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## IN THE COMPETITION COMMISSION APPEALS TRIBUNAL

The Competition Commission

Room 309 New Court 48 Carey Street London WC2

Monday 3 March 2003

Before:

THE PRESIDENT
SIR CHRISTOPHER BELLAMY QC
(CHAIRMAN)

THE HONOURABLE ANTONY LEWIS and MS VINDELYN SMITH-HILLMAN

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BETWEEN:

HASBRO UK LIMITED

Applicant

- and -

## THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF FAIR TRADING Respondent

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MR JONATHAN TATTON (instructed by Messrs Denton Wilde Sapte) appeared on behalf of the Applicant.

MR JON TURNER (instructed by the Director General of Fair Trading) appeared for the Respondent.

PROCEEDINGS

Transcribed from the shorthand notes of Harry Counsell & Co.
Cliffords Inn, Fetter Lane, London EC4A 1LD Telephone 020 7269 0370

MR TATTON: Madam, Sirs. This is an application on behalf of Hasbro UK Limited under Rule 10 of the Tribunal's Rules for the Tribunal's permission for Hasbro to withdraw its appeal application in this case.

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Rule 10 provides that "An applicant can only withdraw his application with permission of the Tribunal and where the Tribunal does give permission it may do so on such terms as it sees fit".

When Hasbro notified the Tribunal of its intention to make this application last Thursday, the Director General of Fair Trading replied on the Friday expressing the then current view that the permission to withdraw should be given but on terms that Hasbro should make a contribution to the Director's costs and at least pay for the costs of a previous unsuccessful application that was made by Hasbro on 24 January to extend time for lodging its appeal and where costs were reserved. Hasbro, on the other hand, hope to prevail upon the Tribunal today, if minded to give its permission, to do so without any order as to costs.

The necessary factual background was aired fairly fully at its previous hearing for an extension of time before yourself, Sir, and it is very fairly and fully summarised in your judgment in that case. Nevertheless, as there is a contentious issue on the question of costs, I would, unless prevented by the Tribunal, rehearse those facts again, as I believe they are pertinent to the issue of where costs should lie.

This appeal relates to a decision by the Director General of Fair Trading following an investigation against Hasbro UK Limited and its agreement with some of its distributors. This is often referred to, and I will refer to it, as the Distributor decision. In its appeal in this case on the Distributor decision Hasbro is not disputing the infringement, it is merely appealing the quantum of the amount of the penalty against it.

In addition to the Distributor investigation the Director was also pursuing against Hasbro another

investigation in relation to agreements it had with some of its retailers, in particular Argos and Littlewoods, and this I will refer to as the Retail investigation or the Retail decision.

To all intents and purposes both of these investigations were, until November last year, running in parallel. When the Office of Fair Trading was taking its evidence from Hasbro employees there was a single interview with each employee which covered both investigations. The Rule 14 Notices were issued in both investigations at the same time.

THE CHAIRMAN: They were separate notices, were they?

MR TATTON: There were separate notices indeed, Sir, under the same cover and there was a single oral hearing in respect of both investigations.

It was always Hasbro's expectation and, I believe, also the Director's expectation, that the two decisions would in fact be issued simultaneously. These expectations were upset last November when, for reasons that I will come on to explain, it became apparent that the investigation in relation to the retail infringement was likely to be delayed.

On 19 November last year, as soon as Hasbro appreciated that this bifurcation of these two, what it considered to be related decisions, was about to occur, protested to the Director immediately. I would like to read out that letter in full. It was appended previously to Hasbro's application for an extension of time.

THE CHAIRMAN: I think we have got it, Mr Tatton. We have refreshed our memory as to what it contains, so I do not think you need to read it, but you may want to draw our attention to particular bits of it.

MR TATTON: Thank you.

The particular bit that I think would be worth drawing the Tribunal's attention to is the fact that as soon as Hasbro appreciated that this bifurcation was necessary, it had anticipated that it would be in difficulty in terms of framing and/or deciding whether to

pursue its appeal and the reasons why Hasbro considered there to be a relation between the two decisions was made known to the Director as early as November last year. The Director's response to that, which was also appended to the correspondence, essentially made two points. The first, the hope that the two decisions would be issued simultaneously, was an administrative matter but, secondly, the Director saw that the solution to Hasbro's dilemma, which it had expressed in its letter, lay in the application of this Tribunal's Rules.

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What happened prior to making the application for an extension of time in January of this year was that Hasbro was on the horns of a dilemma. Its preferred course of action, as is apparent from the letter to the Director of 19 November was, and always has been, to defer making its appeal in the Distributor decision until the Retailer decision was also published. The reasons for that are set out in this letter and the overlap of the likely arguments relevant to quantum are alluded to there. But this preferred course of action would have resulted in neither Hasbro nor the Director or his Office incurring any unnecessary costs in pursuing this appeal and that when Hasbro had decided that it would indeed like to pursue its appeal, being in a position to do so by putting its best foot forward, if I may use that colloquialism, having the completeness of all its arguments available to it at that time.

THE CHAIRMAN: Could I ask you, Mr Tatton, to enlighten us on one point which puzzles me slightly.

We have got but have not really absorbed, but we have glanced at the Retail decision and what I am not at all clear about is when Hasbro knew or had agreed with the Director about the question of immunity or leniency as far as the Retail decision was concerned.

MR TATTON: Allow me to help you in this way. Leniency was granted in September 2001 and Hasbro was in fact granted two sets of leniency. It was granted, in respect of the Retail decision, 100 per cent leniency but if the

Director came to the view that Hasbro was the instigator or the leader of the infringement then a second agreed leniency giving only 50 per cent immunity would be triggered.

That is all in an agreement somewhere?

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THE CHAIRMAN:

MR TATTON: That is all in an agreement, yes Sir.

THE CHAIRMAN: So you were granted 100 per cent but if -
MR TATTON: If Hasbro was the instigator or the leader of
the reported infringement, then another leniency
agreement giving only 50 per cent immunity would be
triggered. During the course of the investigation the

triggered. During the course of the investigation the Director wrote to Hasbro saying that it was his preliminary view, following his Rule 14 Notice, that Hasbro was the instigator and/or the leader of the infringement and was minded to make a decision that only 50 per cent immunity would be granted. He invited Hasbro to make representations in that regard. Following those representations the Director maintained that view and following further representations on 6 February the Director finally notified Hasbro that in fact 100 per cent immunity would be granted.

THE CHAIRMAN: Are you able to give me a few dates to fill that in a bit? There was the original letter.

MR TATTON: The original letter would have been dated around about 15 September 2001, I think. Then the Director deciding that he was minded to withdraw the 100 per cent and replace it with 50 per cent was at the time he issued the Rule 14 Notice, which was 1 May 2002. Within the time frame of the submissions on the substantive issues of the Rule 14 Notice, Hasbro then made submissions as to why the Director should not withdraw the 100 per cent leniency, which was during the first week of July. My associate believes it was 9 July 2002.

Following that, the Director then wrote again saying he was minded to continue to maintain his position and that would have been - and here I am guessing - about two months after that.

THE CHAIRMAN: So query September 2002.

- MR TATTON: Yes. Following which Hasbro made further representations. Again I am sorry I cannot help you on the precise date, but it would have been in the same month. Then the Director considered those representations and on 5 or 6 February notified Hasbro that he would not be seeking to withdraw the 100 per cent immunity.
- THE CHAIRMAN: So if I have understood that correctly, we have got quite a short mismatch in time, if I may put it like that, in the sense that you made an application to the Tribunal for an extension on 23 January, which was dealt with on the 24th.
- MR TATTON: Yes, Sir.

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- THE CHAIRMAN: You had to lodge your appeal on the 29th and it was on the 6th that you got notification that the 100 per cent would be maintained.
- MR TATTON: Indeed, Sir.
- THE CHAIRMAN: I suppose you would say, or do you, that if you had had that notification a week earlier, you might not have put in the appeal at all?
- MR TATTON: We may not have put in the appeal, although I would maintain that simply knowing that we had 100 per cent leniency was not necessarily the end of the considerations because there may still have been issues in the substantive decision that may have strengthened and/or added to the arguments on quantum that we submitted by 29 January in this case. But it is perfectly fair to say that if Hasbro had known that it had 100 per cent leniency prior to then, then that would have been a very weighty matter in their commercial consideration as to whether or not to appeal.
- THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.
- MR TATTON: At the time it made its decision to apply to this Tribunal for an extension of time on 23 January, Hasbro had considered that its only other course, if it had not made that application, was to put in an incomplete appeal (I think I expressed it last time, Sir, as the equivalent of a protective writ) in the trust that

the Tribunal would, consequent upon the Retail decision being published, then be amenable to Hasbro amending, or indeed withdrawing, its appeal application at that stage. Hasbro believed, in effect, that it really had little option other than to make that application, if only to avoid the risk, if it had not, of subsequently being possibly criticised by the Tribunal for not having instead sought the extension of time as a way out of its dilemma.

Further, Hasbro also believed that, in the absence of any indications as to the meaning of "exceptional circumstances" in Rule 6, such an application would not be considered frivolous, unreasonable or vexatious and that the bifurcation of related decisions may not unreasonably be argued to have constituted an exceptional circumstance.

THE CHAIRMAN: It was not a frivolous application, Mr Tatton. It was an unsuccessful one unfortunately.

MR TATTON: Thank you, Sir.

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Having failed to succeed in its application for an extension of time, Hasbro lodged its appeal application in this matter by the deadline on 29 January.

The Retail decision was published by the Director General on 19 February, although, as I have explained, Hasbro on 6 February did know that it would be maintaining its 100 per cent leniency. But nevertheless Hasbro took the view that it still needed to see what was in the Retail decision before finally making a view as to whether to amend or withdraw, or just maintain its current appeal as submitted to the Tribunal.

That process took eight days, from 19 February until last Thursday, and I would submit to the Tribunal that given that decisions had to be made both in the UK and in America, we tried to do that within as expeditious a time frame as possible.

Sir, in the circumstances, I am asking for the Tribunal's permission for Hasbro UK to withdraw its appeal in this matter. This appeal is based on a full

consideration of the fact that it has been granted 100 per cent leniency in the other matter and having read fully the Director's reasoning for, and the quantum of, his penalty in that other matter.

As to the question of costs, I would ask the Tribunal to make no order, for the following reasons. Hasbro would submit that, given the circumstances, it has acted sensibly and reasonably. Indeed Hasbro believes that the Director himself considered that the proper solution to Hasbro's dilemma lay within the application of the Tribunal's Rules.

THE CHAIRMAN: In what sense?

MR TATTON: In the sense that his reply to Hasbro, after its letter of 19 January, was to the effect, if I may read from it, that "We quite recognise that it is for Hasbro to decide if it wishes to take a different view on whether the decisions should be linked in any way ..."

THE CHAIRMAN: Sorry. This is the Director's letter of what date?

MR TATTON: This is the Director's letter dated 22 November 2002 in reply to Hasbro's letter of 19 November asking him not to bifurcate his decisions. In the penultimate paragraph of that letter he says:

"We quite understand that it is for Hasbro to decide if it wishes to take a different view on whether the decisions should be linked in any way but we believe that this would properly be dealt with by the Competition Commission Appeals Tribunal under its Rules."

We read that reference as simply meaning that Hasbro could sort out its dilemma without prejudice to its position within the context of the Tribunal's Rules, either by asking for an amendment, a variation, a withdrawal or an extension of time.

We do believe also that Hasbro's course of action and any prejudice or costs that may have been incurred by the Office of Fair Trading as a consequence of our action is in fact of the Director's making. We believe that it

would have been possible for the Director to have been more appreciative of Hasbro's dilemma at the time and sought not to bifurcate these decisions.

The last point I would like to make is that since the hearing for an extension of time, the Director has clearly been on notice that Hasbro was actively considering whether or not to pursue its appeal depending very much on the outcome of the Retail decision or the Retail investigation and/or that it would be seeking to amend that appeal, and consequently one would have hoped that it would have been reasonable for the Director not to have incurred costs of any great magnitude in the interim.

The Tribunal has a wide and unfettered discretion under section 26 of its Rules to consider the question of costs and to do so on a case by case basis. I would ask the Tribunal to consider that in the particular circumstances of this case it would be appropriate in the exercise of that discretion to make no order as to costs. I would therefore ask the Tribunal for its permission for Hasbro to withdraw this appeal and to do so on that basis. Thank you.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr Tatton. Can I just ask you about one point that is indirectly relevant, which I ask partly to help the Tribunal's understanding of how the system works and partly to satisfy ourselves that aspects that might affect the public interest have been properly taken into account.

I am on paragraph 9.6 of the Director's guidance as to the appropriate amount of a penalty. In the book, which I think you have probably got, it is at page 3121, if you are working off the latest Butterworths

Competition Law Handbook. It is 9.6.1 and 9.6.2. 9.6.1 says:

"An undertaking cooperating with an investigation by the Director under the Act in relation to cartel activities in one market (the first market) may also be involved in a separate cartel in another market (the second market) which also infringes the Chapter 1 prohibition. If the undertaking obtains total immunity from financial penalties under either paragraph 9.3.2 or 9.3.4 in relation to its activities in the second market, it will also receive a reduction in the financial penalties imposed on it which is additional to the reduction it would have received for its cooperation in the first market alone."

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My question is, how does that work in a case like the present? I am not necessarily compelling you to make any comment, but any comment you do have to make would perhaps be of some interest. It would appear that Hasbro has received total immunity under the relevant paragraphs in relation to its activities in what one could call the 'second market', ie the retail sector, which would seem to trigger the possibility of a further reduction in financial penalties beyond those that it has already received in relation to the distribution agreement.

MR TATTON: Indeed, Sir. I think the way that that is intended to work is a question of which cartel activity comes first and which immunity comes first.

What happened in this case was that Hasbro received both its immunities at the same time, on the basis that the infringements themselves were separate infringements. The interrelation that we would have sought to draw to the Tribunal's attention in this case would have been in terms of assessing the impact of those separate infringements on the same market but at different levels within that market in order to assess that there was not double accounting or double jeopardy, or anything like that. Consequently we did consider that in the circumstances of this case, the granting of 100 per cent immunity in the retail infringement would, if the connection had been achieved, have resulted in 100 per cent immunity in the current case.

THE CHAIRMAN: I think what was puzzling us was whether it was arguable that, having in the result received total

immunity in the Retail case, which could be, for the purposes of this notice, regarded as another market, ie the second market, a retail market as distinct from the wholesale market effectively in the Distributor case, it could have been arguable that Hasbro was entitled to say that the 45 per cent reduction that it had received in the Distribution decision should be increased, because this paragraph expresses in apparently definite terms that it will receive a reduction in the financial penalties imposed on it which is additional to the reduction which it would have received, ie in this case has received, for its cooperation in the first market It is not, I admit, wholly clear whether this paragraph is dealing with the original letters or whether it is dealing with what actually happens in the final decision, but one of the consequences of the order of events in this case is that that particular point has been somewhat, if not obscured, it does not present itself with quite the clarity that it might have presented itself had the two decisions been taken together.

MR TATTON: Indeed, Sir, and it may well have been flushed out during the course of any full hearing of the appeal.

THE CHAIRMAN: But it is not a point you want to pursue?

MR TATTON: No, it is not, Sir.

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THE CHAIRMAN: Very well. Thank you.

Yes, Mr Turner?

TURNER: Sir, first, on that last point as to leniency, this is not a point that has arisen and Mr Tatton has also confirmed that he is not pressing it upon the Tribunal now. For what it is worth, my understanding in the time that it has been possible to take instructions, is that that is not meant to operate as a kind of windfall provision, or anything of that kind. What has been drawn to my attention is that in this particular case there were two leniency agreements, one for each of the infringements separately and the Tribunal may care to refresh its memory in relation to the one that was

entered into in relation to this case, which is the first document in Annex B, a letter of 20 September 2001. is Annex B to the Notice of Appeal: an agreement cosigned by the relevant official of the Office of Fair Trading on the one hand and a Hasbro director on the other and, under that agreement, partial immunity was granted in return for an agreement as to the conditions that follow from paragraph 3 on the second page onwards, which related in particular to continuous and complete cooperation throughout the investigation. That having been the basis of the arrangement, in my submission, it could not have been intended that subsequently a further windfall was intended to be given in relation to this as a result of those aspects of the guidance. Indeed one way of reading that aspect of the guidance, although I have not, as I say, been able to take final instructions on this, is that it is simply making clear what the position would be in relation to two quite separate arrangements where a total immunity is granted in relation to one and a statement that in that case a further discount is available in the other, all other things, as it were, being equal, but that was not the case under this arrangement where two separate leniency agreements had already been finalised and confirmed.

Sir, that is about as far as I can take it at the  $\ensuremath{\mathsf{moment}}.$ 

THE CHAIRMAN: In what circumstances is 9.6.2 supposed to operate?

MR TURNER: I am sorry, Sir. The first thing is, my numbering is different from yours. Is that the paragraph which begins: "If the undertaking obtains total immunity ..."?

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

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MR TURNER: I am sorry. In the leaflet version the numbering is completely different.

THE CHAIRMAN: We were just puzzled by it.

MR TURNER: It may be a declaratory statement to the effect that if the undertaking obtains a total immunity in one

market, that being the second market, it is stating that it will be receiving a reduction in the final penalties imposed, which is additional to the reduction which it would have received in relation to its cooperation in the other market as a statement of fact, and that is one of the possibilities.

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here.

THE CHAIRMAN: I cannot read it like that. It reads perhaps to the uninitiated, and I accept at once that we are totally uninitiated in this matter and need re-listening to the explanations, but it looks as if, if you get total immunity in one market, then in relation to the first market you can receive more than you otherwise would have done, ie if you have only got 25 per cent for your cooperation in the first market, if you have got total immunity in another market then that is not only total immunity in that market but it might bump you up to 35 or 40 per cent in the first market. Is that supposed to be what it means, or does it mean something quite different?

MR TURNER: Sir, may I take further instructions on that?

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, we might as well sort it out while we are

MR TURNER: (After taking instructions) Sir, as far as we can take it today, there is a feeling that it must depend upon the circumstances. There may be circumstances in which for one to receive automatically a further reduction in relation to the penalty in one market, because one has cooperated completely in another, would not be warranted. In this particular case, as Mr Tatton says, one has linked facts, although separate infringements and separate proceedings and, in relation to both, the Director entered into separate leniency arrangements on separate tracks. Those were concluded and there was no complaint about those.

THE CHAIRMAN: Well Mr Tatton is not pursuing it, so it may be that we leave it there, but it is a bit obscure to the Tribunal at the moment as to what this is all about.

MR TURNER: It is obscure to me as well, Sir, but it may be something that we will consider further.

Sir, in relation to this application, the Director's position is that we consent to the withdrawal of the application but we do wish to raise the issue of costs.

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Mr Tatton has drawn attention to Rule 10. The other relevant provision, though it is perhaps not necessary to go there, is Rule 26, which provides, in short, that the Tribunal may at its discretion make an order for costs in whole or in part at any stage of the proceedings and in determining how much a person is required to pay the Tribunal may take account of the conduct of all parties in relation to the proceedings.

Here there are two distinct aspects, in my submission, in considering an application for costs. The first is the costs of and occasioned by Hasbro's unsuccessful application on 24 January to extend the time for filing the appeal. The second relates to the costs of dealing with the issues raised by the appeal itself. If I may, I will touch on those separately.

Dealing first with the costs of the application to extend time, I would refer to the transcript of your judgment, Sir. I do not know whether the Tribunal has copies to hand?

- THE CHAIRMAN: We have copies here? I am not sure whether you have a corrected transcript or an uncorrected transcript?
- MR TURNER: We have a copy of what I assume to be the corrected transcript. Well, no. It is entitled "Judgment for approval".
- THE CHAIRMAN: So it is the uncorrected transcript. We have got that.
- MR TURNER: At page 4, Sir, you recited the arguments that had been advanced by Hasbro beginning at line 5, and in that paragraph, which I invite the Tribunal briefly to read for itself, you had recorded that the first submission was that Hasbro had "found it impossible to frame arguments on how Hasbro believes the seriousness of its infringement should be assessed without understanding how the Director has assessed the seriousness of Hasbro's

Retail infringement". Then it was further submitted that Hasbro couldn't know in the absence of the Retail decision whether it had any arguments, for example, that it had in effect been fined twice in respect of any possible overlapping effects of the two infringements; whether there should be any proportionality between the respective penalties or whether the fines taken together in the round could be considered fair and just in respect of the overall impact of the two infringements or, finally; and whether it would be wrong for the two penalties together to exceed a single overall cap. Then there was the point about commercial judgment.

In relation to those arguments, Sir, your judgment was at page 6 and specifically at lines 3 to 20 you summarised your reasons for rejecting the application. In particular at line 6, towards the end, you said that on the material that you had you were "unable to find that Hasbro faces an insuperable difficulty, or even a major difficulty, in framing its appeal or its arguments as to the seriousness of the offence which has already been found to be proved in the existing Distributor decision. It seems to me that there is scope for addressing arguments on the existing Distributor decision, even in the absence of the Retail decision. one argument is that the Director should not have arrived at his penalty in the Distributor case without waiting for the retail case or should have decided both cases together that is an argument that Hasbro is entitled to put forward on the appeal".

Then, Sir, you moved on to what you understood to be the principal argument, that Hasbro could not put forward its appeal completely in the absence of the Retail decision and you gave two answers to that difficulty.

In the first place, if in due course there was a second decision, any new matters could be advanced on appeal against that one. Alternatively that an application could be made to amend or amplify the appeal already lodged. And you refer to the relevant rules.

At the end of your judgment, Sir, costs were expressly reserved.

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What has happened since then, of course, is that Hasbro has lodged its Notice of Appeal and it is appropriate to see what it contained.

What is immediately striking, in my submission, on reading it, is the extent to which it confirms the correctness of your judgment at the time, that there was no difficulty in framing arguments about the seriousness of Hasbro's infringement, let alone the strong submission that Hasbro had found that to be impossible. arguments were (and there were five of them essentially) self-contained and they were not relevant to the Retail In short, therefore, it became absolutely decision. clear that the application was manifestly unsustainable, if not frivolous, and the Director General, for his part, was put to plainly unnecessary costs and effort in having to deal with the application to resist it. I am told that the efforts of the Director General resulted in him being derailed from other work for the best part of at least a day.

Although the sum at stake may in the grand scheme of things be relatively modest in this case, there is a principle at stake and that is that parties should not feel free to make unmeritorious applications, particularly interim applications of this kind.

THE CHAIRMAN: I do not think we could call it a frivolous application.

MR TURNER: And I accept that immediately.

THE CHAIRMAN: There was not any guidance as to what "exceptional circumstances" means. It may have been a weak application but it was not frivolous, I think.

MR TURNER: I entirely accept that, Sir. Nevertheless there are degrees of strength of arguments and in my submission, as was confirmed by the application when it arrived, this was at one end of the scale.

The point of principle, to which I return, is that the Tribunal's costs' jurisdiction should be exercised so

as to send out appropriate messages or signals about what happens when unmeritorious interim applications are made of this kind, which will also appropriately recognise that the other party will have been harmed, will have incurred unnecessary cost and expense. Certainly that was the case here.

Finally, picking up on one or two of Mr Tatton's points, there was no element of reasoning in the eventual Retail decision, which was made on 19 February, which is now relied on in support of the decision to withdraw the Distributors' decision. In my submission, what one has is a plainly commercial judgment that was made without regard to the actual reasoning of the Retail decision. Sir, what I mean by that is that one does not see from the Retail decision any particular element of reasoning which would justify the decision that has now been taken to withdraw the appeal in the Distributors' case.

THE CHAIRMAN: So the Retail decision in itself is not something that would have led them to withdraw? It may be the case that there is nothing in the Retail decision that would strengthen the Distributor case.

MR TURNER: Yes, absolutely. The content of the Retail decision contains nothing that could have led to the withdrawal of the Distributors' decision, as opposed to its outcome, namely that there was no penalty, 100 per cent leniency. Nor has any specific factor been drawn to your attention.

So far as the Tribunal's Rules are concerned, it was suggested that the Director or the Tribunal might have had in mind that the course of action might have been to withdraw this appeal, but in my submission, certainly what the Director had in mind, as came through from the judgment, was that depending upon the content of the Retail decision, had there been anything to strengthen the points in the Distributors' decision the appropriate order would have been for amendment of the notice of appeal or, as you said in the judgment, as to the linking of cases perhaps as a procedural matter.

Third, and finally, it was suggested, although faintly, that the Director General may have been himself at fault in the bifurcation proceedings and that was not of Hasbro's making. As to that, I would confirm that it was not the Director General's fault that the bifurcation took place. The different timing between the Retail and the Distributors' decision was as a result of the administrative pressures in relation to each case and therefore to factors beyond the Director's control.

THE CHAIRMAN: Well is that completely right, Mr Turner? Why couldn't he have held up the Distributor decision until the Retail decision was ready?

MR TURNER: Well one of the reasons for that is that it was not certain at that time when the Retail decision precisely would have been ready and there is every justification, as a matter of good administration, when a decision is ready to be made and published, for that to occur. I am instructed that in relation to the Retail decision there were moreover threats of judicial review and other such applications which may have delayed the Retail decision for an indefinite period.

Sir, those are the points, in short, which I make about the interim application.

So far as the costs in relation to the main appeal are concerned, I tread plainly with greater caution and with a greater degree of diffidence. But as the Tribunal is aware, our defence was due to be served quite shortly as a result of the Tribunal's Rules I believe on about March 12 and therefore, as a result of the Tribunal's procedures, it will be no surprise to anyone to learn that a significant amount of work has actually been done on the case by the Director General.

We, of course, accept that the Tribunal at this stage will not wish to go into the substance of this appeal in any detail at this stage, but our submission is that the appeal on the points that have been raised in the Distributor's decision was always gossamer thin and that on certain points, such as, in particular, an important

issue about the role of compliance programmes, it was plainly misconceived.

With the Tribunal's permission I can briefly elaborate that in a matter of sentences for each point so as to make good my submission.

- THE CHAIRMAN: I do not think the merits of the appeal and what you might have said in your defence really bear upon this, Mr Turner.
- MR TURNER: Well save only to the extent that if the appeal was plainly thin on its own terms, that ought perhaps to have influenced the Tribunal.
- THE CHAIRMAN: I see. You say if it was always a hopeless appeal, then that is an additional reason for giving the Director his costs.
- MR TURNER: On this limb of my application today, I do not ask for all of the costs. Indeed I think that that would be inappropriate. But on this limb I would say that a contribution to costs would be appropriate.
- THE CHAIRMAN: What do you mean by a contribution to costs?
- MR TURNER: A contribution would be in the order of one third.
- THE CHAIRMAN: I do not know whether the Director or his advisers have had a chance to prepare a statement of costs?
- MR TURNER: I am afraid not, Sir. That can be done expeditiously.

May I briefly raise, at least in a few sentences, because it may also be relevant to the point that I was making on the first limb of the application, the discrete nature of the points that were raised in the Distributors' case.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

MR TURNER: I am taking these in no particular order. I believe there are five.

The first point that was raised by way of appeal is that the Director failed to give credit for the corporate compliance programme that Hasbro had and should have done so. That is at paragraph 72 of the Notice of Appeal.

The second point that was raised is that the Director wrongly increased the penalty because of the senior position of Mr David Bottomley, who was the UK Sales Director. Again that is at paragraph 72.

The third point is that the Director failed to give credit for the subsequent disciplining by Hasbro of Mr Bottomley.

The fourth point is that the Director failed to give appropriate credit to Hasbro for its cooperation.

Lastly - and a significant point in the case - the Director failed adequately to take into account the limited impact on competition that resulted from the infringement, and that is essentially paragraphs 60 - 64 of the Notice of Appeal.

As I say, the first point, even in enumerating the points, is the discrete nature of these issues and the difficulty in seeing how the content of the Retail decision would have impacted on the logic of those arguments.

But taking them very briefly one by one, on the issue of the failure to give credit for cooperation, the brief answer is that that was covered by the leniency arrangement, the contractual arrangement which the Tribunal has just seen.

On the failure to give credit for subsequently disciplining Mr Bottomley, the short answer is that it cannot be right that a company which has been penalised for infringement can benefit by a reduction in the fine if it takes, as it were, retrospective action against an individual who was involved in the infringement: 'we have now punished that individual; you should reduce our fine'. What matters is the toughness of the prospective measures to prevent infringement, which would be a compliance programme.

THE CHAIRMAN: Just jogging back on the points you make about cooperation, it is not wholly clear from the Director's guidelines what the relationship is between step 4, mitigating factors, cooperation, which is the last of the

mitigating factors, and the second part of the sentence dealing with lenient treatment. It is not clear whether the one is supposed to wholly absorb the other, or what.

MR TURNER: Sir, it may perhaps be sensible if you would give me the reference again in the book.

THE CHAIRMAN: It is 3120. Paragraph 7 is headed "Step 4. Adjustment for further aggravating and mitigating factors".

MR TURNER: Yes.

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THE CHAIRMAN: Then the last of the mitigating factors is cooperation which enables the enforcement process to be concluded more effectively and will speed another case over and above that in respect of any undertaking.

Then there is a note that says "cooperates fully it may have been total immunity or significant facts that meets the requirements of Part 3 of the Guidance". Then over the page you have got the leniency provisions.

But it is not completely clear in terms of all the Director's steps, step 1, step 2, step 3 and step 4, that when he gets to step 4 does he say 'I am not taking this step now because of the leniency programme', or whether he takes that step but it somehow gets absorbed in the later leniency, or what.

- MR TURNER: My understanding, but I will take instructions, is that one gets absorbed in the other.
- THE CHAIRMAN: I do not think the decision is particularly clear on that point. Well he says it at 93. That is true. He says at 93 "because you have got leniency we are not going to give you any further amount under this head".
- MR TURNER: That is in the Decision itself?
- 32 THE CHAIRMAN: In the Decision itself. That is his view on that.
  - MR TURNER: Mr Brindley has impressed on me that they are separate and that that is how they are intended to operate.
- 37 | THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, I see.
- 38 MR TURNER: The third point was the argument that the

Director General had wrongly increased the penalty because of the senior position of Mr Bottomley and it was pointed out that he was not on the board.

The brief answer to that, again, is that this is the UK Sales Director. There cannot be a definitive strict line between someone who is on the board and someone who is not on the board and it is appropriate to recognise the senior position of an individual involved in the company in any event.

So far as compliance programmes are concerned, this is an important issue generally, so far as the Director General is concerned because corporate compliance programmes can be a major instrument in achieving compliance with the aims of the Act. So this was a topic of some interest more generally in the case, but it was, in the Director General's view, quite plain, looking at Hasbro's compliance programme, which was in the Appeals Bundle, that it was essentially paper based, static, and ineffective and that that being the case there cannot sensibly be any argument that it should be taken into account as a ground for mitigation.

In order to make that point good, I would need to show the Tribunal the relevant parts of the programme.

THE CHAIRMAN: We are not going into the merits of the case at the moment, Mr Turner. I think we are, not without reluctance, allowing you to tell us the points you would have made had the appeal been effective.

MR TURNER: Well the final point is simply this, impact on competition.

Hasbro says that the impact was minimal. At paragraph 61 of the Notice of Appeal, it pointed out there was no evidence that any distributor was using its margin to provide lower wholesale prices to Hasbro's direct accounts with small retailers.

For that, I simply refer to what the Decision itself had culled from the evidence at paragraphs 39 to 40. Those paragraphs, if the Tribunal does briefly turn those up, make clear that the aim of the agreement was

precisely to shield Hasbro's direct accounts from being offered lower prices, which would have had a destabilizing effect on price levels.

THE CHAIRMAN: The direct accounts being, among others, Argos and Littlewoods?

MR TURNER: Direct accounts being, among others, Argos and Littlewoods. That is so.

But certainly the submission that the effect of the infringement must be taken to be extremely limited because it was confined to a narrow corner of the market and that direct accounts, other people to whom the distributors did not ordinarily supply, were outside the impact of this anti-competitive activity simply cannot be sustained on the direct evidence of the Hasbro people involved and the documents which are referred to in the Decision.

I take that no further, other than to draw the strands together and say that on the Notice of Appeal one has quite plainly a number of discrete arguments unaffected by the subsequent retail decision and that all of them, in the Director General's view, were at a minimum, in our submission, weak.

Sir, those are my submissions.

THE CHAIRMAN: Why are you asking only for a third of the costs of the appeal, Mr Turner?

TURNER: It is in recognition of the point that in a situation of this kind, there is a public policy travelling in the other direction which we feel is only fair to take into account and that is that it is desirable that parties should feel able to withdraw appeals and that there is a balance to be struck. We must accept, and do accept, that. Therefore, to ask for all of our costs would seem inappropriate. We also take into account the point as, Sir, you have impressed on me, that the Tribunal has not had a full opportunity to go into the detail of these arguments. For that reason as well, it would not seem right for me to say that we should have all of our costs in relation to withdrawal of

the main appeal.

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However, taking into account the unusual procedures of this Tribunal, whereby a substantial amount of this work has already been done, and what I hoped to demonstrate in relation to the *prima facie*, at least, strength of these discrete arguments, it is, in my submission, correct that we should have a contribution on that issue as to the costs.

Sir, that is a separate matter from the costs in relation to the interim application.

THE CHAIRMAN: Can you help us, Mr Turner, for a moment on the Director's letter of 22 November 2002? The Director received quite a polite and well argued letter of 19 November pointing out possible difficulties if the cases become bifurcated. In the letter of 22 November 2002 the Director says, "We believe the two cases to be entirely separate infringements, based on a separate set of facts. There can therefore be no reason, other than administrative convenience, for the Director to deal with the Distributors' decision differently from the way in which he would deal with it if the Retailers case did not exist." He goes on to say that Hasbro might take a different view and that is to be sorted out under the rules.

I was just wondering if there is a bit more to it than pure "administrative convenience", as the Director states in that paragraph? We have got two cases that are indeed separate infringements and they are based on separate facts, but there are certain links, are there not?

MR TURNER: Yes.

THE CHAIRMAN: It is the same product. It is the same market. It is the same party. We have just looked at paragraph 40 of the contested decision where the distributor agreements are said to be aimed at dealing with possible discounting towards the direct accounts, ie the retailers.

Can one, up to a point, see Hasbro's point of view

that it is a little bit difficult to evaluate the penalty in the round without having the whole picture. It is certainly something that the Tribunal would be a bit uncomfortable about doing without really knowing the whole circumstances, especially if the administrative procedure has run in parallel and the documents have been put in at the same time, the interviews have taken place at the same time, and so on and so forth.

MR

MR TURNER: It is probably best on this if I speak to Mr Brindley briefly, if the Tribunal will allow me to do so. THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

TURNER: (After conferring with Mr Brindley) Sir, I am in a position to give you the reason for why that was written in the Director's view, which was essentially that the relevant facts of the two infringements were regarded as separate. These were separate activities, the restrictions placed on the distributors on the one hand and the restrictions in relation to the retail decision on the other hand. They were separate anticompetitive acts.

The further point is that in the event the two decisions can be seen to have worked out to be completely separate. Although one says now that there may theoretically have been some links between the two, which could have led to it being desirable that the matter should be decided at the same time, in the event that has not proved to be the case, and indeed in this appeal. As I say, no factor has been pointed to which establishes some logical link between the two decisions.

I am instructed that in relation to the point about the possibility of direct accounts being contacted by the distributors, the Office's view at the time, contrary to what I may have suggested before, was that Argos and Littlewood, at any rate, were not thought to be at the forefront of that concern, that other direct accounts were more in the frame for the purpose of the Distributors' decision, although it is accepted that that is not entirely clear from paragraphs 39 and 40 of the

Director's Decision. Thus paragraph 39 of the Decision begins with, "The infringements were proceeded by complaints to Hasbro from some of its direct customers who felt that they could get a better deal from the distributors than directly from Hasbro." As I understand it, that does not mean that the people concerned were not Argos or Littlewood. Therefore, in a nutshell, from the Director's perspective, one had two separate anticompetitive activities and they were regarded as separate infringements. Looking at it from where the Tribunal sits now, that remains the case.

Sir, those are my submissions.

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- THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. I have one other question, Mr
  Turner, which is on a different point. It is on the
  issue of costs. Have we yet had occasion to go into the
  question I appreciate the delicacy and I am not taking
  any position on it at the moment of how far the costs
  of the Director's own legal service are recoverable in
  these proceedings in front of the Tribunal?
- MR TURNER: I am not aware that that issue has arisen yet.

  (Pause for taking instructions) Mr Brindley tells me
  that in relation to other Government departments in other
  litigation contexts, internal costs or internal legal
  departments' bills are rendered, but that issue has not
  arisen yet.
- THE CHAIRMAN: That may well be right. I would not want to take any decision today as to precisely what costs are going to be covered, because that is an issue where the Tribunal would like to be satisfied that we are in line with practice in the High Court and other Tribunals.
- MR TURNER: Yes, I understand that.
- THE CHAIRMAN: That is not the practice in the court of first instance, where the Commission's legal service does not recover its internal costs and because of that difference I want to be satisfied that we are following well established principles in that regard. I do not in any way under-value the services provided by the Director's in house team, which are extremely useful to the

Tribunal. I just want to be sure that we are following general principles in allowing that part of the costs.

MR TURNER: Yes. Indeed it may be sensible if the Office of Fair Trading were to investigate that and to confirm the position in a letter to the Tribunal.

THE CHAIRMAN: I think, depending on what we decide about costs, this is the sort of case where the costs would in any event lend itself to some kind of summary assessment, which could presumably be done by an exchange of letters, in the course of which we could be satisfied about the point I have just raised.

MR TURNER: Yes. Sir, that is a sensible suggestion.

THE CHAIRMAN: But we have not got to that point yet. We have not heard Mr Tatton yet and we have not considered it amongst ourselves.

Yes, Mr Tatton?

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MR TATTON: If I could make three points fairly shortly.

The first point is that Mr Turner mentioned that at

the hearing for an extension of time it was Hasbro's case that it was impossible for it to frame any argument. Whilst that may have been the wording in the written application, in the event at the hearing itself the application turned on Hasbro's reluctance not to put its best foot forward and it felt that in the absence of the other Retail decision it could not fully and properly frame its legal arguments and did not want to be in a position of putting forward a thin, or indeed a gossamer thin appeal at that stage.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

MR TATTON: The second point I would like to make is that it was also made clear at the application for an extension of time that Hasbro was entitled to make a commercial decision as to whether or not to pursue the appeal, irrespective of the strength, or otherwise, of its legal arguments.

The point it made at the hearing was that it was not then in a position to make such a decision in the absence of knowing what, if anything, it was going to be fined in the Retail decision, and indeed the decision that Hasbro has made is a commercial decision. It is a decision taking all factors into account, including the extent to which the Retail decision has been able to add to, or strengthen, its existing arguments in this appeal.

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But there have been other factors as well. There is the weighty factor that I have mentioned, which is that it no longer has to pay a fine in the other decision and it has decided that, taken in the round, it will take its medicine in this decision.

The third point that I would like to make is that whilst Hasbro does not believe it put its best potential case forward in the appeal that was lodged on 29 January, its case is that it had no option other than to do that and, secondly, that the arguments that it did put forward were not gossamer thin.

I can take the Tribunal through the detail and reply to each of the points that Mr Turner has raised and I am very happy to do so, but my overriding point is that this Tribunal's judgment in the decision in Knapp made very clear (and I quote from our appeal application) "that an undertaking penalised by the Director is entitled to have that penalty reviewed ab initio by an impartial and independent Tribunal able to take its own decision unconstrained by the quidance". There may have been all manner of factors that we have perhaps started to discuss today that could have been aired at such a hearing. I do not think the fact that Hasbro put its appeal on the basis that it did, means that when it subsequently was able to make a commercial decision whether to appeal and decided not to, it should therefore be penalised in the payment of any part of the Director's costs.

As regards the five particular issues, the disciplining of Mr Bottomley, I notice that in the Retail decision the Director has in fact given credit to Hasbro for disciplining the directors in that, but he did not give any such clear credit for Hasbro in the Distributor decision.

In terms of the double accounting and double reward for cooperation, the point that we would have sought to air at the hearing of this case is that the Distributor investigation started in May. Leniency was granted in September. There would have been an arguable point that some credit should have been given for the cooperation Hasbro afforded the Director during that period when it did not have the benefit of the leniency agreement.

Thirdly, in terms of the impact on competition, there are two immediate points that come to mind.

The first is that it appeared that it would be an inevitable consequence of the Director's decision in the retail infringement that retailers during the same time frame as the Distributor decision were, in effect, being prevented from selling below the recommended retail prices. In the Distributor decision, one of the impacts assessed by the Director was the fact that in stopping Hasbro's distributors lowering the list price, it took away from retailers the possibility of passing that on to consumers. The effect cannot be the same in both. If there was a cartel working at one level, its effect cannot exist at another. That was an argument that we may have sought, should we have proceeded to have taken.

Another possible argument is that in terms of Rule 14 in the Retail case, it was part of the Director's case that Hasbro's monitoring of the market was part of the infringement. We did not know how that would develop in the decision. It is entirely arguable that what Hasbro did with its distributors was part of monitoring the market and, if so, questions of double jeopardy and double accounting, or indeed proportionality, would all have arisen.

These are issues which Hasbro was entitled to reserve its position on. It may not have been able to fully amplify them and argue them in the absence of the Retail decision. Nevertheless in a protective way, given that an extension of time was not permitted by the Tribunal, it had little option other than to put its appeal in the

1 terms that it did.
2 That is all I have to say.
3 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr Tatton.
4 I think we will rise for a short while to consider
5 what we are going to do.
6 (A short adjournment)
7 (See separate transcript for judgment)