matter will be the final and definitive record.	
IN THE COMPETITION APPEALS TRIBUNAL	Case No. 1007/2/3/02
	New Court, Carey Street, London WC2.
<u>Tuesday</u>	y, 22nd October, 2002
Before: SIR CHRISTOPHER BELLAMY (The President)	
PROF JOHN PICKERING DR ARTHUR PRYOR	
BETWEEN:	
FREESERVE.COM PLC	<u>Applicant</u>
and	
THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF TELECOMMUNI	CATION Respondent
supported by	
BT GROUP PLC	<u> Intervener</u>
MR JAMES FLYNN appeared for the Applicant.	
MR JON TURNER appeared for the Respondent.	
MISS KELYN BACON appeared for the intervener.	
Transcribed from the shorthand not Harry Counsell & Co Clifford's Inn, Fetter Lane, London Telephone: 0207 269 0370	

PROCEEDINGS

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1 Tuesday, 22nd October, 2002 2 2 pm 3 PRESIDENT: Good afternoon, Mr Turner, yes? THE 4 TURNER: May it please the tribunal, I appear today for the MR 5 Director General. Mr Flynn for Freeserve and Miss Kelyn Bacon 6 for BT. 7 THE PRESIDENT: Yes. 8 TURNER: Before beginning, Sir, may I just raise two MR 9 housekeeping matters? 10 THE PRESIDENT: Yes. 11 MR TURNER: First, very briefly, I hope the tribunal has now 12 received the two patent cases that I notified you of. 13 PRESIDENT: I am not sure that we have. THE 14 TURNER: I passed copies to the Registrar, I have additional MR 15 copies, but you did ask me for those cases last time round. 16 THE PRESIDENT: Oh yes. 17 MR TURNER: They are not relevant to today's hearing. The second 18 issue is an issue of timetable. 19 THE PRESIDENT: That is on confidentiality, is it not? 20 TURNER: That is on confidentiality. They are decisions of the 21 Court of Appeal in that area, where they considered precisely 22 the sort of thing that we were discussing last time. 23 THE PRESIDENT: Yes. 24 TURNER: The second matter is the timetable. Of course, the MR 25 tribunal has produced a timetable giving slots for people to do 26 the oral submissions today. The timetable was produced on 16th 27 October, and that is before my learned friend put in his rather 28 large skeleton, and as the tribunal knows I have 30 minutes for 29 my opening submissions in total. My friend then has a 15 minute 30 break to consider what I have said and a 45 minute response. I 31 had a 15 minute reply. I shall endeavour to do what I can to fit 32 everything in, but there are a mass of points that I would love 33 to address the tribunal on. I will be as economical as I can and 34 I am hopeful that the tribunal will extend some flexibility. 35 PRESIDENT: We will try not to cut you short, Mr Turner. There THE

is a good deal of latitude built into that timetable - I say

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"good deal", some latitude. We may not need those slots for short adjournments, so you take your own course and I will stop you if I think you are taking too much time.

- MR FLYNN: If I may, I think Miss Bacon and I are slightly confused. We had understood the timetable to be that the applicant would start and have the half an hour and that Mr Turner would have the three quarters of an hour should he need it.
- THE PRESIDENT: Oh, I see.

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- MR FLYNN: And for his information, I am not proposing to be as long as half an hour on the basis that it is a full skeleton, the tribunal will have read it and so will Mr Turner.
- MR TURNER: Well, in that case I am in your hands, Sir. I had
  understood that as I was the applicant on this application that
  that meant me, but if that is the tribunal's desire I am
  perfectly happy.
  - THE PRESIDENT: Well I think on the last occasion when we were dealing with an issue of this kind it was the Director who started, Mr Flynn, he is the one who is trying to persuade us that there is no decision, so I think he has the right to start.
- 20 MR FLYNN: I am not objecting to that at all.
- 21 MR TURNER: No, it is an understandable confusion.
- 22 THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I think it is you to start, Mr Turner.
- 23 MR TURNER: Very well. I shall attempt to deal with matters in this 24 way, Sir, and to organise submissions as follows under five 25 heads, taking the first four as quickly as possible. First, to 26 address some preliminary remarks on Freeserve's general approach 27 to the case and the overriding tone. Secondly, to refer to the 28 essential test for what is an appealable decision giving the 29 tribunal jurisdiction. Thirdly, to refer to matters of 30 underlying principle relevant to that issue, matters of 31 institutional balance that I wish to draw attention to, and also 32 the matters that are referred to by Mr Green and Mr Flynn in 33 their skeleton - for example, Human Rights considerations.
- 34 THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
- 35 MR TURNER: Fourthly, I shall refer to the importance in this case 36 of the course of dealings between the parties and other aspects

of the context in appreciating whether there has been a final decision on infringement on any of these issues.

Then I shall, fifthly, return to discuss some of the four heads of complaint by reference to the matters set out in Freeserve's skeleton.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

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TURNER: If I may begin then with a preliminary remark. Plainly, as one sees from the skeleton Freeserve wishes to paint the Director General in this case as having changed his tack and recasting the true history of events with a view to avoiding an appeal, and there is a section of skeleton on page 9, paragraph 19(3) in which he accuses the Director General of "regulatory squirm" and "regulatory lockjaw" which apparently means camouflaging or concealing a negative decision that has, in fact, been made.

Since that point has been made in those terms, I will deal with it very shortly and immediately. I can see that it is our duty at this stage to ensure that the contents of the Director's skeleton argument do reflect the true intention of the official responsible for drafting the case closure letter who, by the way, is not a lawyer, and to do so as closely and faithfully as possible. It is that aim that explains the position that has been taken on each point in my skeleton, and it does explain in particular why we felt it appropriate to say that although perhaps a borderline case in relation to the so-called "telephone census" that Oftel had decided there that there was no infringement. But there is no recasting and there is an honest attempt to transmit to this tribunal what was actually intended by the officials in question, and you will be the judges of which party has embroidered its original case.

Moving to the essential test for an appealable decision. The first observation which it is necessary to make is--- PRESIDENT: By the officials in question do we mean the gentleman who signed----

35 MR TURNER: Mr Russell, John Russell.

36 THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

MR TURNER: On the essential test for an appealable decision, it is first necessary of course, and this is not controversial, to distinguish whether a decision has actually been made and then whether that decision is an appealable decision. That was the analysis that the tribunal conducted in the Bettercare case, and it is not controversial.

In this case it is not disputed that the case closure letter has decisional quality. Oftel did not intend to investigate any further the points that Freeserve had raised.

THE PRESIDENT: So it is a decision in other words?

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TURNER: Yes. But the case closure letter does not contain definitive decisions about compatibility of BT's conduct with the Chapter 2 prohibition in the Act, and I leave to one side the telephone census point in this.

The way we say the issue has to be approached is as follows: one asks the question has the Director General definitively decided that certain conduct on the part of BT does not amount to an infringement of the Act. In such an analysis it is important that the conduct as whole is the relevant subject matter of inquiry, not any individual point that is made about that conduct in the complaint.

May I illustrate that by way of a crude example? Suppose that a complainant were to say to Oftel that BT's pricing was discriminatory as between Firm A and Firm B, and that it was also predatory - they were pricing below cost by some relevant measure. Oftel investigates the complaint and it says there is no discrimination and that the matter does not warrant further investigation in its view.

At that point the complainant resurfaces and says that the Director General has completely forgotten to address the predatory pricing question and that indeed the real issue all the time was predatory pricing. The Director General's response is that he does not propose then to spend further time on the matter. In those circumstances it cannot be said that the Director General has decided that BT's pricing (which is the relevant conduct) does not infringe the Act. He has addressed

one contention by way of a reasoned decision. He has declined to spend further resources on looking at the other issue which has been raised in relation to BT's pricing.

- THE PRESIDENT: If we just stop there on that example, the finding on discrimination you have just described as a reasoned decision, so that is a decision?
- 7 MR TURNER: It has a decisional quality, yes, it is a reasoned decision.
  - THE PRESIDENT: That is a reasoned decision, but the other one is just not, it has just not done anything, as it were, and he says he is not going to do anything.
- 12 MR TURNER: Yes.

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- THE PRESIDENT: And that is not a decision as to whether or not there is an infringement.
  - MR TURNER: And it is important to look at the conduct concerned.

    The question is whether the conduct, which is BT's pattern of pricing, let us say, during a particular period, does not infringe the Act.

The complainant raises a number of points and the Director General says "I will give you a view on one of those but for whatever reason I am not pursuing the other contentions, I am not looking at that". What I say is, in those other circumstances it cannot be said that the Director General has decided that BT's pricing does not infringe the Act. He has addressed one contention raised in relation to the pricing, but he has declined to spend further resources looking at the pricing.

- THE PRESIDENT: It might be that he has decided that BT's pricing does not constitute in its discriminatory aspect an infringement of the Act.
- MR TURNER: He may have done that. If so, that does not meet the test for an appealable decision in my submission, particularly in circumstances where, and the analogy with circumstances of this case may become apparent in a moment, the point that is sought to be taken on appeal is only the predatory pricing point which has not been looked into and on which the Director General

has not reached a decision.

THE PRESIDENT: So on this analogy, if it is the predatory pricing point that is raised on appeal you say in these circumstances there is no appealable decision---

MR TURNER: Yes.

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THE PRESIDENT: ---for that purpose?

MR TURNER: There are two possible ways of analysing this, namely, that either one looks at the conduct as a whole, the pattern of pricing, what BT has actually done, and one sees whether the Director General has proved the negative - the Director General, on the available evidence has said "nothing in this constitutes an infringement of the Act". In my submission, if he plainly has not looked at one element that has been presented to him he has not made that decision.

Alternatively, one says he has made a decision in relation to one contention. He has rejected that contention.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

TURNER: If it is so construed then one might say that one could appeal in relation to that decision, here the discriminatory pricing, but where what is sought to be taken to the tribunal is an altogether fresh point which has not been considered in the first instance.

Now, there are two ways of looking at it. I submit that the former way is the right way to analyse this by reference to the terms of the Act. But even if the second way is the appropriate way to view matters, in relation to certainly the first head of complaint here - the cross marketing activity complaint where there is a close analogy - similarly we say that there is no jurisdiction. Just to complete the analogy, as I am now on that of course, what has happened in relation to the cross-marketing complaint is that there were perhaps two issues that were raised by the complainant. We say that the major thrust was always on cross-marketing - what has been referred to as "brands' leveraging". The only point that is sought to be taken on appeal relates to cross-subsidy - issues that, when one looks at the document fairly and in its context, the

Director General just did not go into. Freeserve knows, as I have put in our skeleton, perfectly well that the Director General threw out the point about brand leveraging that did not go into the cross-subsidy issue.

If I may turn from that, which was intended to be by way of a sort of general, analytical framework, to issues of principle and institutional balance, and invite the tribunal just to turn up paragraph 19 of Freeserve's skeleton. I think the relevant part is on page 8 with the Roman numerals. There is a number of points taken to support the proposition that the tribunal should lean liberally in favour of finding jurisdiction in a case such as the present, and my submission — and I shall deal with this only very briefly — is that the arguments are profoundly misconceived. The first point, which it is necessary to address, is that a broad view is needed if the Act is going to be consistent with Article 6 of the Human Rights convention.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

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TURNER: Article 6 requires a fair hearing where there is a determination of civil or criminal rights or obligations. That is misconceived for two reasons. First, there is not a determination of Freeserve's civil rights here. Freeserve is inviting the Director General to take up a complaint administratively. If the Director does not do so, Freeserve can go to the civil courts and sue BT directly. The hearing before a civil court might constitute a determination of Freeserve's civil rights. This administrative procedure does not.

Secondly, and equally fundamentally, Article 6 assumes that there is a determination of civil rights, and looks then at the fairness of the procedure. But here, the very question is the threshold one---

THE PRESIDENT: The argument goes round in circles.

MR TURNER: Yes, it goes round in circles. The second point that is taken is that recourse to the civil courts is somehow unsatisfactory, and we say briefly that that is odd. If Freeserve is talking about a civil action against BT there is nothing in its way here, particularly since Freeserve nakedly

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complains that Oftel have not addressed its complaints properly - not that it has done so and cogently rejected them in terms that might influence a High Court Judge.

If, on the other hand, what Freeserve is saying here is that it is the constraints of Judicial Review that matter, the short point is that the Judicial Review procedure reflects the fact that the Director General has an important decision not to reach a final, appealable decision in a particular case.

What we say on this issue is that the considerations tell rather in the reverse direction; that there are crucial considerations of institutional balance that should make the tribunal think very hard indeed before finding an appealable decision in this case, least where it is not admitted.

It perhaps goes without saying but the focus of this Director, and the other Directors, is on investigating possible significant infringements of the Act, and it would be gravely contrary to policy in my submission if this tribunal was too ready to find that informal indications to a complainant were accidentally appealable decisions. These appeals are obviously resource intensive, and it would be wrong if disproportionate resources were being spent on considering whether an appealable decision had or had not been made every time one came to close the file on a poor quality complaint because that would shift the centre of gravity away from the Office's more important work.

THE PRESIDENT: Do you characterise this decision as an informal indication to a complainant?

TURNER: On the three heads I do, yes, and consciously not a formal decision as to infringement of the Act.

Next, if I may briefly turn to the importance of the course of dealings between the parties, and other aspects of the context in this case. It is common ground that one needs to take into account the full context in this case, and deciding whether an appealable decision has been made, that is in both parties' skeletons. In my submission, that includes first the fact that a recent Telecommunications Act investigation into cross-subsidy

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issues had been concluded on 28th March, and although there is an appeal mechanism under the Telecommunications Act that has not been pursued, and this is, of course, I shall say relevant to the cross-subsidy complaint. It needs to be borne in mind in considering that part of the letter.

Secondly, of course, the fact that this was in the nature of a preliminary investigation of the facts, a full investigation of the facts was never meant to be undertaken, and that was consciously conveyed to Freeserve.

PRESIDENT: So it stopped at the end of the preliminary stage? TURNER: Yes. Now, Freeserve says that that just goes to show at best that is neutral, because it just goes to show that if there is no case to answer that maybe because a decision on the merits was taken. I accept that it is neutral where one is dealing with issues of principle, for example, such as arose in the Bettercare case. But if one takes here the advance notification complaint, one is dealing with an investigation of factual matters - what actually happened. Did BT wholesale give advance notice to BT Openworld, or not? Part of the steps that one must take before arriving at a final decision is to come to a conclusion on those facts, and if one is at the stage of a preliminary investigation where confessedly one is not investigating the facts in detail, then it makes it at the least very unlikely that a final conclusion on the facts, on what actually happened, will have been reached, and that is the extent of my submission in that regard.

Thirdly, it is necessary for the tribunal to take into account what happens at the meeting between the parties on 17th April. There are two notes now as to what occurred at that meeting, but both notes do at least say - in slightly different terms - that Oftel emphasised at the time that the material Freeserve was putting forward on the cross-subsidy issue was too thin to warrant re-opening its former investigation.

It was not saying therefore that chapter is closed and we will not re-open it. It was saying we may re-open it provided cogent evidence is put forward, a more thought out complaint but

what you have put forward does not satisfy that test.

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Fourthly, and finally, in relation to context, and I shall not dwell on this but give the tribunal the references. I note that at paragraph of Freeserve's skeleton there is an indication that the Director General refused a meeting and truncated the entire procedure. That is just not what happened. The truth is quite the reverse, and it can be seen from the series of e-mails at tab 3 of the Director's disclosure bundle, and perhaps the tribunal might also subsequently wish to look at the letter from Baker & McKenzie at tab 4 referring to a plan to send in additional material in the week beginning 29th July.

What those e-mails show, in short, is that the issue of anti-competitive conduct in the emerging broad band sector remains very live; that Oftel stress that it was receptive to any new and well thought out complaint; that Freeserve declined a meeting, preferring to put in a new complaint that it always said was coming, but which has not yet arrived.

THE PRESIDENT: There has been no new complaint?

MR TURNER: No, although in the "Financial Times" this morning there is a reference to a complaint having been lodged one has not arrived.

THE PRESIDENT: This is the only complaint extant?

TURNER: This is the only extant complaint, but if you look at that series of e-mails you will see that all of those facts emerge, and what it shows is that issues of predation, cross-subsidy, cutting across the issues raised by this case closure letter have not been ruled out at all. The necessity is for the complainant to put forward a well thought out complaint. Just before leaving that point and turning to some detailed observations, I do invite the tribunal to look at the note attached to Freeserve's skeleton argument, the note of the meeting of 17th April. At the end there is a part of it which is entitled "conclusion", and if one looks at what is said at paragraph 2, in my submission that sums up the reality of the situation.

"Complaints relating to cross-marketing, brand leverage,

cross-subsidy and predation need greater articulation and more stringent legal analysis if they are to be picked up by Oftel and form the basis for an investigation whether on the basis of undue preference, competition law, or both."

Turning then, lastly to the detailed observations on the four heads of complaint, and I will endeavour to be very, very fast.

THE PRESIDENT: Just before you go on, Mr Turner, I think there is possibly a conceptual issue to be explored here at some stage, which is when we are tackling this question of whether or not the Chapter II prohibition has been infringed, to have a decision, do you have to have something that is, in your words "final" or "definitive", or closes something off or rules something out?

MR TURNER: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Which is, as it were, the Director's concept of a decision, and I can fully understand why he so submits? Or can you have something that is still a decision when he says "This is my decision on the basis of the information that you have given me, that is still my decision. If you want to give me some more information, of course, I will look at it, but you asked me to decide on the basis of what you told me, and on the basis of what you told me I decide that there is no infringement."

MR TURNER: My submission is the former. One comes to a very neat grey area when one discusses the issue of making a decision on the basis of the available evidence.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

MR TURNER: And perhaps the right way to address it is to ask oneself whether, conscious that there may be other aspects out there, the Director expresses himself as dealing with a particular argument or contention, but consciously not endorsing conduct in this case, as not infringing the Chapter II prohibition.

THE PRESIDENT: Hang on. I am sorry, I lost you, "...consciously not endorsing..."

36 MR TURNER: The argument that the conduct concerned does not

infringe the Chapter II prohibition. I accept that of course all courts and tribunals make decisions on the basis of the evidence presented to them.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

MR TURNER: But where what is known by that court or tribunal is that there are other elements out there which would need to be taken into account before the conduct concerned could be said not to infringe the Act then one has not made an appealable decision.

If the tribunal or court concerned, or here the director, makes the decision on the available evidence saying well that is good enough for me, this conduct does not infringe the Chapter II prohibition, that is a different matter.

THE PRESIDENT: If we just test that a moment, just for argument's sake, by looking at the decision, which is in tab 3 to the application, if you look at the first complaint, that started off as a cross-marketing complaint, but you say it is now a cross-subsidy complaint?

MR TURNER: Yes.

PRESIDENT: If we just assume, for the sake of argument, that it was and remained a cross-marketing complaint, and it is that that the Director was dealing with in his decision, when we get to paragraph 3 of this document, under the heading "Oftel's View", it is said:

"There is no prohibition on BT advertising its brand and services collectively or individually. BT is entitled to trade on its brand awareness, use that to promote its internet services. Other service providers can do it. They undertake substantial mass media campaigns, and are beginning to do it...." etc.

Then there is a reference across to BT.Com Broadband website, and so forth. Is the Director not, as it were, taking a fairly clear position on that argument, as it were, point of principle, he would be entitled to use his product?

35 MR TURNER: Yes, he is taking a firm decision on those points.

THE PRESIDENT: So is this not a decision on those points? It may be

they are no longer in contention and your best point is that he dealt with the complaint, and that is what he did.

TURNER: It comes down to this. If the true analysis is that the Director is saying "I am aware that there are other things that one might consider before one could give this conduct a clean bill of health, but I am able to address these particular points, and to be helpful to you I will do so, to explain to you as a matter of good administration why these points are misconceived".

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

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MR TURNER: My primary submission is that that does not create an appealable decision, in part for the very reason that has arisen in this case that, assuming that to be the case, the only point that is coming to the tribunal is the cross-subsidy issue, everything else has been jettisoned, and that cannot be the way that the Act was intended to operate.

THE PRESIDENT: It is a question of where, analytically, you put the point about cross-subsidy. You could say, I would have thought, or arguably you could say - looking at it now from your point of view - the original complaint was about cross-marketing. We dealt with cross-marketing. It is a perfectly plain statement of principle about cross-marketing. If you want to ask me whether that is a decision about cross-marketing, OK, it is a decision about cross-marketing.

MR TURNER: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: What has now come up is a quite different argument about cross-subsidy, I never dealt with that, so there is nothing in this decision about cross-subsidy.

Then I think the question for the tribunal would be "Was there ever in this complaint a suggestion of cross-subsidy or not?" There is some evidence about it in one of the notes of the meeting, but it is probably not in the original complaint. Is it something that is raised? If it was raised but not dealt with, where do we go from there? Is it a sort of "no decision" situation?

36 MR TURNER: Yes.

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THE PRESIDENT: Or is it something that we simply say has not been dealt with - has not been dealt with, we cannot go into it - and we leave them to make another complaint, or what? I am not sure that the argument - yes, I see where you are coming from, you are saying on that point your main argument is that they have shifted the ground, and the new ground to which they have shifted is not a ground upon which the Director has ever taken a decision? TURNER: Yes. As a matter of fact, and subject to what my MR learned friend says I regard it unarguable that cross-subsidy was not dealt with by the Director in this document. The only reference indeed that one finds when the Director deals with the Wanadoo proceedings, before the European Commission ---PRESIDENT: So he has not dealt with it? THE MR TURNER: He has not dealt with it and yet the peculiarity is that this is the point that they want to take to the tribunal. PRESIDENT: Yes. THE MR TURNER: That is the factual situation, and I say that one can analyse it in two ways, both of which lead to the same conclusion. PRESIDENT: Yes. THE TURNER: I think, Sir, you have that. THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I have got the way you put it now. Just to complete that exchange, if we were still on the question, if they were still pursuing cross-marketing would the terms of paragraph 3 in your submission have decisional quality - I mean in the same category really as the telephone census conclusion, that the fact you were using your brand, in itself, is not an infringement of Chapter II prohibition? MR TURNER: Yes, there are two possibilities again, and Freeserve would be the last to say that this was not the case, crosssubsidy is there as part of the original complaint, and it has not been dealt with. The result is that the Director has not formed a final view on the conduct and its compatibility with the Act, in which case the fact that a view has been expressed

on a particular contention does not result in an appealable

decision. The narrower view is that if the Director has, in a reasoned way, rejected a particular contention about the conduct, and I accept that he has done that in relation to the brand leveraging point, for the avoidance of doubt. So that point can be appealed to this tribunal. The Director has dealt with it, one predicates that the applicant has come back and said that that decision in relation to brand leveraging was wrong for the following reasons, and should be withdrawn or varied, and if the Director refuses to do so it goes on appeal.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

MR TURNER: But none of that has happened in this case.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I see. Thank you.

MR TURNER: Cross-marketing activity, just turning then directly to that by way of some very brief observations on the detail.

The cross-marketing activity complaint, to be clear, relates to a series of newspaper advertisements which I understand were placed over a short period from, I believe, 26th February to the end of March. That is the aspect of conduct which is now in issue, and it is over, that campaign.

The essential point which, Sir, you now have well on board, in our submission is that the Director General just did not investigate or decide on issue of cost apportionment, and however one analyses it he did not reach a final decision that there was no abuse of cross-subsidy.

THE PRESIDENT: And you say you cannot, by the device of asking somebody to vary a decision, get into play a contention that you never raised in the first place?

MR TURNER: Yes. There is one point to add as the discussion has gone in this direction, which is that it is not just a black and white situation with brand leveraging on the one hand, and cross-subsidy on the other. I note in particular what is said in my friend's skeleton at paragraphs 23 (iii) and 25, in relation to what are the last two sentences of paragraph 4 of the case for closure letter, and if the tribunal could just look at the last two sentences of paragraph 4 first of all.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

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TURNER: What you see there is Mr Russell saying that it is likely that Openworld derives benefit from the general BT broadband adverts. However, it is Oftel's view that all service providers benefit from this advertising by specific links to their own services. It is interesting to see what Freeserve say about that in their skeleton. If the tribunal then turns to paragraph 23(iii) which is on page 11, what you see is that that part is quoted, and then at the bottom of the page:

"The conclusion of the Director is that there is no abuse, as all internet service providers derive some benefit from the advertising, no matter whether one service provider derives disproportionate benefit."

So that has been focused into a proposition on non-abuse. The same point is then picked up and reinforced just two pages on, at paragraph 25 on page 13, and three lines into that, after saying that this is not leaving the file open, which is not in issue, we have:

"...rather he finds nothing untoward in any of the advertising conducted by BT, concluding that all service providers derive some not necessarily equal benefit, and that this is sufficient for there to be no abuse."

The puzzlement that we have is where that last clause comes from: "and this is sufficient for there to be no abuse", because the Director is not making any conclusion there about abuse. The Director is simply saying that everyone benefits from the general advertisements to an extent and nothing more than that, and it is perfectly consistent as a sentiment with the proposition that it is not considered worth conducting any more, investing any more resources into looking at that matter.

THE PRESIDENT: What he concludes is that what he has been supplied with does not provide evidence of anti-competitive behaviour - that is what he concludes.

MR TURNER: What he concludes, yes, that is so. That is a wrap-up.

THE PRESIDENT: That conclusion is expressed in the same terms as his conclusion about the telephone census.

MR TURNER: Now, that is a separate point. If I may deal with that,

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it is quite true that in relation to each the same tag is used, but to draw from that the inexorable conclusion that in each case a non-infringement decision has been arrived at is wrong. One needs to look at the substance, not the form. If that were to be the argument then I would say that in relation to the telephone census as well it was not necessarily the case that a decision was intended to be made.

What I have done is to approach it in terms of the substance of the decision and not to give decisive weight to matters of that kind, because in truth it is neutral. There are two parts to that tab for one thing. It says that the information supplied does not provide evidence of anticompetitive behaviour, that is one thing. Then it goes on to say "and the Director does not consider that this issue warrants further investigation", and with that qualification one indicates that the matter may not be deserving in some areas of further investigation.

THE PRESIDENT: It means he is not going to go on to the next stage, that is really what it means, is it not?

TURNER: Or that he is not going to look at it any further to decide either way whether in some relevant respects there is an abuse or not, because he has looked at it, and this is a good example, really, the question of the web pages and whether Openworld derives benefit where the other service providers do not. The reality is that it has been looked at and one sees a web page which refers to a whole range of service providers, and Oftel is saying "Each of them benefits to an extent. I am not going to go further into this matter to examine with a fine toothcomb whether there may be some disproportionate benefit if one tries to quantify this accruing to BT Openworld".

In truth, that is the sentiment expressed in those sentences. It is not, when read in context and fairly, a conclusion that there has been no abuse. Similarly, in the same vein Freeserve says in its skeleton at paragraph 23 (iv) which you need not turn up, that the Director General has made a definitive finding that it is not abusive to have a 28 day

notice period for price changes rather than a 30 day period, and he has concluded on the merits that the complaint is *de minis*. In fact, looking at this in the real world, all that Oftel is doing is correcting an apparent misapprehension that Freeserve has exhibited in the original complaint, appearing to believe that there was no mandatory notice period at all. That language is perfectly consistent with the desire to be helpful on the part of the official by saying "There is a 28 day notice period anyway which you may not have appreciated". But to turn that round and characterise it as a non-infringement decision is not warranted.

The last matter that I desire to draw attention to on this issue is significant. It is that the attack on my skeleton, which is sustained throughout the Freeserve skeleton proceeds on a false premise. At paragraph 26, this is a short point but it is important, in the Freeserve skeleton it is said that we assert in paragraph 4 of ours that "there has been no decision", and it does not say that. If you look at paragraph 4 of our skeleton it says that there was no decision, that there was no unlawful cross-subsidy. That must be incontestable.

Sir, I am taking too long so I shall go very quickly to advance notification and cross-subsidy---

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

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MR TURNER: ---make a few points and then sit down.

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.

TURNER: Advance notification. Freeserve's case depends on two propositions. First, that the Director General ascertained the facts to its satisfaction; and secondly, that the Director concluded that those facts did not amount to an infringement. Neither of those is accurate.

So far as the facts are concerned, Freeserve seeks to distance itself from that letter of 17th April, in which the Director General made clear that he was going to carry out only a preliminary investigation into the facts. Indeed, at paragraph 41(i) of their skeleton, Freeserve says:

"The Director nowhere says in the decision that his

investigation was preliminary."

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They urge that the decision must not be read in the light of that letter. But, of course, in the last sentence of paragraph 8 of the case closure letter, that is precisely what is said. As part of its preliminary investigation, it said, Oftel has obtained information on these issues from BT.

THE PRESIDENT: At the moment I think the tribunal is looking at it as a case closure letter at the end of a preliminary investigation.

TURNER: Yes, but what is important is in relation to the facts. It may not be worth developing this much more, but we say that in relation to the conclusions, for the reasons given in our skeleton, they are of a provisional nature as to what actually occurred, and Oftel never intended to make definitive findings on the question of advance notification. Having obtained information after an investigation that was limited in scope Oftel decided not to go further.

Lastly then, cross-subsidy - the general cross-subsidy complaint. Our position is simple. The complaint that was made on 26th March was framed in terms of a general cross-subsidy problem. They said that BT Openworld was not generating enough revenue to cover its costs. It was supported by a very thin document, a hypothetical one year business case. Oftel had recently investigated cross-subsidy issues in this precise area and there had not been any appeal from that, although I understand today that a group, including Freeserve, did apparently suggest that Oftel had made a Competition Act decision at that time, and indicated an intention to appeal, and we can produce the documentation should it become necessary.

Sir, with the best will in the world, Oftel was not inclined to re-open that investigation on the basis of such thin material and it said so. One sees that both from the Director General's note of the meeting which Freeserve urges you to disregard, and Freeserve's note of the meeting. My point of principle is that to decide that the evidence presented does not justify opening a full investigation into something is not the

same as reaching a final decision that the underlying conduct does not infringe the Act.

If a better, cogent complaint were submitted the Director General would consider it on the same subject matter.

Finally, simply as a matter of fact, the tribunal will probably already have spotted that Freeserve, in their skeleton, characterised this, as a determination that BT is pricing its new service at below cost for over 12 months. There is nothing of that kind in it, it is failure to cover its costs, to achieve sufficient revenue to cover its costs, viewed over a particular time period, but not pricing below cost for a period of more than 12 months as appears to have been suggested.

Perhaps it would be sensible if, with that, I were to sit down and let my friend respond.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, that is very helpful, thank you, Mr Turner. Mr Flynn, we had adjournments built in to the timetable, but if it is convenient to you to go on, I think it is probably sensible just to plough straight on.

- MR FLYNN: I will endeavour to pick up Mr Turner's points as we go along.
- 21 THE PRESIDENT: Do you need time, would you like five minutes?
- MR FLYNN: Five minutes to talk to my instructing solicitor would be helpful, if we can be given that. I do not think I am going to take the time that I had thought was allotted to him!
- 25 THE PRESIDENT: Well, because it takes a little time to get up and get down, and sort it out, let us say 10 minutes, and then it will probably save time in the end.
- 28 MR FLYNN: I think so.

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- 29 (Short break)
- 30 THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Mr Flynn.
- MR FLYNN: I am grateful to the tribunal for the short adjournment,
  I hope that will enable a more cogent presentation. If I could
  just briefly present Mr Green's apologies for not being able to
  attend today.
  - Sir, I think we are agreed that there are the three questions to be asked following the Bettercare analysis, namely,

was there a decision? Is it appealable; and have the requirements of s.47 been complied with?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

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MR FLYNN: Those are the agreed three conditions that the tribunal has to consider. As I understand the Director's position now, clearly he is no longer taking the point that the case closure letter has nothing to do with the Competition Act. That reasoning in the 8th July letter has been disowned. He accepts, as I understand it, that all three of those points are made out, are satisfied as regards the telephone census issue, and therefore the appeal must proceed on that head of complaint.

We are grateful for that concession and it is properly made, and nothing said in the skeleton or what I intend to say today is to be taken as any criticism of Mr Turner for making that concession. But it does leave us wondering where the distinction is to be drawn in relation to the other three heads of complaint where the Director is maintaining his view that there is no decision which the Tribunal can review. Now, in the skeleton the phrases "Regulatory squirm", "Regulatory lockjaw" were minted for the actually serious purpose of trying to characterise the position where a Director has made, obviously in the applicant's submission, an underlying decision as to infringement, but will not acknowledge that in the correspondence between the parties, which has to be brought to this tribunal. It is a sort of position as if he had seen or heard that there is no evil in this case, but he will not speak that - he will not state his conclusion. It is for that reason that we submit in the strongest possible terms that it is undesirable for appeals to this tribunal to turn on the fine distinctions as to the words that are used in the correspondence, in the exchanges between the parties. We submit the tribunal's job is to cut to the quick, cut to the core of what was actually done, and if it does not do that it will find that it is faced with many more hearings of this kind in which we spend time arguing how many angels are dancing on the head of a particular pin.

I think it is substance that has to prevail over form, as Mr Turner said. But if the tribunal allows this Director, or the other Directors over whom it has jurisdiction to hide behind formulae about informal indications to complainants, or not worth investing further resources in this particular investigation or other such phrases, of the kind that are, perhaps, hinted at in paragraph 83 of the Bettercare judgment, and the admissibility point, then appeals to this tribunal will be shut off and stifled.

Mr Turner has accepted, I think, that in all respects this case closure letter contains a decision, and we clearly agree with that characterisation. Under each head of the complaint the reasons given for not proceeding have the necessary character or the finality. That analysis is, in our submission, reinforced and not undermined by the Director, and strong reliance on his 17th April letter, which is tab 2 in his disclosure, and that two stage approach which is set out there - Sir, I think you already indicated that the tribunal is approaching this on the basis that this is a case closure letter at the end of the preliminary investigation set out in that letter. It is worth just reminding our selves what the terms of that letter are in relation to the preliminary investigation phase. That is a phase when the "Office will give initial consideration to decide whether there is a case to answer which requires further investigation".

THE PRESIDENT: Do you want us to look at it?

FLYNN: I have read the sentence, Sir, that is the sentence:
"...initial consideration is given to decide whether there is a case to answer." I think both those phrases "to decide" and "case to answer" are worth stressing. What has happened, if an investigation is closed at the end of that preliminary phase, the Director has positively decided not to take up the complaint because there is no case to answer. There is no suggestion of an infringement in that complaint that is worth pursuing. So it is a positive decision not to take it any further, and he closes his file. He is not at that point waiting for any further

information, any additional details from the complainant, or indeed from anyone else. He has decided that he will take no further action. That was the Director's stance in this case as we see from 8th July letter, where although Baker & McKenzie had promised further reasons and information in their letter of 20th June he nevertheless confirms the position that as far as he is concerned that investigation is over.

We are not saying that the Director would not consider a further complaint, or new material if it was suggested, but as far as he was concerned that complaint was over and his file was closed. Just on a point of information, Sir, I am authorised to say that a further new and wider complaint by Freeserve will - if it has not been already - be served on the Director today.

Sir, if I could just spend a couple of minutes on s.47 - I do not know if my friend is taking any points on s.47. Our submission is that in line with the approach which the tribunal took in Bettercare, one perhaps does not have to be unduly sophisticated about it, to the extent that the case closure summary contained a decision or decisions within s.46. The 20th June letter from Baker & McKenzie plainly called on the Director to withdraw or vary that decision, and gave reasons for that request. In my submission, if the request in the Bettercare case was sufficient for those purposes, as the tribunal held that it was, albeit with reservations then it must meet the criteria here. Just for your notes, I am referring to paragraphs 123 and 124 of Bettercare. It is plain that the Director refused to withdraw or vary his decision if one is made, albeit on the basis that he is no longer relying on it.

There is one point raised in the skeleton where my friend I think is saying on the cross-subsidy newspaper advertisement point, that Freeserve did not call on the Director to withdraw or vary that decision. I am referring to paragraphs 27, 28 and 30(b) of his skeleton point.

PRESIDENT: Well he says that the cross subsidy point was never really raised in the complaint, so he never took a decision on it. The request to withdraw cannot really be used to ask him to

vary something about which he has not done anything.

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MR FLYNN: Sir, yes, and our response to that, as you will see, is first, that that is a point which is, as it were, subsequent to the decision. It does not stop his decision on the points which he did make being an appealable one. Our position is that he did make a decision on that point, albeit that he misunderstood the point that was being made to him by Freeserve. He reached the wrong conclusion, possibly because he asked himself the wrong questions, and did not see the point which was being made to him. Nevertheless, that is the conclusion he reached.

THE PRESIDENT: Supposing we have a situation, for argument's sake, where he has not addressed the cross-subsidy point at all, he has just not said anything about it. What is the right legal analysis from the tribunal's point of view. Can we be seized of an appeal about something he has not addressed?

FLYNN: He has considered the conduct. If you take an overall look at those paragraphs of the case closure summary. He has considered the conduct that was put initially and he has said that there is no evidence of anti-competitive conduct put forward by Freeserve. So he has assessed the conduct claimed of - he may not have fully understood the implications of what was being said to him, he may not have put it very clearly, I do not know, but for whatever reason he may not have been ad idem as to where we were going, but he has assessed the conduct and he has come to a conclusion on it. We can appeal that and whether we are right, or whether we are embroidering the case, or making a completely new point is a matter for the substantive hearing. That would be my response.

So essentially, Sir that is a good illustration of my point, that you should not be drawn into detailed textual inquiries into individual phrases. You have to look at the correspondence in the course of dealings between the parties as a whole.

That brings me to another more general point about the analysis here. It does not matter, it is not relevant for the tribunal how thin the Director's analysis or how thin the

complaint is, or how detailed or how broad brush his investigation is, or his consideration of the issues, or indeed how firm his conclusion. The legal question is whether he has expressed, come to a conclusion of the type coming within s.46 and here relevantly sub-paragraph (b) of that provision.

Our submission overall is that here he carried out a limited investigation, one can call it a preliminary investigation if one likes, but he came to a firm conclusion. He found in his own terms, in his own language that there was no case to answer, and he has closed his file. No case to answer is a very strong phrase. He had been able to satisfy himself that there was nothing in the complaint. It is quite similar to a strike out in civil proceedings. That may be a robust, a rough and ready consideration, if a Judge comes to the view the case is unwinable - a short circuited investigative process, if you like. It is shorter than a trial, not all the evidence will have been heard. Reasons are going to be cursory, but nonetheless it is a firm conclusion. This is the phrased Mr Turner used - "a good enough for me" decision. He has looked at what has been put in front of him. He has asked BT the questions he thinks he needs to ask BT, and he has come to a firm view.

Indeed, Sir, as you will remember from Bettercare, this is a case where the Director has gone further than Bettercare, because he has actually spoken to the party whose conduct was complained of. One of the issues that was put to you in that case was that the Director could not have taken the decision because he had not even spoken to the undertaking whose conduct was complained of. The tribunal said I do not see why, if he is able to reach a conclusion without doing that he should not do that in principle. Here he has gone a little bit further and he has asked BT the questions that he feels he needs to put to them for the purposes of assessing whether there is a case to answer.

He reaches at the end of each section in the complaint an identically worded formulaic conclusion that the information that Freeserve has provided does not provide evidence of anticompetitive behaviour, and he does not consider that the issue

warrants further investigation. But that formula, in each case, follows an analysis which we have been through this in detail in the application in the skeleton. But in each case an analysis under which he regards each head of complaint as not disclosing an infringement, and it is true you will not find the words "There is no abuse" in there, that is our inference from what he is saying about not finding any anti-competitive conduct. We say those conclusions are expressed in a firm and unequivocal fashion and lead him to close his file on that.

He accepts that in relation to the telephone census. He said that the Director was able to reach conclusions on that point. If you compare that with most of the other heads it is in my submission hard to see the distinction between them. If you take the third head, for example - because it is easier to have the two open together if your copies are double-sided - the cross-subsidy point say, on the last two pages of the case closure summary in tab 3, and you read through again and I am not going to read them out to the tribunal, but read through again the paragraphs 15 to 17, let us see there is clarity and firm conclusions in everything he has to say. He refers to a recent, thorough investigation into cross-subsidy and margin squeeze.

I think the point is taken against us that Freeserve has not sought to appeal that finding. I do not think I am in a position to give a detailed response to that, but my instructions are it is not accepted that Freeserve had the ability to do that, and it is not a party to the group that expressed a view as to whether there was a possibility of an appeal under the Telecommunications Act, but if it is necessary to go into that in detail then we may need to come back to you on that.

But the Director refers to that recent inquiry where he clearly had reached firm conclusions. He notes, in paragraph 16, that other providers are undercutting BT's rental price and that Freeserve is charging the same price. The inference is in that case there is probably nothing wrong with the BT price. He says

it is perfectly possible for a service to make a loss in the first year without the price being judged predatory in Competition Law terms. That appears to be a statement of legal principle, to rebut what Freeserve had to say in its business cease, which has been criticised as thin because it was thin and it covered only one year.

Sir, he does not need Freeserve's projection in order to reach his conclusion. He has taken it from the horse's mouth. He has looked at BT Openworld's own business case, and found that it is not implausible, and he has found that payback will occur albeit in a period longer than one year. Likewise in paragraph 17 as to the special offer point, he is also able to reach firm conclusions because he has looked at it recently, and he knows there are other such offers around including one from Freeserve.

In our submission it is plain he is saying "I have looked at this conduct, there is no infringement here, there is no case to answer, and I am going to close my file. There is nothing further to investigate." That seems to us is every bit a decision, it has exactly the same qualities as his findings in relation to the telephone census point - similar firm language and definite conclusions, and in paragraph 20 reliance again on his recent margin squeeze investigation. What is the difference between the two? We are not able to see one and we suggest that any differences as there are not relevant to the issue of whether there is an appealable decision.

In relation to the first two heads of complaint, essentially it is the same story, the same analysis. Firm and unequivocal conclusions that he thinks there is nothing in what we have had to say. We have already discussed the first head of the complaint where we say for the purposes of preliminary issue it cannot be relevant that we consider that his reasons for dismissing it are the wrong ones. He reached a firm conclusion.

Likewise as to the second head of complaint there is nothing tentative about those conclusions at all. True, he uses the phrase "could have" in a couple of places, but if you read it in context it is plain, we submit that he was entirely

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satisfied and satisfied from explanations that he had sought from BT, that there was nothing in the discrimination point that Freeserve was raising, and accordingly it necessarily follows there is no infringement of the Chapter 2 prohibition.

PRESIDENT: He says, I think, and Mr Turner can put it much better than I can, that on that last point he did not actually reach any final views about what had in fact happened. He asked BT some questions, he got the answers, the answers did not support Freeserve's allegations and he, the director, thought that that was sufficient to persuade him not to take the matter further. That, I think, says Mr Turner is not sufficient to have a decision as to whether or not there has been an infringement, i.e. the Director is not actually taking a position on whether there has been an infringement, if I have understood the argument correctly, he is simply deciding "I am not going to take this complaint any further".

Indeed, Sir, I think that may be how he is putting it, but if one reads the wording it is not "We take no position on that", he balances the evidence. He looks at what we say. He looks at what BT have had to say, and he accepts their view of events. There is nothing provisional about it. If you look at the last sentence of each of paragraphs 10, 11 and 12 of the case closure summary, there are clear conclusionary statements. "Oftel considers this to be a reasonable timetable". "Oftel accepts BT's contentions that it was the development of selfinstall and not the wholesale price cuts which caused it to begin ordering modems". The conclusion of paragraph 12: "Oftel accepts that BT Openworld could have moved quickly following the announcement of wholesale price reductions." So there is nothing provisional, that "could have" phrasing is perhaps misleading there. Oftel has accepted that they could have done that. They are quite clear on that.

So their summary in paragraph 13: "Oftel considers that given BT's existing broad band marketing activities it could have moved quickly after 26th February. Oftel also believes that the ordering of modems was based on preparation for the launch

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of a self-install service. That leads him to his conclusion: "We have not provided evidence of anti-competitive behaviour".

Once again he has assessed the conduct, he has made the inquiries that he felt that he needed to, and he has come to a firm conclusion. It is not expressed, so far as we can see, in language, it is expressed in firm language and even if he had said "So far as we can see they did", he would have been reaching the conclusion that there was no infringement on the basis of the material he had in front of him, an in my submission that would be an appealable decision.

because he clearly has assessed the story from each side.

PRESIDENT: What do you say about Mr Turner's general argument on principle which I think goes something like this, and I will articulate it so that I can be put right in a moment by counsel. I think the argument is that there are really only two sorts of decisions under this Act. One is whether there is an infringement decision and that is fairly obvious and clear, there is no particular difficulty about it.

I do not think that is the case that we have before us

The other is where there is a, quote, "decision of non-infringement". So the Director says "A decision of non-infringement is a rather important step for me to take. It is rather the definitive measure, because I am really saying that taking a public position in the certain activity does not amount to infringement. So in order to reach a position of non-infringement I have really got to explore it pretty thoroughly to be satisfied that there really is no infringement here, and that is what I do in some cases. I get that far and I arrive at a decision of non-infringement. That is what the Act is talking about".

"The Act is not really taking about a situation", says the Director, "...where I am dealing with a complaint. I get lots of these complaints. I have up to a point got to deal with them". I am now putting words in the Director's mouth", "...up to a point I have to deal with them in a way that is cheap and cheerful, as it were, and get through the work within the six weeks that has

been allotted to me. I cannot look into every complaint, into the depth I would wish to look at it if I was going to take a formal decision of non-infringement. So what I do after the end of the preliminary stage is to say to myself whether the complaint is worth taking any further. If I say it is not worth taking any further, that does not mean it is an appealable decision, it simply means I am not prepared to take it any further".

If we interfere with that then we will upset the whole balance of the way the Act is supposed to work, and put the Director in an impossible position.

MR FLYNN: If he had written back to Freeserve "You may be right, you may be wrong. I have not got time and resources, I have got other things on my plate. You can go to the civil courts. Why don't you do that and let us know how you get on?" It is not part of our case that that would have to be an appealable decision. That would be a decision in the sort of terms you have described. He has other things to do and he was not going to take a position.

THE PRESIDENT: But you say he has taken a sufficient position---

MR FLYNN: He has taken a sufficient position---

THE PRESIDENT: --- on the fact of this case.

FLYNN: Yes, he has fallen, if you like, between two stools. He has fallen between the one that says - there is a range of things that could say and some of them are sketched out in your Judgment in Bettercare. He can say "It sounds very interesting but I have not got the resources". "It does not sound very interesting at all. It is not on my priority list. Come back to me with more information and I might think about it." Or he can go and come up with a non-infringement decision after what was described at some point in Bettercare as an "all singing, all dancing" investigation. But our submission is that he has fallen between the two stools. He has made something of an investigation and he has come to a conclusion and that conclusion is a conclusion of non-infringement.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

MR

FLYNN: Essentially the submission is that this is a decision of the type described in paragraph 85 of Bettercare. He legitimately - "legitimately" in the sense that he is entitled to do that - concluded - and I am paraphrasing the wording a little - he has concluded that there is no infringement without carrying out a formal investigation, whatever that might involve, second stage investigation probably under his letter, he has given only brief reason for the view that he has come to, because in his view the matter is sufficiently clear to enable him to reach a decision without further ado. That is essentially what paragraph 85 of Bettercare says. In our submission that is the case we have here on each of the four heads of complaint, and therefore the appeal is admissible.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

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MR FLYNN: Sir, I think I have probably dealt, at least I hope I have, with most of the big points that Mr Turner made.

It is on the Convention and access to courts, our submission is that these points are interlinked in that if we go to court in relation to the substantive infringement at a time when there is a complaint, or a complaint has been made and has been dealt with by the Regulator, we will either be stayed or we will be told that the Regulator did not think very much of it so why should the court? This affects our ability to have our civil rights determined. I think the points are seen as linked, linked in that fashion. We are put in an invidious position if he chucks out our complaint in this fashion.

I have been passed a note about the Telecommunications Act investigation and appeal, but I think that is a point on which I shall take detailed instructions, if that is seen to be---

THE PRESIDENT: I am not sure that it is going to affect the legal issue one way or the other at this stage.

MR FLYNN: No. In that case, sir, unless there are further questions from the tribunal, I should leave it there for the moment.

35 THE PRESIDENT: Is there any submission BT would like to make, Miss 36 Bacon?

MISS BACON: No, Sir.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr Turner, I think we, or I at least have one or two things in my head that I would like to ask - not much, but one or two points just to clear up.

MR TURNER: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: It might be convenient if I just ask the questions and then we rise for a few minutes and give you time to collect your thoughts if you would like to.

MR TURNER: I am obliged, Sir.

PRESIDENT: I suppose the first thing that is in my mind is what on earth are we to make of this letter of 8th July, when in so far as it says, the Competition Act has not entered into it, or words to that effect. I know you have, no doubt advisedly, abandoned that position, but I am interested to some extent to know how this letter came to be written in the terms that it did, or how the writer came to think that he was not dealing with the Competition Act, because it is a somewhat curious position to have adopted. That, I suppose, is the first question.

The second point is really this. I think we can all understand the desire of Oftel to help the tribunal and to arrive at a solution that is the correct solution for the system, as it were. But is it not somewhat difficult for the tribunal to, as it were, look into Mr Russell's head with the benefit of such ex post facto explanations as are forthcoming and work out what he thought he was deciding, as distinct from looking at what the documents actually say. Have we not got to go objectively by the documents?

I suppose, related to that, what are the consequences of the submission that the telephone census point is an appealable decision but the rest of the document is not. Does that mean, strictly speaking, appeal proceedings before the tribunal on that point but Judicial Review on the rest of the decision in some other jurisdiction and what are the consequences that would flow from that sort of analysis?

I think, for me at least, lastly, the Director's statement

of policy of 1st July, 2002, which I am just trying to turn up.

MR TURNER: It is tab 12.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I am there, thank you. If we look at paragraph 3.13, if we look at the last six lines or so, what is being said - I am picking it up at the question:

"Where there is a case to answer, we will conduct a more in-depth investigation and will generally use our formal powers to gather information. Where we decide to close an investigation because the Director General has concluded that the CAct has not been infringed, we will continue our policy of publishing a non-infringement decision. Such decisions will appear simultaneously on the public register held by the OFT."

That would suggest that the concept, or perhaps it does, my question is: Does this suggest that the concept of closing an investigation at the end of the preliminary stage is consistent with the idea of having what is called here a non-infringement decision? In other words, I suppose the question is does paragraph 3.13 throw any light on this case or not?

So those are some points that I had in mind. I do not know if my colleagues have got any particular points they want to raise? [No questions]

THE PRESIDENT: Very well, we will rise for 10 minutes.

MR TURNER: I am obliged, sir.

## (Short break)

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Mr Turner?

MR TURNER: Sir, if I may begin with the questions that you posed before the short adjournment, they do overlap to some extent with the remainder of my points. I shall take them in turn, if I may.

The fair question that the tribunal raised about the letter of 8th July - how was it thought that the issues did not relate tot he Competition Act. The answer to that is, rightly or wrongly, in tab 2 of the disclosure bundle, which I invite the tribunal to turn up. That was the letter sent to Freeserve in relation to its complaint, talking about procedure. Now, the standard way of doing things at that time in Oftel was if the

eye travels down to the bottom of the page, it refers to s.49 of the Telecoms Act placing a duty on the Director to consider nonfrivolous representations and so on. Then it goes on:

"The Director may investigate such representations under the Competition Act where he is satisfied that this is the most appropriate way of proceeding. I hope to inform you of the conclusions by 28th May at the latest."

Now, as I understand it, at least within Oftel as they considered it analytically, they thought of themselves as first of all looking at matters under the Telecommunications Act, in accordance with the s.49 duty, and then having done so if they formed the view that it was appropriate to pick up the investigation and consider matters under the competition Act they would then do so, and you will at the bottom of that page and just going over the top of the following page that it is said explicitly that "Oftel exercises its powers concurrently with the OFT and Oftel" and "The OFT will agree on which authority will consider your complaint if the Director General considers it more appropriate to investigate your complaint under the Competition Act, 1998."

So the structure that was envisaged was that first of all you look at it under the Telecommunications Act, and then subsequently you reflect and decide what to do, and you may consider to travel on with the case under the Competition Act.

Now, in this particular case on reflection we considered that the way that it had been approached in substance meant that the matter had been closed for the purpose of the Competition Act as well, and so we decided that we would not pursue the point which had been taken in the 8th July letter, that as a matter of procedure what had happened was that a particular process that had been followed. We accept that when you read the case closure letter it is, as Freeserve says, rejecting the complaint in a broad sense, and that therefore it is appropriate to take into account the Competition Act as well. But I hope that that explains for the tribunal how matters arose.

Secondly, the tribunal asks is it not difficult for the

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tribunal to look into Mr Russell's head as distinct to focusing on what the document actually says and respectfully we agree with that - that has always been our position as well. But my overriding submission is that one needs to bear in mind at the outset the two strong points. First is context, and the second is the issue of institutional balance. In relation to context I say that it is necessary not just to look at the case closure letter in isolation, which is what one naturally first does, but to bear in mind that it is part of an ongoing conversation between a regulated party and a Regulator, who are constantly talking to each other, the letter is written in the flow of the stream, as it were.

THE PRESIDENT: So there is an ongoing conversation between Oftel and BT, you mean?

TURNER: And Freeserve, between Oftel and Freeserve. Thee are discussions on issues of concern to Freeserve on a fairly regular and informal basis, and I invite the tribunal to look again after the hearing, perhaps, just at the tone and tenor of the e-mails in tab 3 of this bundle, which really gives you a picture of the sort of relationship that one has, and I ask the tribunal not to ignore that, because it is part of the way in which the Regulator does business.

As well as that one sees the meeting that took place to discuss the complaint on 17th April, and everything that was said there. Freeserve says it is not directly referred to in the case closure decision. Of course, it is not, that is right, but it would be very wrong not to take that into account.

Secondly, the previous cross subsidy investigation which it is necessary to know a little bit about for the purpose of understanding that portion of the case closure letter, Freeserve was of course a party to those matters, and had been centrally involved in it. I do not ask the tribunal to turn this up at the moment, but if you go to the margin squeeze decisions, one for residential, one for business, you see that Freeserve is explicitly a party for one of those, and an industry group, which includes Freeserve, is a party to the other.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

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MR TURNER: And one matter that my instructing solicitor has had copied, and I have passed to my learned friend, I would desire to show to the tribunal briefly. [Same handed to the tribunal]

The first of these is a letter from a man called Richard Sweet, of the relevant industry group, and you will see there that he wrote, interestingly enough, a s.47(1) letter about the margin squeeze investigations, saying that that had all taken place under the Competition Act as well, or should be so construed. If you just turn to the end of the letter, you will see that on page 3 at the bottom, Freeserve is specifically identified as one of the companies supporting that application, so that there is a history there.

The language really needs to be viewed in the context of the experience that this was, as I say, part of an ongoing conversation.

Thirdly, it would be wrong to ignore the letter reminding Freeserve that this was in the nature of a preliminary investigation because that does bear on the issue of the degree of factual conviction that the Director General held, and that is particularly relevant for the advance notification complaint.

The other matter, which needs to be borne in mind, and which I do urge on the tribunal to consider carefully because it is a matter of considerable concern, is the issue of institutional balance, that the Directors, and here the Director General of Telecommunications has to be able to deal with the flow of complaints in as helpful a way as possible---

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

TURNER: ---without feeling that if it puts a foot wrong or is too helpful that someone is going to say "Well, there you are, you have made an appealable decision, or so we construe it, and that an awful lot of resources are then needing to be devoted to this sort of exercise.

There is a desirability in some certainty for the Regulator that they are able to engage in this function of dealing with complaints on an informal basis, although in

exceptional circumstances one quite sees that a non-infringement decision of a definite kind may be made, the tribunal ought in my submission to think hard before concluding in a particular case that that has occurred.

I do not know if there are any particular points that the tribunal has in mind in relation to looking into Mr Russell's head, but as a general matter that is my response.

THE PRESIDENT: The only point I had in mind, and I do not know whether it really takes one anywhere, is that you explained to us very, fairly, very openly, that the reason why a different approach had been taken to the telephone census point, as distinct from the rest of the letter, was that Mr Russell subjectively thought that that was a point on which one could fairly be said to have taken the decision, whereas he was not quite so sure about the other three.

MR TURNER: I understand. I am sorry to have given that impression entirely. That does, in truth, accord with reality, but I do rely on the fact ----

19 THE PRESIDENT: It does accord with reality?

MR TURNER: That statement does accord with reality. Mr Russell does consider on that point that ---

THE PRESIDENT: That is very helpful background.

MR TURNER: He reached a view on that. But I ought to explain that on objective grounds the telephone census part of the complaint can be distinguished, and is sensibly distinguished, and I have not yet done that, so I will now.

The telephone census part of the complaint is different from the three other parts. It is different from the advanced notification part of the complaint, because in the advanced notification part of the complaint the clear fact is that Oftel did not ascertain the facts in detail. It drew short of that. It saw where matters were going and decided that it would not proceed further.

By contrast, the telephone census part of the complaint involves a neat and self-contained issue, and there was no question of detailed factual information needed to be done, so

that makes it different from that.

So far as cross-subsidy is concerned, as the tribunal is aware our simple point there is that Oftel decided it was not prepared to re-open its previous Telecommunications Act investigation on the basis of thin evidence.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

MR

TURNER: And that distinguishes it from the telephone census portion of the complaint. The one that is more interesting is the cross-marketing part of the complaint, and there are two points of distinction here which we consider to be relevant. The first is that the issue of cross-subsidy, the point that Freeserve now seeks to take on appeal was raised, at least in the meeting, with Oftel before a decision was taken, and it was brought into the frame. The distinction between that and the telephone census complaint is that although Mr Russell makes reference, as an aside, to issues of cross-subsidy, something to be borne in mind, in the case closure letter, it is not - and never was - in the frame. It was never raised and indeed is still not raised in any of the documents up to the notice of application as being a part of the point on the telephone census.

THE PRESIDENT: On the telephone census?

MR TURNER: On the telephone census. You will not find it in the s.47(1) letter, or the reasons attached, or in the notes of application, or anywhere. It is a different point.

Moreover, secondly, when one looks at the telephone census complaint, one sees that the appeal that is sought to be brought to this tribunal is on the same lines as that which the Director rejected. Dispute is taken with the Director's conclusion, and fair enough, in the Director's view, that makes it different from each of the three other heads of complaint.

The third point, Sir, that you asked me to address was what are the consequences of a submission, that the telephone census point is appealable but the rest is not and, Sir, you said specifically would that mean that Judicial Review is available on the remainder, and what consequences flow from that

analysis?

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The first point to note is that this does all appear in one document, but it is - to use an expression - an omnibus complaint. There are four discrete matters that appear in one document. They were presented as such and have been treated as such at every stage. It would be wrong, therefore, to think that one was dividing up a single animal in some peculiar way, in fact they are four separate matters.

Secondly, there is, of course, no suggestion of Judicial Review in this case, on any of the other heads. Assuming that an appealable decision was not made on any of those other matters—

- 13 THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
- MR TURNER: --it does not appear to be suggested, or would now be suggested for the first time that that was an irrational step, that the Director should, reasonably----
- THE PRESIDENT: From the point of view of analysis and principle,
  the remedy of Judicial Review would, in principle, be available
  on the other three points. That is to say if they did wish to
  challenge the other three points the only available avenue would
  be Judicial Review. Is that right?
- MR TURNER: Yes. It would be challenging, strictly speaking, the Director's discretion.
- 24 THE PRESIDENT: The exercise of his discretion.
- 25 MR TURNER: Yes, the exercise of his discretion.
- THE PRESIDENT: So you would have to show an error of law or a misdirection or a wrongful exercise of discretion, or whatever?
- MR TURNER: Yes. Finally, sir, you asked me to address the
  statement of policy of 1st July, and the implications of that. I
  have taken instructions. If the tribunal would not mind
  referring again to paragraph 3.13 of that, for ease of reference
  it is again at tab 12.
- 33 THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
- MR TURNER: This paragraph is explaining what will happen after the new regime to be brought into force, as from 1st July. There will no longer be preliminary investigations, it is different

from the situation that obtains on the facts of this case so when, at the end of paragraph 3.13, Oftel says "When we decide to close an investigation because the Director General has concluded that the Competition Act has not been infringed. We will continue with our policy of publishing a non-infringement decision." The first point to note is that one is talking about after a full investigation. The second point is that the qualification is important because the Director General has concluded that the Competition Act has not been infringed. That is to say, where the Director General considers that he has concluded that the Competition Act has not been infringed, which is the very issue in this case, he has, and will continue with his policy of publishing non-infringement decisions. I think I attach to our skeleton argument an example of such a document, and that is what is meant. But that is not to say that in every case previously where a preliminary investigation was undertaken that it necessarily follows from ending the preliminary investigation that a non-infringement decision has been taken.

I have only a few remaining points.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

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TURNER: First, on the issue of language. One of Freeserve's principal submissions is that the Director General should not be able to hide behind language. Well, true enough substance must prevail over form, but Mr Flynn then relies strongly - having said that - on the formula appearing at the end of each section in the case closure letter. The two propositions are not obviously compatible.

More particularly, in relation to the advance notification issue, Sir, you probed Mr Flynn on what Oftel ought to have done, beyond what appears in the document itself to flag up that it had not reached a final decision. As I understood it, Mr Flynn's response was to say that certain other things could have been done. Oftel could have come back and said "We have not reached a final view either way, but..." and so on.

In my submission, to do that is to essentially advocate regulatory squirm; to say that particular language needs to be

adopted is wrong. It is helpful to have language that indicates, if it be the case, that a decision has not been reached, we say that a fair reading of the advance notification part of the complaint is that one sees that it has not been reached, and I do not go back over the old ground.

Next, you asked Mr Flynn how he deals with the point that if a decision on a narrow contention can then be used as a basis for opening up a new front before the tribunal, which has not been addressed by the Director, does that not come into tension with the scheme of the Act? That was specifically in reference to the cross-marketing activity part of the complaint. The response was the Director General has assessed the conduct, and so we can appeal that. It comes back, in my submission, to the point that if you are looking at the conduct as a whole, and we agree that you should, then that conduct does include other aspects of the complaint that are in the frame.

For the cross-marketing complaint, the issue of crosssubsidy had, albeit likely been raised, and there the Director General plainly has not addressed the issue. Yet that is the issue sought to be appealed.

PRESIDENT: That raises the question for us, I think, whether what we have got is a decision on those matters that he has addressed and if it is, what do we do about the questions that he has not addressed? I think, conceptually speaking, there are three possibilities. One is there is no decision in that respect, so there is nothing we can go into.

Two is that because he has not taken a decision there is nothing for us to do except decide that the matter has not been investigated and remitted under the power to remit things that have not been yet investigated; or three, simply to say this matter was never sufficiently, or clearly raised and we are not going to go into it, and if anybody wants to raise it then they must make another complaint.

MR TURNER: Yes.

THE

PRESIDENT: It may not matter from your point of view which of the three we take, except conceptually speaking it would matter,

of course. But the end result I think is the same.

MR TURNER: Yes.

- THE PRESIDENT: The fact that we might hold that there is a decision on the matters he has decided, if I may use the tautology, does nth mean that this point about cross-subsidy is suddenly at large or in the appeal, or needs to be gone into in any depth. They are separate issues.
- MR TURNER: Yes, leaving aside the precise conceptual analysis, where a matter has not been addressed by the Director, and plainly not, then in my submission it would be wrong for the tribunal to consider it as if it were sharing a jurisdiction of First Instance with the relevant director in that regard.
- THE PRESIDENT: Yes. A somewhat similar point arises in relation to the predatory pricing allegation. It may very well be sensible for the Director to be able to say: "Look, I have just gone into all this in another case, and you did not appeal that other case and you come to me with new information that frankly does not add up to anything, so I am not going to do any more about it", as a result that may be a very sensible result---
- MR TURNER: yes.
- THE PRESIDENT: ---depending on how one analyses the facts, looked into the facts. As a result one can see that. One question is whether you get to that result by saying that there is no appealable decision, or whether you get to it by saying "Yes, there is an appealable decision, but frankly, the Director was completely right to take that view."
- MR TURNER: Yes.
- PRESIDENT: In other words, there is a sense in which - I know THE the Director and probably all Regulators are very concerned about institutional balance, but there is also a sense in which the conversation of which you speak simply goes on a bit further in front of the tribunal and does not necessarily result, I would have thought, in catastrophe from the Regulator's point of view, it is simply a case of the tribunal surveying what has been done, and seeing whether the result on what he had was a sensible result.

MR TURNER: It must depend on the circumstances. If one takes the cross-subsidy investigation, there was an investigation under a different Statute. Freeserve was a party to that investigation and, Sir, you will have seen from that letter that it was also a party to the indicated then Competition Act appeal.

THE PRESIDENT: That would apparently have been appealable either under the Telecommunications Appeals Regulations, or under the Competition Act - it might be both I suppose, but nobody has really explored the relationship between the two.

MR TURNER: No, perhaps if the tribunal would care just to look at the little piece of legislation accompanying the letter---

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

MR TURNER: ---because on page 2, there is a new insertion into the Telecommunications Act by virtue of these regulations, and it is entitled "Appeals, Section 46(b)" and it is a section that applies to certain decisions of the Secretary of State or the Director, and the relevant one for current purposes is over the page on page 3, at letter "J":

"Any other decision in respect of which the rights or interests of a person....wishing to provide any telecommunication service by means of a system are materially affected".

We say that would appear to include Freeserve and then one sees the provisions for appeal that follow, in particular, that there is a time limit set in subsection (vi).

In a case such as the present where a party has not availed themselves---

THE PRESIDENT: You cannot get round the time limit by making a new complaint to the same effect and then saying "You have not dealt with my new complaint and therefore I appeal effectively the decision that I forgot to appeal before.

MR TURNER: Yes, and it reinforces the point where what has been offered a very thin basis for proceeding. The party has a discussion with the Regulator at a meeting and is told this is too thin and we do not set our faces against it, but we need more meat than this. The matter is rejected on that basis, that

for use in preparing its judgment. It has been placed on the Tribunal website for readers to see how matters were conducted at the public hearing of these proceedings and is not to be relied on or cited in the context of any other proceedings. The Tribunal's judgment in this matter will be the final and definitive record. This transcript has not been proof read or corrected. It is a working tool for the Tribunal

it would be wrong to say that a decision on the merits has been made, which incorporates all of the previous reasoning, from the previous investigation, and it is right to analyse that as a decision not to proceed further with a thin complaint, because what has been presented is too exiguous to justify the investment of further resources.

Sir, unless the tribunal has any further questions those are my submissions.

- PRESIDENT: I think I just have one point to raise, and it is THE just in the back of my mind, Mr Turner. It is true that the appellate structure under the EC Treaty, when we are dealing with complaints to the European Commission is different from the one we have under the Act.
- MR TURNER: Yes.

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- PRESIDENT: But it is also the case that under that structure 16 complainants have certain rights to have complaint rejections 17 examined by the court. We are shortly going to move through the 18 Commission's modernisation proposals, even closer to the 19 European system when national authorities have the power to apply Articles 81 and 82.
  - TURNER: Yes. MR
- 22 The area of telecommunications is itself much THEPRESIDENT: 23 affected by Community Directives of various kinds, some of which 24 seem to be leading to changes in the regime of the 25 Communications Bill. Should we not at least in a general 26 background way bear in mind the position that complainants have 27 under the wider Community framework in helping us decide what 28 direction we should go in under this legislation that is broadly 29 speaking modelled on Community principles?
- 30 MR TURNER: Under the existing Community framework I think the 31 CICCE case says that there is no right to a final decision.
  - PRESIDENT: No, there is not, but there is a right to appeal the THE rejection of a complaint. It may not get you very far because you may be told "Well, there is no Community interest here" or maybe the fact that you did not get a decision that you want is not enough for you to win. There is at least a right to take the

matter a certain distance. In a case where the authority has actually investigated it and has actually formed a view just to check that that view is not an untenable view and the law is correct, and so forth.

MR TURNER: Yes.

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THE PRESIDENT: I suppose the analogy here is that it is not the same as a full appeal, but there is a certain degree of control over the way the authority has approached the complaint in question.

MR TURNER: Yes, I am sensitive to the fact that, of course, this is the expert tribunal for dealing with matters of this kind. On the other hand, the Act does, as currently constituted lay down a clear distinction and says that where a final decision on infringement has been made it comes to you, but in other cases where the Director has exercised his discretion not to make such a decision a control is available but by way of Judicial Review.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, well that is your submission.

18 MR TURNER: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Good. Mr Flynn, do you have any reply you would like to make?

FLYNN: Sir, I do not think there are detailed points to come back on, but on the general issue that you have just been ventilating with Mr Turner, our submission is that under the structure of the Act as you have it at the moment, whatever maybe in the pipeline, the tribunal's task, as we see it, is to look at the correspondence as a whole, and to take a view as to what it is the Director has actually decided and if that approach is taken then we will get to the substance of determining whether the decision is a correct one. As you said, it may be that its decision is that "There is not very much in this complaint, and go away". If that is his position then that is the issue which should be before the tribunal, not this "Have I gone sufficiently down the road of making my mind up?" The position should be one in which he stands by the views that he has expressed.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

MR FLYNN: And that goes both to the admissibility and the substance. That preserves in full his Automec discretion to prioritise complaints or not invest resources in them. He must not fall between two stools and present as "You haven't given me enough to go on", what is in reality a decision "You have not shown that there is an infringement, and I believe that there is no infringement". In that sort of case then he should stand by it.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, thank you. We are going to reserve our Judgment in this case, Mr Turner. I have just got my diary now in front of me. Some of us have other duties to perform next week, so I am not quite sure, contrary to earlier hopes, exactly when we are going to be able to give Judgment in this case - I hope at some stage within the next few weeks or so.

MR TURNER: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Certainly no longer than that. Are you able to update me on how you are getting on with the defence, and how it is looking from your point of view?

MR TURNER: I was intending to take stock on that really at the end of this hearing and with some steer from the tribunal if possible. I can tell you broadly what efforts have been made, which is that on the substance of the alleged abuses, we know what we say the answer is and from this hearing and the matters leading up to it, I think the tribunal has a fair idea of what we will say as well.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

TURNER: On the bigger issues of market definition, the broadband sector, and dominance and so on, our plan at the moment is to try to assist the tribunal by setting out sensible where Oftel has got to in its analysis of this emerging part of the market.

The chief economist at Oftel is heavily involved on something else at the moment, in fact work for the other side of the Commission, but we are working hard to try to produce something which would be a sensible statement of Oftel's views on those issues as soon as we can.

- 1 THE PRESIDENT: That is very helpful.
- 2 MR TURNER: But I am not able to help the tribunal on timescale any further than that.
- THE PRESIDENT: If I may just make one point on that last issue. On the point that seems, on any view, to be still in the case, that is to say the telephone census, it might be that in that case there is a dominant position in retail voice telephony I do not know, it might be.
- 9 MR TURNER: Yes.
- THE PRESIDENT: And it might be that is the kind of issue that the tribunal could tackle as an issue on agreed facts.
- 12 MR TURNER: Yes. I cannot speak definitely now.
- 13 THE PRESIDENT: I just mention it as something---
- MR TURNER: Sir, you are quite right to say that on that particular limb of the complaint, and that alone, there is a different market definition issue. The retail voice telephony market, and abusing a position in that.
- 18 THE PRESIDENT: That was the allegation anyway.
- MR TURNER: Is the allegation there, and it may be easier for Oftel to produce its views on market definition and dominance there than in relation to broadband. In fact, it almost certainly will be.
- THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Well what I was going to suggest, I think the timing for the defence at the moment is 7th November, is that right.
- 26 MR TURNER: I believe it may have been 5th.
- 27 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, it is 5th November.
- THE PRESIDENT: I was going to suggest a further extension for the defence of two weeks.
- 30 MR TURNER: Yes.
- 31 THE PRESIDENT: So that there is no question of you having to serve 32 a defence until the tribunal's position on the preliminary 33 question is clear from its Judgment.
- MR TURNER: I am obliged, sir. On our side we can undertake that we are continuing with the work and will do everything we can to proceed expeditiously we will not sit on our hands.

THE PRESIDENT: No, well that is very helpful. So we will extend that for two weeks, and BT's time is extended similarly for two weeks. That I think deals with that, so thank you all very much indeed for your submissions today.

(The hearing concluded at 4.30 pm)