a gateway as a link to a cellular network to carry third party traffic". self-provision would be exempted under paragraph 4(2) if the gateway could be classified as mobile. However, we note that in that document it is referred to as a "fixed mobile". That document refers use of a gateway to carry third party traffic as a "grey area". I think that is the only reference from primary documents, rather than repeating it, that refers to "grey area". That is the only reference that we have found anyway. There is no distinction being made between single and multi-party use of the gateway.

In paragraph 5.4 of the Consultation Paper it is recorded that "operators are currently accepting and connecting customers with" gateways and in paragraph 5.8 it raises the question as to whether a distinction between private and public gateways can be justified.

It seems to us at the moment from paragraph 5.7 that in that document a public gateway was thought to be one which provides a third party telecommunications service.

At the moment we do not see that any distinction is being made in that document between single and multi-user gateways provided by way of business.

The position, as set out in that Consultation Paper, appears to us to be reiterated in the Radio Communication Agency's letter to Floe of 20 March 2003 at tab 22. That letter was in response to a letter by Floe to the Radio Communications Agency, but we do not have the original letter. My recollection is that it is dated 13 March.

It may be helpful to look at the letter that it was in response to.

At tab 18 there is the mobile operators' response to the Consultation. That was Vodafone and T-Mobile's response. It appears to us from that response that the operators were distinguishing between "self-use" and "commercial use" but they were not making any distinction within commercial use.

The next documents that I am going to refer to in this sequence are the letters from Vodafone's Chief Executive at tabs 23 and 24. They do not appear to us to make a distinction either. The first one, at tab 23, points to supply of service to third parties and to "wholesale supply" as being objectionable. The second, which is at tab 24, is the letter to Baroness Billingham and that distinguishes between use of "gateway devices by individual corporate customers for their own private use" on the one hand and "the use of GSM Gateways when used to provide a commercial telecommunications service to third parties".

In addition, at tab 30, there is a letter from Vodafone to Oftel setting out Vodafone's initial response to the complaint that had been made by Floe. That letter also refers at point (b) to "private" use as being use by individual corporate customers for their own private calls. It also states that Vodafone has not sought to disconnect individual corporate customers who use GSM gateways.

In this sequence of documentation we also note the letter at tab 37. That is currently stated to be confidential so I am not going to say anything more about it at this stage, save that the contents of that may be relevant.

Vodafone, in its skeleton argument, refers us to page 23 of the Business Plan which Floe relies on. The wording in the paragraph headed "Product 1" refers to "Floe's customers" and the intermediary service which Floe is to provide between its customers and the

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It seems to us - and this is very provisional and subject to what we hear in this hearing - that that is describing a service "by way of business". explanation in the last two sentences of paragraph 55 of Vodafone's skeleton also appears to us to support the understanding which we presently have. Business Plan, whether it is one that Vodafone has produced or the one that Floe has produced, we wonder how a document that is a "Business Plan" is not describing a service "by way of business". The Business Plan which has been produced by Vodafone appears to describe a telecommunications service to be provided by Floe "by way of business". In the same vein the Agreement between Floe and Vodafone seems to us necessarily to be "by way of business" and it clearly expressly envisages resale by Floe.

The distinction which Vodafone now appear to be making in paragraph 57 of its skeleton, if we have understood it correctly, is whether the GSM gateway service is or was provided by Floe to one customer or to multi-Floe customers. If we have understood it right - so this is a very provisional view - the submission seems to be that where the service is provided to one Floe customer then, notwithstanding that Floe is providing the service "by way of business", it is a "private" gateway.

If that is the submission, we do not understand the basis in law for that conclusion and we need some help.

You will now understand why I went through the whole sequence.

We do not see how factual evidence as to what individuals believed the position to be can be relevant to the true construction of the Regulation, but the Tribunal notes that the documentary evidence appears to be consistent with our view.

Of course, Mr Mercer, none of that would arise if your construction of section 1 is right and so it is all without prejudice to whether or not your construction is

right.

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Can I turn to the second question that is in our minds. That concerns Vodafone's ability to authorise Floe's use of gateways.

We note from the skeletons that it is said that it was clear that public gateways were unlawful. We refer to OFCOM's skeleton at paragraphs 65 and 66 and Vodafone's skeleton at paragraph 39 where it says "it was plainly a reasonable belief". That way of putting it is supported in paragraph 24 of T-Mobile's skeleton.

The August 2002 document from the Radio Communications Agency, which is at tab 16, addressed three points.

First, that the GSM spectrum has already been awarded in the UK to the cellular operators by licence on a nationally exclusive basis and that spectrum therefore cannot be licensed to other users.

Second, that "gateways" are fixed and not mobile. That mobile devices only are within the Exemption Regulation so section 1 would require a licence but, because of the licences already granted, referred to on their first point, no further licences could be granted for gateways.

Thirdly, in addition, the exemption did not apply where a telecommunication service is provided by way of business to another person.

That published document stated that anyone installing or operating a gateway of any sort without an individual licence will be in contravention of the Wireless Telegraphy Act and enforcement action may be taken. It concluded that a consultation process was to be undertaken.

Notwithstanding that announcement, which was in August 2002, Floe and Vodafone entered into the contract in the same month. It is now said in Vodafone's skeleton that it was thought that Floe would provide "private" gateways. But private gateways at the time were believed to be fixed, as we understand it. The question in our

minds is, if Vodafone knew that Floe were to provide GSM gateways, whether private or public, at the time the contract was entered into, on what basis did Vodafone enter into the contract? Of course, it is a rule of construction of contracts to seek to avoid a result that would require the performance of an illegal activity.

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At tab 22 page 29 there is a letter from Mr Cliff Mason of the Radio Communications Agency to John Stonehouse of Floe stating that "the GSM Spectrum has been licensed to [the mobile operators] on a nationally exclusive basis and cannot be licensed for commercial purposes to anyone else".

At tab 22 page 297 there is an e-mail from Mr Mason of the Radio Communications Agency to John Stonehouse of Floe which states that the mobile operators are permitted to use their "assigned spectrum" with any equipment that meets the technical specifications in the schedule to the licence and that the mobile operators have the authority under the Wireless Telegraphy Act, but not an obligation, to accept equipment that is not covered by the Exemption Regulations, but if they do so the mobile operators would be responsible for compliance with their licence conditions.

Mr Mason of the Radio Communications Agency is also the person from whom Oftel sought guidance on the interpretation of the Wireless Telegraphy Act and of Vodafone's licence. At tab 34 the views he gave to Oftel are set out and include the statement that "where a gateway is used commercially to provide third party services without coordination with or agreement of the mobile network operator it is not covered by the exemption neither are we able to issue a Wireless Telegraphy licence for the spectrum that is licensed exclusively to the mobile network operator".

At tab 30, which was Vodafone's initial response to the complaint at point (c), Mr Rodman of Vodafone drew attention to the Government's announcement of 18 July 2003 and the statement that operation of a GSM gateway "without the authority and permission of a licensee, ie Vodafone".

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It seems, from the documents that we have seen, that at the relevant time both the authority and Vodafone considered that Vodafone did have the ability to authorise Floe's use of "public" gateways under its licence, because the relevant spectrum which was used by such gateways was licensed to the operators exclusively. The question to be considered seems to us to be whether Vodafone had given sufficient written authorisation and on our reading of the Oftel decision that seems to be the basis on which that was written as well. However it is now said by OFCOM and Vodafone, if we understand the position correctly, that that understanding as to how Vodafone's licence operated was wrong, that Vodafone were not "exclusively licensed" in respect of the relevant GSM spectrum but only part of it, the part which is used by the base stations. GSM Gateways are "user stations" and not "base stations" and so fall outside the licence entirely and Vodafone can therefore have had no authority to authorise their use. I think that is the argument in the skeletons. I hope I have summarised it properly.

At the CMC on 25 June I averted to this point, which I am elucidating now, and suggested that the point be dealt with in the skeleton arguments, but I do not think that it has been - at least as I had it in mind. What I had in mind when I mentioned the point was whether, in the circumstances, if both the authority and the licensee understood the licence to operate in a particular way and proceeded to deal with third parties on that basis, can they now abandon that approach if that would prejudice the applicant Floe?

To be slightly more helpful, what was going through the Tribunal's mind in thinking about this were two cases on construction contracts. One is Amalgamated Investment & Property Co Limited v. Texas Commerce International and the other is Hiscox v. Outhwaite (No 1). There are other cases in that line, but they are the two main ones. You

are all probably familiar with them.

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I hope that outlines the concerns that are worrying us about that sort of approach.

The next issue is, of course, which Business Plan did Floe provide to Vodafone before entering into the contract in August 2002.

We note that the Business Plan which Floe relies on bears a footer "Revision 09.05.2002". But Appendix 4 of that document attaches the Government's announcement of 18 July 2003. It is at tab 13 and that is the version that was annexed to the Amended Notice of Appeal.

We have checked the OFCOM Decision Bundle, which very kindly was provided, and that does not contain Appendix 4. We also note that the Business Plan produced by Vodafone was specifically designed for "Vodafone". That is at tab 54. Also the version at tab 13 is a very truncated version of the version in the Decision Bundle, but the version in the Decision Bundle is also not complete because it is missing pages 17 and 21. I leave that there. I do not know what has happened about sorting out which Business Plan it was, but I make those remarks about it.

I now come on to the RTTE Directive 1999.

Can I thank you all for the submissions which you made in response to the Tribunal's letter of 6 July. They were very helpful and hopefully put us on the right track. It seems clear (again provisionally and subject to T-Mobile's point and further submissions) that Article 7(2) permitted member states to restrict the putting into service of apparatus for reasons related to the "effective and appropriate use of the radio spectrum" and it also seems at the moment that that is probably what the UK intended to do by making Article 4(2) of the Exemption Regulations as amended in 2000 and re-enacted in 2003.

What we are unclear about is whether before the 2003 Exemption Regulations, or indeed any earlier version of the same restriction, there had been any evaluation into

whether commercial use of a GSM Gateway had implications for the effective and appropriate use of the radio spectrum. What we are wondering is whether such an evaluation might be necessary to provide the required reasons for the restriction.

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The Government announcement of 18 July 2003 followed a Consultation Process which began in November 2002. The re-enactment of the Exemption Regulations was in February 2003, before the Consultation Process had finished. We wonder whether that might be a reason why there are references to there being a "grey area" over the question of whether the restriction applied to GSM gateways supplying commercial services.

The next point is that we have noted sections 172 to 174 of the Communications Act, which provide that after that Act came into force in July 2003, no proceedings can be brought under section 1 of the Wireless Telegraphy Act or any exemption regulations made under section 1 unless OFCOM have given a notification that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the person is contravening section 1 and has considered representations made by that person. There are certain exceptions to that about public safety and national security and the like.

We therefore are wondering whether, after July 2003, Floe could not have been guilty of an offence under section 1 unless and until that procedure had been followed.

Given that the "abuse" which the Director was considering in his Decision was that of "refusal to supply", which commenced on the date on which Vodafone initially disconnected Floe's SIM cards, which we understand was in March 2003, but which refusal to supply continued throughout the Director's investigation (and, I suppose, is still continuing) the Tribunal wonders what relevance those statutory provisions have on the proper analysis of the issues presently before us and, in particular, with regard to whether Vodafone's refusal to supply was, or remains, objectively justified.

We do not expect you to answer all those questions immediately, but they might be incorporated, if you know the answers, in what you are addressing us today. We note that the timetable envisages that all parties have the opportunity to address us during the course of tomorrow and that should provide ample opportunity to consider the matters and to address us upon them.

If I may come to one final matter, and that is Confidentiality.

We note the extent of the confidentiality which is being claimed for documents in the bundle, but we are unclear as to the basis upon which the claim is being This needs to be considered further and if the confidentiality claims are to be persisted in, then the requirements of rule 53 must be complied with and they require that the relevant words, figures or passages for each claim of confidentiality must be identified and the reasons must be given. That ought to have been done before this hearing. I expect it cannot be done now until after the hearing but I think it needs to be done by 5 pm on Thursday. It may be that a very broad approach has been taken by everybody and actually if you look at the documents there is a very small claim to confidentiality, but I do not know. But it does mean that we have got to be very careful in this hearing as to what we refer to, because the claim is very extensive at the moment.

I hope it has been helpful to elucidate where we have got to. Everything I have said is very provisional, but we need to be put right.

MR HOSKINS: Can I just pick up on the confidentiality point?

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

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MR HOSKINS: Obviously that is going to bear on the hearing. It may be my fault but I am not aware of which documents they claim to be confidential. While I am standing on my feet, how do I make sure?

THE CHAIRMAN: The bundle has an index and all the documents

- on which confidentiality has been claimed have been underlined.
 - MR HOSKINS: So in relation to each of those. Probably the safest way, and we have done this in previous Tribunal hearings, is to say 'look at the third paragraph of the document at tab X', and we will all read it.
 - THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, that is how we are going to have to deal with it, which makes it much slower and one wonders whether in fact there should be a claim or not.
- 10 MR HOSKINS: Precisely.

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- 11 | THE CHAIRMAN: I do not know who is making the claim.
- MR HOSKINS: I presume it must be the private companies.

 Perhaps the private companies can have a conversation.

 Obviously it is easier if we do not have to adopt that
- system, but if we do, then we do.

 THE CHAIRMAN: Maybe it can be dealt with at lunch.
- 17 MR HOSKINS: That was my hope. Thank you.
- 18 THE CHAIRMAN: Would that be appropriate?
- 19 MR MERCER: Yes, Ma'am. That is not Floe.
- 20 | THE CHAIRMAN: It is not Floe?
- 21 MR MERCER: No.
- 22 MR IVORY: Madam, we will try and sort it out over lunch.
- 23 | THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.
- 24 MR PICKFORD: Ma'am, there is a further housekeeping matter.
 25 I do not know whether the Tribunal has received copies

of the correct version of the document that the Tribunal referred to at tab 16? We meant to include the version as published on the RA's website. The wording is the same in both documents, but this version makes clear that it was published on the website as opposed to the others which did not. I can hand that up. I have already handed those documents to my friends.

- 33 THE CHAIRMAN: Do you want us to put them into tab 16?
- 34 MR PICKFORD: That would be very helpful.
- 35 THE CHAIRMAN: Or should we do that over the luncheon adjournment?
- 37 MR PICKFORD: Yes.
- 38 THE CHAIRMAN: Then we will do it over lunch. Thank you very

much.

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Mr Mercer?

MERCER: My firm has a promotional giveaway. MR It is a mouse mat that redefines various items in Telecoms, one of which is a Telecom's lawyer is one who speaks entirely in acronyms and that is something which this industry has an unfortunate habit for. If you hear one which you have not heard before, perhaps because in a moment of abstraction when writing the skeleton I developed one, do stop me and ask what it is, but you are going to hear some of them quite a few times, like ARPU (average revenue per unit) and the like. That same item defines GSM as "good source of money" and therein lies the heart of this matter, because GSM is and continues to be a good source of money, particularly in the business sector and particularly when people can, by using arbitrage between fixed to mobile rates and on-net rates, gain a considerable saving over what they might otherwise have paid.

I think, Ma'am, it might be useful if I started, as does my skeleton, with the meaning of the contract. I will deal with it straightaway, because it is a related point, where I can help just at the moment in relation to the Business Plans.

Unfortunately during the course of the complaint and the investigation, my client of course became insolvent and went into administration, something which has not occurred in respect of Messrs Vodafone or T-Mobile. That has an unfortunate effect on being able to find company records, etc. The staff, the people who dealt with the matter, if not spread to the four winds are at least They are in different companies now because dispersed. they are in different businesses and so is part of their equipment and their records, although I am sure the Administrator did his duty in being able to bring in as many records as he possibly could. That means that we are working from incomplete records. We have done the best we can. We were instructed at the time that the

Notice of Appeal was put in but what we submitted was part of a Business Plan structure which the people who had worked for Floe in the relevant period believed had been in every Business Plan. We worked on a lowest common denominator basis. That is what, by consensus amongst those responsible, we believe to have been shown. We do not have a copy, or anything like it, of that produced by Vodafone. We feel sure that what we have provided in the bundle represents the things that will be discussed and which we believe to have been sent to them. We have no evidence that their version was or was not sent.

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You will see in my skeleton, Ma'am, that I make two submissions about the Business Plan, one about theirs and one about our versions. In the case of our version I make reference to the wording, which makes it clear that we are going to be aggregating services together and pushing it out through a switch. If that is not - I was going to say "a definition of public gateway services", but I think I will restrain myself from saying that just for the moment until we get on to that very subject - but if that is not a definition of the kind of thing that Vodafone seem to have objected to, I do not know what is.

The second thing is, in their version prominent amongst a list of bullet points is the fact that we are going to in this Business Plan, if it works, provide eight times the ARPU. This is not some penny-ante contract. This is not some small affair. This is a Business Plan where we are looking at eight times the average revenue. We assumed Vodafone to be the modern, switched-on company that we know it to be and that its executives would have known the implications of that as far as were known at the time in the industry.

One of the things I will mention here, though I am sure I will mention it again, is something you will have seen, first of all, in Mr Happy's statement and then elsewhere, and it goes through to some of the exchanges of letters between Mr Stonehouse and the RA and Mr

Stonehouse and others, and that is Floe singularly failing to understand what difference there was between public and private gateways.

Back in the summer of 2002 Vodafone and Floe are discussing a contract. It is not just any contract for the provision of wholesale services. This is one where Vodafone are saying "you have to show us a business plan before we are going to give you this contract". not a walk-in-off-the-street business relationship. is something which is being carefully constructed, or so you would have thought, in terms of what is clearly a new business opportunity. If you read the version of the business plan provided by Vodafone, this is something that Floe is explaining in there. It is something new. It has higher ARPU level. It has a new means of making If you look at the contract you will see that there is actually a minimum revenue per unit provision. Vodafone and Floe agree not to have just any old customers. They want high-rolling, high-average revenue per unit customers.

In the industry at that time, as I think is clear from the initial letter from the RA, the one, if my memory serves me correctly, T-Mobile is seeking to provide a new copy of --

THE CHAIRMAN: Is this the 2002 copy?

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MR MERCER: 2002 August. You will have seen, Ma'am, that the date of the contract is 12 August, shortly followed by the statement on the 23rd.

At that time we have an industry that is just going into this area for the first time in towards what the RA slightly later in the year described as a grey area in the executive summary to the November consultation document.

What can we ascertain about what this contract means?

One of the most important things about this contract, which I hope will have struck the Tribunal, is that it is a contract for the provision of services. It

is not a contract in relation to the connection of equipment to a network. It is not a contract for anything else other than the distribution or resale of telecommunications' services. Well it would have been at that time. We now have to call them electronic communications services. That kind of contract is not unusual in the industry, Floe contends. The contract, if you look at it, is in fact a non-standard front end attached on to a number of standard conditions, a number of which appear to relate to the provision of apparatus in motor vehicles, which is something which not even my client has ever quite understood. Floe is in that contract never characterised as the service provider - that is always Vodafone - and it is specifically not Vodafone's agent. It is merely reselling a service.

Because it is going to be a bit of a scene I will deal, if I may, for a moment with who receives a service from whom with what.

The service that is being resold by my client is that provided by Vodafone. Is my client providing a service? The answer as a matter of logic is "No". Vodafone is providing the service. We will come back to that, Ma'am, when I attempt at some point to deal with your questions concerning the Wireless Telegraphy Exemption Regulations 2003.

In that contract Floe is obliged to comply with licences etc necessary for Floe to use the services. This implies that Vodafone recognise that Floe itself intended to use the services, which would not have been necessary if they were nearly in every case to be resold on by another. The wording, in other words, is inappropriate, Ma'am.

Very little is said in the contracts about SIM cards, except as to who is responsible for ensuring connection to the network and the expectations of quantities to be supplied. I have already said that quantities to be supplied and the amount of revenue per unit are larger than is usual and the contract is at risk

if certain minimum requirements on that are not met.

I contend that what Floe had a right to believe goes like this.

'On buying services you give me SIM cards. We put SIM cards into devices.' 'What kind of devices?' 'Well, in the European Union we have the benefit of the RTTE (the Radio and Telecommunications Terminal Equipment Directive). That is a pretty powerful Directive which goes back to the earliest days of liberalisation of telecommunications in Europe and it says that Governments should not allow to be on the market that which is not compliant and also the equipment must not only conform to safety standards but also conform to general standards necessary for operation.

It is a bit like Cinderella. 'Whatsoever this SIM card shall fit, we, Vodafone, should be able to provide services by means of', because we know that something which is harmful will be prevented from access to the market and we know that what is on the market will work with that equipment. We have that general expectation as a populace and as commercial operations using GSM standard equipment. Whatever that SIM card fits into and operates with we should be able to use.

There is no prohibition in that contract on what are known as public gateways and we say that no express authority was needed to put the SIMs into equipment which was otherwise lawfully able to be sold in the United Kingdom.

One thing I would like to point out as we go through is the ability of Vodafone, pursuant to the contract, to give instructions about how it may be used, a standard clause in contracts for the provision of re-sale services or the sale of services, which is "we may give you from time to time instructions as to how this service may be used and if they are lawful you should follow them". I will come back to that, Ma'am. If you look in the contract and I think it is Appendix 6, which is the standard term contract terms, you will see a lot of the

standard boilerplate that goes with this kind of contract.

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There is clearly a dispute about pre-contract discussions between Vodafone and my client as to what it can all have meant, but I think we would contend that Vodafone knew that this was not something in the ordinary means of distribution of services to the public using ordinary handsets and if you look, for example, at the version of the Business Plan provided by Vodafone, when I last looked it had some photographs at the back of gateways. This was at a time when the industry, we would contend, really was not able to differentiate between public and private. Nobody had made that distinction quite yet.

The contract is also silent as to who is responsible for installation and indeed establishment of the apparatus involved, though clearly when the contract is read together I would submit that you get the impression from that that there is sufficient authority, if not expressly then impliedly, given in respect of putting SIM cards into equipment installed in cars and I suggest that it is no different to move to an implied authority to instal equipment in which the SIM cards are to be placed.

Ma'am, I mention that because of the arguments relating to "even if we are wrong about who is using it, you installed it anyway", because the licence will act under section 1 of the Wireless Telegraphy Act 1949, to establish, instal and use. My contention is that the contract anticipated authority being given to instal and indeed did give authority.

Notwithstanding the protestations of Vodafone that they had no idea whatsoever that this was to be used in what are now known as public gateways, I am pretty sure that they would have been brave men at the time, and indeed women, to either identify at that time what public gateways were or were going to be and to know what not to put in them. But, my goodness, they had a really good idea of the size and capacity of the business that could

be created by what Floe intended.

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Unless, Ma'am, you have any questions or any points that immediately occur to you on the contractual matrix I will move on to the primary argument.

There are two elements to Floe's arguments here. One, our own, and the second responses to the other parties arguments.

Floe's arguments are essentially set out in Schedule 1 to the Amended Notice of Appeal and those points, as a primary argument, depend on looking at interaction between the Wireless Telegraphy Act and the Wireless Telegraphy Exemption Regulations. Might I suggest that we find the latter and have it in front of us? That is Volume 3.

The regime set up by the Exemption Regulations assume that GSM network services have the same kinds of characteristics, when you are looking at user apparatus and the rest, as apparatus which was envisaged and known about by the draftsman in 1949.

Let us look at a fairly simple situation. Some of us are old enough to remember Tony Hancock and the radio ham. He buys a piece of equipment in 1958, I think it was. He switches it on. He chooses the frequency and he chooses the power and he can speak to the poor gentleman on the yacht who is making the May Day signal. His control over that apparatus is complete and utter. There is no SIM card. There is no IMEI. I go out and I buy that equipment, I switch it on and I control every facet of it, whether it works, whether it interferes with next door, whether it interferes with a BBC broadcast, etc. I control that. I control the power over that.

Where you are dealing with a GSM mobile, because certainly my learned friends would classify a gateway as a mobile device - otherwise things start to fall apart under the Regulations - if you look at that device, you put a SIM card in it and it works. Take the SIM card out of it and all you can do is make an emergency services call.

I have tried lots of ways to think of explaining this simply, but I think the only real way is, first, to make this point that with the SIM card you can phone the world. Without the SIM card no authorisation, no nothing.

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What does a SIM card do? The other parties in this matter would have you believe that it is just an identification device and that it did not link to anything else. In fact it is linked to getting services from a network, because that is what identifies the person who is given that SIM card. It identifies them to Vodafone - yes, for billing purposes. But once that relationship is set up, once the identification has been made, what does the network through the identification of the SIM card do? It tells that mobile phone what frequencies to use. It tells it what power to use, because the closer you are to a transmitter the less power you need to send signals back to it.

What other things can Vodafone and T-Mobile do? Well, they can make sure that you cannot use that handset The other parties, at least in writing, get quite excited about this. They say, under the GSM case, "No, no, you do not understand IMEIs". (I begin to hear W S Gilbert and 'this is not ridiculous and this is not preposterous', coming from them. 'We just have access to these numbers. We can upload them and it is all for the public good'. Well, the answer is that what this is an example of is the ultimate degree of power and control that they have over an individual's handset. upload it if the CEIR [there is one of those acronyms again] and that will stop it being used in this country. Look around at the advertisements on railway stations and the tube at the moment about the immobilisation campaign when things are stolen. Report your mobile phone is stolen. Make sure that it is stopped. not just stopped with one SIM card, that is with any. The answer from the other parties is, 'Well it only counts in this country unless we load it to the CEIR in

each country in which you might use it'. An interesting answer. But they have got that level of control and that is how they can exert it if they want to.

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As far as the other parties are concerned, control and the ability to tell you whether you can or cannot make a call by means of a handset has nothing to do with who is using it. 'Irrelevant', they cry. (I precis). You cannot look at comparables like what constitutes providing an electronic communications service. You cannot look at how we used to look at what constitutes running a telecommunications system in the UK. It is all irrelevant. 'Well, that is plain old fashioned', and here they throw the case of Rudd at us Ma'am. 'It is a plain old fashioned use of English. "Use" must be given its ordinary and natural meaning in the context'. That means, they say, that it is you or I picking up the handset and we are using it.

That is a point, which you may remember at the last CMC Mr West alluded to when I used "use" in a particular way. "If you have to make that distinction", he said, "then what is your argument worth", or words to that effect.

Well, there is quite a lot of merit in it, I say, because "use" in the circumstances, has to be looked at in the context of "use" in the Wireless Telegraphy Act 1949, section 1. Mr Ivory helpfully, in Vodafone's Statement of Intervention, set out the kinds of things that the Wireless Telegraphy Act was meant to provide control over in the public good. Radio spectrum is a funny thing. You cannot add to it and you cannot subtract from it. It just is, exists, and has always been a prerogative to dispense. If you are looking at what is important in Wireless Telegraphy Act terms it is to prevent interference, to prevent harm and that there should be an orderly use of the spectrum.

Ma'am, relate that back to the kinds of things that I was talking about a few minutes ago in terms of power, in terms of frequency, because it is the network telling

the phone what frequency to use for its reverse path, whether to frequency hop or not, or what power to use. You might say, Ma'am, that you have some degree of day to day control over your handset, because handsets and gateways you can class the same for the purposes of this argument, but you do not have any real top level control and, when you come down to licensing, when you are running something, who is controlling it, who is operating it and who is using it, it is those sorts of issues that you need to examine. Who has that ultimate control?

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That, in essence, fits in with, for example, contractual matrix in terms of Vodafone and Floe, which is that Vodafone provide a service which is provided by means of the gateway.

Where Floe came from originally in its arguments was that it was not the person who used apparatus, a wireless telephony link by means of which telecommunications services were provided by way of business to another person, which made it committing some form of offence under Regulation 4(2) of the Wireless Telegraphy Exemption Regulations, as they now exist.

At this point, Ma'am, it might be useful if I make my first - though I do not guarantee that it will be my last - attempt to deal with the meaning of Regulation 4(2).

I think anybody would have real difficulty with Regulation 4(2), because I am going to contend that it is a bit of nonsense really. It was not intended to be, but I think that is how it has ended up. To go off in what might seem a slight tangent but I do not think is, Ma'am, I am going to talk for a moment about the RTTE.

At last, I might say, the parties in this case have just about found something that they could agree about, which is that the RTTE is about radio equipment. There are indeed parts of what T-Mobile say about it which I could have written myself. There are parts, mind you, that I would not. But where they say that the RTTE is

about radio equipment and only radio equipment, then I wholeheartedly agree, and it should only be about radio equipment and it should never, in my submission, be used as authority for making exceptions to exemptions about usage - and that is what it has been used for. I really must stop using that word!

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The draftsman kind of knew that what he was being told in respect of Regulation 4(2) should be about That was the rationale for making the exemption, so he tried to use words in the regulation that related to what in fact is a usage point to characteristics of equipment. Remember the only way in which Regulation 4(2) is lawful is if it relates to the RTTE so that it gives OFCOM the ability to say that this is a condition to the general authorisation. There are limited things for which you can have a condition under the general authorisation, one of them being the relevant regulation, which I think is 7(2) of the RTTE. way, I have to say as a matter of history that it is not unusual in wireless telegraphy terms to find matters dealt with as exceptions to exemptions and for a number of years the authority for BBC television licences was that they were an exception to an exemption. It is an established practice, for some reason, in this area.

What does it do? It does not apply to relevant apparatus which is established, installed or used to provide, or to be capable of providing a wireless telegraphy link between telecommunications apparatus or a telecommunications system and a public switch telephone network by means of which a telecommunications service is provided by way of business to another person. The bits that the data try and attach an exemption to wireless equipment is the "capable of", "used to provide or capable of providing".

The other parties, and Floe, had an interesting series of exchanges about what appeared in the agreed statement of facts relating to what was typical or untypical in relation to a gateway, a public or private

gateway and, as a matter of fact - it is probably true - on average gateways have higher usages than private gateways.

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We will come on to what public and private are in a moment, but let us take that for a moment. Of course, they need not. They could have exactly the same kind of poor profile. Typically they may, but you cannot tell. In our submission there is no doubt that you could use the apparatus referred to in the Business Plan - I will take the one that has been supplied by Vodafone - and use that apparatus that is capable of providing public gateway services.

So what are public and private gateway services? What, when I started looking at this matter, Ma'am, I took them to be goes like this.

A public gateway service is where Floe owns the gateway device. Upstream of that one way is a PABX or switch which aggregates traffic from a number of users. In fact the number of users could have access through a multiplex plate straight into the gateway device and that gateway device then connects on net to the Vodafone network.

What I had believed OFCOM and Vodafone to be saying, and the RA before that, is that a private gateway is one where a single legal person purchases leases or otherwise becomes the user of a gateway device to which it attaches its ordinary fixed line system. That is, the only calls being made by means of that gateway device come from one source, so it is self-provision. There is no element of providing a service in relation to the wireless telegraphy link to any other person.

My client, it is true to say, has had a great deal of difficulty working out what public and private gateways are. That is something referred to in Mr Happy's statement and that goes back to the correspondence that you can read from Spring 2003 and before. What is this? What distinction are you making?

Let me put it in a way in which they never quite

articulated because they are not quite so familiar with the ins and outs of the Wireless Telegraphy Exemption Regulations, as I unfortunately have become. like this. If you start to analyse those words, I have already dealt with the "capable" point. This apparatus is used to provide, or is capable of providing a wireless telegraphy link by which a service is providing to another person. So it catches every device that could theoretically be used for what the other parties describe as "public gateway use", because all of that apparatus is capable of being used to provide those services. than that it assumes a very particular form of business relationship between the person providing the services and, we will call them, the end user. The end user in this case is the person who is provided with a service by means of business by another. The business relationship it assumes is that the end user is using the gateway device. That is, using for the purpose of wireless telegraphy.

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What happens, however, if the device is off your site and in the premises of the person who has resold you the Vodafone services, owned by the reseller of the Vodafone services by whom you are billed? That is entirely possible under, for example, the Floe/Vodafone contractual matrix. What happens then? Is that private or is that public? The answer, I contend, Ma'am, is that it is public, because the end user of the services is not using the gateway devise. On the example that I have just given he does not even know where it is. He does not care where it is actually. That, too, seems to be caught by the regulations, whichever way you look at it.

I will go one stage further. Remember that 4(2) refers back to the relevant apparatus as described in Schedule 3 to 7, so it includes the handset in your pocket. Let us have a look. "Used to provide or capable of providing a wireless telephony link between telecommunication apparatus or telecommunication system and a public switch to telephoned network, by means of

which a telecommunication service is provided by way of business to another person.

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It is an interesting use of the comma in the prepenultimate line between "network and by", but notwithstanding that, what I think that means is that it is the wireless telephony link by means of which a telecommunication service is provided by way of business to another person. Well we really are getting out of kilter. We are not looking at gateways at all.

What are you sold by Vodafone, Ma'am? You are sold a service. How is that provided? By means of what is described as "a mobile user station". It does not say who has to be using it. It just says that that wireless telephony link has to be one "by means of which a telecommunication service is provided by way of business to another person." Well, if Vodafone are not providing you with a service by way of a business, using your mobile phone, I really do not know what they are doing, Ma'am. They are a public switch telephone network operator, as I understand it, and your apparatus you have actually got in your hand. So, Ma'am, I have come to the conclusion that the entire thing is nonsense.

I can tell you what it was supposed to do and I can tell you how it could have done it, or how the same effect could have been achieved by Messrs Vodafone and But I do not think this does it. I go back to the underlying problem with it, being that it is an equipment regulation which seeks to deal with a restriction on usage. It is hammering around trying desperately to find a characteristic of radio equipment that gives it the result that it wants. Hence, as I said before, the use of the strange word "capable" - the "provides or is capable of" provision. The draftsman is struggling around trying to attach something to "apparatus" rather than "usage", because he knows that if he puts in a straight-forward usage restriction by using this provision he has got a problem, because it has to relate to equipment.

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What should he have done? I think I explained that earlier. What they were trying to get at was aggregation into one box and on to the net. In other words, that which Vodafone contends has the highest usage capacities, and of course you can imagine that you have got lots of people feeding into one SIM or set of SIMs in a particular cell, and though we contend that those technical problems can quite easily be overcome, that certainly seemed to excite them the most. It is also, of course, the case where in commercial terms, as Mr Happy's witness statement says, Vodafone and Floe were competitors and they are competitors in this market in terms of providing services and allowing termination on net.

I have thrown up quite a few concepts in the last few minutes. I am conscious of that, Ma'am. It may be that you would like to think about what I have said and then ask some questions about it.

- THE CHAIRMAN: No, go on, unless you want a break for five minutes?
- MR MERCER: I am quite happy to take a break, Ma'am, if that is what the Tribunal would like.
- THE CHAIRMAN: We are quite happy, but we will break until 12.25.

(A short adjournment)

MR MERCER: The consequences are of course that, firstly, on the primary argument Floe was not committing an offence and, secondly, if I am wrong in that, an awful lot more people than Floe were committing an offence, including possibly Messrs Vodafone in respect of all of their handsets.

The second element that I made in my skeleton relating to the primary argument, is to put it to a test in respect of the arguments made by the other parties.

The first one is the TV Receiver argument, which Vodafone used. The reference is in the skeleton, Ma'am.

There is a big difference between GSM handsets and TV monitors - actually there probably will not be in the

future, Ma'am, but just at the moment there is - because you are receiving on an ordinary standard TV set en clair signals. The BBC does not tell you what frequency to use, you have to tune it in for yourself, and it does not tell your machine automatically, as a GSM phone does, what frequency to use at any particular time. It does not tell you what power. It is not relevant in that case because it is just a reception device. The BBC does not actually switch you off if you are using it unlawfully if you have not paid the licence fee. You get prosecuted.

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A better example, and a closer comparison, might have been in respect of using something that does require a set-top card or enabling device to be put in it, like a satellite digital box or something, or a cable box. If you take the cable box, however, that box, when I last looked at the issue, Ma'am, is part of the cable operator's network, even though an individual has to pay or lease it, etc., because of the degree of functionality exerted by the network in the box because of the equivalent of a SIM card.

The next one is Vodafone never changes the SIM or alters it. It merely alters its databases on the network to de-authorise use. In this way it is like a credit card.

The SIM may not change, but it is the means by which the control is exerted on the handset by the person who is truly using it. Credit cards, like SIMs, remain the owner of the person providing the services. I used the standard Barclay Card one, and if you read that you will see that a Barclay Card, or whoever your card issuer is, retains ownership of the card, like Vodafone do. If you read the Floe/Vodafone contract you will find reference to that. The SIM card belongs to Vodafone. Credit cards, like SIMs, though they should provide a higher level of service if it is a content service, they permit between the terminal in the shop into which it is put and the network, their use is controlled by the issuer, just like SIM cards.

I think I have rather indicated that the regulated structure may need a slight overhaul.

The next point, Ma'am, you have already touched on yourself, which is the continuing offence nature of what has occurred. A failure to supply is a continuing failure to supply. It goes on as it happens and that affects some of the arguments that we have made. The argument here that Vodafone were referring to, I referred in the amended Notice of Appeal to the situation where the Authorisation Directive was a reason, or was part of a reasoning relating to why you should interpret use in a particular way, the primary argument. They said 'that only comes into force on 23 July'. Well there is a continuing offence. There was also the fact that the primary argument does not just depend on making references to the Authorisation Directive.

I then deal with an argument which you touched on this morning, Ma'am, in a way, which is that it could never be lawful, even if you are right on the Primary Argument, which depends on looking at the state of Vodafone's licence.

I will deal with your question later, Ma'am, when I have had a chance to look at it over a sandwich at lunchtime, but this is a slightly different point, which is that OFCOM blithely disregarded eleven paragraphs of their own decision letter. Is that right or is that wrong? I will deal with one context later.

What I want to deal with here is, really, could they have done what they thought they could in respect of authorising use of the apparatus under Vodafone's licence? The argument goes like this.

If public gateways could be authorised under Vodafone's licence, they would have to force in the relevant definition of Radio Equipment (RE) in the licence. We have not in fact got a copy of Vodafone's licence but we have got a copy of T-Mobile's licence fortunately provided, which is in the bundles, and I understand that nobody has questioned that it is exactly

the same. It appears, from comparing it and the decision, that it is the same.

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The argument goes that if you can, however, show that it is radio equipment it can be authorised. But to be authorised as radio equipment there is a licence condition that says 'Vodafone must only do so in writing and expressly'.

Why is this raised, you may ask, by OFCOM in its Decision Letter? Because I think it was seeking to show how reasonable everybody thought they had been, certainly how reasonable the RA had tried to be, in finding a consensual solution to the problem, because it was the RA who came up with that idea in the first place and said it might be tried out. They did, with the best of motives, I think, to try and get the parties together. But they failed to think it would work because there was no express written authorisation. I say to that that you should not term a licence obligation placed on Vodafone into an obligation on Floe. In any event, given the state of play at the time at which the contract was entered into, it was authorised in effect because it was tacitly agreed that you could run this kind of kit in anything into which the SIM card will fit.

Now OFCOM changes its tune. It says 'it is awfully inconvenient but we were wrong, because the definition of a base station, as referred to in the definition of radio equipment, in the Vodafone licence can only be read by reference to GSM standards and in the GSM standards Vodafone's and user stations are entirely different and, frankly, we do not know what we were playing at in the first place'.

That depends, of course, on us all finding, Ma'am, a direct connection between the definition of base station and a GSM standard. I submit you will not. There are references to GSM standards in the licence, but not in the definition sections. It might not have been what was intended, but it is not written out anywhere.

What constitutes a base station? It is a matter for

what was intended. Of course, if I am right about the interpretation of the Wireless Telegraphy Exemption Regulations, it would be awfully useful to be able to include a GSM devise as a base station on the part of Messrs Vodafone, because otherwise all of the handsets are unlawful.

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What we get is a situation whereby essentially OFCOM, Vodafone and T-Mobile say to us 'your primary argument is wrong; even if we are wrong about that where is the authorisation for Floe to run this piece of equipment', or, 'where was the authorisation for Vodafone to run this piece of equipment?'

That brings us back to two things. One I have referred to already, which is that the Wireless Telegraphy Exemption Regulations have been made wrongfully, using the wrong authority. Secondly - let us take an example in around March 2003 - if somebody had been able to persuade OFCOM (perhaps they had gone to the courts and got the interpretation wrong) of section 1 or the regulations, what would have happened? If Vodafone had been seen to be running equipment without authorisation the Government at that time, I would suggest, the DTI to the RA and Oftel would have moved heaven and earth to sort that problem out overnight. That is the reality of the matter.

I want to deal with one point which has been raised by Vodafone and others. It partly touches on what you opened with this morning, Ma'am. That is that Vodafone have a defence because they reasonably or genuinely believed that the law was that Floe was acting unlawfully.

The first thing I want to point out on that is this. As we agreed in the Agreed Statement of Facts I have little doubts that Vodafone and OFCOM believed that Floe was acting unlawfully at the time concerned. There is no evidence, however, Ma'am, as to the genuineness of that belief or indeed as to the motive for what actually happened. Indeed these are questions which Floe

considers are matters for another hearing, if necessary, on another date in relation to negligence, intention and damages. And I point out, as kindly T-Mobile did, that the first question relating to the legality of gateways appears to have been raised in the letter which was substituted this morning, dated 23 August 2002. So Vodafone, who hold themselves up as the holders of the law, let things continue for about nine months then.

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As Mr Happy points out in his witness statement - I have mentioned it already - Vodafone and Floe were competitors in the relevant market and the consultation document, you may recall, issued in November 2002, actually proposed that public gateways be made lawful. It may be that Vodafone had advance knowledge of the results. It in fact went the other way but did not emerge until July, but I doubt that that is so, in which case they switched off the relevant public gateways operated by Floe knowing that they might, of course, be made lawful in the summer of that year. One might have read what OFCOM and Vodafone have said about genuine belief having an effect, etc, their mindset determining whether or not there was an abuse. I cannot begin to imagine how dangerous a view that might be. It all depended on what could be evidenced as the genuine belief of someone in respect of whether or not there was an abuse. point which rightly goes to damages as to negligence and intention.

Vodafone's stance over switching off was pretty uncompromising. It set itself up as judge, jury and indeed executioner, because it, of course, had the power to switch off the phones. However, if you take some of the things I have mentioned before about the way in which the Wireless Telegraphy Exemption Regulations might be interpreted, or should be interpreted, it is likely that if they adopted that stance widely throughout the industry they could cut all sorts of things off, public/private whatever, because the basis on which they were deciding whether something was public or private was

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Here we come to something that I have always found inexplicable, Ma'am. We have been dealing with Telecoms contracts for longer than I care to remember and the first thing I looked for in the Floe contract was the provision allowing Vodafone to set reasonable conditions relating to the service, conditions of usage. shalt comply with all our reasonable instructions concerning the usage of the service'. The standard boilerplate provision. What it would have enabled Vodafone to do if it had actually used that clause, because it is part of the contractual matrix, would have been to have set a usage restriction based on hours of use, times of use, whatever. A better SIM card. indeed, though it has not come out in the evidence, T-Mobile referred to sometimes as "a fair usage policy". That would have been a standard response and it is permissible. I mention it because it is permissible under the contractual matrix. Why didn't they do that?

The only submission that I can make in answer to that rhetorical question is (a) if they had done that, it would have led to the scrutiny of those failures of policy provisions by OFCOM and then by this Tribunal and it would not have sustained the uncompromising attitude that was adopted.

I am about to start hitting another topic, Ma'am. I see that it is 12.55. Do you want me to start and make the best use of five minutes or stop at this juncture, Ma'am?

THE CHAIRMAN: If that is a convenient time to stop probably it is better. What had been going through my mind and the other members of the Tribunal was whether it would be useful if we add another, say, 15 minutes on lunch to consider the points that we have raised. I do not know whether you would find that useful or not, because I do not want to waste time and I do not want to have a break if we do not need it. We could either resume at 2 o'clock or we could resume at, say, ten past 2 or quarter

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MR HOSKINS: For myself, my intention over lunch was just to get my head around what the points were. If Mr Mercer needs the time it would be helpful if he could deal with the points today so that we can respond tomorrow.

THE CHAIRMAN: Would it be helpful for you to have an additional ten minutes over lunch so that you can consider the points that we dealt with earlier?

MR MERCER: Yes, it would be, Ma'am.

THE CHAIRMAN: Alright. If we break now. Shall we say quarter past 2?

MR HOSKINS: Can I make one cheeky request? I am not sure whether you are in a position to grant it, but over lunch I was going to go back to Chambers to try to consider the points.

THE CHAIRMAN: We can give you a copy. Is that alright.

MR HOSKINS: I was going to ask for the references so that I could get them more easily, but if you have copies that is better.

THE CHAIRMAN: We can get copies. There are library facilities here for us and so if you want a bit more we might be able provide it to you.

MR HOSKINS: It was simply those three cases.

THE CHAIRMAN: Very well.

(The short adjournment)

THE CHAIRMAN: I hope that was helpful?

MR MERCER: Well I am afraid that I went to a school where it was not permitted to do one's homework at lunchtime, Ma'am, but I have done the best that I can.

The place that I had got to was the first alternative argument and I will hopefully deal with as many of your questions as I can when I get towards the end.

I have really dealt with the first alternative argument and the points which I think are relevant in terms of dealing with the question about the licence and authorisation under the licence. I have dealt with both the points.

One is whether it could be authorised in any event and the second, which is a point that seems to be raised by the other parties (I have referred to this before as well) in relation to whether or not, if you have a licence condition, that imposes a duty on Vodafone to only expressly authorise in writing, can it nevertheless authorise without doing so expressly in writing? My submission is quite straight-forward, which is if Vodafone authorised use of public gateways, which we say they did under their contract, and that does not comply with their licence condition, that does not mean that the consent is void, or wrong, or unenforceable, it means that Vodafone are in breach of its licence condition, for which there is a remedy.

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I have also dealt, really in the process of going through the points this morning, with the RTTE, but I just want to codify some of the points that I make about that. The most important is that it deals with equipment - radio equipment. But the problem in this matter, the difficulty that led Vodafone to do what they did, at least in part, so they say, is usage. I will come back again to volume of usage. That is what they say caused the problem. Not the way in which apparatus was used.

If you were to take, for example, one of the devices referred to, of which there is a photograph in the Business Plan, in the copy provided to you by Vodafone and you look at those devices, there is nothing inherently wrong with those devices. There is nothing that gives a problem. There is nothing inherent in those devices that actually gives you any inappropriate or ineffective use of the airwaves. There is nothing in the It is the volume of apparatus that causes a problem. service that goes through the apparatus that causes the difficulty. Stopping the apparatus being put into service does not (well in one sense it does) in a real sense does not cure Vodafone's problem that it perceives, or says that it perceives, which is associated with the volume of usage. In a sense the problem has nothing to

do with equipment. But for reasons that I cannot define - perhaps just making it administratively simple to do it this way, I do not know - they chose to baste the framework for what is essentially a condition to the general authorisation on the RTTE, and that just does not make sense.

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I am sure that one of the serried ranks in opposition to my client will make the point that the exact wording of Article 7(2) of the RTTE simply gives a permissive power to member states to restrict the bringing into service of radio equipment only for reasons related to the effective and appropriate use of the radio spectrum, avoidance of harmful interference or matters relating to public health.

What is this getting at? The example I gave in the supplemental skeleton argument I believe is of the interesting, but still unfortunately compliant piece of apparatus which re-broadcast Radio 3 on its downfrequencies, so if it is not using something it chooses the last frequency it uses for the return path and it rebroadcast Radio 3. I understand Radio 3 is relatively unharmful and does not really bother public health, but that would have a significant effect on the appropriate use of the airwayes.

There the characteristic is the apparatus. It does something which causes an inappropriate and ineffective use of the airwaves.

Our apparatus does not do that. It is only the volume of usage that is allegedly the problem and therefore it is not possible to use Article 7(2) as justification for this weird and wonderful regulatory regime.

In the skeleton argument in the first place and in the supplemental, Ma'am, you may think that I have been a little prerogative about the Wireless Regulatory regime and that is partly because I find it difficult to understand why it is necessary to do what has been done. Essentially OFCOM argue that the exception to the

exemption set out in Regulation 4(2) of the Wireless Telegraphy Exemption Regulations is in fact a condition of the general authorisation and a condition relating to the general authorisation giving a right to use certain frequencies. With the coming into force of the new telecommunications regime in the UK on 25 July last year what that legislation is supposed to do is to deal with general authorisations or specific authorisations relating to the provision of electronic communications networks or services, or the right to use spectrum.

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At that point, Ma'am, I have some difficulty in understanding why the UK let stand on the statute book a statute that also talks about establishment and installation of apparatus as well as its use and I have some difficulty in understanding why it is necessary to deal with something as simple as a condition to the general authorisation by means of an exception to an exemption, apart from perhaps, as I alluded to earlier today, that this is the way we have always done it, because there is no doubt that that strikes some chord.

What they should have done was to put an exemption, if they could find justification for one, into the general authorisation. The answer is that it is actually very difficult to find something that would give them the same result in terms of what the general authorisation gives them the power to do in terms of putting conditions on general authorisation. But that does not really matter because, as I said before - and I do not mind belabouring the point on this occasion - the way to have dealt with this was for Vodafone to have imposed a reasonable restriction on usage, which it could have done pursuant to its contractual matrix. But something drove it not to do that.

Given the submissions made by the other parties, Ma'am, I do not intend to go on at length concerning Articles 7(3) and (4) and the Regulations relating to them of the RTTE, concerning disconnection for technical purposes. I think the parties are not too far apart

there.

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I am beginning to draw towards a conclusion, apart from dealing with supplementary, but let me deal with an overview of how this all fits together, in our view.

Vodafone was using and arranging and permitting the installation and establishment of the Gateways (though, as I have just said, we have doubts about whether to establish and install should continue to be licensable acts).

Floe resold services provided by Vodafone by means of the gateways.

The contract of 12 August 2002 is one relating to the sale of services and at the time it was entered into, Vodafone had to have considered that anything into which its SIMs could be put lawfully, would be put to use.

We contend that Regulation 4(ii) of the Wireless Telegraphy Exemption Regulations is just a nonsense and there is no authority that it should be there.

Interestingly that leads to another conclusion, which is that if, of course, it was unlawful and void, then the exemption would still apply, if you take the other parties' reasoning together with mine, and it would therefore be lawful for them to be used by Vodafone because the exception to the exemption would have gone.

Alternatively, and assuming that the primary argument is correct, the "public" gateways are in fact base stations under Vodafone's licence.

Alternatively, if the primary argument is correct, the Government will see the ridiculousness of the position that they had accidentally created and would have made a licence change to Vodafone's licence, if it had been discovered, say, in March 2003.

Lastly, Ma'am, looking for a home for who is running this, I will deal with the estoppel argument which you asked us to consider. I will deal with that in a moment.

I want to move on now towards some of the other points that you asked us specifically to consider.

The first thing that I want to consider is the case

of *Hilti*. The first point on that relates to paragraph 89 of the Commission decision which the Tribunal pointed us to at the end of last week, where was set out the points that made it look as if *Hilti* had made very little effort previously in respect of reporting matters to the authorities or taking little action previously in relation to making a proper and justifiable complaint about what others were doing in relation to health and safety.

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I do not understand in this case why Vodafone were not jumping up and down and demanding that the RA took I do not understand, except that you will have noticed, Ma'am, that as far as we know, and I think this goes uncontested, we do not actually know of any Though the RA persecutes people like Mr prosecutions. Ridd in the case quoted by Vodafone in respect of the normal meaning of the word "use" (I think he was the poor gentleman who accidentally switched on his pirate radio station when he did not think it was switched on), in spite of the fact that they prosecute people like that, there have been no prosecutions in this area, as far as we know and I would doubt that any sane prosecutor would start a programme of prosecutions in respect of the guidelines that most prosecutors work to and in relation to the fact that at least until the summer of 2003 the policy position about what might have been the law, let alone was the law, was still to be decided by the government. Prosecutors, I submit, Ma'am, tend not to prosecute when the law is possibly going to be changed. It is interesting to note that even after last summer If this was so important, and they had not prosecuted. given that that was a way of dealing with it as far as Vodafone and the other parties are concerned, why didn't They are big enough and have resources enough to commence an action for mandamus. But instead, Ma'am, Vodafone chose the way, which by accident or design, had the maximum disruptive effect on Floe's business. is no evidence for that, Ma'am, apart from the use of the words "in administration" after the name of my client as it presently stands.

What is *Hilti* about? I have no wish to add to the amount of paper flowing around, but I have behind me another small forest relating to three cases where I provided, as is expected, the whole matter, though I am going to make reference to three very short paragraphs. I apologise for not having circulated these earlier, but this was my homework for the weekend in terms of sorting these out. (Transcripts handed to the Tribunal and the parties)

The first is the 1991 case of Stichting Certificatie Kraanverhuurbedrijf. It is the CFI talking. The case concerned certification systems for hiring cranes where one element of the system was a prohibition on hiring cranes from firms not affiliated to SCK. The Commission found that there was an infringement.

- 18 THE CHAIRMAN: I think we need to find which document you are 19 referring to. The first one we have here is dated 30 20 November 1994. I seem to have been given three cases.
- One is Cement and it seems to be 1994. One is Stichting.
- I think that may be the one you are referring to. It appears to be 1997.
- 24 MR MERCER: Yes, it is.
- THE CHAIRMAN: I thought you said 1991. The third one is Albany, which is 1999.
- 27 MR MERCER: That is correct. In fact, I was misreading 1991 28 for 1997. We start with the 1997 one. I should say that
- I have not noted next to the quote that I am about to
- 30 make exactly where it comes, but I will supply you with
- 31 that.

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- 32 THE CHAIRMAN: It is always a nuisance if you do not write it down at the time. It happens all the time!
- 34 MR MERCER: Yes. I am afraid the problem is technology,
- 35 keeping your fingers open in three different places while
- you are typing on the PC at home. It is never easy I
- 37 find.
- 38 Anyway the CFI stated in relation to the more

effective monitoring argument which it had already raised - and let me tell you what that was - the SCK (I will shorten it to those initials because it will be simpler for everybody) argued that the -

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"certification system had sufficient added value to
justify the alleged restriction upon competition",
inter alia because -

"SCK pursues a more active monitoring policy in relation to statutory requirements than the ... public responsible for the inspection of cranes in the Netherlands", and its "system imposes requirements ... which go beyond the statutory requirements."

The CFI stated, in relation to the more effective monitoring argument, relying on *Hilti*, that is in principle the task of public authorities and not of private bodies to ensure that statutory requirements are complied with. It went on to say:

"An exception to that rule may be allowed where the public authorities have, of their own will, decided to entrust the monitoring of compliance with statutory requirements to a private body. In this case, however, SCK set up a monitoring system parallel to the monitoring carried out by the public authorities without there being any transfer to SCK of the monitoring powers exercised by the public authorities."

That is relevant here, because there is no delegation of RA's or OFCOM's powers. They enunciate this principle quite clearly. It is the task of public authorities and not private bodies to ensure that statutory requirements are complied with.

The second one that I am going to refer to is the Albany case and it is the Advocate-General's opinion to which I am referring. I hope that I have correctly taken down the reference this time. It is paragraph 289. (It is not quite what I have. We will check that, Ma'am). The Advocate-General says:

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"In those circumstances the infringing undertakings have often claimed that they were engaged in the prevention of unfair competition, dumping, or more generally, acting in pursuit of the public interest. The Court and the Commission have consistently held that it is for the public authorities or the courts and not for private undertakings to protect the interests of the public in matters such as product safety or the prevention of unfair competition." The last reference is the Cement Cartel case and we

are looking at paragraph 49(3) of the Decision.

"... it is not the task of an undertaking or association of undertakings to act on its own initiative in place of the public authorities responsible for implementing the laws of its country and to take 'steps to eliminate products which rightly or wrongly, it regards as dangerous or at least as inferior in quality to its own products.'"

I wanted to use those authorities, Ma'am, for the obvious purpose of saying that in this country, except in very limited circumstances, we do not delegate matters of control in wireless telegraphy, the very limited circumstances being in relation to the enactment of Articles 7(3) and 7(4) of the RTTE where people need to act pretty quickly because something nasty is going to I think the parties are more or less in agreement that those are not really relevant here.

We come back to the point again. There was no need for Vodafone to act in the way that it did. There was a contractual remedy open to it but it decided to become judge, jury and indeed executioner, when it is accepted that that is not supposed to be what we do, unless you are given very specific instructions to do so.

It is a long time since I studied criminal law or was indeed a regular prosecutor, but I think I had better turn to the Accessories and Betters Act 1861.

I am not going to pretend that what I am about to say is original. I will happily provide copies of

Archbold in the circumstances.

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THE CHAIRMAN: If you tell us what paragraphs of Archbold we can probably provide it.

MR MERCER: It is essentially sections 18/10 to 18/14. My starting place is the reference there to a case at the beginning, which is quoted in those sections:

"But even if a man is present whilst an offence is committed, if he takes no part in it and does not act in concert with those who commit it, he does not become an aider and abetter merely because he does not endeavour to prevent the offence or fails to apprehend the offender."

That goes along with my general belief that it is the law of this country that, even if I see a crime being perpetrated in front of me, I am under no duty, unless I am the police, to take any action whatsoever. There are exceptions to that, relating to money laundering and terrorism, but I do not think I need go into those.

Also quoted there is $National\ Coal\ Board\ v.\ Gamble,$ a 1959 case, 1 QB where Archbold quotes Mr Justice Devlin, as he was at the time:

"A person who supplies the instrument for a crime or anything essential to its commission aids in the commission of it and if he does so knowingly and with intent to aid ...

- and if he does so knowingly and with intent to aid [I repeat those words] -

 \dots he abets it as well and is therefore guilty of aiding and abetting."

That brings me to the mental element which is necessary, which is an intention to knowingly aid.

Vodafone, we have submitted, had a contractual duty to supply services which Floe could resell. Vodafone, one might say partly because it took no interest in the matter, had no real idea of what those services were to be used for. We say that they probably had a pretty good idea, but they say they did not think they were going to be used for other than private gateway services.

Vodafone, it seems to us, Ma'am, simply does not have the mens rea to be able to commit an offence under the 1861 Act. It has no intention. Quite the opposite, it would seem. It certainly would not have known what it was doing in the sense of what to switch off, what I am going to come back to in a moment, because, as we pointed out, though it is indicative of what my learned friends describe as public and private gateways as to the volume of usage, it is not conclusive. You can have a private gateway serving just one person where that one person was a very large company, like Vodafone, where the usage would be quite phenomenal. They would not know exactly what it was. They do not have the mens rea. They are obliged to provide the services. I submit, Ma'am, that they do not have the intention to assist, they do not know if they are assisting, they are just providing a service and therefore they have no duty to stop it.

As Vodafone itself contends in paragraph 38 of the Agreed Statement of Facts, which is at Tab 92 of Volume 5, it believes (reading to the words) SIMs provided Floe with use and mobile handsets are in private GSM gateways."

Well, if that is true then they could not possibly have had the *mens rea* necessary to believe that they had a duty and, even if they had had a reasonable suspicion that Floe was providing public gateways, they still would not have had the intention to help them break the law.

Unless you have any questions about the section I have just been through, Ma'am, I will continue on to the points you raised this morning, or as many as I can assist with at this time.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

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MR MERCER: What is the distinction between public and private gateways?

It would be true to say that this is the problem that my client has been having for some time, or certainly had for a lot of the spring, summer and fall, to use an American expression, of 2003. What is it we

are talking about here?

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I will tell you what I think they were trying to do and ask you, Ma'am, to match that with what I was discussing this morning in terms of what I think they did. I think the object was to differentiate between gateways owned, run and serving one legal person, and gateways other than that. I do not intend to repeat all that I said this morning, but as I think you will have appreciated I do not think they have managed that in any way, shape or form in terms of the wording that they used.

If I have got it right, the purpose of remaking the regulations in January 2003 was to avoid the fixed mobile problem. That is to say, it is my understanding that when we started the process in August 2002 and the letter of 23 August, what we were looking at in regulatory terms was everything that was fixed being banned. What we have at that time was the RA going 'Oh, dear, we need to have a look at this'. They had sorted that problem out by the January, when the new regulations came in in 2003 as amended. It amended the 1999 regulations. First of all, we deal with the fixed mobile point by means of changing the regulations.

You asked, Ma'am, whether there was any justification for the distinction. Well the justification for the distinction --

THE CHAIRMAN: I do not think I asked that actually. I think I was saying that that was what was being asked in the Consultation paper.

MR MERCER: What I was going on to say was you asked in general terms about the justification for the distinction. We would always say that the justification used by Vodafone is that public gateways produce typically larger volumes of usage and cause ineffective or inappropriate use of the radio waves, the spectrum.

THE CHAIRMAN: I said this morning that paragraph 5.8 of the Consultation document raises the question as to whether the distinction between private and public gateways was

justified. Then, of course, one has to answer in the summer when they said it could.

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MR MERCER: Yes. Where I come on to with that is to deal with that area and another question of yours at the same time, which is that we are not actually aware of any study having taken place or any scientific objective study or report, even to the question of what constitutes inappropriate and ineffective use which in itself is alleged to be caused by public gateways.

THE CHAIRMAN: On that point I did raise a question about evaluation and probably we ought to listen to what is said by OFCOM.

MERCER: Generally when they are trying to make a MR distinction between self-use and communal use, Ma'am, it might be helpful to mention that the use of gateways is not just restricted to the making of voice calls. you put your card into an ATM that may well be linked by a gateway back to the branch. It does not rely on land lines, which are too easy to interfere with. with sets of traffic lights in London, in particular. You may sometimes wonder why suddenly they change their phasing more quickly than other times. It is because they have been instructed to do so and that again can be by means of a gateway. That is a prime example of selfuse. You could see that the authorities were trying to avoid catching inside the regulations.

I do not think I have very much to say about the question you asked, Ma'am, about Business Plans.

THE CHAIRMAN: I think you made that clear before.

MR MERCER: I think, Ma'am, that I have already laboured the point about interpretation, so that probably brings me to estoppel.

I have already alluded to the fact that if the primary argument is right and you look for what happens next in terms of an authority or what would have happened, and what is the answer to 'who would have been running it and how', there are four answers. I will not run through any of the other three because I have done so

already.

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On to estoppel, really I think the extended form of the point is made in the *Hiscox v Outhwaite* case on page 12. It is the paragraph at the top of the page, the last paragraph, which is the unconscionability of being able to abandon the defence, a position generally which has been relied upon by others, which appears to be the fourth answer that I might have found in that it seems to be on that basis unconscionable for OFCOM and Vodafone, OFCOM in particular, merely to rip up, in fairly breathtaking style, 11 paragraphs of their own Decision Letter.

Two last things. Firstly, we have a copy of what we think is the 13 March letter from John Stonehouse to Cliff Mason at the RA and we will have copies made of that.

Lastly, I refer back to the study point, which of course is what having a study and having this examined as to what should have been the technical parameters for the usage constraints to be applied is exactly what we would have liked to have happened in the case. That is what we would have liked. We would have liked to have examined what are the correct parameters that should have been employed, if there was a problem at all, by Vodafone and imposed pursuant to the contract.

As far as sections 172 to 175 of the Communications Act, Ma'am, unless you have any objection I will deal with those tomorrow when I have a chance to better consider them.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

MR MERCER: Unless you have any questions from the Tribunal, Ma'am, I think that I have, for the time being at least, finished.

THE CHAIRMAN: That is very impressive. You have done it in the time, because we started with half an hour of opening, so that was very well done.

I have one question. It is on the Wireless Telegraphy Act 1949, which you will find at Tab 55 of

Volume 3 of your bundles. It is page 988. Halfway down there is a paragraph which is in brackets:

"Any person who has any station for wireless telegraphy or apparatus for wireless telegraphy in his possession or under his control and either (a) intends to use it in contravention of section 1 or (b) knows or has reasonable cause to believe that another person intends to use it in contravention of that section shall be guilty of the offence."

My question is that in that drafting it appears that the draftsman has made a distinction between use and control.

Maybe you would like to consider it overnight and come back tomorrow when you do your reply?

MR MERCER: Yes. Having taken 30 seconds to read it, Ma'am, you couldn't escape seeing that he uses three concepts, possession, control and use. "Use" very specifically in respect of its use in contravention of section 1 and then he uses the other concepts to control that, so that I do not think it is necessarily that you do 1, 2 or 3, "possess", "control" or "use". You could do all three. "Possession" and "under his control" must mean physical possession and physical control in the circumstances, which are very interestingly divided from use.

THE CHAIRMAN: Would you like to come back to it?

MR MERCER: I do not think it shows that it has to be in possession and control for you to be able to use it, or vice versa, Ma'am. I am not sure that it takes us to the separate point that he makes about use in contravention of section 1.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

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Mr Hoskins?

MR HOSKINS: Can I, if only for my own benefit, set myself a road map?

THE CHAIRMAN: It would be of benefit to us, I am sure.

MR HOSKINS: It has already been flagged up in OFCOM's skeleton argument. It is paragraphs 12 to 13. You will see the way I have divided the cases. We say there are two main parts.

The first part is to ask whether the operation of public GSM gateways was unlawful as a matter of law, so if you like we will look at the black letter of law position at that stage.

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The second main part of the case is then to say presumably there is nothing to say that it is unlawful. Whether there was either an exclusion from the Competition Act that Vodafone could rely on, or OFCOM could rely on, to justify its decision, or whether there was objective justification for Vodafone's acts.

Those are the two main parts of the case.

The first part of the case has a number of quite difficult and quite technical questions, which again I have tried to compartmentalise. I think it is useful to try to come at this case in compartments, because otherwise one tends to flow from one to the other (no pun intended) and it becomes quite difficult to follow.

The four parts of the illegality argument are at paragraph 13. The first one is intended to reflect Floe's primary argument.

"(a) Were Floe's Public GSM gateway devices 'used' by ... Floe", because if they were they fall into problems with Regulation 4(2). If Floe were to succeed they would have to show that the gateway devices were used by Vodafone and not Floe. Also that the use of public GSM gateway devices was authorised by Vodafone's Wireless Telegraphy Act licence. So there are two parts to that. I think the heading for that is Floe's Primary Arguments, although the second limb was actually raised by us. We say there are two limbs to it.

The second aspect of the illegality part of the case is, if Floe's public GSM's gateway devices were 'used' by Floe - ie they have lost the Primary argument - was the use of such devices nonetheless authorised pursuant to Condition 8 of Vodafone's 1949 Act licence? I think the best heading for that is that it is Floe's first alternative argument.

The third element is compatibility with community

legislation, both the RTTE Directive and the Authorisation Directive.

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The fourth element raises very similar issues but it makes the point that if Floe did not use their own public GSM gateways, they have effectively accepted that they installed the gateways and the Act and the Regulations bite equally on a person who instals apparatus for wireless telegraphy.

Those are the four parts to the illegality argument. I intend to take the case like that, break them down and deal with it in those compartments. I will also deal with the questions that the Tribunal posed this morning in the course of those submissions. However, I do not intend to say anything about the third issue, which is which Business Plan. It is more sensible to leave that to Vodafone to deal with.

Before we plunge into the primary argument, I would like to make some comments on the regulatory background. I appreciate that the Tribunal is now very familiar with that background, but there are certain points of detail that I think I need to highlight at this stage.

At paragraph 8 of the OFCOM skeleton argument we have set out a short summary of the position. It is basically a regulatory system which has three tiers.

First of all, under section 1(1) of the Act itself, a licence requirement is imposed.

The second tier is the general exemption that one finds in Regulation 4(1) of the 2004 Exemption Regulations.

The third tier is an exclusion from that Exemption, which relates to the provision of commercial services to third parties.

So three tiers, but the second tier is a general exemption and the third tier is an exception or exclusion from that exemption.

Dealing first with section 1(1) of the Wireless Telegraphy Act, it may be useful to have the legislation open as we do this. It is at Volume 3 tab 55 of the Act.

There are two elements to section 1(1). First of all, for the purposes of this case, no person shall establish or use any station for wireless telegraphy or install or use any apparatus for wireless telegraphy, except under the authority of a licence. So there is a licence requirement for installation or use of apparatus for wireless telegraphy. If such use or installation takes place without a licence, it is an offence - ie a criminal offence. There are two elements to it.

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The relevant Regulations are the 2003 ones, because they came into force in February and the first disconnection was in March. They are to be found at tab 69 at page 1224. Regulation 4(1) is what I have described as a general exemption for "relevant apparatus".

Just to follow through the definitions, because certainly the regulatory bodies' approach to the definitions has changed over time. That is clear from the evidence, but I want to make sure that everyone is aware of that. It was picked up in the questions this morning.

4(1) deals with "relevant apparatus". If one turns over to the previous page, 1223, Regulation 3(1) is an interpretation provision and it has a definition of "apparatus", meaning "wireless telegraphy apparatus or apparatus designed or adapted for use in connection with wireless telegraphy apparatus". Over the page, still in Regulation 3(1): "'relevant apparatus' means the prescribed apparatus is defined in Schedules 3 to 9 hereto", so they have gone from 'apparatus' to 'relevant apparatus'. We then see the phrase 'prescribed apparatus'.

If we go through to Schedule 3, which is the relevant one for equipment in this case, it is at page 1228. Part 1 is entitled 'interpretation' and 'prescribed apparatus' is said to mean "A user station as defined below". If one goes to the definition of "user station", it is said to mean "a mobile station for

wireless telegraphy designed or adapted to be connected by wireless telegraphy to one or more relevant networks and to be used solely for the purpose of sending and receiving messages conveyed by a relevant network by means of wireless telegraphy".

The reason why I have taken us through the definition trail, if I can put it like that, is that one comes, in the end, to the definition of "user station". It means a mobile station. Previously we have seen the RA in certain documents saying that in its opinion at the time GSM gateway devices were fixed to mobile stations. It is not clear whether that means fixed or mobile.

THE CHAIRMAN: We started off by fixed.

MR HOSKINS: I think that is right.

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The position now, in terms of the relevant regulatory body, which is obviously now OFCOM, is that a GSM gateway device is a mobile station within the definition in the Regulation. One sees the justification for that view in the second witness statement of Dr Unger. Again it may be helpful to look at the way he puts it. That is at Volume 1, tab 9. I think rather than have me read verbatim, as long as the Tribunal is happy, I suggest you simply read paragraphs 2 to 4. is very short. But that is the explanation for which he says that GSM gateway devices are mobile stations and he explains why they are treated as mobile stations. much of this case, it depends on where you slice through time, what position you have. That is the current regulatory position and, insofar as I am dealing in this section with submissions with the black letter law position, that is what I say the position is. Obviously the use of the phrase "the definition of user station is a mobile station" was the same in the 1999 Regulations and through, so that has been the case since 1999 when the Consultation was muted. The definition has not actually changed.

If I can lay down a marker, and I will come back to it, in its Consultation document, at paragraphs 5.6 to

5.8 from memory, there are two reasons that the Radio Communications Agency gave for why public GSM gateways were unlawful. One was that they believed they were fixed mobile and not fixed and therefore could not benefit from the exemption, but the other was that they were to provide telecommunication services for commercial purposes. The fact that the Regulatory Body now takes a different view of what a mobile station is, it does not alter the fact that there were two reasons for illegality and the second one is still valid.

I am sorry if that is a bit of a side-step of the path that I have set myself. I think it is important, because obviously that dichotomy is there which everyone has referred to. I think it is important to understand where OFCOM is coming from in terms of that part of the case.

If I can turn back to Regulation 4(2), which is the exception to the exemption. It is at page 1224.

THE CHAIRMAN: It might be helpful, Mr Hoskins, if I explain that the reason we referred to it was because of what the parties understood at the time rather than what the position is now.

MR HOSKINS: I understand that, Madam.

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THE CHAIRMAN: We will want to come on to that later.

MR HOSKINS: I will have to deal with it. I think the way I would like to deal with it is to say as a matter of black letter law was it unlawful, and that requires me to say what we think 'mobile station' covered. It is the same, as I say, in the Regulations one sees factors for 2003 all the way through.

The next question will be, how does that go to the parties' belief, because the Radio Communications Agency thinks it is a grey area. What does that mean? What was Vodafone entitled to assume it meant, etc. I will come back to that.

Regulation 4(2) leads us into the first question asked by the Tribunal this morning, which is what is the proper definition of a public GSM gateway? What is the

distinction between private and public? What is a public GSM gateway device?

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What is clear is that "relevant apparatus" which is used to provide or to be capable of providing a wireless telegraphy link etc, by means of which a telecommunication service is provided by way of business to another person does not benefit from the exemption. That is the point.

There is no definition of "public GSM gateway" as such. It is a phrase which is used by the Regulators and by the industry to refer to GSM gateway devices, but of course 4(2) covers lots of other different types of devices. It is not specific to GSM gateways. That terminology is used to cover GSM gateway devices by means of which a telecommunication service is provided by way of business to another person. OFCOM agrees with the Tribunal's assessment this morning, but if I could summarise it this way.

The distinction between public and private and between private and public is between self-provision and commercial service. If a person is using a GSM gateway device to provide a commercial service to another person, it does not matter whether the service is provided to one or more other person or persons. It will not benefit from an exemption.

That is all I wanted to say about the regulatory position at this stage, but obviously I will have to keep coming back to it.

If I can turn to the Primary Arguments now.

Floe's Primary Argument has two limbs and that is partly because of the point that we have raised. One of the limbs is ours. It must succeed on both limbs in order for its argument to succeed. Floe's argument runs like this.

On a proper construction of section 1(1) of the 1949 Act, Floe says it did not use the GSM gateway devices that it operated. It says it was Vodafone who used them. Secondly, even if that is correct, it would have to be

shown that the use of public GSM gateway devices by Vodafone was authorised by Vodafone's Wireless Telegraphy Act licence. Those are the two limbs. The first limb is did Floe use the GSM gateway device?

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With all due respect, in our submission this argument is hopeless. If I can pick it up from our skeleton argument at paragraphs 17 to 20, the starting point is this - and I do not think there is any dispute between the parties - that the words should be given their ordinary linguistic meaning. That is the starting point for any statutory construction as a matter of English law. It is also common ground that Floe's GSM gateways were connected to Vodafone's network in the same manner as a mobile handset is connected to a mobile operator's network. I say that is common ground, because that is what is reflected at paragraph 13 of the Statement of Facts. It is Bundle 5, tab 92 at page 1759.

In our submission, it would be ridiculous to suggest that whenever a person made a telephone call using their mobile phone over the Vodafone network it was, in any ordinary sense of the word, Vodafone who was using the mobile phone. If that is accepted as being ridiculous, as we say it must be, then given that Floe's GSM gateways inter-react with Vodafone's network in precisely the same way as a mobile phone, it must equally be ridiculous to suggest that when Floe is operating its GSM gateways it is Vodafone who is using the GSM gateway device. The power of control over the SIMs, the control that can be exercised through the IMEI number is precisely the same if one has a gateway device as if one has a mobile phone.

We say on any normal meaning of the word "use" or "used", it has to be Floe who was using the GSM gateway device.

We say that is confirmed - looking at the normal meaning of the words, what does one appreciate by the word "use" - by paragraph 10 of the Statement of Facts. I think it is worth turning that up for this point. It is Volume 5, tab 92 at page 1758, paragraph 10. Here one

sees the extent of the agreed facts about public GSM gateways.

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- "(a) By contrast the operation of a public GSM gateway typically is the owner of that GSM gateway;
- (b) has the GSM gateway installed at its own premises or at premises which it otherwise has the right to control and if it has switching equipment, has the GSM gateway connected to its own switching equipment;
- (c) subscribes for the SIMs to be placed into the GSM gateway and places them into the GSM gateway;
- (d) enters into contracts with corporate and/or individual customers to supply them with fixed to mobile calls at on-net prices [etc];
- (e) installs or procures the installation of connectivity ..."

I will not read the next word because Floe does not agree with all of this sentence, but the only bit it does not agree with are the words "and operates the GSM gateway", so the agreed bit of (e) reads:

- "... installs or procures the installation of connectivity ... so that it can supply those customers;
- (f) operates the GSM gateway in order to provide services to a number of corporate customers."

 Again, by any normal understanding of the word "use", even if one takes it to a more technical level than who was using the handset, still the pointers are clear. It is Floe who uses, who operates, its own GSM gateway devices. It owns them. It puts the SIMs in. It has them on its premises. It installs or procures the installation of connectivity. It enters into contracts with customers. It is overwhelming and there is no contrary argument.

Floe's only real point, certainly up until today, but I will deal with the new points later, was based on

the notion of control. Floe's point was that Vodafone was the user of Floe's GSM gateway devices because it could control the use of those devices through the SIMs and the IMEI number. I do not need to go into the details but there is a description of how that control is exercised at paragraphs 27 to 30 of the Statement of Facts.

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It is not contested because it is obvious that Vodafone had power to block access to its network. However, we say the fact that a mobile operator can control the use of apparatus in this way by blocking access to the network does not mean that the mobile network operator is therefore the user of that apparatus. The reason we say that is that there is a clear distinction between use and control of use.

Let me give you a silly example but I think it makes the point. Mr X is driving home from the pub. had too much to drink. Mr X is using his car. policeman stops Mr X and says 'I am terribly sorry but I think you have been drinking. I am going to stop you driving any further.' Mr X is the user of the car. policeman is controlling the use of the car by saying 'I am not letting you drive it any more'. You would never, in any normal use of language, say that the policeman was using the car. It is a silly example, but it gets to the heart of the problem. There is a fundamental distinction between 'use' and 'control of use'. Yes, the mobile network operators can control access to the network, but that does not therefore mean that they are using every piece of apparatus that happens to connect to their network.

Paragraph 20 of the skeleton is a more apposite and less silly example, but hopefully it is equally powerful.

Imagine the facts were as follows. Vodafone provides a SIM card to Floe. Floe places the SIM card into a public GSM gateway device. Vodafone at that stage, let us presume on this example, does not know that the SIM card is being used in that way. Vodafone does

not at any stage interfere with the operation of that particular SIM card.

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If that were the end of the story and if that was the whole story it would be ridiculous to suggest that Vodafone was using a public GSM gateway device of which it had absolutely no knowledge.

Let us add to the example. Suppose Vodafone discovers that the SIM card is being used in a public GSM gateway device and takes steps to prevent access to the network, either by disabling the SIM or by flagging the IMEI number. It would be equally ridiculous to suggest that, by virtue of those acts, Vodafone had all along been "using" the GSM gateway device.

What that example proves is that control has nothing to do with use, because if you are using a public GSM gateway device you are using it from the start and the fact that Vodafone takes action somewhere down the line cannot change the identity of the person who is using the device.

The new point in relation to this which came up today was Mr Mercer's argument that Regulation 4(2) is nonsense. That is not the case - and I will show why in a minute - but even if it were nonsense that would not solve the problem that the Tribunal has with the issue it has before it, which is what does "use" mean in Regulation 4(2). We say the literal meaning is quite clear.

If I can deal with the arguments that Regulation 4(2) is nonsense, I think again we probably need to have the Regulation in front of us. I am sorry to be chopping and changing. It is Volume 3, tab 69, page 1224.

Mr Mercer said that Regulation 4(2) is nonsense, for two principal reasons. First of all, he focused on the words "capable of providing", which are used in Regulation 4(2). He said that, because of the inclusion of those words, Regulation 4(2) captures every device which could be used for a public gateway use, as such equipment is capable of being used as a public gateway.

For example, if you have a piece of equipment that can be used either as a private gateway or a public gateway, it will automatically be excluded from the exemption because it is capable of being used as a public gateway device.

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With respect, that actually overlooks the wording of Regulation 4(2) because it is not as simple as that. Regulation 4(2) says: "With the exception of 'relevant apparatus' operating the frequency band specified in paragraph (3), the exemption in paragraph (1) shall not apply to 'relevant apparatus' which is established, installed or used to provide, or to be capable of providing." The test is not simply whether apparatus is capable of providing a commercial service, the test is whether 'relevant apparatus' has been established or installed so as to be capable of providing the necessary service. Where a person has established or installed a private GSM gateway device, which links only to that company's own fixed lines, that device will not fall within the Regulation 4(2) exception. One cannot overlook the necessity for establishment or installation so as to be capable of providing that sort of service.

For example, I have been given a pirate radio station. Say the police, or the regulatory bodies know it is there. They rush in and nobody is there. It is turned off. You could still catch them, because you have equipment, apparatus, which has been established or installed as to be capable of being used as a pirate radio station. There is no nonsense in Regulation 4(2) on that aspect.

The other way in which Regulation 4(2) was said to be nonsensical (my note is a bit incomplete) but Mr Mercer said 'Vodafone provides you with a service. How is it provided? By means of a mobile user station'. The wireless telegraphy link has to be provided by means of the handset, I think is the way he put it. Therefore Vodafone is providing a service by use of use of your handset.

Again that ignores the wording of Regulation 4(2),

because what Regulation 4(2) actually deals with is apparatus which is established, installed or used to provide a wireless telegraphy link between telecommunication apparatus or a telecommunication system, or other such apparatus or system, by means of which a telecommunication service is provided by way of business to another person. "To another person" must mean a third party, ie not Vodafone or the handset user. Of course, when one uses a handset to talk to someone, one is not providing a telecommunication service by way of business to another person, one is simply talking into one's phone. It is the words "to another person" at the end of Regulation 4(2) which pull the legs from that particular argument.

There is nothing in 'the Regulation 4(2) is nonsense' argument and even if it were difficult to apply in those particular ways, it would not make any difference because the definition of the person who uses the apparatus is clear, for the reasons that I have already set out.

- THE CHAIRMAN: Are you saying that the "by way of business" refers to the other person?
- MR HOSKINS: Precisely. You must be providing a telecommunication service by way of business to another person. I am afraid "another person" cannot be the person who is providing the telecommunications system, nor can it be the person who is using the apparatus which is linking with it.
- THE CHAIRMAN: Whereas Mr Mercer's argument is that "by way of business" is the original provider.
- MR HOSKINS: That is correct. It is Vodafone providing.
- THE CHAIRMAN: So those words face that way or face that way?
- MR HOSKINS: In my submission, the addition of the words "to another person" must mean something and if they do not mean what I have suggested, it is difficult to see what they do mean. Mr Mercer might have more of a go to his argument if there was a full stop after "business" and no other words. That is what we say. Those words have to

have a meaning and that is the meaning that they have.

That is all I want to say about the first limb of the argument. I will now move on to the second limb, which is, if, contrary to what I have just submitted, it was Vodafone who was using the GSM gateway device, was that use authorised by its own Wireless Telegraphy Act licence? As you know, we say it was not authorised by Vodafone's Wireless Telegraphy Act licence.

Can we have a look at the licence, or a licence which is in the same form. It is in fact T-Mobile's licence but they are in the same form. That is at Bundle 1, tab 12.

You will see at the top, under the Radio Communications Agency logo, it says:

"Condition 1

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This licence authorises T-Mobile to establish, instal and use radio transmitting and receiving stations and radio apparatus as described in the schedules hereinafter together called 'the radio equipment', subject to the terms set out below."

What is being authorised for the purposes of the 1949 Act

is the establishment, installation and use of the radio equipment as later defined in the licence.

One finds the definition of 'radio equipment' at page 202. Under the heading the text says, "This Schedule forms part of licence ... and describes the radio equipment covered by the licence and the purpose for which the radio equipment may be used. This is the definition section, if you like. Paragraph (1):

"Description of radio equipment licence

In this licence the radio equipment means the base transceiver stations ... [I do not have to worry about repeater stations; nobody is suggesting that GSM gateway devices are repeater stations] ... forms part of the network as defined in paragraph (2) below.

Purpose of the radio equipment

The radio equipment shall form part of the radio

telecommunications network in which mobile user stations, which meet the appropriate technical performance requirements, communicate by radio with the radio equipment to provide a telecommunications service."

There is a distinction drawn between, on the one hand, base transceiver stations and, on the other hand, mobile user stations and it is only base transceiver stations which form part of the radio equipment for the purposes of the licence.

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Floe's point in this, as set out at paragraph 22 of its skeleton argument, is simply an assertion, because there is no evidence to back it up, but the assertion is that a GSM gateway device is "a less sophisticated base station". That is the way that Floe puts its case.

Without having to enter into any analysis of the technical issues, the hopelessness of that argument, we say, is underlined by paragraphs 17 to 18 of the Statement of Facts and that again is at Bundle 5, tab 92. Paragraphs 17 to 18 are at page 1760. These are the facts that have been agreed by Floe and in our submission clearly show that Floe, certainly for the purposes of the Statement of Facts, accepted that there was a clear distinction between base transceiver stations and mobile stations and also accepted that GSM gateways were mobile stations.

- "17 A feature of a GSM system is that the role of mobile stations such as GSM gateways and base transceiver stations and the frequencies under which they operate are distinct ..."
- I do not need to go into the technicality.

"GSM gateways are expressly said to be mobile stations in contra-distinction to base transceiver stations."

The same distinction and acceptance applies throughout paragraph 18:

"18 The network of a mobile operator sends information to a mobile handset or a gateway device

which indicates the precise radio frequency to be used for transmission and also information which is needed by the device or handset to synchronize with the network. On the basis of information sent by the handset or device ...

[and that is obviously a gateway device]

"... to a base station ...

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[so the gateway device sends information to the base station]

"... instructions are sent by the base station to the handset or gateway device informing it of the power level it must use. Base station users are frequency hopping" [etc]. "... this procedure grants permission for the mobile handset or gateway device to start sending or receiving user information, for example, speech or data, to or from the base station."

On the basis of the agreed Statement of Facts GSM gateways are mobile stations and mobile stations are distinct from base transceiver stations. On that agreed basis, Floe's argument is again, we submit, hopeless.

One does not have to simply rely on that, what Mr Mercer might think is a forensic trick, because the technical position is set out in Dr Unger's second witness statement. Those are the paragraphs that I have already taken you to and asked you to read. Again the reference for your notes is Volume 1, tab 9, page 53. Dr Unger's expertise is explained in his first witness statement, which one finds at Bundle 1, tab 2, page 11. Floe has not produced any evidence whatsoever to counter that of Dr Unger.

The only argument that has been put forward today on behalf of Floe in relation to this part is that, whilst we have seen that Dr Unger justifies his classification of GSM gateway devices as mobile user stations by reference to the GSM standards they apply, Mr Mercer says that there are no references to those GSM standards in the relevant definitions in the licence, which we have

just looked at, to which our response is that that is irrelevant, because the expression "radio equipment", the expression "base transceiver station" must be given a meaning. Dr Unger has explained why the obvious meaning, at least to those with sufficient technical knowledge, is that a GSM gateway device is not a base transceiver station because it does not comply with the GSM standards set down for base transceiver stations.

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You have on one side the evidence of an expert with an explanation of why his approach is the correct one and, on the other hand, one has no evidence on behalf of Floe and indeed no suggested alternative criteria for deciding what is a base transceiver station and what is a mobile station. You are simply left with a void.

In our submission, faced with the evidence on one side and the absence of any evidence, or even explanation, on the other, Floe's argument has to fail on that part.

The punch line on this is that because a public GSM gateway device does not fall within the definition of "radio equipment" for the purposes of Vodafone Wireless Telegraphy Act licence, the licence does not authorise Vodafone to use public GSM gateway devices, even if Vodafone were the user of those devices.

At this stage can I pick up the second issue that the Tribunal identified this morning, which I suppose can probably be described as the estoppel issue. Let me put it this way.

Given that the decision proceeded on the basis that it might be possible for use of public GSM gateway devices to be authorised under Vodafone's licence, can OFCOM now go back on that? I appreciate the question is in relation to can OFCOM go back and Vodafone go back. I am dealing now with can OFCOM go back on that.

We say the answer is "yes", for three reasons.

The first point is this. The issue as to the scope of Vodafone's Wireless Telegraphy Act licence has arisen as a result of Floe's primary argument.

The second limb, as I have put it, is a pure point of law at its best. I appreciate that I have then gone on to rely on the evidence of Dr Unger but the point can be made without any further evidence because of the statement of facts. But even if that were a problem, the primary argument was only introduced as a result of an application by Floe to amend its notice of appeal. was Sir Christopher Bellamy who heard that application. He said it should be allowed in because it was a pure point of law. Of course, we have now discovered that we have had to have evidence and an Agreed Statement of Facts, but so be it. That is what has happened. also recognised that it was important that if the Tribunal was to be dealing with these legal issues, it should be dealing with the issues without one's hands tied behind its back. It would make no sense for a Tribunal, with a function such as this, to approach a legal question whilst deliberately being forced to turn a blind eye to an important part of the legal equation, ie it would make no sense to decide that if Floe succeeded on the first limb of its primary argument, one was going to assume that what it did was necessarily lawful without inquiring into whether it was in fact lawful. the first point.

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The second point is this. The decision itself proceeded on the basis that authorisation might be possible but found that the conditions for authorisation were not in fact fulfilled. This point about authorisation, I believe I am correct, was something that the Office raised rather than something that Floe put forward in the first instance. The Office spotted the point, dealt with it and found that even if authorisation was possible the conditions were not satisfied. Therefore what we have now is that, if we are allowed to raise the second limb of the primary argument, then there are no vested rights which Floe can claim which are affected by that change of position, because under the Decision it was not authorised because it did not fulfil

the conditions. What we are saying now is that it was not in fact possible for it to be authorised. But the effect on Floe's position in terms of vested rights is precisely the same. It cannot be authorised and it was not authorised, leading to the same result. Floe was acting unlawfully in operating public GSM gateways. One is not taking away anything which should have been vested in Floe as a result of the Decision.

The third point relates to the two authorities that the Tribunal very kindly provided copies of. The point in relation to those authorities is that cases on estoppel between private parties cannot bind a public body acting as a public body.

The doctrine of estoppel has a very limited role to play in public law. We are dealing with a regulatory authority performing its statutory function and one cannot take authorities which deal with estoppel by convention as between private parties and apply them to a public body.

I wish that I could give you references for those, but they are dealt with in leading textbooks.

THE CHAIRMAN: We can look at them tomorrow.

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MR HOSKINS: It is certainly something that I can look at overnight and bring the references.

For those three reasons we say that it is not just appropriate but probably necessary, because of the first reason I put forward, for the Tribunal to listen to the arguments and deal with the arguments that we put forward in relation to the second limb of the Primary Argument. If it is correct that OFCOM is entitled to take that position, Vodafone's position becomes irrelevant. Again, we are dealing with a challenge to the decision of a public body and if the public body is entitled to raise those arguments, then it makes little sense to go into it any further and inquire whether Vodafone can raise the point or not, because the point is before the Tribunal. But even in relation to Vodafone we would say that estoppel cannot apply so as to require a party to perform

a contract in an unlawful way. That is another important distinction between the contractual position between Vodafone and Floe in the present case and the contractual position in the two authorities, to which the Tribunal has referred us. There is no sense that estoppel was being relied on in order to impose an obligation on a private party to act in an unlawful way or for an unlawful purpose.

That completes all I wanted to say on the Primary Argument.

The next compartment I wanted to move on to was Floe's first alternative argument. If I can deal with that by reference to our skeleton argument, it is paragraphs 31 to 34.

Just to position us along the route map which I have set out, the question here, which is set out at the top of page 12, is:

"If Floe's Public GSM gateway devices were 'used' by Floe ...

[so I am presuming that Floe has lost the Primary argument, because it is its use we are now looking at]

"was such use authorised pursuant to Condition 8 of Floe's 1949 Act licence."

This is the point. This is the way in which the point was raised in the Decision itself.

Condition 8 of the licence I have set out in the skeleton. I do not think we need to turn it up. I have given the reference.

"The Licensee shall ensure that the Radio Equipment is operated in compliance with the terms of this Licence and is used only by persons who have been authorised in writing ...

[those are the crucial words]

...by the Licensee to do so and that such persons are made aware of, and of the requirements to comply with the terms of this Licence."

I say those are the crucial words, but, of course, there is no evidence at all to suggest that the requirement in

the latter part of Condition 8 was satisfied with either, ie that Vodafone made Floe aware of the licence and of the requirements to comply with the licence.

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Let us focus on the "authorised in writing" part.

There are two points which we make in response to this first alternative argument. The first is the one we have just been looking at. Because GSM gateway devices are not radio equipment within the meaning of Vodafone's Wireless Telegraphy Act licence their use by third parties cannot be authorised in writing by Vodafone. If the licence itself does not allow Vodafone to operate public GSM gateway devices, then Vodafone cannot authorise a third party under its licence to operate such devices.

The second argument is that, even if public GSM gateway did fall within the scope of Floe's 1949 Act licence, Vodafone did not in fact authorise Floe to operate such devices in accordance with Condition 8. That is because such authorisation would have had to be in writing. There are a number of points in relation to this.

Firstly, Floe does not allege that it has any such written authorisation. The highest that it puts its case on authorisation is that Vodafone 'tacitly' authorised the use of GSM gateways by Floe. The reference is footnote 25. It is the Amended Notice of Appeal Schedule 2 paragraph 1(b). That is the highest that Floe puts its case on authorisation. 'Tacit' authorisation is not express written authorisation.

Secondly - and I would like to change the reference here - rather than referring to paragraph 50 of the Decision. As indicated at paragraph 35 of the Statement of Facts - because obviously that is something that has been agreed by Floe - the actual agreement entered into between Vodafone and Floe makes no reference to GSM gateway services whatsoever. There is nothing in the written agreement between the parties referring to GSM gateway devices or GSM gateway services. That is agreed.

It is paragraph 35 of the statement of facts.

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The third point is that, although it is possible - an issue before the Tribunal - that certain Vodafone personnel may have been aware that Floe was using SIMs supplied by Vodafone in public GSM gateway equipment, such knowledge by certain Vodafone employees would not amount to written authorisation. I will come back to Vodafone's knowledge when I deal with objective justification, but just on this point, the fact that certain Vodafone employees may have known what the intended use of the services and SIMs was is not written authorisation.

The next point is that the agreement is said to represent the entire agreement between the parties, so if one were looking for written authorisation one would have expect it to be in the agreement. That is not the best point, because one can have an entire agreement and still have authorisation outside the agreement. That is why that is very much the last of the points made in the skeleton.

Just to deal with the way in which the point was put today in oral submissions by Mr Mercer, he argued that the authorisation to use public GSM gateways was implied by virtue of the fact that the agreement between Floe and Vodafone did not expressly exclude Floe operating public GSM gateway devices. It was not that they were expressly authorised, it was that they were expressly not precluded from providing such services using such devices. But that is not a correct construction of the contract. It is probably worth having a look at the contract at this stage. It is in Bundle 1, Tab 15. It is paragraph 8.1 of Schedule 6, which is at page 255. 8.1 says:

"Floe undertakes that its end users shall use the services in accordance with such conditions as may be notified in writing by Vodafone from time to time. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, Floe undertakes not to use the services and/or the equipment for any unlawful purpose. The

use of public GSM gateway devices was unlawful, therefore the contract expressly prohibits the use of Vodafone services and/or equipment in relation to public GSM gateway devices.

So there is an express prohibition in the contract of such use.

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For those reasons we say that the first alternative argument that Floe has put forward cannot succeed either. THE CHAIRMAN: The Business Plan did make clear that what was being or going to be used was the GSM gateway device. It also made clear it was for business. What do you think about the fact that the whole background to this agreement is the Business Plan - that is what we have got - and that that refers to the GSM gateway devices and therefore one must read this altogether. One cannot look at it in isolation with just the agreement.

MR HOSKINS: There are a number of points in relation to that.

First of all, the entire agreement clause does become relevant at that stage, because the purpose of the entire agreement clause is to preclude either of the parties from relying on the discussions that took place leading to the contract in order to insert provisions into the contract which are not there.

THE CHAIRMAN: Can that be right, because if everybody understands that what is going to be used is GSM gateways and the fact that there is an entire agreement clause cannot mean that this contract means you cannot use GSM gateways. That would make a nonsense. Lord Hopkins' analysis in the cases on construction of contracts I think indicates that that really is no longer a way that one can look at an entire agreement, or anything else.

MR HOSKINS: Let me put it this way. In a sense one chases one's tail, because one starts saying let us assume - because that is the assumption at the moment - that certain Vodafone employees were aware that Vodafone's SIMs and equipment would be used for public GSM gateway devices which were in fact unlawful. It may be that the

Vodafone employees dealing with it did not know at the time they were in fact unlawful. You then have a clause in the agreement saying that Floe must not do anything unlawful and indeed, if Floe ever came to try and enforce the contract in order to require Vodafone to provide services or equipment in order to allow Floe to provide public GSM gateway devices, the contract would be unenforceable on grounds of public policy. It could not be sued on.

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It does not really take Floe anywhere at the contractual level to rely on the Business Plan, because the bottom line is always going to be, whenever it came to enforce the contract it would not be able to do so because of public policy.

But there is another level to this, because that is the contractual position. Obviously it is important for the Tribunal to get to the bottom of the contractual position in order to decide what it has to decide, but what we must not forget is that this is not a contractual dispute. Floe could have sued Vodafone on the contract and it is perhaps not surprising that it did not. For the reason that I have just described it would not have got very far. What it chose to do was to make a Competition Act complaint.

I will come on to deal with objective justification, but the fact that certain Vodafone employees may have entered into this contract in the knowledge that (and I am just presuming that it is going to be that) a public GSM gateway device was going to be provided, does not answer the Competition point because it may be - we do not know because, of course Vodafone says it had no such knowledge - that the particular employees involved in the Commercial Department had no idea of the legality of public GSM gateway devices. Or may be they did? But what has happened in this case is that subsequently someone higher up the food chain, if I can put it like that, in Vodafone has spotted a problem. We have seen that in the evidence from Vodafone. It is very detailed

as to how they became aware of this problem and how they dealt with it. Once a company realizes, if this is the correct factual basis, that employees with authority to contract on its behalf have entered into unlawful contracts, the question is then, as a matter of Competition law, are they objectively justified in refusing to continue to supply the services under that contract for unlawful purposes? That is where we get to. I think it is important always to realize the split between the contractual position and the Competition position. We say, even if one looks at the contractual position, it does not get Floe anywhere. always come up against the barrier of public policy and in fact the more knowledge that Vodafone had of the intended use, probably the worse it is in terms of public policy.

That has finished the first alternative argument. My next matter is the community law arguments, but given the time I do not know if you want me to begin with that or not?

THE CHAIRMAN: Are you going to finish it?

MR HOSKINS: I can take it quite quickly, I think. It may take me 10 or 15 minutes, if you prefer to take the risk of a few more minutes.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

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MR HOSKINS: We have dealt in our defence and in our skeleton argument with compatibility with both the RTTE and the Authorisation Directive.

Given the nature of the submissions this morning, I do not intend to say anything specific about the Authorisation Directive, unless the Tribunal wants me to do so, but I will deal with the RTTE Directive first and tomorrow morning, if the Tribunal wants to hear how we say the Authorisation Directive fits, I will be happy to do that. I want to focus on the RTTE Directive, because that has been the focus of the attack.

The Directive is in Bundle 3 at Tab 59. The issue which has been raised before the Tribunal is that the

RTTE Directive is to do with equipment and nothing else. Our submission is that, yes, it is primarily concerned as equipment, but certain aspects of the RTTE Directive also concern the use to which such equipment may be put.

If I can set the scene for the Directive by looking at some of the recitals in the preamble.

At page 1079, Recital 21, one sees the focus being on equipment.

"Whereas I accept the degradation of service to persons other than the user of radio equipment and telecommunications terminal equipment should be prevented, whereas manufacturers of terminal should construct equipment in a way which prevents networks from suffering harm which results in such degradation when used in normal working conditions" etc.

It is all about the construction of equipment, the construction of networks.

Then 22:

"Whereas effective use of the radio spectrum should be ensured so as to avoid harmful interference ... [so it is use of the radio spectrum]

... whereas the most efficient possible use, according to the state of the art and limited resources, such as the radio frequency spectrum, should be encouraged."

So it is also to do with use of available spectrum.

Recital 27, over the page, explains the role of essential requirements:

"Whereas it is in the public interest to have harmonised standards at European level in connection with the design and manufacture.

[So again very much focusing on that aspect of radio equipment and telecommunications terminal equipment]

"Whereas compliance with such harmonised standards gives rise to a presumption of conformity to the essential requirements, whereas other means of demonstrating conformity to the essential

requirements are permitted."

Then 32:

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"Whereas radio equipment and telecommunications terminal equipment which complies with the relevant essential requirements should be permitted to circulate freely."

[so there is the Free Movement of Goods provision]

"Where such equipment should be permitted to be put into service for its intended purpose, whereas the putting into service may be subject to authorisations on the use of the radio spectrum and the provision of the service concerned."

That is very important, because obviously the Treaty has various fundamental freedoms. One is the free movement of goods, another is the freedom to provide services. The RTTE Directive is primarily concerned with free movement of goods. The Authorisation Directive is primarily concerned with freedom to provide services. But what Recital 32 shows us is that the RTTE Directive is also to a certain extent concerned with the provision of particular types of services. It is not purely about construction and manufacture of equipment. It is also about the use to which it is put. It is also about provisions of service using that equipment.

We can make that good by looking at the substantive Articles of the Directive. One can see it immediately in Article 1.

"This Directive establishes a regulatory framework for the placing on the market free movement and putting into service in the community of radio equipment."

So you already have the distinction between placing on the market of equipment and putting into service of equipment.

Article 2 has various definitions. I do not think I need to look at that in any detail.

Article 3 deals with the essential requirements. Equipment must comply with the essential requirements in

order to be able to be put on the market, etc.

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Article 5 deals with harmonised standards, because the essential requirements are, for example, "radio equipment shall be so constructed that it effectively uses the spectrum", etc. What 5 does is to provide for harmonised standards to be created at community level. As we have seen from the Recitals, if equipment complies with the harmonised standards it is assumed to comply with the essential requirements. That is the way the mechanism works.

Then crucially Article 6 and Article 7. One can see the distinction immediately that I highlighted in relation to Article 1. Article 6 is entitled "Placing on the Market. Article 7, which must relate to something else, is entitled "Putting into service and right to connect".

Article 6 is when one has manufactured the equipment, one wants to sell it. One wants to place it on the market. What Article 6(1) tells us is:

"Member states shall ensure that apparatus is placed on the market only if it complies with the appropriate essential requirements identified in Article 3 and the other relevant provisions of this Directive when it is properly installed and maintained and used for its intended purpose. It shall not be subject to further national provisions in respect of placing on the market."

So that is when you sell your equipment. You have manufactured it and you sell it.

Article 7 is about what happens next, because what we say is the putting into service means the use to which the equipment is put.

"Member States shall allow the putting into service of apparatus for its intended purpose where it complies with the appropriate essential requirements identified in Article 3 and the other relevant provisions of this Directive."

That is a general obligation on the Member States to

allow them to put into service.

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However, Article 7(2) is a derogation from that:
"Notwithstanding paragraph (1) and without prejudice
to conditions attached to authorisations for the
provision of the service concerned in community law,
Member States may restrict ...

[so not necessarily prohibit but restrict]

... the putting into service of radio equipment only for reasons related to the effect of inappropriate use of the radio spectrum, avoidance of harmful interference and matters relating to public health."

One has a situation where equipment has been placed on the market and what the Member State is entitled to do is to place restrictions on the putting into service, ie the use of that equipment.

That is precisely what the United Kingdom has done. There is no prohibition on the placing on the market of GSM gateway devices. However, there is a restriction upon the putting into service of such devices and that restriction is contained in Regulation 4(2). So no restriction on placing on the market. You can sell GSM gateway devices. However, a restriction on putting them into service, ie the use to which they are put.

If I can deal very briefly with the fourth question, because that relates to the RTTE Directive and then I shall stop for the night.

The fourth question is whether there had been an evaluation at the time when the 2003 Exemption Regulations were adopted of the impact of public GSM gateway devices on use of the spectrum.

There was no formal evaluation. It was obviously something that was considered as a technical aspect by those responsible for implementing the legislation. There was no formal investigation. But there was no need, as a matter of community law, to conduct an investigation before a Member State exercised the powers under Article 7(2). It could have been possible for the Directive to be drafted so as to say there is a power of

derogation, but a Member State may not exercise it, unless it has first carried out an impact assessment or something of that sort. But the Directive does not say that. What a Member State is entitled to do is to take a view on the basis of presumably technical expertise from its technical advisers as to whether it is necessary to invoke the exception or not. That is what the United Kingdom chose to do.

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The basis upon which it decided to exercise the 7(2) restriction is irrelevant for purposes of community law. The only question is whether it was entitled to exercise the 7(2) exception - ie do public GSM gateways have a problem for efficient use of spectrum. In relation to that, there is no dispute before this Tribunal, because Floe has never contested the fact that public GSM gateway gateways cause harmful interference and are an inefficient use of the radio spectrum. In relation to the last point that comes out clearly from paragraph 11 of the statement of facts, which is Bundle 5 tab 92, page 1759. It is the first sentence of paragraph 11:

"A public GSM gateway is likely to generate more traffic than a private GSM gateway and can cause congestion by concentrating significant volumes of traffic in a particular cell site and at particular times of day".

There is no dispute before the Tribunal that the basis for the United Kingdom invoking or relying on Article 7(2) is fulfilled, ie it was necessary to impose restrictions related to the effective and appropriate use of the radio spectrum.

THE CHAIRMAN: What you would say is, if you go back to 7(2) it is only for reasons related to, and you say that the reasons are admitted in the Statement of Facts and that is an end of it?

MR HOSKINS: Precisely. The fact that we have or have not carried out particular problems of investigation is irrelevant as a matter of community law to whether the United Kingdom was able to rely on Article 7(2). As a

matter of community law the only question is, are there reasons related to the question of appropriate use of the spectrum which justify the UK invoking Article 7(2) and, yes, my point, as you have just put it back to me, is there is no dispute before this Tribunal that the UK was so entitled.

That is all I wanted to say on the RTTE Directive. I am quite happy to stop there.

THE CHAIRMAN: That is probably a convenient place to stop.

Can I ask you, in relation to the estoppel argument, do you think that you could make good your submissions in relation to public authority, because what concerns me is the principles of legitimate expectation, proportionality and that sort of thing. I would like to hear your submissions as to why this case clearly falls within the public authority and no estoppel rather than a more general and flexible area.

MR HOSKINS: Certainly.

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THE CHAIRMAN: 10.30 tomorrow morning.

MR IVORY: Madam, at the risk of detaining you for more than 30 seconds, can I mention where we have got to on confidentiality?

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

MR IVORY: The position is, as I understand it, that it is simply to do with the number of documents referring to prices and rates, which may be commercially sensitive as between my client and the second intervener. That is what confidentiality is about.

Madam, what we propose to do is to overnight produce a list of the documents in question and we will seek to mask the references to the sensitive issues like prices.

It does not seem to have caused a problem so far. The relevant documents I understand T-Mobile have not got.

THE CHAIRMAN: But of course there may be things in the relevant documents that T-Mobile would like to see, which are not to do with that, because the documents are numbers of pages, some of them.

MR IVORY: Indeed. That is why we have produced redacted

1		documents and simply mask the sensitive areas. It does
2		not seem to have caused a problem in practice so far, but
3		that is what we propose to do.
4	THE	CHAIRMAN: Is that convenient to T-Mobile? Do you want a
5		time limit on that? I do not know whether these
6		documents are relevant to your submissions? They
7		probably are not.
8	MR	PICKFORD: As I understood the matter, I thought we were
9		going to get those tomorrow morning, but that is fine by
10		us.
11	MR	IVORY: Indeed, Madam. That is what we envisage.
12	THE	CHAIRMAN: Excellent. I am pleased that got resolved.
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14		(Adjourned until 10.30 am tomorrow morning)
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