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Summary
Judgment of the Tribunal in relation to a claim by Alex Neill Class Representative Limited (the CR) on behalf of approximately 12.2 million class members. The CR contended that the Defendants (Sony) infringed the Chapter II prohibition of the Competition Act 1998 and Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union by engaging in certain exclusionary conduct including exclusive dealing, tying and refusal to supply in relation to sale of digital PlayStation games and add-on content (the exclusionary abuses). The CR also alleged that as a result of its dominance, Sony was able to charge excessive and unfair prices in relation to the digital games and add-on content sold on the PlayStation Store (the exploitative abuse). In the absence of Sony’s abuses, the CR argued that there would have been appreciable entry into the market for the distribution of digital PlayStation games and add-on content and the retail prices for digital content would have been approximately 20% lower.
Following a 30-day trial between March and May 2026, the Tribunal concluded as set out below.
Market Definition and Dominance
The Tribunal rejected the CR’s proposed market definition, comprising markets for the sale of digital PlayStation games and add-on content, as being an unsafe basis on which to assess Sony’s conduct. The CR’s proposed markets excluded physical game distribution and took insufficient account of consumers’ ability to switch through multi-homing as well as cross-commerce for games and add-on content. The Tribunal considered physical games as likely to be important substitutes for digital PlayStation games which suggested that a SSNIP for digital games would result in material switching by digital users to a physical channel. The Tribunal also concluded that multi-homing and cross-platform functionality would be potential routes through which consumers could substitute away from Sony and towards other providers of games and game content (albeit, in relation to cross-platform functionality, not for the whole period contended for by the CR, or for all types of games). The Tribunal could not exclude the possibility that a SSNIP for digital PlayStation games would have resulted in material switching through both routes. In any event, these were both considered likely to be material constraints on Sony’s game pricing.
The Tribunal considered the possibility of a systems market and the criteria as set out in Case C-56/12 P EFIM v Commission EU:T:2010:517 (the EFIM Criteria). The Tribunal was satisfied that the EFIM Criteria had been met as:
- Potential PlayStation console purchasers had both access to sufficient information and an incentive to consider that information in order to make informed purchasing decisions at the console level, especially in the case of high value users who spend significant amounts in the digital gaming aftermarket (and represent a considerable amount of PlayStation digital revenue).
- There was strong evidence that consumers would be likely to make informed choices when purchasing consoles, using the information available to them about game prices (as evidenced by the Shopper Insight Survey).
- There was strong evidence of a willingness of consumers to switch consoles following an increase in games prices to the extent that it would make a SSNIP uneconomic. Sony’s own research forecast commercial harm to Sony if it allowed PlayStation game prices to be uncompetitive with Xbox.
- The potential for switching operated within a reasonable period of time so as to constrain Sony or to make a unilateral aftermarket price increase unprofitable by reason of adverse consumer choices.
The Tribunal concluded that the appropriate market definition for the analysis of any anticompetitive infringement by Sony was that of a systems market and as such the CR had not satisfied the Tribunal that Sony was dominant in its defined or any relevant market(s). The CR had not satisfied the Tribunal that the console market was limited to PlayStation and Xbox consoles as it had not dealt with the reverse Cellophane fallacy relating to the cross-subsidy between PlayStation game sales and PlayStation console sales.
Despite this conclusion, the Tribunal proceeded to consider anyway the CR’s alleged exclusionary and exploitative abuses on the basis of its rejected market definition.
Exclusionary abuses
When considering exclusionary effects, the Tribunal considered that the CR’s economic counterfactual was not credible as it was based almost entirely on theoretical assumptions, which did not hold good in important respects in the real world. The contention that the competitive price would be 20% lower than the actual retail price was not made out. There was no real analysis to support the CR’s contention that market entry at any level would have resulted in appreciably greater competition that would be economically viable, and the evidence before the Tribunal suggested that such an outcome would be unlikely. The Tribunal concluded that it was likely that the only viable market entry for a third-party store would lead to a set of charges against the retail margin which would not be significantly different from the level of Sony’s commission in the real world.
Had the Tribunal accepted the CR’s proposed market definition, the Tribunal would not have accepted Sony’s argument that competition between platforms, through an integrated system which would price the console low to attract customers, recovering that and various other investments through game sales, could amount to competition on the merits. This was because that competition would be taking place in a separate (upstream) market from the digital distribution market in which the abuse was alleged. However, that outcome seemed inconsistent with the reality of what happens in this market, which is why the Tribunal considered a systems market to be the correct approach.
The Tribunal also considered the case law in relation to refusal to supply, which Sony contended to be a complete answer to allegations of exclusionary conduct. The CR argued that the case law relating to refusal to supply was not engaged. The Tribunal concluded that Sony’s platform has been established with a view to encouraging developers and publishers to produce content and offer it to Sony for sale to users, but that was not sufficient to make the platform an open one. Sony has not in any way relinquished its control of the PlayStation store so as to allow others to do anything other than sell games or add-on content to Sony for on-sale to consumers. In order for a third party to undertake a distribution activity, significant adaptation of the platform and its operations would be required at significant cost and effort. In that event, some aspects of the PlayStation Network would likely operate subsequently with materially reduced security in the platform architecture and with potentially reduced performance. As a result, it would be necessary for the CR to meet the requirements as set out in Case C-7/97 Oscar Bronner v Mediaprint [1999] 4 CMLR 112 for refusal to supply and the Tribunal concluded that the CR was unable to meet them.
In addition, the Tribunal’s conclusion that any assessment of Sony’s conduct ought to be made at a systems level was fatal to the CR’s allegation of tying.
Exploitative abuse
Had the Tribunal identified digital PlayStation games and add-on content distribution markets, as argued for by the CR, it would still have concluded that the CR’s case failed when it came to analysing the exploitative pricing abuse as: (i) the CR had not established that the margin charged by Sony was excessive; and (ii) even it was, it was not apparent that the margin was unfair.
The CR’s claim was therefore dismissed in its entirety.
This is an unofficial summary prepared by the Registry of the Competition Appeal Tribunal.