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IN THE COMPETITION APPEAL TRIBUNAL

AND IN THE MATTER OF A NOTIFICATION UNDER SECTION 94 OF THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT 2003

Competition Appeal Tribunal
Victoria House
Bloomsbury Place
LONDON

Wednesday, 5 May 2004

Before:

THE PRESIDENT, SIR CHRISTOPHER BELLAMY
(CHAIRMAN)

MS MARION SIMMONS QC

MS ANN KELLY

BETWEEN:

BRITISH TELECOMMUNICATIONS PLC

Appellant

-and-

THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS

Respondent

Together with

THUS PLC AND BROADSYSTEM VENTURES LIMITED

-and-

NJ ASSOCIATES

Intervenors

MR GERALD BARLING QC and MS SARAH LEA (instructed by BT Legal Department) appeared for the Appellant.

MS ELEANOR SHARPSTON QC and MR JOHN O' FLAHERTY (instructed by OFCOM) appeared for the Respondent.

MR JOHN EDWARDS (Solicitor) and MS NUSRAT ZAR of Messrs Herbert Smith appeared for the Intervenors THUS PLC and BVL.

(Transcribed from the Shorthand Notes of Harry Counsell & Co, Cliffords Inn, Fetter Lane, London, EC4A 1LD. Telephone 020 7269 0370 Facsimile 020 7831 2526)

PROCEEDINGS - DAY 1

THE CHAIRMAN: Good morning Mr Barling.

MR BARLING: Good morning. May it please the Tribunal, as I think you know, I appear with Ms Sarah Lea for the Appellants, BT; Ms Eleanor Sharpson QC and Mr John Flaherty appear for the regulator, OFCOM, and Mr John edwards of Herbert Smith for the interveners THUS and BVL. As far as I am aware, Mr Jones does not appear, but I hope I am right in saying that.

THE CHAIRMAN: Before you start, I wonder if I could just say a couple of things. First of all, we are very grateful to the parties for their further comments on section 94 and following of the Act and how that works. When we had raised the point on the previous occasion, Ms Simmons in particular raised the point, we were not then aware that the very same point had actually been raised in the course of the Parliamentary passage of the Bill.

MR BARLING: Yes.

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THE CHAIRMAN: However, we feel at the moment, for the purposes of today at least, we can park that whole point, because what we want to do is to get on with the substantive issues, as I think you know.

MR BARLING: I am grateful

THE CHAIRMAN: What I would like to do is to just, if I may, tell you where I am as it were personally, on the legislative history of what we are considering, so you can put me right - and I have no idea where this takes one. originally, we had the 1997 Interconnection Directive which ---

MR BARLING: Which the Tribunal is familiar with, for certain reasons.

THE CHAIRMAN: Which I have had occasion to become familiar with, which, at least in general terms, was predominantly concerned with operator to operator relationships, and the whole question of inter-operability between network operators.

MR BARLING: Indeed.

THE CHAIRMAN: And that was the subject of an eminent

judgment by another tribunal here. It then appears that in Directive 98/61/EC, which is at tab 10 to your file of Directives, Carrier Pre-selection was sort of bolted on to the Interconnection Directive.

MR BARLING: Along with number portability.

THE CHAIRMAN: Along with number portability, which in fact surfaces in the Interconnection Directive to some extent, I think, in one of the later Articles. So to that extent one can say that there was some perceived association between interconnection and carrier Pre-selection and number portability.

MR BARLING: Yes.

THE CHAIRMAN: We then get to the 2002 package of Directives, in which again matters bifocate to some extent. You have the Access Directive, which is what we are here concerned with, particularly the fact that network access, presumably for the purpose of that Directive, is now defined statutorily in section 151 of the Act and General Condition GC1.4.

MR BARLING: Yes.

THE CHAIRMAN: But Carrier Pre-selection is now not dealt with in the Access Directive but is dealt with, so far as I can see, in the Universal Service Directive at Article 19, or it seems to come up in Article 19.

MR BARLING: Quite so, yes.

THE CHAIRMAN: Of the Universal Service Directive.

MR BARLING: One can see the logic of that because the Universal Service Directive is dealing to a great extent with what the end users need to have as a minimum set of

THE CHAIRMAN: Correct, but Article 19(2) of the Universal Service Directive (which may or may not be relevant) refers to what it calls "user requirements" for the carrier selection procedure - "... shall be assessed in accordance with the market analysis procedure laid down in the Framework Directive and implemented in Article 12 of the Access Directive ... ", which takes one back to the Access Directive.

MR BARLING: Yes.

THE CHAIRMAN: Where that takes one I am not quite sure, but that is the statutory framework insofar as I have so far understood it.

MR BARLING: That is extremely helpful to know. I was, obviously, going to take the tribunal to those provisions, and you have anticipated me.

THE CHAIRMAN: That also raises the question, which is probably fairly central to the case, which is whether the information that we are talking about here is provided before, during or after the process of negotiating network access as now defined in the Act. One question, I suppose, is whether this idea of network access as defined means or includes particular circumstances in which particular customers want to change apparatus, or whether we are in a situation in which network access is limited to arrangements between operators that amount to interconnection or the use of other services or facilities, but that once such network access is in place, anything that happens after that which has a sufficient nexus with that, is covered by GC1.2 as something that has happened after the process of negotiating it and is therefore covered by the confidentiality provisions.

MR BARLING: Certainly, that is a question that arises. We would say that the answer to the second part of the question is that, quite clearly, the access in this context does not include access by end users, such as might be said to occur when you have CPS.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

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MR BARLING: We rely for that upon the whole framework as explained in our skeleton argument, but if one wants to focus in on one very clear provision, it would be Article 1(2) of the Access Directive which says in terms "Access in this Directive does not refer to access by end users".

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

MR BARLING: When one looks at the preamble one can see why that should be, it is just dealing with the relationship, and access by one network operator to the facilities of another, that kind of access.

- THE CHAIRMAN: Even if that were right, would it not leave open the possibility that Article 4(3) should be given a wide enough interpretation as to, as it were, put a cloak of confidentiality over everything that is supposedly confidential and which happens after the access has been put in place.
- MR BARLING: That is the argument that OFCOM raises. We say it is fundamentally wrong and can be seen, clearly, to be fundamentally wrong, because it ignores, apart from anything else, the words of GC1.2 and, in particular, the information which is protected by GC1.2 must be acquired in confidence but also in connection with and solely for the purpose of negotiations relating to interconnection or access.
- 15 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

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- 16 MR BARLING: We submit that that meaning is also to be
 17 derived, as it was derived by Oftel when they implemented
 18 it from Article 4.3 of the Access Directive.
- 19 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.
- 20 MR BARLING: Sir, you have homed in on the crucial, vital 21 issue in the proceedings which is: is this the kind of information - that is the customer identification 22 information which goes in day in, day out, simply as part 23 of the day to day CPS service - something which vis 24 within the scope of protection of Article 4.3 and/or 25 GC1.2? we, as you know, submit emphatically that it is 26 2.7 not referring to that, for a whole host of reasons, which we say are extremely compelling. 28
- 29 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.
- 30 MR BARLING: Sir, I entirely accept that you have, in a very focused way, isolated the real issue.
- 32 THE CHAIRMAN: I did not want to take you out of your stride, 33 Mr Barling.
- 34 | THE CHAIRMAN: Not at all, it is helpful.
- 35 THE CHAIRMAN: That is all that we wanted to say at the beginning.
- 37 MR BARLING: It is helpful to know where the Tribunal has 38 got to. If I may just deal with a bit of housekeeping to 39 begin with, I do apologise that you have got quite a few

bundles. Inevitably, when things are referred to, however tangentially, in the course of skeletons or pleadings, they tend to get put in a bundle, so we may not need to trouble you with everything in those bundles - I very much hope not, in fact, but they are there.

There is also a short further witness statement from Mr David Moulson of BT. I do not inviter you to read it now because I will come to it in context.

THE CHAIRMAN: It has been served on the other parties, has it?

MR BARLING: It has been served this morning. I am afraid it was only produced yesterday.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

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 MR BARLING: It really relates to a factual assertion in the interveners' skeleton argument - which we received on Friday, and then with the intervening Bank holiday, the relevant people were not able to be collared until yesterday to deal with it. It is just dealing with a short matter and, as I say, I will come to it in due course.

Also, you should have now a small clip of extracts from some consultation papers relating to the introduction of General Condition 1.2.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

MR BARLING: Again, if I may, I will deal with those in due course, but just so that you know what they are.

The main issue is, of course, does GC1.2 apply to prevent "save" activity, and I leave aside for the moment what precisely is encompassed in OFCOM's idea of save activity, because there are areas of considerable doubt about what they say we can and cannot do. Leaving that on one side, that is the question, and that question involves deciding whether 1.2 applies to and constrains BT's use of this customer ID information, which is provided to BT via the gaining operator. It may be that it is convenient to arrive at a sort of shorthand, otherwise we are going to be using lots of different expressions for these. I have tended to call the gaining operator the CPSO, the Carrier Pre-selection Operator, so

if I do lapse into that shorthand, the Tribunal knows what I mean.

Sir, this information comes to BT via, at the moment, the gaining CPSO under the CPS transfer process. That is the question: does GC1.2 apply to it?

We are now, so far as we are aware, safe in saying that the parties are ad idem in asking the Tribunal to resolve this issue of interpretation and, indeed, application of GC1.2 without, directly at any rate, having to resolve the interesting question of the nature of the decision appealed against.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

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- MR BARLING: Both types of decisions which are candidates require OFCOM to interpret GC1.2.
- THE CHAIRMAN: If you were to win on construction you would no longer have reasonable grounds.
- MR BARLING: Exactly. Those subsidiary issues you are happy to park, as you have said, and I know you have seen our short paper on the interrelation between sections 94 and 96. Also, I rather assumed that what you said, sir, applies to some extent to the "winback" points.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

- MR BARLING: We have, as you seen, filed a separate argument on the winback issue: whether and to what extent the notification covers it. There is not much to add to what we have said in our skeleton on that, and perhaps I can come to that at the very end of my submissions.
- THE CHAIRMAN: I think we will treat that as parked as well, until we signal to the contrary.
- MR BARLING: I am grateful. We have also put something in on transferable products, which was a question you specifically raised at the CMC.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

MR BARLING: May I therefore turn to the crunch question and make a few introductory remarks before delving a little further into the issue. We submit that OFCOM and the Interveners have fallen very badly into error in arguing that this condition has anything to do with the data as to customer ID. The Interveners, one understands, have

an interest in arguing that it does have something to do with it, because if the arguments succeed, they will have achieved a major competitive advantage over BT, an advantage resulting directly from a change of process agreed to by BT in August 2002, at the request of the industry (if I can put it broadly) CPSOs in particular. It was requested in order to make the transfer process less cumbersome. Sir, I do not know to what extent the tribunal has had an opportunity to read the evidence, but Mr Steggles, in his first statement ---

THE CHAIRMAN: If you just give us the references, that is probably sufficient.

MR BARLING: Mr Steggles' first witness statement at paragraph 45 onwards explains how the change to what has been called the reply Slip System came about, and the reasons for it.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

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 MR BARLING: BT agreed to that change reluctantly, to some extent because it removed the only requirement for a customer's signature which most people in the industry feel more comfortable about, and certainly it is a standard feature of an ordering system for this kind of service in other jurisdictions (as we understand it). The customer basically signed his reply slip and sent it back to BT, so there was a direct authorization.

BT was willing to agree to this change of process because there would still remain the notification letter sent to the customer by the loser (in this case BT) and there was still the "save" call that BT tended to make when it received notification from its customer that it wanted to change. Can I just, for the Tribunal's notes, ask you to glance at Mr Steggles' first witness statement, paragraph 48, in relation to that and why BT was happy to agree.

No one at any time, until this notification or the immediate preamble to the notification, suggested that this change from a direct notification by the customer to BT to an indirect notification, would or might cause a profound change in the characterisation of the ID

information in question. If OFCOM is correct and the Interveners are correct, an apparently innocent change of process agreed to to help both CPSOs and customers - in other words to streamline the transfer process - suddenly and by a magical process akin to alchemy has rendered the ID of the BT customer in question the subject of stringent confidentiality obligations and a whole panoply of GC1.2 protection for it. Suddenly, the information which a BT customer was always and is still quite happy for BT to receive and used to send directly to BT, and which BT was admittedly quite legally free to use if it received it in that way, suddenly becomes valuable commercial information.

THE CHAIRMAN: It does apply to everybody though.

MR BARLING: Yes, it does.

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 THE CHAIRMAN: If one changes from one mobile operator to another, say.

MR BARLING: Mobile we have to be a bit cautious about because although there is of course a transfer process, I am not sure precisely what the exact process is. (Mr Barling takes instructions). So far as mobile is concerned, the transfer position is that you have to get what is called a PACT number from your existing supplier before you can begin the process, so it is in a sense even more that you tell your existing supplier than it was under the reply Card system for fixed line arrangements. We can look into that a bit more if you would find it helpful.

THE CHAIRMAN: It might be interesting at some stage to understand how this works on an industry-wide basis.

R BARLING: I think the trouble is, sir, that there are these end to end processes negotiated on an industry-wide basis, but they tend to be focused on particular types of product, so there is one end to end process for CPS on fixed line, there is one for wholesale line rental, when you want to transfer the actual line operation. So there are quite different arrangements for each of these products, it is the way it has happened. One will not find, as it were, necessary harmony in all respects.

- MS SIMMONS: Forget about mobile, in an ordinary land line situation, if the customer was no longer a BT customer because he has moved to Smith line ---
- MR BARLING: So he is not a line rental customer.

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- MS SIMMONS: He has done whatever happens here, so he has become a customer of somebody else.
- MR BARLING: If he has done whatever happens here then he is still probably a BT line customer, and he may also have some calls through BT because it depends which CPS option he has chosen. If he has chosen the all calls option, then he will not have any calls through BT other than emergency and one or two others.
- MS SIMMONS: So in so far as he is not the customer of BT, he is the customer of Smith.
- MR BARLING: Yes, he gets a bill from both.
- MS SIMMONS: Then he decides that he is going to change from Smith to Jones. That is the situation where I am interested in what happens, because he is not then a BT customer in that sense, therefore what happens in relation to the information? You may want to park it.
- MR BARLING: No, I can answer it. In those circumstances the information comes to BT as the access operator because BT will have to facilitate the transfer from smith to Jones in its exchanges, but there will not be any question of any "save" activity because they are simply moving from one CPSO to another, other than BT. The issue with which we are concerned ----
- THE CHAIRMAN: No save activity on the part of BT, but possibly save activity on the part of Smith, which would be, presumably, prevented by the General Condition.
- MR BARLING: There is a big question over that, in the way in which it has been said to cover this information, whether it would because there may be no interconnection agreement, there may be no negotiations or anything of that kind between Smith and Jones. They only have to individually have interconnection agreements with BT, and in many cases they will not have any negotiation between themselves or, indeed, any agreement. That is the example that Mr Steggles has given in his witness

statement and which we say, in a sense, gives the lie to the type of information in question, the ID information, in relation to CPS being anything to do with GC1.2.

MS SIMMONS: But it does mean that BT is in a better position when you are still a BT customer than Smith in my example, who would not get that information and therefore ---

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- MR BARLING: No, Smith will get the information. He will get it from BT. BT is the access operator who receives the information and BT will pass the information to the losing operator, and the losing operator will then use it, if allowed to do so, depending on how the Tribunal interprets this condition. So the losing operator will be in exactly the same position, whether he is BT or another loser.
- THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, Mr Barling, you have told us about the background now.
- MR BARLING: I am still going through it a little bit, if I may. We would say, therefore, that because of the alchemy point, if you like, the fortuitous nature that this change, done for wholly unrelated reasons, suddenly produces that surprising result, is an indication as it were that OFCOM's arguments are not likely to be correct because it is, we submit, an absurd result.

 Confidentiality and the possibility of severe fines ought not to arise as a result of an entirely unconnected change of procedure, because the reply slip was dropped.

Again, looking at it with an overview, why is OFCOM's argument wrong? Well, there is a host of reasons, but just listing the main ones, one can approach it in a number of different ways. In reality, this information is not acquired from the CPSO, it has historically been sent by the customer to BT. On occasions, even under the reply slip system, the new operator would get the signature and then offer to send the card to BT, in which case he is effectively a postman for the customer. That is precisely what we say the position is now, now that the reply slip has fallen into disuse. The information comes from the customer via the

CPSO; the nature of the information is that it is not acquired in connection with negotiations for access or interconnection; and, thirdly, it is not acquired in confidence. All these points are related in a sense, it is difficult to completely separate them out.

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Dealing with the first one, that it is not awkward from the CPSO, we rely upon, obviously, the incidental change of process as not making any difference. The origins of CPS are also extremely important here and, sir, you have indicated the origins of GC1.2 and we also place some emphasis on the origins of CPS in contrast to that. From the very beginning it was something which affected the retail relationship between BT and its customer. The retail customer, from the very beginning, was required to request this service from BT; it was a service provided by BT.

I am still in a bit of a preamble, but it would save time later if I could just at this point show you the passage you referred to in the amended interconnection Directive. The old one (unamended) is at tab 9, the new bit that was inserted to do with number portability, as you said, is at tab 10 and there was a new sub-paragraph 7 added to Article 12. There are two points really to note about this. It related to organisations which had significant market power (SMP), they had "... to enable their subscribers ..." - so it had to be something that they enabled their subscribers to do - "... to access the services of any interconnected provider ... " Then it goes on to say: "National regulatory authorities shall ensure that pricing ... related to the provision of [this] is cost orientated and that direct charges to consumers ... do not act as a disincentive ... " Obviously, the fear of the Council in this case was that those who already had the customers might well try and charge their customers too much for providing this facility so that they could go elsewhere for calls. So there was a restriction on direct charges.

So it is quite clear that what was envisaged here was a service being provided by BT, by the existing

supplier, to its subscribers. If one goes on ---

THE CHAIRMAN: Just before you do that, when we read the words "pricing for ... interconnection related to the provision of this facility ..." what is comprised in interconnection there?

MR BARLING: My understanding of this is that what the Council is saying is that there are charges both to the new supplier - so the person who wants to take BT's customer is also going to be charged something because --

THE CHAIRMAN: What is he going to be charged for?

MR BARLING: He is going to be charged for a certain amount of carriage because, inevitably, there will be the set-up charges - to set up the interconnection between the trio systems - there will be carriage charges of calls and so on. Of course, the interconnection agreement relates to those.

THE CHAIRMAN: Will they not be there already?

MR BARLING: They may be, they may well be, but of course this is one size fits all legislation, so there are parts of the Community which are more developed than other parts.

THE CHAIRMAN: Assuming that there is an interconnection agreement in place already, what is the additional element that could give rise to a charge to the new operator?

MR BARLING: I would suspect - and I will be corrected if I am wrong - that it is carriage, call origination chargees - heads are nodding. You see when the new operator has taken over the customer, they will still be relying (unless there is some change of line rental) upon BT to carry the calls at least to the point of interconnection between the two networks. So the main ongoing charges will be wholesale carriage charges.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

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 MR BARLING: Those charges will not be seen in a BT bill to the customer anomer, all the customer will see from BT is the rental for the line assuming all calls have gone through other operators, but those charges will be

carried through into the new operator's charges t,o the customer.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

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 MR BARLING: So this is dealing with two sorts of pricing, it is saying so far as you charge the new operator, those cost charges must be cost-orientated. So far as you charge for your service that you are providing your customer, direct charges to customers must not be a disincentive.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

MR BARLING: That was effectively carried through into condition 50A, and if you would be kind enough just to turn to tab 13 and turn over one page You should see 50A.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

MR BARLING: Of course, this was in force at the time of ctge notification, so on 7 November when notification was made, this was the relevant condition in BT's licence.

It had been continued by a continuation notice beyond 25 July 2003 date when all such conditions were supposed to be reviewed.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

MR BARLING: I am showing you this now just to make the point that one sees in 50A.1 reelecting what we have just seen in article 12(7).

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

MR BARLING: "The Licensee shall provide Carrier Preselection in accordance with the Carrier Preselection functional specification which does not involve Autodiallers to any of its subscribers who notify the Licensee in writing that they require it to provide Carrier Pre-selection ..."

Then going down to 50A.3 you see the reference to direct charges again and so on.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

MR BARLING: Can I also, while we are here, ask you to turn over the page and look at 50A.11 at the very bottom of the last page? "If requested in writing by the Director, the Licensee shall provide to the Director a record of each subscriber in relation to which it is providing

Carrier Pre-selection." So that is how that was done.

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Then under the current system the corresponding provisions are Article 19 of the Universal Service Directive (who you have already referred us to) in tab 8. We perhaps do not need to go to it again, but we can, there are very similar provisions to what was in Article 12(7). Condition AA8.1 which is what has replaced 50A, for your reference, is in OFCOM's documents at tab 30.

Sir, without going to those one can see that there is a retail relationship in relation to this, there is a relationship between BT and its customers for the provision of CPS, and it was always envisaged from the very outset that it was going to be requested by a customer of BT. It is not information about the CPS operator that we are dealing with here, despite the attempt by OFCOM in their skeleton to say that really there is a bundle of information that vis being transferred, it is both about the CPS operator and the customer. With respect, it is not, the only thing that is relevant to "save" activity is the information relating to who is our customer, which of our customers. The customer wants and indeed needs BT to have this information, because it has to make a request.

May I, at this point, just introduce the new witness statement and deal very briefly with the points arising out of that?

THE CHAIRMAN: Is there any objection to this statement? (There were no objections).

MR BARLING: We noted in the skeleton lodged on behalf of THUS and BVL (the Interveners) at paragraph 25, the very last sentence of that paragraph, they say: "In the old reply Card system the information would still not be lawfully received by BT Retail for such a purpose since the Reply Card went only to BT Wholesale." That is what the statement deals with. That is completely wrong; we do not know where they have got that from and Mr Moulson deals with that.

THE CHAIRMAN: He says the reply Card went to BT Retail.

MR BARLING: If I can just ask the tribunal to glance at

that, it will probably be quicker than my reading it. It is quite important, in any event, to see what happens. (Pause for reading).

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

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38 39 MR BARLING: It has always been made quite plain that what was being done in the reply statement was a variation of the retail relationship, and that is exactly the wording that the industry agreed to - you can see that from the quote in paragraph 6 of the witness statement. That is from 3.4.1 the end to end process, and I will probably have to take you to the end to end process at some point; it is very much about the retail relationship.

Sir, we say that this information is not acquired from the CPSO in the sense in which Article 4(3) and GC1.2 is saying.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

BARLING: As to the question of it being acquired in connection with negotiations for access and interconnection, it is extremely important again to bear in mind how CPS evolved and the separate evolution of the interconnect and access arrangements. I will point up issues that we have made in our skeleton argument in a few minutes, but the conclusion and the submission that we make about it is that CPS transfer to a retail customer is a separate and distinct process from the relationship negotiated between interconnected operators. No one is saying that there is not an association, of course there is, because without the concept of interconnection you are not going to be able to have CPS. so in an Adam and Eve sense there is of course an association, but in terms of GC1.2 it vis simply not what is being talked about, the downstream, if you like, day to day multiple transfers that take place to make CPS work.

THE CHAIRMAN: That is perhaps not a bad way of looking at it, how far downstream does GC1.2 go?

MR BARLING: Yes. We say there are a lot of clues: one has got the in confidence, one has got the in connection with and solely for the purpose of negotiations relating to

these various matters, and one can see when one sees one or two of the other documents that I want to show you, that that was precisely how it was always understood, even by the regulator until very recently.

On the other hand, 4(3) and 1.2 applies to the information provided by one operator to another in order to forge the interconnection or access relationship.

 as you will have seen, OFCOM do not like the wording of 1.2, even though that there was (if I can lump them together with their predecessor Oftel) the way they interpreted Article 4(3). We submit they got it exactly right; so far as the wording differs from article 4(3), it only differs in such a way as to draw out the true meaning of article 4(3). Now they want to turn their back on it, they are very keen to disown as much as they decently can the wording of GC1.2, even though that is what we are being prosecuted under, and go back to what they regard, wrongly in our submission, as the more benign (from their point of view) wording of Article 4(3).

They say that they are not doing that, but if one can just glance for a moment at their skeleton at paragraph 115, they say: "Contrary to BT's submissions, ofcom does not seek to rely principally on article 4(3) ... or to rely upon Article 4(3) 'rather than' or 'in substitution for' GC 1.2, so as to impose obligations on BT."

THE CHAIRMAN: They rely upon Mar Leasing to interpret it.

MR BARLING: Yes. Then all is fine, one might sat, but then you go to paragraph 136 of the skeleton: "To the extent that it is necessary to do so, OFCOM relies on the broader wording of the directive as an aid to the proper construction ..." but then say "We do not need to rely upon it" - this is in connection with the words "in connection with and solely for the purpose of such negotiations ..." which they do not like now.

Similarly, at paragraph 146 they say: "However, should it be necessary, OFCOM relies on the fact that the text of article 4(3) does not require the information to

be acquired in connection with the negotiations ..." They are trying to say now that the wording of their own condition should be ignored if necessary in order to get the conviction. This is not only a rather strange approach by the regulator, we submit, to their own condition which, as we shall see in a moment, they said they had very carefully and closely adapted to Article 4(3), but it is also wrong in law, for reasons which we have explained in the skeleton and which I will touch on again, because they have turned on its head the correct legal principle. The correct legal principle is that yes, you apply Mar Leasing, but if it comes to a stage where you need to rely upon the words of the Directive rather than the words of the national implementing rules in order to impose greater obligations, let alone criminal penalties or quasi-criminal penalties, of a potentially huge kind as here, 10% of turnover, if it comes to that then you cannot do it, and they are seeking to do it. We say that they are completely wrong in any event because the wording of article 4(3) and GC 1.2 are perfectly sympathetic to each other and all that GC1.2 does is to draw out the correct meaning of 4.3.

THE CHAIRMAN: Just unpacking that point for a moment, GC1.2 is implementing a Directive. Implementation of Directives leaves a certain amount of scope to the member state as to the means of implementation. As far as the tribunal is concerned, presumably our starting point is the actual wording of 1.2, that is what you have been accused of contravening.

MR BARLING: Yes, and that is all we can be accused of.

THE CHAIRMAN: That is all you can bed accused of contravening, you cannot be accused - I am now thinking aloud but it is probably better that I do so that everybody knows what the points are - of directly contravening the Directive because the implementation of the Directive is in GC 1.2.

MR BARLING: Yes.

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THE CHAIRMAN: In order to work out what the meaning of GC1.2 is, we can presumably have recourse to the Directive in

order to understand it and, in so far as there is room for more than one meaning, presumably we can rely *Mar Leasing* to interpret 1.2 in the sense intended by the Directive.

MR BARLING: Yes, but with a caveat though.

THE CHAIRMAN: There is, presumAbly, a limit to how far you can go with that, in other words you cannot, one might argue and I think you submit, by the *Mar Leasing* route as it were either rewrite or write out or as it were strike out what is in 1.2 by an interpretation mechanism because, at the end of the day, it is 1.2 that is being contravened, not the Directive.

MR BARLING: Yes, with respect.

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THE CHAIRMAN: just to finish this train of thought, if 1.2 is drafted more tightly than the Directive would have required, you would submit that is the way we have implemented the Directive and unless it is actually contrary to the Directive, there it is, we go by 1.2.

MR BARLING: Yes, sir, that is right.

THE CHAIRMAN: If it was contrary to the directive presumably there could not have been a contravention in the first place because it would not have been properly implemented.

BARLING: It would not have been properly implemented, precisely. The only grey area is the area where there are two possible meanings - I am not at the moment suggesting we are in this area - and there is a broader meaning as it were, a more penal meaning, a more onerous meaning, and one which is less onerous. My concern is that the principles laid down by the European court may well require the national court or indeed the European court, not to adopt the more onerous meaning by reference to the Directive, if it involves further obligations or heavier obligations or, indeed, criminal responsibility, and we would submit quasi-criminal, or criminal in a sense that would be used in the human rights context of very severe penalties.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

MR BARLING: So we would, if necessary, submit that that

would apply here if the Tribunal - which we submit it should not - reached the view that Article 4(3) covered this kind of information and GC 1.2 might or might not. We submit we are not in that position.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

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 MR BARLING: In their interpretation of 4(3) and implementation of 4(3) Oftel produced 1.2, and they did add the words "that it should be acquired "in connection with and solely for the purpose ..." We submit they were absolutely right to emphasise that it should be in connection with that.

I just want to, if I may, introduce the second of the two additional bits of paper here. It is perhaps only fair to bring these in at the outset. There is a document in our bundle, attached to our notice of Appeal, at tab 12.

THE CHAIRMAN: General Conditions.

MR BARLING: Yes. This was the final statement by the director-General on 9 July and, as you see from the beginning, if you look at paragraph 1.4, you will see that there had been two previous consultations on these general conditions that were going to apply going forward. It is extracts from those consultation papers produced by Oftel that we have put in this additional slip. These are extremely long documents and they could be reproduced, but what we have done is select the passages that we consider are pertinent, but they are there for anybody to look at and my learned friends are well familiar with them in any event.

I want to show you some passages in this document f 9 July, which is in the bundle, but perhaps I can turn first to the slip and show you what we note. The first document is the first of the two consultations, May 2002, on draft general conditions, and turning over four pages you come to page 4. "General access. This condition oblige the providers of public electronic communication networks to negotiate interconnect agreements with each other. It also imposes restrictions on the use of or passing on of confidential information obtained by

communications providers during access or interconnection negotiations." Obviously, it is not binding, it is a shorthand, but it shows how the Regulator understood what was to become condition 1.2.

Over the page, paragraph 3.4, the regulator said: "This condition is required to implement the obligations contained in Articles 4(1) and 4(3) of the Directive and falls within condition 3.14..."

Then going to the next document which is the consultation on certain aspects of implementation of the access Directive, also in 2002, one sees a reference at manuscript page 8, paragraph 2.2. "The general obligation to negotiate interconnection is set out in the draft general conditions ... draft general condition 1 ... obliges providers of PECNs to negotiate interconnection agreements ... It also imposes restrictions on the use or passing of confidential information obtained by providers in the coursed of such negotiations."

Finally, we have simply inserted at the end, page 16, the draft general condition 1.2. headings are not to be relied upon, but one cannot help but forensically note the heading to general condition 1.2 in this document, "Information obtained during negotiations for network access". Similarly, the very last page of the slip, page 19, paragraph 2.2 again.

so those are the early ones and then the Director reaches some conclusions which it sets out in tab 12. right at the beginning, s.7, he says the proposed general conditions have been drafted to apply appropriate regulation, reflecting the obligations required by the new EC Directives as closely as possible.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

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 MR BARLING: There are two sets of conditions drafted, annex A and annex B, but we are only concerned with annex B because one was done against the possibility that the Communications Act might not be passed in time so they would have to be differently worded, so in the end only annex B became relevant because the Act was passed in

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turning to paragraph 1.6, one just notes who must comply with general conditions, and then in the table, general condition 1, 1.2: "Contains confidentiality requirements applying to all communications to providers engaged in network access negotiations.

Then I would just ask you to note in 2.3 the footnote 2, that the intervenor THUS was actually a member of the operators' Group which submitted detailed responses to the consultation documents.

Then in paragraph 3.3 in chapter 3, discussing condition 1, first of all "The operators group objected to the drafting of 1.1 on the basis that it laid the emphasis on conclusion of an agreement following negotiations. They believe the obligation should relate only to the negotiations themselves. The operators group also suggested that paragraph 1.2 be deleted in its entirety on the basis that confidentiality terms should be agreed commercially between the communications providers themselves, but if it is going to be retained it should be more transparent."

It is interesting to note that they thought it was not necessary because once you have got an agreement you have dealt with the confidentiality anyway. Then at the bottom of the page one sees Oftel's comments on those remarks and that they have not taken the point to amend condition 1 in line with the operators group response. "The current draft requires networks ... to negotiate with a view to concluding an agreement. In Oftel's view this appropriately puts emphasis on the conclusion of negotiations in that it requires those providers to negotiate ... rather simply negotiating without more for an indefinite period. The drafting of 1.2 is drawn from 4(3) of the Access Directive ... Oftel does not agree that these terms lack clarity or transparency. Oftel's view references to departments are to internal departments ..."

Then it is interesting to note that they say: "references to a competitive advantage should be read as

meaning an unfair advantage over competitors." That is quite an important point, if it is right, and we submit it is. Then at 3.7, the next paragraph: "Oftel agrees with the replacement of 'in this condition' with 'for the purposes of this condition'.

"Oftel has also amended paragraph 1.4 so as to clarify the broader application of paragraph 1.2 (in relation to network access negotiations) over paragraph 1.1 (which only applies to interconnection negotiations)."

The point, sir, as you will readily appreciate, that we make about it is that everyone's understanding is that what one is dealing with here in relation to Article 4(3) and 1.2 is the confidentiality of information passed to each other during or in connection with negotiations to reach an interconnection agreement, widened to include an access agreement. It is that kind of information which is being dealt with and which everybody understands in the industry is being dealt with, it is nothing to do with the downstream, day to day identification of particular customers who want a service.

The actual conditions are set out of course later on in that document. At this stage they still retain the heading that we saw in the consultation paper, "Information obtained during negotiations for network access" but I readily accept that on the previous page under "Interpretation" it says that headings and titles should be disregarded - before Ms Sharpson points that out. Then you have got the wording which, as far as I am aware, is the final wording. It is interesting to note, lower down in 1.4, what network access means, as we have already mentioned.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

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MR BARLING: we say that clearly, of course, does not include CPS provision to subscribers. That would be consistent with Article 1 of the Directive that says that access does not mean access by end users.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

MR BARLING: So, in a sense, GC1.2 cannot cover CPS. In a

sense one can stop there, by looking at that - although I suspect we are not going to be able to.

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So that is the second of the three indications, if you like, as to why we say this cannot apply. The third one was the reference to being acquired in confidence. Again, it is related to both of the first two points. It comes via the CPSO who is merely a conduit for the request from the customer to BT and of course it is not acquired in confidence; it is an indirect rather than a direct communication. Similarly, if it has nothing to do with the negotiations between competing networks then it is unlikely to be the subject of confidentiality. So they are linked and, again, as I pointed out, OFCOM does not like the wording of 1.2 and it seeks to get away from this express requirement that the information be acquired in confidence.

we wonder whether the matter can be tested in this way. Suppose that the reply slip system was still in use. No one would say that the retail customer's request to BT for CPS was acquired by BT in confidence. They get the reply slip direct from the customer and they also get a separate order, as they do now, from the CPS operator, the gaining operator. No one could possibly suggest that under the reply slip system that was acquired in confidence, nor would they, we would add, possibly suggest that it was acquired in connection with negotiations for interconnection etc. If it came direct from the customer how could it possibly be acquired in connection with and solely for the purpose of negotiations etc?

Equally, no one would be remotely interested in what the CPSO's purpose was in placing the order, which is how they communicate this information to BT Wholesale. What their purpose was would not matter.

In focusing on the purpose of the CPSO in supplying the information now, we submit OFCOM are really falling into confusion, for although they submit that it is the CPSO's purpose that is relevant - as one sees from paragraph 100 of Ms Wallace's witness statement - they

are also constrained to accept (in the same witness statement, paragraph 91) that the CPSO places this order on behalf of "BT's customer". We submit therefore that the purpose that the CPSO has when he is placing the order is irrelevant to this question and is another clear indication that OFCOM's attempt to force this square peg into a round hole is utterly misconceived.

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Before I dig into the skeleton, just a couple of other quick points. There is a big problem about the lack of clarity and transparency if you accept OFCOM's interpretation. This may be a criticism as much of the notification itself as of GC 1.2, but we have got to a situation where we do not know what we are allowed to do and what we are not allowed to do, according to OFCOM's interpretation of 1.2 - no one could know. They say "You are allowed to contact your customer, but you can't say certain things to him. You are allowed to make sure that he has not been slammed", but we do not know whether we are allowed to give him neutral information such as the impact that his proposed transfer would have on existing services because thewy blow hot and cold in their papers. Even now we do not know whether it is their case that we can supply to our customer, along with the notification of transfer, purely neutral information about what that means in respect of existing services.

They do not seem to be able to make their mind up about neutral information, they do not seem to be able to make their mind up about whether we are allowed to tell the customer that they can still, after transfer, use BT by dialling 1280. They have forbidden us to do it and we had to remove it from our notification of transfer letter pending this hearing, but in another part of their documents they say - I cannot recall the exact words - that it is an essential consumer protection that they should knows that they can dial 1280. We are not allowed to do it; so they do not really know either.

The root cause for these problems is because of their misinterpretation of 1.2. If they confined 1.2 to what it is intended to and does cover, namely clearly confidential information passed between people when negotiating, or indeed after negotiations - negotiations may fail, there are all sorts of reasons why you have to keep it in being, m even after the interconnection agreement has come into being, you have to have confidentiality requirements - then none of these problems would arise. It is because they are trying to suggest that this is not really confidential information because we can transmit it to BT Retail if it comes through BT Wholesale, we can tell BT Retail and they can use it to contact the customer, but they cannot say X they can only say Y. This is a nonsense, and you will not find any of those purposes or as it were delineations from GC1.2. So if they are right about this there is a very real issue of legal certainty as far as both the notification and GC1.2 are concerned.

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it is also, of course, we submit, a grossly unfair situation that when one operator persuaded our customer to leave us for certain calls of all calls, presumably by extolling the virtues of their own services and possibly by denigrating the quality of BT's services, who knows, they can continue to reinforce their advocacy throughout the cooling-off period of ten days as much as they want, but BT who is potentially the loser, is artificially constrained from contacting its customer. We submit that is not just nonsense, it is also very unfair, it is anticompetitive and it is certainly nothing that you can read out of the effect of GC1.2. It is contrary to the rules of natural justice.

There are no consumer protection benefits here at all in relation to this notification, they do not really try and make a case for this being consumer protection; it cannot possibly be, it is not fair competition, it is the opposite, and it lacks transparency.

It is interesting also, finally, to note that in the context of local loop unbundling, which was quite akin to CPS in some respects, Oftel considered save activity was quite possibly beneficial to the customer. The reference for that, sir, is in the documents attached to the reply bundle, mr Steggle's appendices to his second statement, the very last document. It might just be worth glancing at that, just to show you where it is. Immediately after Mr Steggle's second statement of 10 March there are a number of tabs. Tab 3 is the first of the documents and you can see that that is dealing with replacement of the reply slip process, there are discussions about the merits and demerits of the reply slip system, and towards the bottom someone says it is not an infallible method of preventing slamming, the reply slip, so you could dispense with it. I just show you that there.

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 Then there is a group meeting at tab 4, and at the third page of that there is a reference to the "save" call, just so you know what it is, at the bottom, the paragraph just before the heading AOB, there is a reference: "Oftel summarised the conclusion of consumer groups that BT could make a call during the cooling-off period ... the costs should not be recoverable." so it appears to be thought of as fairly innocuous at that point, but we were not allowed to charge the other operator for making it.

- THE CHAIRMAN: That starts off by saying "The firm view of consumer groups was the outbound telephone call from BT was unnecessary."
- MR BARLING: Yes. It was not popular with our competitors, certainly.
- THE CHAIRMAN: Who is the consumer group there? These are consumers, are they?
- MR BARLING: I am not quite sure who is in the Consumers Group, but I can find out. Oftel's view certainly is that the "save" call could be made. Going to the next document, which is another commercial group meeting, really the only relevant passage there is under the heading "AOB" towards the end of the document, relating to outbound calls during the cooling-of period, Ms Wallace said that there would be controls on what BT would be allowed to say during the cooling-off period when making outbound calls to customers who had been

signed out by a CPS operator."

Then there is the letter dealing mainly with local loop unbundling, but with reply cards in relation to that.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes

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- MR BARLING: The passage that I was referring to earlier is on page 3 of the letter, the second paragraph on that page.
- THE CHAIRMAN: "... BT should not be prevented from undertaking 'save' and 'winback' activities ..."
- MR BARLING: Yes. "Within the framework of BT's existing regulatory obligations, 'save' activity before transfer of service had occurred could be beneficial as it would enable consumers to receive information about the services and products of companies including BT."

I do not know if anybody else wants me to read anything more from that. Sir, that is all I was going to say by way of an overview of the case. May I then, using the skeleton as a guide, at paragraph 8 of the skeleton we set out a ground plan and, in the remainder of my submissions, I was going to stick fairly much to the order of service set out in paragraph 8.

- THE CHAIRMAN: How are we getting on, do you think, from a timing point of view?
- MR BARLING: Pretty well, I think.
- THE CHAIRMAN: I have the impression we have already covered quite a lot.
- MR BARLING: I am sure that we will come to a chunk of skeleton that we will be able to pass over, on the basis that we have already covered it. I know you would encourage me to do that, and I will try and be receptive to that. I think, sir, you were content for me to have a bit of time this afternoon, and I would have thought that sticking to that I should be fine.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

MR BARLING: It will hopefully help that we have set out the text of 1.2 and 4(3) at paragraph 5 of this, so it may be easier to turn to look at them in the skeleton if we need to, and the full version of General Condition 1 is at tab

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THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

MR BARLING: The position we had got to is that Oftel clearly regarded 1 .2 as covering information revealed by an operator to another operator in relation to negotiations for network access or interconnection. We saw that from the July paper and the Interveners thought that 1.2 was not necessary as it would be really subsumed by confidentiality agreements. It is also clear that Oftel had given considerable thought to the wording of 1.2 in an attempt to make it reflect 4(3).

THE CHAIRMAN: Just remind me, was there a still earlier version of 1.2 that was less tightly drawn than the one we finish up with?

MR BARLING: I am aware of an earlier version, but I do not know whether it is the one in here that we see in the slip at page 16. The only change in the wording as far as I am aware is the wording which related to network access, in relation to which in tab 12 Oftel says it did accept the submissions that were made and changed the wording slightly. It is paragraph 3.7 of tab 12. "Oftel agrees with the replacement of ..." Actually, that is not in the wording of 1.2, that is in the wording of 1.4.

THE CHAIRMAN: The definition of network access.

MR BARLING: Yes. The answer then is that so far as I am aware there is not an earlier version.

Picking it up at paragraph 10 of our skeleton then, we are dealing with some general remarks on the legislative background, many of which I hope I have now covered, the main point being that OFCOM has confused two fundamentally distinct - not unrelated but clearly distinct matters - the provision and negotiation of access or interconnection and the processing, if you like, of customer requests for CPS.

One sees in paragraph 11 the Interveners condense this and it is almost a reductio ad absurdum, they say that Network Access is being negotiated when each customer requests CPS, that that is another negotiation of network access. We say that really, in a sense,

encapsulates why this is so flawed, it is clearly wrong.

then we refer at paragraph 13 that the history and wording of 4(3) has clearly demonstrated that those provisions have nothing to do with the provision of CPS to customers. Nothing to do is, perhaps, putting it too strongly because of course CPS is one of the spin-offs, one of the downstream products, but it is not itself something which relates to or is in connection with negotiation of network access and interconnection.

Then in paragraph 15 we come back to the text of 1.2, how that appears also to have been a tightening. That appears clearly to be the Director General himself looking at 4(3) and saying this is dealing with a certain class of information, otherwise it is not Achieving its object, and the class of information this is dealing with is information acquired in connection with these negotiations, not just any information which happens temporally to be transferred from one to another after negotiations have taken place.

THE CHAIRMAN: Just help me a little on the technicalities. Every time a customer transfers from BT to another operator, in most circumstances the other operator would require the use of some parts of BT's existing facilities, even if it is only the last bit of the line from the local exchange to the customer's house.

MR BARLING: I believe that is right.

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 THE CHAIRMAN: The new operator using that part of BT's facilities - and I use the word so as not to get involved in arguments about networks - is that not a form of network access?

MR BARLING: In pure CPS they will not be using our facilities in that sense, because we will still be providing the line to our retail customer. As I understand it, in the typical case, what will happen is that we will retain the relationship with the line, so we will bill the line. Assuming they have opted for all calls - that is the all calls option: international, national and local calls they are taking from the new operator rather than from BT, and they can have, as you

know, various combinations of that, then we will presumably carry those calls as subcontractor to the nearest point of interconnection with that new operator';s network and charge for it, so in that sense, yes, there is a use. But they are not borrowing it, we are ---

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- THE CHAIRMAN: But your agreement to carry those calls as a sub-contractor for the new operator is a form of giving the new operator access to the network, or at least to the facilities.
- MR BARLING: Yes. I suppose we might need to get into the intricacies of the interconnect Agreement, as to whether that is the right analysis.
- THE CHAIRMAN: It may well not be, I am trying to understand how it works technically, what you have to do. Where the customer is still paying for the line ---
- MR BARLING: I think this might be explained quite helpfully by Mr Steggles' first statement at paragraph 33 and 34 where he deals to some extent with this. He is referring here to the Interconnect Agreement: "... incorporates into the interconnection agreement between BT and the CPS Operator ... the CPS Industry Code of practice published and amended ... The Order Handling Process This is to do with order handling. I am told that paragraph 16 might be more helpful, of Mr Steggles. Yes, I think this is slightly more on the point. That is 16 and 17. (Pause for reading). I do not know whether this answers your question, sir, but it is quite clear that the customer, in a sense, still retains the ability to use BT as its retail carrier because it can use the override if it wants to on a call by call basis, but equally BT is in effect agreeing to take other calls that are pre-selected, straight to the point of interconnection, but I think the position is that for those calls there is no charge to this customer by BT, the charge is all carried by the CPSO for those preselected calls, even including a bit of carriage, up to the point of interconnection. I have a nasty feeling that is not quite what you were driving at.

THE CHAIRMAN: What I am trying to drive at is when the customer has selected a new operator, although the customer is still paying for the line, and although the customer apparently retains the ability nonetheless to go back to BT, perhaps by dialling the 1280 number that you were referring to a moment ago, is there any sense in which, in order for the customer to use the new operator, BT is making available to that new operator facilities within the definition of access, for the purpose of providing electronic communication services.

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MR BARLING: I think, in a sense, the answer may be that they have already done that, because inevitably they will have reached an interconnect agreement with that operator - otherwise, CPS will not work.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, that I follow. I am trying to come back to a point I think I may have asked about in a rather confused way earlier. Once there is an interconnect arrangement of some kind in process, what additional availability of facilities is made available when you are dealing with particular customers, or is the facility already there and it is just a question of using it?

MR BARLING: I think Ms Kelly has got a question.

MS KELLY: Is the network access agreement a bit like an exchange of codes or something, or giving the other operator a key so that they then have access to the line?

MR BARLING: It no doubt incorporates that idea but as I understand it, it is a complex marrying up of the charging arrangements that need to be made, the technical link-up with the points of interconnection. Obviously, the two networks have to be compatible so there has to be an exchange of protocols, there has to be an idea of forecasting

MS KELLY: There is a technical bit and a business bit, and it is the technical bit we were just trying to clarify.

MR BARLING: I am just reading the paragraph that ms Leas has pointed out to me. "In relation to CPS, it has no effect on existing interconnection arrangements ..."

THE CHAIRMAN: Where are you?

MR BARLING: This is Mr Steggle's second witness statement,

paragraph 39. It is really from paragraph 34 onwards and it might be helpful just to glance at 34 through to 42. (Pause for reading).

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THE CHAIRMAN: To put the question in another way - and we need to read this with some care - the question is when a particular customer transfers to another operator, is BT in any sense making available to the other operator some additional facility, over and above the facility that already exists by virtue of the existing interconnection?

MR BARLING: My understanding at the moment is no, in that

MR BARLING: My understanding at the moment is no, in that it is all in effect ---

THE CHAIRMAN: It is all covered, you do not need to do anything, you just ---

BARLING: Ms lea reminds me of course that the crucial thing is that there will have to be the twiddle of the knobs in the BT exchange that means that the customer can just dial the normal number and he will automatically be carried onto that other CPSO's network at the point of interconnection. In other words, it routes his calls henceforth, in a pre-selected way, from wherever the relevant exchange is, onto the point of interconnection with that particular operator. So that will haded to be done, but because the interconnection agreement is in place, in a sense everything is in place for that to be done that just needs to be done. Paragraph 39 of Mr Steggles says: "It has no effect on any existing interconnection arrangements that the CPS operator has with BT except to ensure that the calls are handed over at the point of interconnection."

He goes on to point out - Ms simmons' point - that you can look at it in terms of two operators who are not interconnected with each other, but each has an interconnection arrangement with BT, as he says in paragraph 39. CPS still works between those non-interconnected operators, all that happens is that the twiddling of the BT knob at its exchange sends it off to a different point of interconnection. So it has been going onto Jones's network at Jones's point of interconnection with BT, now it is going to Smith's point

- of interconnection with BT. Obviously, those points of interconnection have to be the subject of pre-negotiation agreements and all the rest of the panoply of interconnection arrangements. Obviously, the interconnection involves making the interconnection work and compatible and that has also already been done.
- MS SIMMONS: In the previous scheme, when it was done with thew customer sending the card, how was the person in the switching told about the switching?
- 10 MR BARLING: Were they told by BT Retail as it were or were 11 they told by BT Wholesale? I am not sure.
 - MS SIMMONS: You said that the document effectively went to BT Retail, but that would not have actually effected the operation that was needed, the technical operation.
- 15 MR BARLING: No.

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- 16 MS SIMMONS: So what happened on the technical operation?
- 17 MR BARLING: On the technical operation I suspect that it
 18 was done from the BT Wholesale side, but I am not sure.
- 19 MS SIMMONS: So who told BT Wholesale?
- MR BARLING: What happens, just to recap, is that when the customer decides that he wants to try another operator, he gets signed up by the new operator and, under the reply slip system, the customer would then have a reply slip which he would sign and send with the relevant details to Bt Retail, to make the request basically, "I want to henceforth have these calls with this operator."
 - MS SIMMONS: Yes.
 - MR BARLING: At the same time as that is happening, the new operator has placed an order it basically has notified BT Wholesale that this order is coming.
- 31 MS SIMMONS: So there are two bits of information.
- 32 MR BARLING: Yes, the new operator says to BT Wholesale,
 33 through what is called the CPS Gateway, I want to place
 34 an order on behalf of your customer X for this kind of
 35 CPS thing", so that data goes into the system. Then when
 36 the reply slip data came through the BT Retail system,
 37 the two would be married up and if they matched bingo,
 38 the order went through.
 - THE CHAIRMAN: Sorry, Mr Barling, can I just go back to

paragraph 11 in your skeleton where you were criticising the Interveners' argument or the idea that network access is broad enough to cover the actual case where a particular customer transfers to a new operator, where there is an interconnection agreement already in place. I have open in front of me Article 2A of the Access Directive which defines access, and although there is a long list of inter alias, the basic definition means "the making available of facilities and/or services to another undertaking under defined conditions on either an exclusive or non-exclusive basis for the purpose of providing electronic communications services."

MR BARLING: Yes.

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- THE CHAIRMAN: Could it be said that when BT twiddles the knob, as you said language that I can understand but I think probably seems somewhat archaic to some of our more technical representatives of today's modern technology could it not be said that they were making available facilities or services to another undertaking for the purpose of providing electronic communications services, thus giving a form of access within the wide terms of this definition?
- MR BARLING: The only reason I hesitate and it may be I will be told that I need not hesitate is because, in a sense, inevitably, that access has already been made available inevitably to that operator under an interconnection agreement.
- THE CHAIRMAN: What I am still struggling to understand and I am sure it is all in the papers somewhere, I just need to get on top of the technicality is whether there is some additional step that could be described as a further making available of further facilities on the basis of the existing agreement that brings the transaction within the idea of network access, and thus triggers the confidentiality arrangements? I just do not know.
- MR BARLING: Those sitting behind me have heard the question and I wonder whether I could try and come back to that.
- THE CHAIRMAN: Of course, take your time with it.
 - MR BARLING: My reaction is that all that is in place,

inevitably, because we have reached now beyond the stage where the ---

- THE CHAIRMAN: Your basic case is that it is already in place, the relevant negotiations which article 4(3) is talking about are long since passed, it is simply a pretty basic implementation of what is already there.
- MR BARLING: Yes, and it is one of the reasons why people bother to enter into interconnection agreements and network access agreements; they do it so that they can provide a whole host of services to each other's customers.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

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- MR BARLING: The question in this case is whether the confidentiality and the information that is being protected is information at the upstream stage, which has all been negotiated and agreed, or whether it somehow encompasses ---
- THE CHAIRMAN: Extends over to its downstream implementation.
- MR BARLING: Yes. I am sorry not to be able to throws more light on that at the moment, but we have got in mind that you would like some further input on that.

Moving on, I am keen now as I go through the skeleton just to, in a sense, point out points rather than deal with things at length, and also to make sure you have seen the things throughout the papers that you want to look at.

- THE CHAIRMAN: Do not hesitate to draw our attention to things you particularly want us to bear in mind.
- MR BARLING: I do as it were remind you, as we have said in paragraph 16 that Network Access as defined in 1.4 does not include the provision of CPS, which is an important point related to the question that you were asking now.

Then we turn to the legislative history and we have seen the Interconnection Directive at tab 10. I suppose I just ought to show you, so that you can sideline it if you have not already done so, tab 9, the precursor to that. The only relevant part of that is 6(d) which is the forerunner of article 4(3) and of course was in place before CPS came on the scene.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

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MR BARLING: So whatever else 6(d) was thinking of, it certainly was not thinking of CPS because CPS was not a Community animal at this point.

i have shown you tab 13 and condition 50A. The introduction of a requirement to introduce CPS came about following a consultation initiated by the Commission on numbering policy. I do not believe you would need to see that, but in case you want it just for your notes, it is in the second of the two authorities bundles at tab 15, and I was not proposing to trouble you with it. That deals with the increased demand of users wanting to use other carriers. We have said a bit about the history here, and there was a resolution inviting the Commission to adopt proposals with regards to CPS; that is at tab 19 of the same bundle.

Then the Interconnection Directive came in with 12(7) and the Universal Service Directive then took over, and you have seen that. We set out at paragraph 21 the scope and the aims of that Universal Service Directive. something I perhaps did not point up when we were looking at it a few minutes ago, but we set it out in terms in paragraph 21, which is that it is expressly saying it is dealing with the needs of end users and establishing the rights of end users.

Sir, as you said at the outset, we had number portability and this was shoved into the Interconnection Directive when it first came in by way of amendment, but with the new package of legislation they were separated out again, so that you have the Access Directive on the one hand, dealing with rights and negotiations and so on between operators, expressly not dealing with end users, and then end users coming in through the Universal Service Directive.

THE CHAIRMAN: We have not got Article 19(2) in your skeleton which sort of links it back again by another route to the Access Directive.

MR BARLING: That is perfectly true. Then article 19 and then the current requirement which we have set out of the

replacement for Condition 50A, AA8.1. Again, it is still required to be supplied by the operator to any of its subscribers upon request.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

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 MR BARLING: So there is still this need for a request which we say in a sense just cancels out the whole problem here. If they haded got to tell you who they are if they want it, how can there possibly be any confidentiality in that information when it comes by a different route? We are entitled to know it, and all that has happened now is that we have said "Fine, we do not need to have it from two routes, we will let our customer tell you via the operator who tells us anyway." Really, it is almost as simple as that, this case. We are making the same points in paragraph 25 about the relationship.

Then we turn to the legislative history of access and interconnection and we go through a very similar process. Again, you have seen now most of these matters referred to already in my introductory remarks, but we are making the point here that the Access Directive envisages negotiations between two service providers on the technical and commercial arrangements in order to establish access and/or interconnection between their networks. That is pointed out in Article 1, which we have quoted there.

THE CHAIRMAN: I think we have got all that.

MR BARLING: As I say, I am just moving through now, just to make sure. Similarly, article 1 of the Access Directive.

Then we come on to the meaning of access, and we have heard the recitals in the Access Directive, where it says in terms that it "has a wide range of meanings, and it is therefore necessary to define precisely how that term is used in this Directive ..." and it then defines it.

THE CHAIRMAN: It is a laudable aspiration, but it is not entirely achieved.

MR BARLING: No, and also passing quickly over the meaning of interconnection, which may be a painful subject, and coming to the conclusion in paragraph 32, we say that

this really shows that neither of the terms "access" or "interconnection" includes the provision of services to end users such as CPS.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

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MR BARLING: Then the history of 4(3) taking a similar course. There we have a quote from Article 6(d) of the old Interconnection Directive: "Information received from an organisation seeking interconnection ..."

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

BARLING: We know that that wording changed when it came into Article 4(3) and talked about before, during or after negotiations, which my learned friends jump on and say now it is all different, it is a completely different source of information now, but we say no, it is quite clearly not. For a start, all that did was protect the information coming one way from the organisation seeking interconnection, the new condition 1.2 makes two changes, we submit. First of all, it now protects information going both ways, so it does not matter which of the two, whether it is the person seeking or the person giving. It is rather an odd thing anyway to say seeking because it implies that there is a dominant partner and, more and more of course, everybody needs interconnection, everybody is seeking interconnection now.

The other thing is the temporal change which we submit does not have the significance that my learned friends say, it simply is a tightening-up exercise, recognising that extremely confidential information may well pass after negotiations in a whole host of different scenarios. For example, negotiations may break down, or maybe the confidentiality agreement that is inevitably going to be entered into is not sufficiently widely drawn, and there are ongoing relationships, as one knows, once interconnection is established that have to be maintained. Confidential information does nt stop being passed once there is an interconnection agreement, it continues, as Mr Steggles explains.

So we submit those are the reasons for those changes in emphasis, they do not suddenly mean that the

type of information, the class of information has changed, it still has to be information, we submit, that is supplied in connection with those negotiations or arrangements.

THE CHAIRMAN: When we get on to paragraph 33 and following you have helpfully given us a lot of references to the various stages at which this occurs. To what extent do you say we need really to burrow into all that?

- MR BARLING: Very little, because we have, I hope, drawn out or indeed quoted actually from them. I apologise that we do not say which of the authorities bundles these are in, but if it would help we can give you a list of tab numbers or possibly even send through at some point a version with those in.
- THE CHAIRMAN: If they are in the authorities bundle I do not think we need it particularly.
- MR BARLING: I am grateful. This was really just to set the scene and I would doubt, frankly, whether you would need to delve into it.
- THE CHAIRMAN: No, unless there is some particular point that you want to draw to our attention.
- MR BARLING: We have normally put it in the text if there is, for example the scope from the Commission's explanation, paragraph 34, that the amendments "increase transparency and ensure reasonable confidentiality."

Article 4(3) is then dealt with in paragraphs 36 onwards, and we have uncovered also those points. Perhaps the point I can make about paragraphs 37 and 38 is that the juxtaposition of 4(1) and 4(3) was not accidental. 4(1) is all to do with the obligation to negotiate interconnection and access, and 4(3) then protects the information.

- THE CHAIRMAN: So we cannot lift 4(3) out of its context and apply it to something that is not really within the scope of the Access Directive at all.
- MR BARLING: No, sir, that is the submission. Then we turn in paragraph 39 to come down more to the specific wording of the provision itself. Again, many of these points have now been made and it may be that I will just refer

briefly to one or two passages in the evidence and make one or two other points of emphasis. It has to be before, during or after the process of negotiating access or interconnection, and of course it has to be acquired in connection with those negotiations or arrangements. Obviously, information about a particular customer who might wish to use CPS is simply not in the picture at the stage this is all envisaging, it is well downstream and of a different type.

Mr Steggles, in his first witness statement at paragraph 33, and also in his second witness statement at paragraph 34, seeks to explain why the differences are very real and fundamental between these two types of information. We have seen some of this already, the passage is really 33 to 41, and he touches in the course of this upon how the negotiations are progressed between the two parties and he also provides a specimen confidentiality agreement at tab 38, which might be worth glancing at so you can see it.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

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MR BARLING: If one turns over one page in the agreement you come to a definition of confidential information.

THE CHAIRMAN: This appears to pre-date the 2002 Directive.

MR BARLING: Yes, this is the 2000 version, but it is presumably a version that is just a specimen. Can I just ask you to sideline that as it were, then also clause 3 and the heading "Confidentiality".

All I want to say about these is that these are the types of clauses that parties negotiate between themselves to protect themselves.

THE CHAIRMAN: Last for six years after the end of the signing of the agreemnt.

MR BARLING: Yes. Then skipping a tab and going to tab 40 we see, again, a specimen, this time dated 2002, of the main part of an interconnection agreement.

Confidentiality is also touched on in this; if you look

at page 16 of the internal pagination, clause 21.

Inevitably, as Mr Steggles says, one will find something of this kind in arrangements.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

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MR BARLING: So that is where those are. May I just check that there is nothing in this second statement at paragraph 34 that I should have shown you? I think we have already looked at that in answer to your question, sir, it is dealing with the type of information that might be provided on an ongoing basis. That is also, in those passages, dealing with what Ms Wallace says in paragraph 95, who "attempts to argue that on each occasion that the CPS Operator places an order it is in order to enable interconnection to work. This is clearly incorrect. Interconnection points, which are set up between BT and CPS Operators for the handover of traffic, are not affected by individual orders.

"The lodging of an individual ... order merely enables an individual customer's choice to be implemented as is required by Condition AA8.1. BT Wholesale makes a change in the exchange that relates to that particular customer (and no others) which ensures that the customer's calls are handed over to the CPSO at the nearest point of interconnection between BT and that CPSO. BT is thus providing a service to that customer.

"It has no effect on any existing interconnection arrangements that the CPS Operator has with BT except to ensure that the calls are handed over at the point of interconnection." He then gives the example of two CPSOs who are not interconnected.

THE CHAIRMAN: I am sorry to take you back, but can we just glance at paragraph 38 of Mr Steggles' first statement, which talks about BT sending prospective CPS Operators a Customer Requirements Document. I take it that is the document sent when any customer wants to transfer to a CPS operator.

MR BARLING: No, apparently not. Apparently, this is all to do with interconnection, the customer in this context is the person seeking interconnection.

THE CHAIRMAN: If we go to the tab, tab 39.

MR BARLING: The subtitle is "Notification to commence interconnect planning".

- THE CHAIRMAN: I may have got completely the wrong end of the stick, but as you turn through this it starts off with the operator details.
- MR BARLING: That would be the operator seeking interconnection.
- THE CHAIRMAN: Then it goes to customer billing details. Is that the same as the operator, or is that somebody else?
- MR BARLING: That would also be the operator.
- THE CHAIRMAN: And then there is a number of services that are being offered, operator services, ring back when free, in transit calls, directory enquiries and all those sorts of things, but that is all operator to operator.
- MR BARLING: These are descriptions of products which the interconnect operator wants to purchased from BT, presumably for the purposes of providing services to its own customers or those who will become its customers.
- 17 | THE CHAIRMAN: I follow, thank you.

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- MS KELLY: If you look at the back it is all set out there, it is operator to operator.
 - MR BARLING: Yes, I think that is right, but there is a little more in 38 and 39 of Mr Steggles' first statement, filling in a few of the gaps in that.
 - THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, I follow.
- 24 BARLING: I am not sure whether I have made the point or 25 not, but towards the end of paragraph 42 we say that the 26 situation is well illustrated by an example Mr Steggles gives in paragraph 39 of his second witness statement. 2.7 If one thinks of the example of a transfer of information 28 29 between two CPS operators who may or may not be interconnected with each other, the information 30 transferred by the gaining provider merely ensures that 31 the calls are handed over to a different point of 32 33 interconnect used by the gaining provider. It cannot 34 affect any agreement between the two operators because none is in existence. Nor does it affect any 35 arrangements between BT and anyone else. 36 So far as BT is 37 concerned it is simply routing calls to one interconnect point rather than another. 38

We go on to say that it is not clear whether or not

OFCOM contends that if there is no interconnection of access agreement between the gaining and the losing providers that the CPS information passed to the losing provider is still governed by GC1.2 notwithstanding that there is no question of any network access negotiations ever having taken place between the two. Then we point out that at paragraphs 64 and 67 of OFCOM's defence they seem to put it in different ways, and we say that if OFCOM does in fact rely on there being an interconnection agreement between the two undertakings in place it would mean that when BT is the losing provider, it would be in a worse position under GC1.2 than other losing providers who will not have an interconnect agreement with the gaining provider (because the losing provider is not also the access operator). Why should the fact that BT is the losing provider mean that it cannot use the information when other losing providers would not be prevented from doing so?

We would say that looking at that example, GC1.2 cannot cover this type of information when you have got as it were three parts to the system. In that example it cannot be covered by GC1.2, there is no question of it being acquired in connection with negotiations of access or interconnection, and it would be absurd if it covered BT just because BT virtually always has an interconnection agreement with other operators. In a sense it is just an acid test really, to see how this clause must be related to the class of information that we say it relates to, namely passed in the course of or after negotiations, but in connection with negotiations for interconnection.

It can be tested in a different way, we say in paragraph 44. If the CPS customer placed his request for CPS directly (as he used to do rather than going through the CPS Operator) could it conceivably be said that the information had anything to do with negotiating access or interconnection arrangements between two undertakings? The answer is no. This is the alchemy point really.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

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MR BARLING: The purpose of Article 4(3) we deal with in a number of paragraphs there, which I might just take quite briefly because I have really dealt with most of this already and I do not think one wants to dwell upon it. All I would say, of course, is that what we are saying in 45 and 46 is that normally speaking, once there is an interconnection agreement, as you will see from the specimen, the parties will normally cover this. not to say that there cannot be some continuing exchange of information, one can see that there might not be complete co-extensiveness between the confidentiality agreement and the regulatory measure, it may be possible, and no doubt Article 4(3) in the change of wording wanted to cover ctge possibilities, that information of a confidential nature would not necessarily just stop once you had first signed the interconnect agreement?

- MS SIMMONS: Is there another reason for that, that you cannot contract out what is in the Directive or in the General Condition?
- MR BARLING: That is certainly the argument that Oftel put when the Operators Group said let us strike out 1.2 and get rid of it that was in the July document at tab 12. That is what Oftel said, that we have got to do something like this because the Directive says so.
- THE CHAIRMAN: Recital 5 provides "there should be no restrictions that prevent undertakings from negotiating access and interconnection arrangements between themselves ..."
- MR BARLING: Yes. That is very important in understanding 4(3) and in a sense it explains why, apart from the wording of 4(1) and 4(3) itself, Oftel built in that extra bit that made it quite plain that this was only dealing with information in connection with these negotiations.
- THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

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MR BARLING: In paragraphs 49 and 50 make additional points to say that it is not anything to do with end users. As for the promotion of competition, we accept that of course the Access Directive is designed to encourage

competition, but we do make the remark that giving it a broad construction so as to include this kind of information within it would not have any effect on encouraging negotiations in respect of access and interconnection agreements, which by definition have already taken place.

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Then we come to the need for a restrictive interpretation. There is supposed to be a light touch on regulation now, the regulatory authorities are supposed to be reviewing all regulatory restrictions and, where appropriate, withdrawing them and avoiding over-regulation, as Recital 14 to the Directive itself states. So there is a tension here between that aim of the Directive and OFCOM's primary argument which is effectively to apply Article 4(3) to anything which, in terms of time, happens and which in an Adam and Eve sense would not have happened but for the existence of an interconnection agreement.

- THE CHAIRMAN: So at least in terms of General Conditions the conditions should be as tightly drawn as possible.
- MR BARLING: Yes, to deal specifically with the matters it is required to deal with. On OFCOM's interpretation, there is no hiding it, this is extremely draconian in its effect. It means that we really cannot talk to our customers, at a stage where they have been "chatted up" by a competitor and persuaded that they will get a better deal, and we are suddenly told "Sorry, BT, you cannot talk to them." It is very draconian.
- THE CHAIRMAN: You cannot, for example, tell them that they need to read the small print.
- MR BARLING: Or are they aware that there is this deal and the other deal and so on. Of course, that is marketing, but we are not even, as far as we can see, allowed to say "Well, of course you will not be able to get Call Waiting or Ringback, you realise that, don't you?" We are not even to give them factual information on the impact of what they are doing to their existing services. It is very bizarre this, and we submit that one should lean very heavily against interpreting anything in such a way

that it has that effect, if it is not inevitable. That is a more general point.

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So OFCOM ignores entirely all this history of the clear distinction between negotiations for interconnection and network access on the one hand, and the history of CPS on the other. Yes, they have touched at times and they came together for a while in the Interconnection Directive, but they are separate and distinct in concept. None of that has really been addressed by OFCOM or the Interveners.

In paragraph 57 we give a different wording between 6(d) and 4(3) and I have already dealt with that, and then at paragraph 58 we come on to those respects in which OFCOM has sidelined as it were the specific requirements of GC1.2. I have taken you already to paragraphs 136 and 146 of their skeleton and asked you to contrast that with what they say in paragraph 115, so I need not take you to any of that again, but we do say that reading between the lines they are saying ignore these words in confidence and ignore the fact that it requires interconnection and just look at article 4(3). That is not permissible and runs completely contrary to what the Director General himself said in July of last year, that he aimed to get as close as possible to the requirements of 4(3).

There is a point to be made at some stage in reflation to what OFCOM say are the purposes of the operator passing this information on. Both the Director General and OFCOM recognise that the customer information can be passed by BT Wholesale t]o BT Retail or indeed to another losing provider for the purpose of the Notification of transfer letter. So that is the peculiar thing about this, they both say yes you can do it for that purpose.

Then Ms Wallace in her witness statement at paragraph 100, which is quite important, sets out a whole range of other purposes. She attributes all these purposes to the CPS operator, and we submit that this is an unreal exercise. To take for example number 5, "To

ensure that the Notification of Transfer letter is sent out." I am not sure why, particularly, CPS operators care about that. A CPS operator who has mis-sold, perhaps, or slammed, it certainly would not be within his purposes. His purpose in supplying the information to BT would be so that BT would twiddle the knob that would enable the customer to come through to his point of interconnect. All these other points, some of which have some validity - he wants the order validated of course (number 1) because if the order is not validated BT will not twiddle the knob, but number 8 is completely unreal, we would submit, "to deal with any CPS Operator's specific questions or problems that may arise", (7) "Provide management information to the CPS industry ..." Number (6) perhaps: "answer customer questions about the order - and possibly cancel the order ..." That is the last thing that the CPS Operator wants, that the customer rings up BT and talks to BT.

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So with all due respect to Ms Wallace, this does not make sense, and it does not make sense because it is trying to attribute a whole range of purposes to the operator sending it through. The reason is two-fold; he sends it through because first of all BT has to have a request from the customer. If one turns back to paragraph 91 of her statement she says, quite correctly: "Thus, when a BT customer wishes to switch to a CPS provider, an electronic order is lodged with BT Wholesale by the relevant CPS operator on the customer's behalf." There has to be a request to BT from the customer, that is what all the regulatory provisions have always said and it is hardly surprising, there it is.

What Ms Wallace avoids saying in paragraph 100 is that really the purpose is the customer's purpose. The person here who needs the request to be placed is the customer, and the CPS operator is simply doing it on behalf of the customer, which is why all this talk about confidence is nonsense actually, and it is nonsense to talk about any other purposes.

Of course, once you get into speculation about for

what purposes it might be permissible for BT to contact its customer, ofcom is putting itself in the position, as it has now done, effectively of having complete discretion over what we may and may not says. says, as it has now said, that we may talk to our customer about slamming, we may not talk about 1280 (the override number) and we may not talk about anything which could persuade the customer to come back, does that mean that if we tell them the truth about the impacts, if that might have the effect of the customer coming back to BT, that will also be treated as marketing activity? not know the answer to any of these questions and they have not provided any clear answers. So we are in the position where their say-so is now everything, OFCOM can say what they like and we have to obey it in terms of the way they have constructed this. That also, we submit, gives the lie to their interpretation of the measure.

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Coming on to their interpretation of the words "in connection with negotiations", they say it is really a "but for" test, it is sufficient if it is consequent upon the interconnection agreement having been made. paragraph 62 and 63 we have explained why we submit that that is simply not correct. Apart from anything else, it would have said that; if it was going to be that draconian and wide, that anything that happens after the event, that would not have happened if the world had not gone that way would be covered, it would have said so. We submit that actually, funnily enough, OFCOM have put it rather well themselves in their skeleton argument at If you have it to hand, just glance at paragraph 138. They say in the second half of that paragraph 138. paragraph: "If the reference to the 'process of negotiating network access' were to refer solely to the initial negotiation for access, it would be meaningless for many CPS operators to speak of negotiations for access in the context of CPS at all, since they already had 'access' to BT's network prior to the introduction of CPS." Exactly, that is precisely what we are saying, it is meaningless.

Sir, I am getting on quite well, I am virtually finishing off on any other sweep-up points on the request. I have got to deal with one or two letters, in particular the notification of transfer letters, and then a word on confidentiality, the relevance of the significant difference in wording which I have dealt with to a large extent, a word about competitive advantage and then the final argument as to whether the interpretation, if they are right, would make it unlawful.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

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 MR BARLING: I do not anticipate having any difficulty in covering those points in an hour or so after lunch.

THE CHAIRMAN: I think three o'clock was the time suggested.

If that is a convenient moment for you, Mr Barling, it is convenient for us.

MR BARLING: Certainly.

THE CHAIRMAN: If we say two o'clock then.

(Lunch adjournment).

MR BARLING: Sir, if I may make a couple of points relating to the network access point, which may take us some way down the road to understanding this. According to paragraphs 29 and 30 of the Notice of Appeal, which I probably should have taken you to before ...

THE CHAIRMAN: It is always good to go back to it.

MR BARLING: 28 deals with the reply slip and then 29.

"Once a customer's CPS order is lodged with BT it sends a
Task to Switch Manager which is the BT system which
controls changes to the configuration of customers of
lines in the BT local exchanges."

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

MR BARLING: "Switch Manager then marks the customer and the category of CPS calls (for example national and international etc) and which operator will carry the calls. BT sends a message back to the CPSO to confirm that the switchover has taken place.

"After switch over, when the customer makes a call, the local exchange looks at the dialled digits to see what type of call is being made. If the call is appropriate to CPS, the local exchange inserts the 8XXX

code before the dialled digits and sends them to the trunk network. The call is then routed as per the agreed routing plan. If the customer dials an indirect access (IA) override code [the 1280] the local exchange will send all the dialled digits to the trunk network and the calls would be routed as per the agreed routing plan for that IA code."

THE CHAIRMAN: Right.

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 MR BARLING: Then there is a bill for the parts of the call that are carried over the BT network which is sent to the CPS operator.

THE CHAIRMAN: That is what happens.

MR BARLING: That is what happens. Then I should also show you tab 41 which is an annex to the Interconnection Agreement. Again, this must be a specimen but no doubt it is a standard type of thing. You see that it is actually an annex dealing with how Carrier Pre-selection is dealt with and it defines ---

THE CHAIRMAN: This is an annex to what?

MR BARLING: To the standard Interconnection Agreement, such as the one we saw at tab 40. It has got its various definitions, including the definition of Carrier Preselection.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

MR BARLING: "a service whereby a CPS Customer opts for some outgoing calls ... to be routed to the Operator System for conveyance by the Operator", the Operator being the CPS Operator.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

MR BARLING: Then "CPS Call". You can see then the definition of routing prefix as referred to in the Notice of Appeal; "a routing prefix code, in the format 8xxx, allocated by Oftel which indicates the operator ..." So every operator has its own 8xxx code. Then lower down the "Transaction" is defined, "A BT activity in respect of each CLI for any of set-up, remove, re-number, cancel, change or dummy or any other such CPS processing activity ..." Then "Transaction request" is dealt with. If you look at 2.4, for example, "The Parties shall agree in

advance all necessary technical requirements, including call set-up and cleardown sequences ..." Then over the page there are some general obligations on both BT and the operator, in particular 3.2: "BT shall process each CPS transaction Request in accordance with the Process description ..." I think that must be a reference to the end-to-end process description, which is a document I am going to refer you to in a moment.

then we have provisions relating to forecasting, routing, charging etc. I am not sure that there is anything in particular, but 3.4, as Ms Lea points out, is "If the CPS Customer makes a call to the Operator System under one of the CPS Options, BT shall prefix each such CPS call with the CPS Routing Prefix allocated to the Operator, and hand over such calls to the Operator System in accordance with the provisions of this schedule."

So, as it were, when you enter intro an Interconnection Agreement with an Operator, it obviously includes setting it up. Prior to CPS, almost back to the Eighties, there was the possibility of dialling a code - the customer could dial a code and access another operator, I think it was called Indirect Access - and then the call would be routed according to that code, over any interconnected operator's network, if they were interconnected to BT and vice versa. Under CPS, of course, the benefit is that the customer does not have to dial a code for each call, it is done by the access operator at the local exchange, with the software that is contained there.

Obviously, there is no doubt about it, CPS is a downstream retail product, dependent upon there being in place interconnection between different networks.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

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BARLING: I do not know how much that helps on it. May I turn back then and again follow the general framework of the skeleton? I think we were at page 18 where we were emphasising the importance of and the reasons for the request made by the customer to its retail operator, in this case BT, for CPS facilities. The importance of the

request is evidenced in a number of ways, and we set those out in paragraph 67, the Interconnection Directive, Article 19, the SMP service condition, the new one AA8.1, condition 50A, the one it replaced, and also at the end we have made a reference to the industry end to end process description. This is an important document which you have not yet had an opportunity to see, and I will ask you, if I may, to turn to tab 43 of the BT bundle. What you have there is the industry end-to-end process description - this is the thing that was thrashed out by the industry players who all have an interest in these things, and in the case of CPS this is incorporated by reference into the actual agreements. As you saw, it is referred to no doubt in a whole range of places in the actual Interconnection Agreement and its annexes.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

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BARLING: As far as I am aware, this is post reply slip, this end to end process, this is the one that succeeded the end to end process description that I am also going to show you in a moment relating to the reply slip system. so this is the current one, so far as I am aware, and this is a moving feast, it gets changed from time to time when a few things are agreed within the industry, so it may not be absolutely up-to-date. You will notice that there are some passages that are amended here.

What I wanted to draw to your attention specifically was paragraph 3.2 at page 32, under the heading "Order Handling Processes". 3.2.1 "General Assumptions. Customers via [via, you will notice] their chosen CPS Operator(s) will arrange the setting up of the Carrier pre-selection service. CPSO(s) will raise electronic orders, on the customer's behalf, with the customer's Access Operator." So it is still exactly the same as it always was, the order is being placed on the customer's behalf with the Access Operator. Then you see the bullet points setting out what the basic steps for a customer order are, and that is also, you might think, quite helpful, just to understand what then happens.

"The gaining operator is responsible ... for the validity of each electronic order it sends to the access operator regardless ... The AO validates the order against its customer database", so this ties in with what mr Moulson was saying in his witness statement that we put in today, that is the validation process that goes on which before, in the old days, had to be married up with the reply slip. If it cannot be validated, the access operator rejects it with one or more error codes, depending on what happens, so if it is not their customer, for example, then they will reject the order. There are lots of reasons why it can be rejected, one would be if it is asking for incompatible services, for example. There is a whole range of things.

If the order is valid the AO confirms the order and sends notification of date of impending switch to both losing and gaining operators. The gaining operator may not, of course, be the access operator. The switchover will be 10 working days from notification by the access operator. Both the losing and the gaining operators are obliged to notify the customer of the pending switch. the customer contract is through a reseller, the operator will be responsible for ensuring their reseller notifies the customer of the pending switch." that is the situation where, for example, some companies may sell to a retail customer call services, but they do not actually have a network themselves, but they have an arrangement perhaps with a network operator, so in that sense the reseller will be the front man with the customer and he will sell it and be responsible for it, but he will, as it were, use the services of another CPS operator.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

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MR BARLING: "The minimum content of the notification is specified in the 'Notification to Customer of CPS service switchover' section below."

So there is a minimum content for this notification letter that is agreed, but no restrictions.

THE CHAIRMAN: That is on page 35.

MR BARLING: Absolutely.

THE CHAIRMAN: The sample on page 36 is, curiously, in Latin.

I do not know whether you would like to translate it at some stage.

MR BARLING: I have not tried to translate it - it may not even make sense. I recognise bath in the third line, but I do not know what it has to do with Bath.

THE CHAIRMAN: It is something to do with parsimonious farmers in the Bath region.

MR BARLING: Yes. Going back to page 35, the third bullet point, "the text of the paragraphs is not restricted but should not detract from or confuse the customer with respect to the minimum information requirements ..."

So as far as the industry is concerned, first of all there is an obligation to notify the losing operator, because obviously you have an obligation to notify the access operator, and as between themselves the industry has not placed any restrictions on, for example, marketing information, other than it must not be confusing in certain respects.

THE CHAIRMAN: Can you just remind me, what is the CLI?

MR BARLING: Customer line identification, or calling line identification.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

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BARLING: I think I will carry on before I show you the other End to End Process for a moment and just follow through, so as not to get too far out of line. The conclusion we draw in paragraph 71 from all this is that there is express provision for the losing provider to have notice of the switch, whether or not it is also the Access Operator." This all, in a sense, chimes in with issues such as can this possibly be confidential and so on and so forth. They have agreed that it should go without restriction, so, clearly, the implication is that none of these industry players think, or thought, certainly not when agreeing this, that there was something to be restricted, as to the use to which it could be put.

Then we have a heading, "OFCOM accepts that BT or a losing provider can put the information to certain uses."

this only serves to demonstrate what we have called the absurdity of OFCOM's position. It is artificial to say that the information is provided for a long list of purposes, but not save activity. Then we say that OFCOM's list has a number of items which do not overlap with any conceivable purposes of the gaining provider, and I took you to paragraph 100 of Ms Wallace's witness statement in relation to that point before lunch.

Of course, all this is premised on the CPSO's assumed purpose, which is a fallacy because the real provider of this information to BT is not the CPSO but the customer, and I believe I have made that point already.

There are considerable benefits, and to some extent this is not controversial, as we saw from the local loop unbundling letter sent by Oftel. Allowing the losing provider to discuss with his customer the fact that the customer intends to switch has benefits, and it has always been accepted that one of the benefits of this is that slamming is reduced. Slam, ming is a big problem, everybody accepts it is a big problem. Mr Steggles deals with it in some detail, and perhaps I could give you the references to where he deals with that, because it is very important background to this. It is in his first witness statement at paragraphs 46 to 51 and 63 onwards, and in his second statement at paragraphs 49 onwards and 69 onwards. He deals with not just slamming, but all forms of mis-selling. I forget what the percentage is, but a significant percentage of all CPS orders received at the BT Wholesale gateway are actually without the authorization or knowledge of the customer. accepts that this happens, and the first the customer knows is when he gets a bill.

THE CHAIRMAN: Is there any quantitative information about that?

MR BARLING: There is in Mr Steggles' first witness statement.

38 THE CHAIRMAN: Paragraph 68.

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MR BARLING: That is it, I am grateful.

THE CHAIRMAN: Since you have been complying with this direction and the process, according to you there has been no effective means of combatting slamming, is that the situation?

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38 39 MR BARLING: There is nothing nearly as effective as being able to ring up the customer, but the notification of transfer letter goes out of course. That has always gone out, but the problem with that is that people do not always look at these things, it is just another circular about something - it is not a bill and therefore I do not have to deal with it. So obviously some people will read them and if they find that, to their horror, they have been slammed, they will probably ring up BT, but we do not have up to date figures - there is nothing more up to date than Mr Steggles' statement, so we do not know as it were what the effect has been of save calls no longer being made since 9 December. As far as I am aware we do not have that, but maybe we do. Excuse me a second, sir. (Mr Barling takes instructions). Mr smith actually tells me that OFCOM have recently published some figures about mis-selling, so there are some up to dated figures in the public domain. This is a consultation document headed "Protecting citizen consumers from mis-selling of fixed line telecoms service", and there is a deadline for comments of 3 June. This gives complaints made to the Regulator in respect of CPS set-up orders for various months in 2003 and up to february 2004. They range from 20 in 2003 to 220 in october 2003, with a whole range of others. So those are where people have actually complained to the regulator as opposed to simply complaining to BT. BT has its own figures for misselling complaints as well. In the same document these are also recorded up to February and, for example, the complaints raised by BT of unfair trading reports were 12,000 for February 2004.

THE CHAIRMAN: This is BT customers complaining to Bt.

MR BARLING: Yes, and BT then recording.

THE CHAIRMAN: Complaints about CPS transfer?

MR BARLING: Yes, out of 460,000 or so total CPS set-up

orders in february this year, there were 12,000 complaints raised with BT by BT customers. so the order of magnitude there is about 2.6% for february; it has been as high as 3.5% for december, so it is significant.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, thank you.

MR BARLING: So this is not an entirely negligible point, and one of the benefits as it were of being able to speak to your customer is to be able to find out whether they haded been slammed but also whether there is mis-selling taking place.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

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- MR BARLING: The other thing is of course the impact. Many people are sold products without knowing precisely whether they will still be able to carry on doing the same things that they have been doing when their calls were carried entirely by BT, and often people are surprised that they were not told, for example, that there are certain products that they will lose or nit automatically be able to carry on with, fir technical reasons, if they go for CPS.
- THE CHAIRMAN: That is something that could be regulated, could it not, by some kind of regulation with the other operators?
 - BARLING: Yes, it could, but if you just rely on the other operators of course the problem is they can ring up whoever they want, they can tell them whatever they want. It is only, according to this notification, the existing supplier who is not able to put their side of the case. Even if I look at it in an adversarial way, you are not able to point out anything to them, other than what OFCOM say, which is little more than saying "we understand you want to transfer, here is a number you can ring." So, yes, these things could be dealt with, certainly, and no doubt OFCOM will say that they are making all sorts of attempts to stop slamming and other forms of mis-selling, but as those figures indicate they are not entirely successful at the moment.

We do not shy away from the fact that the marketing is also important. Of course, it has these benefits of

slamming, the customer ought to know what the impact is on his existing service, but we go further and say that actually there is no reason why we should not be able to market and should not be able to do exactly the as the gainer has been doing to that particular customer. That is where the equal treatment, level playing field arguments, also are touched on.

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We are both in the same position because we are both, as it were, rivals for a particular customer, and the extraordinary thing is that OFCOM seem to accept that this kind of competition is healthy and they do not condemn it. If one looks, for example, at OFCOM's defence at paragraph 104, they are dealing here with the points that we took under the ECHR, the human rights provisions, and actually if one turns and looks over the page, the last sentence of paragraph 104: "Finally, there is no restriction on BT receiving equivalent information directly from the customer in question, or on BT using information provided by that source in whatever way it sees fit.

- THE CHAIRMAN: If the information actually did, in a particular case, come from the customer ----
- MR BARLING: As it did under the reply slip system.
- THE CHAIRMAN: As it did under the old system, there is no restriction, according to that, on what BT can say, "Do you really mean it and do you realise that this, that and the other follow from what you are doing?
- MR BARLING: In other places they have said it is very good.

 In the local loop unbundling letter it is very

 beneficial for people to be able to put their case and

 compete, so this is the absurdity of this.

In the middle of paragraph 96 of the defence they say "That assertion is simply factually incorrect. BT Retail can carry out any marketing, to any customers it wishes, and may compete vigorously with CPS ... (indeed OFCOM would encourage it to do so) so long as it does not contravene the regulations that bind it."

So they are not against us telling customers all these things we want to tell them, they just think that

because we now get it via the operator, that somehow means it has got to be condemned,. It really is as absurd as that, particularly - I keep harping on this, but it is important - when we only changed that system for other reasons. We say that does not matter because we still actually are getting this from the customer. They say you must get it directly, that seems to imply that they accept we are getting it indirectly from the customer now: we agree with that, we are getting it indirectly from our customer now.

THE CHAIRMAN: Would it be open to you to change the system back again?

MR BARLING: Quite possibly.

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THE CHAIRMAN: Could you say "We have walked into a trap here, we are going to change it back again"?

BARLING: Quite possibly, but we should not have to. industry agreed this change to streamline the process, so it would be extraordinary if the Regulator's action in this way were to oblige one to turn the clock back and unstreamline the process again in order to make clear what is already the case, that we get it from the customer. Now we have done it, of course, it is always difficult turning the clock back, and there may be issues about whether the retail contract itself could be changed so that customers give us notice, as is in fact often the case with many, many products, including telecoms products where you have to give notice if you want to terminate an arrangement. Our point is that really that underscores the absurdity, that we should not have to do that. So it does have benefits and we have set those out underneath in 74 and following.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

MR BARLING: In paragraph 78 we make reference to the notification of transfer letters that are, under the End to end process, required to be sent out. I have not yet shown you those, those are tab 46. We have got three versions here and chronologically they go from the back, so the earliest version, number 1 if you like, is Annex 3, the second of the two pages. That was, as it says,

used until the end of October last year, and if we can just glance at the wording you may think it is a pretty innocuous wording. (Pause for reading). You will note that it refers to the option to dial an override number, which is actually one of the services that the Directive requires; Article 19 of the Universal Service Directive requires that option to be there. So all that is being pointed out there is that if you go through with the transfer, you will still be able to dial an override code.

OFCOM were not happy with that, I think it was the marketing that they were not happy with.

- THE CHAIRMAN: Sorry, did you just say that the Universal service Directive requires the override?
- MR BARLING: Yes, that is in Article 19(1)(b). at the beginning of this bundle.
- THE CHAIRMAN: If you are obliged to provide the facility, on what basis are you prevented from telling the customer that the facility exists?
- MR BARLING: We are baffled, we simply do not understand. But this is all part of the GC1.2 vice at the moment; they are saying we are not to do it, but I will leave Ms Sharpson to explain that. So it was taken out of the final letter which you see at Annex 1, at the beginning of that tab 46.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

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MR BARLING: Number 2 softened what was regarded as a marketing thing. I think it was the bit "You will need to check with your new service provider which services are likely to be affected by this change and which services may not be available to you", so that went.

I think, in fairness to the other side, that they would probably say that what they really wanted to control was the save call, but they are in fact trying to control the save letters as you have seen as well, even though the industry did not think it was anything that needed to be restricted. We now do not know what we can say in a saved call; equally, we are not sure what we are allowed to put (unless we put absolutely nothing) in the

letters - the letter has got down to almost the point of saying absolutely nothing, other than giving a contact number. Certainly, they forbid anything which would be regarded as likely, possibly, to persuade the customer to think again. That seems to be the touchstone at any rate for what they say is prohibited, anything that could be construed as marketing activity. It might be that they might change their mind if they actually knew the neutral bare facts: is that marketing activity, just to tell them what the impact is, if it might change their minds? As you can see, we have erred on the side of caution in relation to the letter and we have stopped making save calls altogether.

- THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. I think Ms Simmons has got a question.
- SIMMONS: Did they actually ask BT to remove the 1280 MS reference?
- MR BARLING: There is correspondence about this. I think the position was, and we can check against the correspondence because I do not want to say anything that is unfair to OFCOM about this - they did raise a question mark about it, and because the date of 9 December (when we could be subject to penalties) was approaching, out of an abundance of caution, because a question had been raised about it, we removed it.
- 25 THE CHAIRMAN: I see.

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- Has that correspondence gone on at all, or has 26 SIMMONS: it just stopped because you have removed it?
 - It has stopped. BARLING: They were satisfied presumably MR with it being removed. They have not said "You should not have removed it" or anything of that kind.
 - THE CHAIRMAN: But it is still the case that the customer who is now being carried by another operator could dial 1280 and override.
- 34 MR BARLING: Yes.
- 35 THE CHAIRMAN: Although he does not necessarily know that he 36 can.
- MR BARLING: He will not know from us at all. 37
- THE CHAIRMAN: 38 If he doers nor know it from you, it is rather 39 doubtful whether he would know it from any other source.

MR BARLING: That is probably right, unless he goes to the public library, as OFCOM suggested in their evidence that people might, and digs out the Oftel Consumer Guide. It may be on the OFCOM website as well, but he would have to dig around, certainly.

Moving on now quite quickly, hopefully, paragraph 82 and onwards reiterates the points we have made about the information not genuinely coming from the gaining operator. He is effectively acting as an agent, as OFCOM seem to accept in paragraph 91 of Ms Wallace's statement, he is placing the order on behalf of the customer.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

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 MR BARLING: They say that that does not matter, whether he is an agent or not. It does not matter in what capacity he provides the information - if he provides it, that triggers 1.2.

Then in 85 we reiterate the absurdity of all this when given the reply slip system, and I have not shown you the trebly slip system s agreed in the end to end process. I do want to do that because Mr Moulson, whose witness statement you have, touches upon it. It is at tab 45. 43 was the existing one, 45 is the one that operated under that when the reply slip was being worked. Looking at internal page 9, part of the definitions section, "Reply Slip. The Reply Slip is the mechanism agreed within the industry to protect customers against unauthorised change to their service and is the authorization from the customer to their AO to allow the change."

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

MR BARLING: This is really quite an important document in setting out how this has all come about. Then 2.2.1 deals with the content of the reply slip when it comes from the customer, and again it is being returned to their Access Operator. Then over the page the design has been agreed, and over on page 35 we have the minimum requirements: reply slip, return envelope, and then it says even the address it has got to be sent to, which is BT Plc in Durham. Mr Moulson, you will recall, said that

that was BT Retail, so that the retail people could put it into their scanning equipment there.

then at page 39 you see (not in Latin this time) a photocopy of the letter as it might be designed, over the page 40, and then passage 3.2 on page 43: "Customers, via their chosen operators, will arrange the setting-up. CPSOs [this is important] will raise electronic orders on the customer's behalf with the customer's access Operator to set up the CPS service". So they are acting as agents.

then skipping two or three pages we come to page 48, paragraph 3.4.1 which is very important. "Carrier Pre-selection set-up orders have two elements, a computer-operator request from the CPS Operator to the customer's Access operator to arrange CPS; a reply slip from the customer to their Access Operator to vary their retail relationship with the Access Operator to enable CPS." So that is what is happening, that is the customer's request. So this reflects all those regulatory requirements and the requirements in the Directive. That is what is being done.

In the next paragraph: @The customer completes the reply slip and sends it to their AO. The CPSO processes the customer order and negotiates service set-up internally, then raises the CPS set up order to the customer's AO."

Then "Order Validation" 3.4.2.1 - these are the kinds of things that Mr Moulson was dealing with on page 49 of the end to End Process. So those are the passages we draw to your attention in relation to the former system; it speaks for itself, we say. Nothing has changed in substance, it is just that we have streamlined it.

Then we come to confidentiality in paragraph 88. There is not much on page 25 of the skeleton that I have not already covered. It deals with the specific arguments made by OFCOM and basically refutes them. Basically what OFCOM is saying is that somehow confidentiality is inferred in a number of different

ways. In one place they say it can be inferred just by the transmission of this information by the CPSO to BT triggers confidentiality. Then in other places they say, in a rather circular way, that anything to which GC1.2 applies is confidential information, which is not entirely helpful.

We have quoted in paragraph 91 - although in a wholly different context the sentiments we submit are rather in point - that bearing in mind this is an entirely fortuitous result, really what is happening or attempted here is to distort the law of confidence, and really that should not be.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

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 MR BARLING: In relation to the potential justification put forward by OFCOM, paragraph 92, those (a), (b), (c), (d) are all the different ways in which it is said that confidentiality arises, and we deal with all of those in the succeeding paragraphs. Can I just make one basic point, which is that it is really ludicrous to suggest that it is provided in confidence, in circumstances where the CPSO could not possibly have said that, had the system remained under the reply card. Nothing really has changed.

the first point is that it is passed on with strict limits as t its use - that simply is not right. There are no express limitations placed on the use of the information by the gaining provider at the time when the information is provided; nothing of that kind happens in practice. Indeed, it is interesting to note, as I have already pointed out, that the interveners said, when consulted on 1.2, that you did not really need it at all, confidentiality agreements dealt with all this. Taking your point, sir, if we reverted to our normal practice of having the information directly, even OFCOM would accept that we would be free to use it in whatever way we wanted - see paragraph 104 of the defence.

THE CHAIRMAN: If we were on article 4(3) instead of on GC1.2, you could perhaps argue that Article 4(3) had two separate and self-standing obligations: one, to use the

information for the purpose for which it was supplied and, two, to reflect at all times the confidentiality. Therefore, one could perhaps argue that irrespective of the information status as confidential or not, it was supplied for a particular purpose and should not be used for some other purpose. The argument would be well what was thew purpose for which it was provided and what is the purpose for which it is sought to be used.

However, in GC1.2, just reading it, the obligation to use the information solely for the purpose for which it is supplied, appears to be subordinate to the requirement that the information is confidential in the first place, so that two possibly distinct obligations seem to be elided under the same umbrella in GC1.2.

MR BARLING: With respect, yes, and that is obviously because the Director General took the view (we say rightly) that this is only dealing with confidential information.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, quite.

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MR BARLING: And that is the way it is put in the Oftel consultation papers, protection of confidential information, because if information were not to be confidential it would not be a restriction on negotiating interconnection agreements, and that, one recalls from the preamble to the Access Directive or possibly the Interconnection Directive, I have forgotten which now, was the reason for this, there should be no restrictions on the freedom to negotiate, and of course not having protection for your information that you have to disclose in the course of negotiations would be a restriction.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

MR BARLING: But it would not be a restriction if it was not confidential information, because you would not mind.

THE CHAIRMAN: It also takes us a little bit into the Interveners' argument that there is a difference between information supplied in confidence and information that is confidential.

MR BARLING: Yes.

THE CHAIRMAN: If there is such a distinction.

MR BARLING: I struggle at the moment to find that there is.

Confidentiality can arise no doubt in different ways,
but ultimately ...

THE CHAIRMAN: But not here.

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 MR BARLING: Yes. Paragraphs 93 onwards really knock down (a), (b), (c) and (d). Strict limits are dealt with, not all information passed between a gaining and a losing provider is acquired in confidence. They say that does not matter, it becomes confidential just because it is transmitted; "Similarly, by definition", they say, "all information to which GC1.2 applies is confidential", and I have already pointed out that that is a rather circular argument, that is the problem. We have to decide what information it does apply to, apart from anything else.

Then we say OFCOM's approach is simply wrong. It is not clear where the principle that they adopt is derived from, there is certainly nothing in Article 4(3) to support it. There is an interest in freedom of information, both in imparting and receiving it, which should only be circumscribed in clearly defined situations. Secondly, their approach is circular. Thirdly, it is impossibly wide: the most innocuous information will be covered as well as information which the losing provider has an overwhelming and legitimate interest in transferring to a third party.

then they may the point that it is the very person whose interests tend to be harmed who has to pass it across to BT, and therefore it should be protected, but the reply card is the answer to that. It is just incidental - their protection, if they succeeded in claiming it, would be wholly incidental and fortuitous. We say if you concentrate on the route by which the information is conveyed, rather than on the true course of the information, it produces anomalies, and we give the example of the transfer between two CPS Operators, neither of whom are interconnected.

THE CHAIRMAN: Is that likely to be a very common example, or is that still relatively unusual?

MR BARLING: I do not think it is completely uncommon, that

if people are mainly getting what they need via the BT Network they might not bother to negotiated between themselves, particularly if they are regional rather than national. I suspect if they are national they would have to have an interconnection agreement, but maybe cable companies who are regional do not.

THE CHAIRMAN: The regionals would just be some regional cable company.

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- MR BARLING: I am sorry, I misunderstood your question. I think the answer is that it is increasingly common that two there would be two rival CPSOs, one of which would not be BT.
- THE CHAIRMAN: Who do not have an interconnection agreement with each other, but each has one with BT.
- BARLING: Yes. We point out the anomaly in paragraph 99 MR and we refer again to Source Informatics and Simon Brown LJ (as he then was) who proposes a sort of conscience test, does it affect one's conscience is really the acid test, or should it affect one's conscience? be useful to apply to this case, when it is information we are entitled to under the regulatory system, always have been and we have always received it directly, it is our customer who is changing. We obliged, to streamline the process, and received it by another route: I think one can safely say that BT's conscience is not remotely affected, neither should it be, by using this information for save activity, as well as all the customer protection benefits and the fair competition benefits that are engendered, if we are able to do that. If that is the test, then we pass it with flying colours; it is clearly not confidential information.

Then the fourth point, is the information of value? We deal with that in paragraph 102, effectively making the same points again. In relation to that, we do know, and it is important, that the Interveners have put forward a concern which is simply imaginary. They say hang on, this means that you - this is paragraph 11 of Mr Bangs' statement - BT as Access Operator and wholesale supplier has to honour its position and not abuse it, the

suggestion being that even where we were not the losing operator we would carry out marketing activity to the customer whose identification we had discovered. This is, as Mr Steggles' has said in his second witness statement, absolutely not the case. There is no question that BT has ever acted in this way or would ever act in this way, so we can reassure the Interveners entirely on that score. In fact, in those circumstances, as Mr Steggles has said, BT Retail - the people who have to make the save call - do not see the customer information in those cases.

THE CHAIRMAN: How are you getting on, Mr Barling?

MR BARLING: Might I crave a few more minutes, but I am increasing I hope in speed now. Ms Sharpson says she is very happy for me to continue, but the Tribunal probably is not, but I expect quarter of an hour would do it.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

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- MR BARLING: In terms of confidentiality, I think our conclusions are set out there at paragraph 106.
- THE CHAIRMAN: 104 of your skeleton, if I may say so, reflects the difference of philosophy between the two sides in this case as it were. I think you can see nothing wrong as the losing provider having equal opportunity, as you put it, to put your case to the customer so you can hold on to the customer; the Regulator sees arguments going the other way and risks arising if you have that save opportunity.
- MR BARLING: He does and he does not, because bear in mind that he also says if we get the information directly from the customer we can do what we like with it and good luck to us.

THE CHAIRMAN: I see.

MR BARLING: So you are right, this is the impossible position they have put themselves in because they are trying to ride two horses. They say it is fine for you to do it, but because you get it indirectly and not directly you cannot do it at all, but there is not really much in their evidence about what a rotten thing it is if you can do it, and there could not really be, given what

they have said in the past about, on the whole, it being rather a good consumer protection safeguard.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

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MR BARLING: Then at the bottom of that page (29) the heading relates to the differences of wording. I have really touched on this to a considerable extent already, and when we were doing the reply, which we have incorporated in this respect into the skeleton, we set out verbatim the passages of the various cases, in particular the Wells case and the case against X that we rely upon, as well as the Advocate General in the Netherlands case from whom we have quoted verbatim. I do not propose therefore to take you to these cases, they are all in the bundle.

THE CHAIRMAN: We can look at them.

MR BARLING: But the principles that we rely upon, I hope I have accurately summarised this morning, and the submission based on those principles is that Ms Sharpson and OFCOM are trying to do something which Community law does not allow them to do - based on principles of legal certainty mainly - which is to increase our obligations by reference to the words of the Directive and distance themselves in that regard from the implementing measures.

As the Advocate General put it, "... Member States must define a specific legal framework in the sector concerned which ensures that the national legal system complies with the provisions of the directive ... That framework must be designed in such a way as to remove all doubt or ambiguity ..." So if they do not like GC1.2, they cannot just write out, airbrush out of it, the words "acquired in confidence" and "acquired in connection with and solely for the purpose of."

THE CHAIRMAN: So you would submit you cannot be in contravention of a provision that has not removed all doubt or ambiguity.

MR BARLING: Yes, and the benefit of any doubt - if there is any doubt - or ambiguity, contrary to what they say, we submit goes to the defendant, us, because principles of legal certainty would require that and possibly other

fundamental principles as well.

THE CHAIRMAN: So that even if, for example, there was vires to make condition 1.2 because you could find sufficient relationship between that and Article 4(3), if it was not clear exactly what it was that was prohibited by GC1.2, you would, on your submission, still succeed because it has not been sufficiently clear.

MR BARLING: precisely. We do make that point in a slightly different point in relation to if their interpretation is correct.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

 MR BARLING: Therefore, may I leave those points on legal provisions as a matter of Community law and take those paragraphs in the skeleton as read?

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

MR BARLING: Competitive advantage. Here OFCOM say we are not relying on any infringement because you have passed on to BT Retail - this is paragraphs 16 and 184 of their skeleton. So they say we pin our flag to the mast of "use for a purpose other than intended". They have a problem in that approach, in our submission. They do that in order to escape from the difficulty that if they are complaining about us passing it on, then they have to show that there is an unfair competitive advantage. I have added in the word "unfair" because we agree with what Oftel said in the tab 12 document, that "competitive advantage" means "unfair competitive advantage".

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

MR BARLING: So they seek to avoid having to prove an unfair competitive advantage to BT by saying "We are not relying on you passing it on to BT Retail, we are relying on the first sentence and the fact that you have used it for a purpose." First of all, their notification, in its explanatory memorandum, clearly finds a breach of passing on. I will just give you the paragraph numbers: s.8 and 3.21 onwards which indicate that BT has infringed GC1.2 in relation to passing on the information. Also, the complaint by THUS relating to passing on: see paragraph 2.4 of the Notification.

Here though the problem for them is this. In this case it is accepted that BT is allowed to pass on information to BT Retail, and in that regard it is difficult for them to escape the need to show an unfair competitive advantage. If they are trying to control what can be done in relation to the passing on, as they are doing, and saying you can tell your customers this but not that, they cannot escape the need to show an unfair competitive advantage. We submit that they cannot show an unfair competitive advantage, they do not really even attempt to do so.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

MR BARLING: We deal with it in slightly more detail in paragraphs 114 to 116, but I am going to, if I may, ask the tribunal to take those paragraphs as read.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, we will.

- MR BARLING: I turn then to effectively the final submission, which is that there is no problem in relation to section 47 of the Act or in relation to general principles of European law, if our interpretation of GC1.2 is right. We submit that problems only arise if OFCOM's strange interpretation is thought to be unavoidable.
- THE CHAIRMAN: If that interpretation is right, then according to you it is disproportionate, unequal, uncertain, not transparent and contrary to human rights.
- MR BARLING: To mention but a few.
- THE CHAIRMAN: Among others.)(Laughter).
 - MR BARLING: One laughs because we have prayed in aid all those general principles, but if something is wrong it generally tends to offend quite a lot of different things, and this does.
 - THE CHAIRMAN: I was not short-changing your submission, I was just summarising it.
 - MR BARLING: I know. Section 47 does encapsulate certain of the general principles, including transparency and discrimination, but we rely on the fact that those principles come in from two different sources. They come in from section 47, so all conditions set under these

provisions of the Communications At must comply with those principles because section 47 says so.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

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MR BARLING: Equally, even if it did not say that they would have to, because in so far as GC1.2 is implementing Article 4(3) of the Directive - and I know I am teaching my grandmother to such eggs here - the general principles would apply in any event. This is not controversial, if one, just for one's note, looks at paragraph 50 of OFCOM's skeleton which shows that they accept that general principles apply independently of section 47.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

BARLING: So without worrying too much about how they apply, effectively one can look at them, and there is not an enormous amount to add to the way we put it under the heads of proportionality, equal treatment and transparency or legal certainty. May I take equal treatment and proportionality as read; perhaps the case is most apparent under equal treatment because what is being done here is effectively giving a privileged position to one advocate, the gaining provider, whilst tying a gag around the mouth of the losing provider. There is a clear breach, in our submission, of the principle of equal treatment here in the effect of GC1.2 or indeed of the notification. Equally important, we submit, is transparency and legal certainty, because we are, as I have said on a number of occasions, genuinely in a quandary as to what is really said to be forbidden and what is not. I probably do not improve that point if I add to it, but perhaps all I can do is ask the Tribunal when considering this to glance at paragraph 3.3.2 to 3.3.4 of the Notification itself.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

MR BARLING: In which the Director explains to BT what it is and what it is not allowed to do in relation to thew industry agreed letter, Notification of Transfer letter that I showed you. This is part of the explanation really, I think, of what the implications of this are.

What he is saying is that the letter is a vital consumer

protection measure and therefore you should keep it; however, the Director would expect BT to remove any marketing information. question: what is marketing information? what they say in their definition of save activity is that it is anything in an attempt to persuade that customer not to transfer, so anything that could be construed as an attempt to persuade a customer not to transfer is save activity (marketing information) forbidden.

How do we know? I have made the points already about the inevitable impact on neutral information. So we do not know what it covers, we do not know whether we can tell the customer about things that will happen after transfer such as the 1280 material. These are just examples of the lack of clarity that will ensue. As I have said, if you compare paragraph 20 of the OFCOM skeleton with paragraph 168 of their skeleton, OFCOM do not know either, they do not know whether it applies to neutral information or not.

If, however, BT's interpretation is right and this information in GC1.2 is dealing with proper information which the industry understands perfectly properly what it amounts to, confidentiality of negotiations for interconnection, there is simply no problem with any of this, these problems do not arise. In our submission, the fact that they do arise shows the interpretation to be wholly wrong.

That just leaves the ECHR points which, again, we have covered here, m and I would ask you to take those as read.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

MR BARLING: There is a missing reference in paragraph 127 where you see the square brackets; it should be 3.4.1. Then there is a summary and so on, so unless there is any other specific question or I have missed anything out at the moment, those are my submissions.

THE CHAIRMAN: unless my colleagues have any questions? No. Thank you very much.

MR BARLING: Thank you.

THE CHAIRMAN: Ms Sharpson, I think we will just take a five minutes break, if we may, before we start.

(short adjournment).

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, Ms Sharpson.

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38 39 MS SHARPSON: Sir, I wonder if I could begin by making a number of general points which are very general but, like Mr Barling, I feel that they are quite important in terms of getting an understanding of why the Regulator has adopted the position that it has in this case.

Perhaps I could begin with a rather trite illustration by saying that changing the provider of calls is not the same as changing whom one chooses to have as one's banker. If I have a bank account and I, for one reason or another, decide that a different bank would offer me more interesting products, I do not have to tell my existing bank anything at all, I can shop around in the marketplace, I can draw down the balance that is in my bank account in cash, place it with somebody else, and there is no way that my existing bank knows whom I have gone to. There is no requirement that I notify; but in due course of course they are going to be able to work out that very little seems to be moving in my account, which used to look quite healthy and now has 5p in it, and at that stage, probably, they would like to contact me and ask me what is going on and whether they can entice me to come back to them.

Choosing to change one's supplier to CPS is not like that. It is not like that because network access is essential to the supply of the product. Unless, there is an interconnection arrangement in place, there is no point in even thinking about CPS, it would be a fine idea but there is no way of getting it to happen. That is why we say that it is very important to keep this link in mind. It is perfectly true that there is an access agreement an arrangement at the wholesale level, there is a wholesale relationship between BT and the individual CPSOs. Unless that wholesale relationship exists, it is impossible to do anything. That must colour one's understanding of the fact that CPS is being sold as a

product to a particular end consumer.

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The second point that I should like to make is the point in relation to making arrangements for each customer, because the way in which Mr Barling puts the case seeks to limit the application of General Condition 1.2 to a very narrow scenario from one where there is actual negotiation happening between BT, the network operator, and a would-be provider. He said that oaf course there will be confidentiality arrangements that one can expect to see in such a context, and indeed he took you to such an arrangement. We say - and I will be inviting you to look at the evidence of Ms Wallace to complement what you have already been shown - that when one looks at what actually happens when, to use Mr Barling's phrase, BT "twiddles the knobs", what is going on is in fact the making of an arrangement, such that it is possible for the calls of that particular individual customer to be routed to his or her chosen provider. Without the twiddling of those knobs the routing does not happen, and that twiddling of knobs requires a modification to the arrangements, it requires something more than the structural framework arrangement that was previously in place.

- THE CHAIRMAN: When GC1.2 refers to "before, during and after the process of negotiating network access" are we talking about the original framework negotiations, or are we talking about the twiddling of knobs for the individual customer, or possibly both?
- MS SHARPSON: Sir, I say that it is certainly not limited to just the original negotiation of the interconnection agreement, and I say that because there is in fact technology moves on and of course the market moves on a continuing relationship between any CPSO and the network provider.
- THE CHAIRMAN: Do you say, for the purposes of this case, that what we are inaccurately and crudely calling the twiddling of knobs is within the words "before, during and after the process of negotiating network access ..."?

 It is in fact the network access that we are talking

about.

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 MS SHARPSON: I do say it is the network access. I say further that if one is merely looking at the framework agreement, the framework agreement is itself not something that is completely static because there is a continuing relationship, there is a need for further negotiation, further modification. I say that if one looks at what needs to happen in terms of the Access Directive, what is happening here is indeed within the meaning of article 2, making available facilities or services for the purposes of providing electronic communications services.

THE CHAIRMAN: In relation to an individual customer.

MS SHARPSON: Sir, yes. While I am making a point about the Access Directive, perhaps I can just say this, that of course we accept that there is the limitation of the definition of access in the Access Directive to dealings between operators. We say that is for a perfectly simple and obvious treason, the reason is that avoids the situation in which end users would be requiring access to the network, and it is not about that.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

MS SHARPSON: But providing CPS to the customer is not about that, the customer is provided with CPS as a product, but that product can only be supplied to the customer if the operator has the access. You have my point, sir.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

MS SHARPSON: The next point that I wanted to make is that if one takes this in perhaps rather a simple way, the CPS Operator has to provide some information, a bundle of information, that identifies both the customer and the gaining operator. If that information is not provided, then the customer does nt get CPS. The information is provided for a specific purpose, the purpose is described in a generic way as being "to facilitate the transfer", to make sure that the customer can then use the gaining operator as the route for calls. When BT uses that information in order to supply further marketing information to the customer, and/or make a call to the

customer to clarify the position and to discuss with the customer, the purpose that BT was using that information for was not, I would suggest rather plainly, the purpose of facilitating the transfer.

THE CHAIRMAN: You would say it was the opposite.

MS SHARPSON: I would say it was the opposite, yes. I would say it is called generically the "save" activity because save activity is quite a good shorthand way of describing it, it is a way of saving the customer for BT.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

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Indeed, if one looks at the correspondence SHARPSON: from BT and the way in which they have complied with the notification, the mechanism which they disabled in order to break the link was between the database and a very specific marketing tool. It is very clear that the activity is to save the customer for BT. So I do say that if one just bears in mind the plain wording of general Condition 1.2, before one even goes and looks at Article 4(3) of the Directive, it is relatively easy to see how that use of information could seem to the regulator to be a use for a purpose other than that for I venture to suggest which the information was provided. at the outset that that rather simple way of looking at it is, in fact, the correct one.

Sir, the next point that I wish to make is in relation to the information, because my learned friend Mr Barling, who is a very excellent advocate, has referred repeatedly to the information as being information about the customer identity. Indeed, if one looks at the way in which, in the BT skeleton argument, the question for determination is stated, the primary issue for determination in this appeal (paragraph 6 of the BT skeleton) the way that he puts the question to you, sir, and your colleagues is whether General Condition 1.2 applies in circumstances where BT receives notification (indirectly via the gaining CPS Operator) of its customer's proposal to switch ... and uses that information ..." and so on.

That focuses on the customer ID part of the

information that is communicated, but, sir, the information that is communicated is a bundle of information. As you saw when Mr Barling took you through the detail under the old system, you need to know about the customer, m about the line that is affected and you also obviously need to know who the gaining operator is. That the information must be regarded as a bundle can be tested by asking the question, if you remove an element of the information, will what you are left with be of any use? The answer, I suggest, is no. You have to have that combination of information.

THE CHAIRMAN: What is in the bundle? The identity of the customer.

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 MS SHARPSON: Sir, if I may, I will take you to it a bit later, but it is a combination of information about the customer and information about the gaining CPS operator.

Although one obviously understands why it is put in this way, trying to disaggregate that bundle of information and say it is really all information about the customer and BT has a right to know this, just does not work, because it is only the bundle of information which serves to facilitate the transfer, as a bundle.

The next point is in relation to general conditions, and it is one that you picked up in discussion with my learned friend. It is that the general conditions are indeed general conditions. Unlike the earlier regime, this is a condition that relates to everyone, and so the question that the Tribunal has to decide is the proper interpretation of General Condition 1.2 in relation to everyone, not uniquely in relation to BT.

I will be coming back to the confidentiality point, obviously, later on in detailed submissions, but perhaps I may make a general point at this stage, again by asking a question: whether information is confidential can sometimes best be tested by asking who would mind if it was in somebody else's hands? I ask the question whether either BT or the gaining CPSO would be happy if a third party CPSO were to be handed the packaged of information,

the bundle, to which I have just referred, the bundle which would tell them that there was a particular existing BT customer who was footloose, interested in looking for an alternative provider for calls. Would either BT or the gaining CPSO be happy at disclosure of that information? Once again, perhaps naively one suspects, the answer is probably no, they would think that that information was certainly sensitive and perhaps if it is commercially sensitive one is part of the way towards thinking that it is confidential.

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 There is another point that I need to make at the beginning, which is in relation to the past history of the system adopted by the Regulator because, again very understandably, Mr Barling has taken you to the development of these conditions and to various statements that have been made by Oftel, the precursor to OFCOM, in this regard, and then statements which seem to point towards a more restrictive interpretation of general Condition 1.2.

It is perfectly true that the position of the Regulator has evolved, and I do not seek to pretend otherwise. This is a new situation, there is a new framework of EC measures, a new package of directives that were put in place. Although it is true that CPS, in some form, using a manual prefix or using an autodialler existed before, permanent CPS with routing is relatively new. The Regulator is under a duty to oversee the market, to investigate, to look at what is happening and to take a view, and one would add cannot really be limited or constrained by the steps that were taken along the way and by a series of previous statements which were all non-binding statements but which represented an understanding of where one had got to at a particular point.

THE CHAIRMAN: On the other hand, he has to take that view as it were with European spectacles on, bearing in mind that we are dealing with European directives, and ask himself - or at least we have to ask ourselves - what ultimately was the meaning that the European Parliament and the

Council of Ministers intended this Directive to have at the time it was adopted.

3 MS SHARPSON: Indeed. Sir, I do rely on the need for the
4 Regulator to wear European spectacles, and something that
5 I wanted to try and deal with quite early on in my
6 submission is indeed the *Mar Leasing* consistent
7 interpretation, imposition of burdens issue, because
8 obviously it is important.

While I am dealing with general points, can I just make one or two more? In a number of places in the written submissions and, again, orally, BT has laid great emphasis upon the role that it plays in contacting its customers, in providing information, in consumer protection. Perhaps I am putting it a little bluntly when I say that one could almost be forgiven for thinking that BT saw itself as having a function as the industry policeman in this regard; actually BT is not the industry policeman, it is a player among other players in the market.

20 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

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MS SHARPSON: The industry policeman is the Regulator and the Regulator has the specific duty and has the means to oversee what is happening in the market and, where necessary, to issue the necessary directions to try to keep the market operating smoothly.

My learned friend made a great deal of the antislamming letter and the issues of consumer protection there, and it is perfectly true that the Notification of Transfer letter is not 100% effective, but it is thought by the Regulator to represent a reasonable balance between protecting consumers and promoting competition.

It will be necessary to go to Ms Wallace's witness statement at a number of points, but could I perhaps ask you to look at paragraphs 112 through to 125? It is at the beginning of binder 1, under tab 2 in the OFCOM bundle of documents. If I can quickly take you through this passage, because such reliance is placed by BT on this. The anti-slamming component is the information component in the Notification of Transfer letter, it is

saying to the customer "We have been told by a gaining CPS that you want to switch", and obviously if they do not it means that something rather unorthodox has happened.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

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 MS SHARPSON: It is not the persuasive marketing part, that is a different element. The switchover period of ten days is precisely intended to make sure that consumers have the opportunity to stop the process, and that is applicable whatever the sales or marketing channel by which the original sale came. The issue is the use of the information for a different purpose from the purpose for which it was intended.

Ms Wallace then goes on, at paragraph 115 and following, to identify a range of anti-slamming consumer protection measures that have already been put in place and other measures that are being put in place. There is reference there to a consumer guide and a joint CPS/Wholesale Line Rental guide which is in draft form, available on the website, the generic consumer guides that are distributed generically and given to a number of places where ordinary citizens probably go.

There are (paragraph 117) some CPS operators whose heads perhaps stick up above the parapet a little, and with whom discussions have been initiated, since these seem to be the ones, from consumer complaints statistics, who are having the greatest problems with the sales activities.

THE CHAIRMAN: What can you actually do to these people if you find they are breaking the ground rules?

MS SHARPSON: Initially, you can certainly have discussions as the Regulator ---

THE CHAIRMAN: What is the ultimate sanction?

MS SHARPSON: What are simply called "Stop now" orders. So given that one wishes to be a market player in that particular market, that is indeed a very striking sanction.

Sir, it is of course a balance between what Mr Barling rightly described as an attempt to have a light

regulatory touch, while at the same time ensuring that the market does operate correctly, and those discussions and those guidelines that are put in place are all part of trying to have the light regulatory touch. One has guidelines that apply on a voluntary only basis, but if that does not work then you tighten up the arrangements and you begin to apply teeth to the way in which you control the market.

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 The final point I would make in this context, sir, is in relation to the figures that Mr barling was giving you. My instructions are that in fact the regulator has been told by BT that not all of the 12,000 that you were quoted are in fact complaints. Some of them are issues that the customer does not actually want to complain about, so any data in this area is probably a little bit unreliable. It is certain that there is a situation about slamming, and that needs addressing. For the same period as there was the 12,000 figure for BT, february 2004, from the same source, the consultation document on protecting citizen consumers from the mis-selling of fixed line telecommunications services, the number of complaints to the Regulator was 53.

THE CHAIRMAN: Have we got that document in our papers?

MS SHARPSON: I think not, but since it came out in this form only on 29 April I hope you will forgive both parties for not having lodged it earlier.

THE CHAIRMAN: There has been a bank holiday in the meantime.

MS SHARPSON: Perhaps we could make it available.

THE CHAIRMAN: No, we can find it on the website, if we need it.

MS SHARPSON: Sir, whatever would be most convenient.

THE CHAIRMAN: You might just track down for me - not now but when convenient - tell us under what powers that stop now order is made.

MS SHARPSON: Certainly. sir, again, in dealing with general points, can I go back to the statement I had begun to make about the new directives? There is a package of new Directives and it is a new regime that we say has to be read together with the Framework Directive

over the top. There are cross-links between the various Directives is, as we say, pretty evident. You, sir, indeed, identified very swiftly one of those links in discussion with Mr Barling when you pointed out that Article 19(2) of the Universal Service Directive takes you back of course to the Access Directive. So we say that as themes behind the new package we do fined competition and we find consumer protection, so it would be wrong to exclude those elements from one's mind when looking at the interpretation of provisions within the package. Some measures are clearly more specifically directed at fair competition and consumer protection than others, but overall one is looking at integrating a market and having a level playing field (in the famous phrase) which is with ex ante regulation rather than always ex post regulation, and therefore one is looking for terms of the Directives and the General Conditions that give effect to them, which are intended to be given a meaning for everyone, and one that bears in mind those principles of competition and consumer protection. sorry, these are very obvious points, but it is important to make them at this stage.

THE CHAIRMAN: No, they are very well worth making.

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MS SHARPSON: while I am trying to get general points out of the way, may I just recall the points that were made as summary points at the beginning of the skeleton argument, because it is quite easy when one gets into the detail to lose sight of those summary points. Could I ask you just to turn up the skeleton, starting at paragraph 6? The first bit we do not need to worry about because those are the points that have been put on behalf ---

THE CHAIRMAN: Where do you want us to go to?

MS SHARPSON: OFCOM's skeleton, sir, beginning at paragraph 13, which begins with the European spectacles phrase.

THE CHAIRMAN: These are the seven elements that have become nine.

MS SHARPSON: Seven have become nine, indeed, sir. It sometimes happens that when one looks more closely one sees that one should have been a little bit more

circumspect, even when following so beguiling an opponent as Mr Barling and Ms Lea and following the way they divide things up. We do say that probably it analyses better in terms of nine elements rather than seven, and we say that there are free-standing obligations one can identify within General Condition 1.2: the obligation not to use the information for a purpose other than that for which it was provided, respecting confidentiality and not passing on the information. This is the structure which we say mirrors the structure in Article 4(3) of the Directive, and we say that indeed the condition is meant to implement it and implement it properly, and I say for emphases: therefore, we are not, for example, in the territory where a Member State has failed to put something in place and, quite independently therefore, the national implementing measure is trying to go back to the Directive in order to impose an obligation. not this situation; we have a national implementing measure in the shape of General Condition 1.2 which we say does in fact do what the Directive is meant to do, and so we use the Directive as a gloss, as an aid to interpretation, but we say that we do not have to go back to the Directive to fill in the gaps.

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THE CHAIRMAN: So we are not thinking of wells v Secretary of State for Transport.

SHARPSON: Sir, I do not think we are as far as Wells, although since you raise Wells with me, Wells is perhaps relevant in this sense, that Mr Barling put his point to you this morning - if I understood him correctly - as saying that we were not entitled to impose a penal obligation which was not to be found in the national implementing measure, but he went further and he said we were not entitled to impose any extra burden, or additional or heavy burden. At least, that is how I understood him. Of course, in Wells one does have a situation where it was indeed burdensome to the mining companies who had their licence already to be told that actually there ought to be have been an Environmental Impact assessment. They probably thought that these were

circumstances in which it was not necessary to have an EIA, and it certainly produced a result that was "adverse" to them, but nevertheless the ECJ was prepared to say that that Directive could be relied on and that the principle of consistent interpretation in giving effect to the Directive was - I would not exactly say was more important than the third party rights, but was not to be denied simply because there would be an extra burden on a third party.

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THE CHAIRMAN: It cannot create obligations, but might have some adverse consequences.

MS SHARPSON: It may have adverse consequences, and obviously what we have here is precisely a general condition, and there are different market players. is burdensome to BT is something that may produce a fair marketplace for a CPSO, and one needs to look at the two sides. But I do say that in the case law we are well away from the type of argument that is to be found in the Commission v Netherlands, that is to be found in Arcaro, where the court says you as the Member State, having failed to put something into the implementation, cannot then turn round and snatch the missing words out of the Directive in order to write in an obligation that you failed to put there, because I say that general Condition 1.2 when read sensibly in context does what it needs to do and bears the interpretation for which we contend.

Sir, perhaps in this context I should also just make one point on whether this is quasi penal, because Mr Barling has been making that suggestion to you and it is right I should make the position clear. OFCOM does not accept that this is a situation which is necessarily quasi penal because it is not one where, automatically, one triggers a criminal penalty, and this comes back round to the structure of sections 94, 95A and 96.

THE CHAIRMAN: we are going back to the - oh dear.

MS SHARPSON: Sir, I do not wish to be drawn into that unless it would be helpful to the Tribunal, but I think I can make the point very shortly in this way. Under the section 94 Notification the addressee has some options.

If he complies, makes representations and appeals to this Tribunal there are two possible outcomes. One is that the conduct is deemed unlawful, but because he has stopped the conduct there is no enforcement notice and no penalty. So he is not criminal.

THE CHAIRMAN: But the regime still potentially exposes him to the possibility of a penalty unless he does something.

MS SHARPSON: It exposes him to the possibility if he does not comply, but at that stage there is a higher test and there is a second step. If it is not helpful, I do not wish to take up time and get drawn into a complexity which is not perhaps required. The marker I did want to put down was just to say that it is not self-evident that we are here talking about something that is quasi penal. Whereas if you try to prosecute somebody for selling mineral water, or selling water that was not mineral water as mineral water and your domestic rules do not have anything in them, but you go back to the directive, then you are relying on the Directive to found the criminal prosecution. That is not quite the situation here, that is the only way I can put the point.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, I see.

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38 39 MS SHARPSON: Sir, again just tidying up on the general points, I have made the point that the interconnection written agreement is in fact a framework agreement, and my learned friend has taken you to the agreement that is under tab 40 of the BT bundle. It may help just to go back to it to look at it briefly, because if you recall], sir, you were asking questions about how that would operate. Yes, there is a confidentiality agreement in it, and then under tabs 41 and 42 there is a sequence of possible annexes. It may not be necessary to turn them up.

THE CHAIRMAN: What is it that you want to show us?

MS SHARPSON: Sir, I wanted to make the point that in the interconnection agreement - perhaps I can make it simply from the table of contents under tab 40 - one has got all the elements that one would expect to find in terms of matters that need to go in - for example, on charges and

payments, on system protection and safety, but one does not have at this stage anything which means that a particular customer is going to have their calls routed via interconnection to a specific chosen CPS operator. It is perhaps a clumsy way of making the point, sir, I think you have the point in the way I made it before. Much more will actually be needed if something is going to happen.

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Sir, can I invite you to go to Ms Wallace's witness statement again, this time to the paragraphs which deal with what happens when a customer makes this decision. Could you go to paragraphs 37 to 39 to begin with, which look at what happens? She makes the point that under primeval CPS there was a manual prefix or an autodialler, and at that stage there was no need for the customer to inform BT, either directly or through the chosen communications provider, that he or she had chosen to use another communications provider. So in those circumstances, this issue simply does not arise. one gets to permanent CPS however, the call is routed automatically through the network and that technical change is effected by BT Wholesale, and it is precisely because the technical change has got to be made to give effect to the consumer's choice for permanent CPS that the customer's specific information, with the identity of the gaining CPS Operator, is necessarily communicated to BT, and there is obviously a reference to the Reply Slip system, being the Reply system at first in place.

therefore, there are two types of information that BT will get: there is the technical information and customer-specific information, and this goes to a question that one of your colleagues put earlier to Mr Barling, that these two types of information are needed to allow the interconnection arrangements to become effective in the case of individual customers' call traffic.

Could I then ask you to pick it up again at paragraph 8? Sir, the distinction is there made between BT Wholesale and BT Retail, and there are references to

documents that you have already been shown, being the Industry End to End Process Description and the industry Code of Practice. There is the reference there but I probably do not need to actually take you to that.

Then there is the description at paragraph 90 that explains how this is set up with the electronic order, and probably again the specific sub-paragraphs are rather technical and do not matter. If I can go on to 91, there are a number of mandatory fields of mandatory information - this answers the question you, sir, put to me a few moments ago as to what the bundle of information is.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

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- MS SHARPSON: Mandatory fields, "including customer's postcode and telephone number, which allow BT Wholesale to validate the order." It is then validated and then the identifying code and, if necessaria, a reseller code, all of this mandatory information has to be there so that it is possible to set up CPS on the lines concerned. That is the twiddling of the knobs, to use that shorthand.
- THE CHAIRMAN: What have we got actually in it apart from the customer's postcode and telephone number?
- MS SHARPSON: Sir, you have the necessary electronic identification for the CPS operator, because what has to happen is that the switches need to substitute for what the customer would otherwise have done manually by dialling the appropriate code, or what was subsequently, at an intermediate stage, done by the autodialler. The routing has physically I say physically, that is not perhaps a good shorthand. There has to be a change.
- THE CHAIRMAN: There has to be something, perhaps in the BT local exchange, I know not where it happens.
- MS SHARPSON: Sir, I am very conscious that there are people on the other side of the room who know this much better than I do. There is a change that takes place ---
- THE CHAIRMAN: Everybody in the room knows it better than us.
- MS SHARPSON: In terms of setting up that routing. If there were not that technical change, the routing would not happen, and although the customer would have expressed a

desire to have permanent CPS, he would not in fact have it because if he dialled the number instead of the calls routing over the permanent CPS network ---

THE CHAIRMAN: Something has got to happen so the calls are automatically re-routed to the network operator.

MS SHARPSON: Sir, rather little found its way into the agreed statement of facts, but something at least did. Can I perhaps suggest that the answer to the question you are putting to me, sir, is partly at least to be found there under (b). The mandatory information is CPS Operator's ID, customer's postcode, customer's telephone number, date of the switchover, the routing prefix, the order number and what the CPS option selected was because, as Mr Barling said, it may be all calls, it may be some subset, it is very much a matter for the customer to say what they want.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

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SHARPSON: Sir, that is the location for the answer to your question. If I could just go back for a moment to Ms Wallace's statement, I have almost finished this passage in it, this makes the point about ongoing discussions with BT. If one goes to the section under negotiation of network access, paragraph 93 and following where she picks up the passage in Mr Steggles' first witness statement para 41, he suggests that the type of information passed by operators prior to and following an interconnection of access agreement is clearly different She says this: "To adopt this position is in nature. fundamentally to misunderstand the interaction between BT and the CPS Operator." She says if it was the initial negotiation then it would be meaningless to talk about negotiations for access, but that actually what is happening (para 96) is that there is an ongoing provision of information in order to enable interconnection work, and she refers to routing plans, to new requests to make information available in relation to particular calls. It goes through to paragraph 99, but it makes the point, we say, that this - the twiddling of the knobs is very clearly something that falls within Article 2(a)

of the Access Directive.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

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MS SHARPSON: Perhaps I could just tidy up on a couple of points which tie in here. Mr Barling referred to charging and carriage charges; there is in fact also a set-up charge for making this available to an individual customer, and you were taken, sir, to condition AA8 in volume 2 of the OFCOM bundle, tab 30. Sir, the actual provision condition is AA8.1 and then one has the charging condition as AA8.4.

THE CHAIRMAN: This applies to the dominant provider.

MS SHARPSON: Yes, the necessary market review was carried out under the Directive and two rivals were found to have SMP (significant market power). So this is a condition that applies to BT as the dominant provider, there is the requirement to provide Carrier Pre-selection at AA8.1, and then in AA8.4 there is the charging arrangements.

"Charges shall be made by the dominant provider as follows ..." and the costs can be categorised, if you go to (b) as falling within one of the following categories: Carrier Pre-selection, they will provide the set-up costs and ongoing costs.

What happens is not that BT charges the customer, but for every line that is set up with CPS, BT does charge the gaining CPSO and I am told that the charge is approximately £3.70 for each line that is set up under this system.

THE CHAIRMAN: That is presumably agreed under (3), is it, customer line set-up costs.

MS SHARPSON: Indeed, sir, yes. So, very, very specifically, associated with each and every individual customer who wants to have CPS, there is a technical activity carried out by BT in order to give effect to that request, and there is indeed a charge that is made for that purpose.

Sir, again tidying up, there was a discussion earlier as to what the situation was when a customer was transferring from one CPS Operator to another CPS Operator. This was paragraphs 42 and 43 of BT's skeleton

argument.

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THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

MS SHARPSON: In this situation it is perfectly true that the losing and gaining CPS Operators are not necessarily directly interconnected,, but what would be much more unusual would be that it was BT as the Network Access Operator who needed to make the necessary technical changes to enable the customer's calls that were with CPS Operator Smith then to go to CPS Operator Jones.

the position of the Regulator is that General Condition 1.2 would indeed apply to information that was passed to the losing CPS Operator, if there is a CPS Operator to CPS Operator transfer rather than a transfer between BT and a CPS concern.

THE CHAIRMAN: How would that arise if there is no interconnection between those two operators?

SHARPSON: well, the reason that that is the Regulator's MS position is this, although the losing and gaining CPS Operators may not be directly interconnected, nevertheless the customer transfer is still predicated on the existence of network access arrangements. They are not direct arrangements between the losing and gaining CPS Operators, but there does still have to be the network access. Therefore, the Regulator takes the view that the information that is being transferred is still passed to the losing operator from another communications provider, before during and after the process of negotiating network access or interconnection arrangements. I make the point because obviously it arose in discussion with Mr Barling.

THE CHAIRMAN: Is there a difference there with mobile operators, or does the same situation not arise?

MS SHARPSON: Sir, I am told that the position is different because they use different access networks. If you switch from one mobile to another you do not necessarily stay with the same network, whereas in the situation that was being suggested it would still be using the BT network, but what is happening is that the calls, instead of being routed with CPSO Smith, are being routed with

Jones or vice versa.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

- MS SHARPSON: Sir, those were the general points that I wanted to make and get out of the way as it were. I wonder what way I can be of best assistance to the Tribunal because I see the time. What I had intended to do was to go into the context and purpose of general Condition 1.2 and then the correct analysis. It may be that if I take advantage of the overnight adjournment I could in fact compress and put together a number of points which I need to deal with, which Mr Barling raised, and make my submission rather shorter than if I start it now and leave it somewhere in mid-air.
- THE CHAIRMAN: That sounds like a fairly thinly disguised plea to draw stumps for the day, Ms Sharpson.
- MS SHARPSON: Sir, I am happy to go on if the Tribunal prefer me to do so, but I think I might occupy less minutes if I continued tomorrow.
- THE CHAIRMAN: We had a provisional timetable that envisaged you having an hour or so tomorrow morning, perhaps a bit more. We have slipped a bit so we would probably go on a bit longer than that, and then we have got the Interveners, which I think will probably be fairly short. Are we heading for finishing by lunchtime tomorrow?
- MS SHARPSON: Sir, we are on schedule I would have thought.

 My hope was that if I stopped now I would be shorter

 rather than longer in the morning; I think I can compress

 what I have to say.
- THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. It sounds to me as if we have probably got a reasonable chance of getting through at lunchtime tomorrow. I think we would quite like to do that if we can, without hurrying anybody unduly.
- MS SHARPSON: Sir, I will make sure I do compress things overnight.
- 35 THE CHAIRMAN: We have had very interesting skeletons and so 36 forth which we have done our best to absorb, so I think 37 we are getting into the case quite well.
- 38 MS SIMMONS: May I ask something?
- 39 | THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. Ms Simmons has got a question for you.

- MS SIMMONS: I was looking at para 40 I think it is probably for both of you because I do not know where this has come from which is the standard Interconnection Agreement. I have been thinking about what we call the twiddling of the knob, where the obligation is, and I think (but I may be wrong) that it is in clause 5, which is on page 6. What clause 5.1 says is "The Parties shall convey calls and provide the services and facilities pursuant to the schedules ..." We do not have the schedules.
- MR BARLING: We do. At 41 we have the relevant one.
 - MS SIMMONS: Is that going to provide me with the answer?
 - MR BARLING: It should do. If you look, for example, at 3.4 of tab 41, "If the CPS customer makes a call to the Operator System under one of the CPS Options, BT shall prefix each such CPS call with the CPS Routing Prefix allocated to the Operator ..." That is the gaining operator.
- 19 MS SIMMONS: But does not something have to be done before 20 that?
 - MR BARLING: When it says "BT shall prefix" it does not mean there will be a little man there each time a call comes through, what it means is that the exchange machinery will recognise a call from that customer and automatically attach the relevant prefix to it. It is the setting up of the route; Ms Lea reminds me that the route to that operator will already be set up.
- 28 MS SIMMONS: Absolutely, it is the twiddling of the knob for 29 that customer to make sure he goes down that route.
- 30 MR BARLING: Yes.

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- 31 MS SIMMONS: And that is what 3.4 is dealing with, or is 32 there some other provision somewhere in another schedule 33 to do with it?
- MR BARLING: I hesitate to say that there is not another
 highly technical document, but that is what, as I
 understand it, 3.4 is referring to when it says "BT shall
 prefix each such CPS call ..." The technical changes to
 the software that actually have to be done in order to
 achieve that may be described somewhere else, in another

technical document, but I cannot put my finger on it. I 1 2 will check overnight with those instructing me. 3 SIMMONS: MS Thank you. 4 THE CHAIRMAN: Ms Sharpson? 5 BARLING: Ms Sharpson may have the answer. MR I may have only part of the answer - it is 6 MS SHARPSON: 7 usually my fate when I am trying to follow Mr Barling. 8 It may be helpful to say that the Interconnect Agreement 9 refers in terms to the CPS Process Agreement which is under tab 43, the Industry end to End Process 10 Description, and it is necessary to set up an operator so 11 that the operator becomes the CPSO, and then once that 12 13 particular operator is the CPS Operator, then there is 14 the twiddling of knobs for the individual customer. to take Mr Barling's illustration, there is not a little 15 man routing each call, that is because the software knows 16 17 that there is a particular four digit prefix which is for that operator, and then the individual customer is 18 19 slotted into that by making some additional changes, so 20 that when a call comes from that particular identified line the software knows that the call should be routed by 21 putting in that automatic prefix. I am told that in 22 section 2 of the process document that deals with setting 23 24 up the operator to become a CPS Operator, and then 25 section 3.4, but I was just checking it myself. 26 SIMMONS: What I am really looking for is whatever obliges BT to put those prefixes on, so that that 2.7 customer will be switched. 28 29 BARLING: You mean legally obliges BT? MR 30 SIMMONS: Yes, legally obliges. MS THE CHAIRMAN: Or has agreed to do it by virtue of the 31 interconnection agreement or whatever. 32 SIMMONS: Where is the legal obligation? 33 MS34 MS SHARPSON: That is condition AS. 35 MR BARLING: That is the regulatory obligation to do it, but 36 it is also reflected, one suspects, in the 37 interconnection agreement.

if they are reflected in the agreements.

SIMMONS: The way these have been constructed it looks as

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- MR BARLING: I would expect it to be a general BT obligation, but you pointed out, ma'am, in tab 40, and then referring to the schedule, and also incorporated in this is the end to end process which provides another layer of detail. But the legal obligation probably comes both from the interconnection agreement but of course you are under an obligation to negotiate and enter into interconnection agreements.

 THE CHAIRMAN: What might help, and perhaps one can do it overnight rather than taking time now is for somebody to just track down where in the documents we have got arises the operation for which BT charges £3.70 for the
- MR BARLING: Yes. So where in the documents the obligation arises.
- 16 THE CHAIRMAN: A contractual provision dealing with it, to put it neutrally.
- 18 MR BARLING: Yes.

THE CHAIRMAN: Very well, shall we say half past ten?

(Adjourned until 10.30 tomorrow).

line set-up cost, if you see what I mean.